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whole remained to the survivor under the orig-| Mr. Weatherford, and respecting which she tesinal grant. 2 Bl. Com. 182; 2 Kent, Com. 113; tified, she waived her right to object to his giv1 Washb. Real Prop. 4th ed. 672. Nor had this ing his own account of the matter. As, for rule been changed at the time of these transac- instance, when she says that the original deed tions by the Constitution or statutes of Arkan- from Shepard was drawn by Weatherford; that sas. Robinson v. Eagle, 29 Ark, 202. But it she has not got it, and that she thinks she gave was also true at common law that, as "In point it to him, it is clear that her letter of July 6, of fact, and agreeable to natural reason, free 1875, calling for that deed, and Weatherford's from artificial deductions, the husband and reply of July 14, inclosing it, are admissible in wife are distinct and individual persons, when evidence. lands are granted to them as tenants in common, thereby treating them without any respect to their social union, they will hold by moieties, as other distinct and individual persons would do." 1 Preston, Estates, p. 132; 1 Inst. 187 b; 1 Washb. Real Prop. 4th ed. p. 674; McDermott v. French, 15 N. J. Eq. 80.

The Supreme Court of Arkansas and the Circuit Court of Desha County must have proceeded upon the conclusion that Buck and his wife held by moieties, in decreeing that, through their conveyance, Drake and Winfrey became the owners in fee, successively, of Buck's undivided half of the lands in question; and the decrees of these two courts to that effect, standing unreversed, would seem to be binding adjudications in favor of complainant's title.

In the circuit court case Mrs. Buck sought and obtained a decree quieting her title to an undivided half, as between her and Buck's heirs and Drake, Buck's grantee, and holding a tax title to have been acquired for the benefit of Drake and herself, and she is to be held to have embraced her whole cause of action in one suit. In the supreme court case she had joined with Drake, in seeking relief as co-owners, against an execution sale of a parcel of the land, the rectification of a mistake in the deeds, and the vesting of title in herself and Drake, and the compelling Winfrey to accept title to the Drake half; and that relief was in substance accorded by the decree.

Under such circumstances it cannot be denied that Hunt was justified in advancing his money upon the strength of the Drake, Winfrey title.

Defendant Blackburn insists, however, in her answer, that the part she took in the litigation of these two cases was the result of misplaced confidence in her counsel, by whom she alleges she was deceived, misadvised and misled; that she was ignorant of her rights, and that she ought not to be held estopped in the premises; while at the same time it is objected, on her behalf, that her attorney, on the ground of privileged communications, should not be permitted to defend himself by testifying to the facts and circumstances under which he advised her and the advice which he actually gave.

But, apart from Weatherford's evidence, the testimony of Mrs. Blackburn and Drake, together with the documents in the case, fail to satisfy us that there was any deceit or misapprehension in the premises, or any advice given Mrs. Blackburn in fraud or in mistake of fact or law. Buck and his wife purchased the separate halves at different times, and with the intent of holding in moieties, and conveyed Buck's half to Drake, who paid therefor in good faith, and without actual notice. The second deed of Shepard was so drawn as to run directly to Buck and wife, and upon the language in which it was couched this claim is set up. And yet that second deed was given, on request of Drake's attorney, at the very time when Buck and his wife were conveying to Drake for valuable consideration. The injustice of allowing Mrs. Blackburn to insist, years afterwards, that by that deed she acquired an estate by entirety is too apparent to need comment. Nor could such deed devest the title which had once vested in her husband and herself by the former conveyance from the same grantor, nor alter its nature.

The decree will be reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings in conformity with this opinion. Decree reversed.

HENRY R. DENNY, Piff. in Err.,

V.

CHARLES C. BENNETT, Asssignee of A.
B. VAN NORMAN & BRO.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 489–503.)

Statute impairing contracts-state law, when valid-constitutional construction-Minnesota Insolvent Law-does not discharge debt of citizen of another State-decision of motion, not res judicata.

to enforce his claims against the property of his 1. State statutes, limiting the right of a creditor debtor, which are in existence at the time a contract is made, are not void as impairing the obligation of the contract.

2. The inhibition of the Constitution against impairing the obligation of contracts is wholly prospective; the States may legislate, as to contracts thereafter made, as they see fit. It is only those in existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect.

