Its recognition by statute. the Act of Parliament in 4th Henry 8, commonly intituled, 'An Act concerning Richard Strode,' is a general law, extending to indemnify all and every the members of both houses of Parliament, in all Parliaments, for and touching any bills, speaking, reasoning, or declaring of any matter or matters in and concerning the Parliament, to be communed and treated of; and is a declaratory law of the ancient and necessary rights and privileges of Parliament." And on a subsequent day, they also resolved, "That the judgment given, 5 Car., against Sir John Elliot, Denzil Hollis, and Benjamin Valentine, in the King's Bench, was an illegal judgment, and against the freedom and privilege of Parliament." 2 A conference was afterwards demanded with the lords, and their lordships agreed to the resolutions of the commons; 3 and, finally, upon a writ of error, the judgment of the court of King's Bench was reversed by the House of Lords, on 15th April, 1668.* This would have been a sufficient recognition, by law, of the privilege of freedom of speech; but a further and last confirmation was reserved for the Revolution of 1688. By the 9th article of the Bill of Rights it was declared, "that the freedom of speech, and debates or proceedings in Parliament, ought not to be impeached or questioned in any court or place out of Parliament." 5 But, although by the ancient custom of Parliament, as well as by the law, a member may not be questioned out of Parliament, he is liable to censure and punishment by the house itself of which he is a member. The cases in which members have been called to account and punished for offensive words spoken before the house, are too numerous to mention. Some have been admonished, others imprisoned, and in the commons, some have even been 19 Com. J. 19. 4 12 Lords' J. 223. 29 Com. J. 25. 3 12 Lords' J. 166. 5 1 Will. & Mary, sess. 2, c. 2. 64 Lords' J. 475. 5 Ib. 77. Sir R. Canne, 1680. Manley, in 1696. 11 Com. J. 581. 9 Com. J. 642. Mr. expelled.' Less severity has been shown in modern times, in the censure of intemperate speeches. The members who offend against propriety are called to order, and generally satisfy the house with an explanation or apology. not extend to published Taking care not to say anything disrespectful to the house, Privilege does a member may state whatever he thinks fit in debate, however offensive it may be to the feelings, or injurious to the speeches. character of individuals, and he is protected by his privilege from any action for libel; but if he should proceed to publish his speech, his printed statement will be regarded as a separate publication, unconnected with any proceedings in Parliament. This construction of the law cannot be complained of by the Houses of Parliament, as, by their rules and orders, the publication of a debate is forbidden; and it is therefore impossible to protect, by privilege, an irregular act, which is itself declared to be a breach of privilege. This view of the law has been established by two remarkable cases. In 1795 an information was filed against Lord Abingdon for a libel. His lordship had accused his attorney of improper conduct in his profession, in a speech delivered in the House of Lords, which he afterwards had printed in several newspapers at his own expense. His lordship pleaded his own case in the Court of King's Bench, and contended that he had a right to print what he had, by the law of Parliament, a right to speak. But Lord Kenyon said, "That a member of Parliament had certainly a right to publish his speech, but that speech should not be made a vehicle of slander against any individual; if it was, it was a libel." The court gave judgment, that his lordship should be imprisoned for three months, pay a fine of 1007., and find security for his good behaviour.3 In 1813 a much stronger case occurred. Mr. Creevey, a member of the House of Commons, had made a charge against an individual in the house, and incorrect reports of his speech having appeared in several newspapers, Mr. C. sent 1 Mr. Shepherd, 1 Com. J. 524. 2 See Chapter IX. on Debates. 