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solutely grotesque.'

The issues in the direct

primary being purely personal and not directly involving any issue of public policy, do not appeal to the general mass of citizenship, and it is well known that the vote cast in them is much less than that brought out by the regular election.2

From the considerations that have been presented two general principles may be deduced that call for little in the way of comment. Their logical connection is almost obvious and their validity is readily verifiable by observation of actual conditions. They are:

1. The greater the number of elections the less is their effect on public policy! They may make changes among the players, or shuffle their positions at the table, but the same old game goes on as before. Results then illustrate the French proverb that the more change you have the more you get of the same thing.

2. The greater the number of elections the greater the cost of government! In addition to supplying funds for vast electioneering outlay the community must support a huge staff of pro

1 The author's article on "The Direct Primary" in the North American Review for July, 1909, gives instances drawn from actual experience.

2 An exception is to be noted in the case of certain states in which the direct primary has virtually superseded the regular election; but this is an abnormal situation resulting from national legislation of the Reconstruction period.

fessional politicians.1 Legislation will then be controlled by campaign contributions and the taxing power of the state will be exploited on private account. The inevitable result will be an exceptionally high price level for supply and service to the community.

1 Bryce computed the number of professional politicians engendered by the British system as being about 4,000, as compared with over 250,000 in the United States. See his American Commonwealth, vol. II, chap. LVII, p. 63. The estimate for the United States is now doubtless far below the actual figures.

CHAPTER X

DIVIDED REPRESENTATION

A QUESTION whose bearing upon representative government has been and still is a matter of anxious consideration is whether the legislature shall consist of two chambers or only one. Mill remarked:

"Of all topics relating to the theory of representative government none has been the subject of more discussion, especially on the continent, than what is known as the question of the two chambers. It has occupied a greater amount of the attention of thinkers than many questions of ten times its importance, and has been regarded as a sort of touchstone which distinguishes the partisans of limited from those of uncontrolled democracy."

Mill himself regarded the matter as being of only secondary importance, "if all other constitutional questions are rightly decided." Nevertheless he considered the matter at some length, and he made observations whose acuteness has since his time been often illustrated by the course of events. He allowed little weight to the argu

ment oftenest urged for having two chambers, namely that the arrangement checks precipitancy and compels deliberate action, remarking that "it must be a very ill-constituted representative assembly" if its own methods do not secure circumspect behavior. He observed, with a prescience which has since been signally attested by events, that it was incredible that "in a really democratic state of society, the house of lords would be of any practical value as a moderator of democracy." The only real check upon the behavior of the popular assembly must be such as is provided by its own composition and by the conditions under which it exercises its authority. If there is a proper place for a second chamber, he thought that it would not be merely as a moderating body but that it might be rather as an impelling force in the path of progress. Although frankly admitting that the ideal was not within the range of practical politics, he thought that it would be advantageous to have a senate “composed of all living public men who have passed through important political offices or employments," such as cabinet office, eminent judgeships, big posts in the civil service or the diplomatic service, high command in the army or navy. Such a body, he thought, might rival in character and influence the Roman senate, which he pronounced to have been "the most consistently prudent and

sagacious body that ever administered public affairs." But he concluded his examination of the subject by reiterating his mature conviction that

the main reliance for tempering the ascendency of the majority cannot be placed in a second chamber of any kind. The character of a representative government is fixed by the constitution of the popular house. Compared with this all other questions relating to the form of government are insignificant."

It may aid in appreciation of the soundness of this conclusion if we consider the analogies of private business. Who would argue that two boards of directors would be desirable to avert precipitancy and secure well-considered action in the affairs of a joint stock company? There the reliance is upon the fact that the business to be considered emanates from administrative experience, and the issues to be decided have been thoroughly prepared by the executive management. The process is virtually the same when representative government is duly constituted, and in such case no need whatever is felt for the existence of a second chamber as a checking and moderating influence.

Practical experience since Mill's time on the whole confirms the soundness of his judgment on

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