The rule which places the seal of secrecy upon communications between client and attorney is founded upon the necessity, in the interest and administration of justice, of the aid of persons having knowledge of the law and skilled in its practice, which assistance can only be safely 3. The established construction of the Constituand readily availed of when free from the con-obligation of contracts requires that statutes of tion of the United States against impairing the sequences or the apprehension of disclosure. this class shall be construed to be part of all conBut the privilege is that of the client alone, and tracts made when they are in existence, and thereno rule prohibits the latter from divulging his fore cannot be held to impair their obligation. own secrets. And if the client has voluntarily 148, which provides that whenever the property of 4. The Minnesota Statute of March 7, 1881, chap. waived the privilege, it cannot be insisted on to a debtor is seized by an attachment or execution close the mouth of the attorney. When Mrs. against him, he may make an assignment of all his Blackburn entered upon a line of defense which property for the equal benefit of all his creditors who shall file releases, and such property shall be involved what transpired between herself and equitably distributed among such creditors, is not

repugnant to the Constitution of the United States so far as it affects citizens of States other than Min

nesota.

5. A statute of a State, being without force in any other State, cannot discharge a debtor from a debt held by a citizen of such other State who does not appear and take part in the proceedings, or is not otherwise brought within the jurisdiction of the court granting the discharge.

6. The decision of a motion or summary application is not to be regarded in the light of res judicata, or as so far conclusive upon the parties as to prevent their drawing the same matters in question again in the more regular form of an action. [No. 67.]

Argued Nov. 8, 1888. Decided Nov. 26, 1888.

IN

N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota, to review a judgment in favor of an assignee for benefit of creditors, for damage for conversion of the assigned property. Affirmed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

This is a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota.

The principal point raised by the assignments of error is that an Act of the Legislature of that State, approved March 7, 1881, chap. 148, is repugnant to the Constitution of the United States, so far as it affects citizens of States other than Minnesota. That statute provides that whenever the property of a debtor is seized by an attachment or execution against him he may make an assignment of all his property and es tate not exempt by law for the equal benefit of all his creditors who shall file releases of their debts and claims, and his property shall be equitably distributed among such creditors.

This is the only assignment of error (with the exception of one other, which will be considered farther on) that, by any fair construction, can be said to come within the jurisdiction of thiscourt, though others are set out in the brief of counsel, relative to fraud in the assignment made by the debtors in this instance, which

Mr. C. D. O'Brien, for plaintiff in error: An assignment for the benefit of creditors can be attacked for the concurring fraud of the as-raise no federal question. signors and assignee.

Locke, Attach. 522, § 240 and cases cited; Hutchinson v. Lord, I Wis. 286: Bogert v. Phelps, 14 Wis. 95; Thayer v. Willet, 5 Bosw. 344, 354; Fallon v. McCunn, 7 Bosw. 141; Hall v. Stryker, 27 N.Y. 596, 600; Damon v. Bryant, 2 Pick. 411; Pratt v. Wheeler, 6 Gray, 520; Owen v. Dixon, 17 Conn. 492, 497, 498.

The law itself is so framed that it does impair the obligation of contracts.

Gilman v. Lockwood, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 410 (18:432); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 213 (6:606); Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 122 (4:529); Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 223 (17:531).

Mr. Ambrose N. Merrick, for defendant in error:

No federal question is involved.
Re Mann, 32 Minn. 60; Simon v. Mann, 33
Minn. 412; Bennett v. Denny, Id. 530.

The constitutionality of the Minnesota Assignment or Bankrupt Act of 1881 has been sustained, not only by the Supreme Court of Minnesota, but also by the federal courts.

Mather v. Nesbit, 13 Fed. Rep. 872; Weston v. Loyhed, 30 Minn. 222; Wendell v. Lebon, Id. 234; Sloane v. Chiniquy, 22 Fed. Rep. 213.

From the time of the execution and filing of the assignment by the Van Normans the property was in custodia legis.

Kingman v. Barton, 24 Minn. 295; Swart v. Thomas, 26 Minn. 143; Re Mann, 32 Minn. 60. Property in custodia legis could not be levied upon by the United States Marshal.

Drake, Attach. §§ 251, 267, 5th ed.; Murfree, Sheriffs, § 269; Re Mann, 32 Minn. 60.

The same contingency which would dissolve an attachment in the state court would also dissolve it under the federal laws.