31 Esp. N. P. C. 228. G a correct report to the editor of the Liverpool paper, with a request that he would publish it in his newspaper. Upon an information filed against him, the jury found the defendant guilty of libel, and the King's Bench refused an application for a new trial, Lord Ellenborough saying, "A member of that house has spoken what he thought material, and what he was at liberty to speak, in his character as a member of that house. So far he is privileged; but he has not stopped there; but, unauthorized by the house, has chosen to publish an account of that speech, in what he has pleased to call a corrected form; and in that publication has thrown out reflections injurious to the character of an individual.” ' Mr. Creevey, who had been fined 100l., complained to the house of the proceedings of the King's Bench, but the house refused to admit that they were a breach of privilege.2 In the case of Rex v. Wright,3 Mr. Horne Tooke applied for a criminal information against a bookseller, for publishing the copy of a report made by a committee of the House of Commons, which appeared to imply a charge of high treason against Mr. Tooke, after he had been tried for that crime and acquitted. The rule, however, was discharged by the court, partly because the report did not appear to bear the meaning imputed to it, and partly because the court would not regard a proceeding of either House of Parliament as a libel. In the event of any similar case arising, the defendant may give the report in evidence under the general issue, and prove that his own extract or abstract was published bona fide and without malice; and if such shall be the opinion of the jury, a verdict of Not guilty will be entered.4 11 M. & S. 278. 38 Term Reports, 293. 2 Hansard Deb., 25th June 1813. CHAPTER V. FREEDOM FROM ARREST OR MOLESTATION: ITS ANTIQUITY; BEING IMPLEADED IN CIVIL ACTIONS: OF NOT BEING DANCE ON PARLIAMENT. this privilege. THE privilege of freedom from arrest or molestation Antiquity of is of great antiquity, and dates probably from the first existence of parliaments or national councils in England. Blackstone traces it as far back as the reign of Edward the Confessor, in whose laws we find this precept, "ad synodos venientibus, sive summoniti sint, sive per se quid agendum habuerint, sit summa pax:" and so too, in the old Gothic constitutions, "extenditur hæc pax et securitas ad quatuordecim dies, convocato regni senatu." In later times there are various precedents explanatory of the nature and extent of this privilege, and of the mode in which it was sustained. From these it will be seen that not only are the persons of members of both Houses of Parliament free from arrest on mesne process or in execution; but that formerly the same immunity was enjoyed in regard to their servants and their property. The privilege was strained still further, and even claimed to protect members and their servants from all civil actions or suits, during the time over which privilege was supposed to extend. The privilege of freedom from arrest has also been construed to discharge members and their servants from all liability to answer subpoenas in other courts and to serve on juries; 11 Comm. 165. Steirnh. de Jure Goth. Freedom from arrest and dis and in some cases to relieve them from commitments by courts of justice. These various immunities have undergone considerable change and restriction, and being now defined, for the most part, with tolerable certainty, they will be best understood by considering them in the following order: 1. Privilege of members and their servants from arrest and distress, and the mode of enforcing it. 2. Their protection from being impleaded in civil actions. 3. Their liability to be summoned by subpoena or to serve on juries. 4. Their privilege in regard to commitments by legal tribunals. 5. Privilege of witnesses and others in attendance on Parliament. It may, however, be stated at once, that although many cases that will be given apply equally to members and to their servants, according to the privilege in those times, the latter have, at present, no privilege whatever. These cases, though at variance with modern usage, could not be omitted consistently with a perfect view of the privilege of freedom from arrest and molestation. So far back as the 19th of Edward 1, in answer to a tress of goods. petition of the master of the Temple, for leave to distrain for the rent of a house held of him by the Bishop of St. David's, the king said, "It does not seem fit that the king should grant that they who are of his council should be distrained in time of Parliament." From this precedent Sir Edward Coke infers that at that time a member of Parliament had privilege, not only for his servants, but for his horses or other goods distrainable.2 The freedom, both of the lords and commons, and their servants, from all assaults or molestation, when coming to Parliament, remaining there, and returning thence, was distinctly recognised in the case of Richard Chedder, a member, by statute 5 Henry 4, c. 6, and again by another statute of the 11th Henry 6, c. 11. In the 5th Henry 4, the commons, in a petition to the king, alleged that accord |