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The facts may be briefly stated as follows: on the 31st day of December, 1883, J. H. Purdy & Co. brought a suit in the Fourth Judicial District Court of Hennepin County, in the State of Minnesota, against Axel B. Van Norman and Gustave Van Norman, partners, under the firm name of Van Norman & Brother, and on the same day procured a writ of attachment to issue in that suit, which was levied upon a part of the goods of the defendants. On the same day that firm made a deed of assignment to Charles C. Bennett, the present defendant in error, reciting the issue and levy of this attachment, and 'all the lands, tenements, assigning to him hereditaments and appurtenances, goods, chattels, choses in action, claims, demands, property and effects of every description" belonging to them, wherever situated. The instrument also provided that the assignee was "to take possession of the property, and to sell and dispose of the same with all reasonable diligence, and to convert the same into money; and, also, to collect all such debts and demands hereby assigned as may be collectible, and with and out of the proceeds of such sales and collections to pay and discharge all the just and reasonable expenses, costs and charges of executing the assigument," including a reasonable compensation to the assignee for his services.

The assignment then directs the assignee to proceed as follows:

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To pay and discharge in full, if the residue of said proceeds be sufficient for that purpose, all the debts and liabilities now due, or to become due, from said party of the first part to all their creditors who shall file releases of their debts and claims against the said party of the first part, as by law provided, together with all interest due, and to become due thereon; and if the residue of said proceeds shall not be sufficient to pay said debts and liabilities and interest in full, then to apply the same, so far as they will extend, to the payment of the said debts and liabilities and interest proportionably to their respective amounts, and in accordance with the statute in such case made and provided; and if, after payment of all the costs, charges and expenses attending the execution of said trust, and Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the payment and discharge in full of all the said

U. S. R. S. § 933; Mather v. Nesbit, 13 Fed. Rep. 872; Simon v. Mann, 33 Minn. 412; Wendell v. Lebon, 30 Minn. 240.

The holding of the court that the defendant in error had mistaken his remedy in moving to dissolve the attachment is no bar to this action. Abbott, Tr. Ev. 830, § 11; Marsh v. Armstrong, 20 Minn. 81.

the court:

lawful debts owing by the said party of the first. 128 U. S.

part, there shall be any suplus of the said proceeds remaining in the hands of the party of the second part, then to repay such surplus to the party of the first part, their executors, administrators, or assigns."

It appears that the goods and chattels mentioned in this deed of trust were, under its authority, delivered to Bennett, the assignee, or partly so, the sheriff having closed the doors of the store in which they were situated, at the time that Denny, the plaintiff in error, seized them by virtue of a writ of attachment issued out of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, of which he was marshal, in a suit brought by Lapp & Flershem against the firm of Van Norman & Brother. The latter action was also commenced on the 31st day of December, 1883. On January 21, 1884, after a refusal by the marshal to deliver the goods, Bennett, the assignee, made application in the United States Circuit Court to be made a party to the suit of Lapp & Flershem against Van Norman & Brother, and prayed for the dissolution of the attachment issued in favor of the plaintiffs therein. The court, on February 18, 1884, made the following order: "First. That Charles C. Bennett, assignee, do have, and he is hereby given, leave to intervene and become a party defendant herein. Second. That the motion to dissolve the attachment be, and the same is, hereby denied." Although the assignee was thus permitted to come in and be made a party, it is not shown that he ever did so, or ever appeared in the case after that time.

There is no further record in this case of any proceedings in the Circuit Court of the United States, nor in the action of Purdy & Co. v. Van Norman & Brother; but the transcript then proceeds with the suit brought by the assignee against the marshal, Henry R. Denny, in the nature of trover and conversion, for damages on account of his unlawful seizure of these same goods while they were in the hands of said assignee, and for a conversion of the same by his refusal to return them to plaintiff. This suit was decided in favor Bennett, the assignee, in the lower court, by a verdict of a jury; and upon the judgment being carried by a writ of error to the Supreme Court of the State of Minnesota it was there affirmed. In both of these courts the questions we have mentioned were raised by exceptions to the charge of the judge that the assignment was a valid one, and to the ruling that the decision of the Circuit Court of the United States on the motion to dissolve the attachment was not a bar to the present action by the assignee.

The question of the invalidity of this Minnesota Statute, as it relates to the rights of creditors, is an interesting one. The argument in favor of that proposition is twofold: first, that it impairs the obligation of contracts; and second, that such a statute can have no extraterritorial operation, aud cannot, therefore, be binding on creditors living in a different State from that of the debtor and of the situs of his property.

case of no effect. But the doctrine has been long settled that statutes limiting the right of the creditor to enforce his claims against the property of the debtor, which are in existence at the time the contracts are made, are not void, but are within the legislative power of the States where the property and the debtor are to be found. The courts of the country abound in decisions of this class, exempting property from execution and attachment, no limit having been fixed to the amount-providing for a valuation at which alone, or generally two thirds of which, the property can be brought to a forced sale to discharge the debt-granting stays of execution after judgment, and in numerous ways holding that, as to contracts made after the passage of such laws, the legislative enactments regulating the rights of the creditors in the enforcement of their claims are valid. These statutes, exempting the homestead of the debtor, perhaps with many acres of land adjoining it; the books and library of the professional man, the horse and buggy and surgical implements of the physician, or the household furniture, horses, cows and other articles belonging to the debtor, have all been held to be valid, without reference to the residence of the creditor, as applied to contracts made after their passage.

The principle is well stated in the case of Edwards v. Kearzey, 96 U. S. 595 [24: 793] in the following language:

"The inhibition of the Constitution is wholly prospective. The States may legislate as to contracts thereafter made, as they may see fit. It is only those in existence when the hostile law is passed that are protected from its effect."

See also Mississippi & M. Railroad Company v. Rock, 71 U. S. 4 Wall 177 [18: 381]; Northwestern University v. People, 99 U. S. 309 [25: 387]; Knox v. Exchange Bank, 79 U. S. 12 Wall. 379 [20: 287, 414].

The doctrine was very early announced in the case of Wales v. Stetson, 2 Mass. 143; and in the separate opinion of Mr. Justice Story in Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 518 [4: 629] decided in 1819, it was suggested that in a grant of a charter to a corporation a reservation of the right to repeal it would be valid. This has been acted upon, and such action has been held in many cases to be valid.

The later case of Greenwood v. Union Freight Railroad Company, 105 U. S. 13 [26: 961] contains a review of this whole subject, so far as contracts are concerned.

No reason has been suggested why the Legislature could not exempt all interests in landed estate from execution and sale under judgments against the owner, and perhaps all his personal property, However this may be, it is very certain that the established construction of the Constitution of the United States against impairing the obligation of contracts requires that statutes of this class shall be construed to be parts of all contracts made when they are in existence, and therefore cannot be held to impair their obligation.

With regard to the first of these it may be The Act in question in the present case does conceded that, so far as an attempt might be not exceed many of the class to which we have made to apply this statute to contracts in exist-alluded in its effect in enabling the debtor to ence before it was enacted, it would be liable dispose of his property without regard to the to the objection raised, and therefore in such a ordinary judicial proceedings to subject it to

court in the cases of Sturges v. Crowninshield, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat 122 [4:529]; Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 213 [6: 606]; Baldwin v. Hale, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 223 [17: 531] and Gilman v. Lockwood, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 409 [18: 432]. The proposition lying at the foundation of all these decisions is that a statute of a State, being without force in any other State, cannot discharge a debtor from a debt held by a citizen of such other State. One of the best statements of the doctrine is found in the following language used in the latest case on the subject, that of Gilman v. Lockwood, supra.

forced sale. The power is conceded, when not forbidden by the statutes of a State, to a failing debtor to make a general assignment of his property for the benefit of his creditors, as this one does. It is further admitted that in such an assignment, if there be nothing fraudulent otherwise, he can prefer some creditors over others, and that he can secure to some payment in full while he leaves others who will certainly get nothing out of his estate. When this is done the creditors who are not provided for in the assignment are left in a worse condition than they are where it is done under the present law; because in the first instance they would certainly get nothing out of the debtor's property, though they would retain a right to proceed against him by a judgment and execu-ing with their provisions, and provided that the tion, while in the present case they have the option of pursuing that course, or of coming in with the other creditors, executing releases, and obtaining their share of the property assigned. Here, instead of naming the preferred creditors, the assignor gives his property to all who will execute a release of their claims against him. Nobody is required by the statute to do so unless he thinks it is to his interest. The creditor who executes such a release gets his share of the property assigned, while the one who does not receives nothing, unless there may be a surplus left after the payment of the releasors, but he is not hindered or delayed in obtaining a judgment against the debtor, or in levying upon any other property, if such can be found, not conveyed by the instrument, or upon any afterwards acquired by the debtor. The latter remains liable, notwithstanding this statute and this assignment, as he always was, for the debt of the nonassenting creditor.

It is not easy, then, to see how this statute can be more complained of as impairing the obligation of contracts than the statutes of exemption which we have already mentioned, and the principles which lie at the foundation of all voluntary assignments for the benefit of creditors with preferences that exhaust the fund assigned.

But it is said in answer to this view of the subject that there is a clause in the instrument now before us directing that if there shall be a surplus after the payment in full of all the creditors who shall release the assignors it shall be paid over to the latter. There are two answers to this. If that clause or provision is unlawful and violates the laws of the State of Minnesota, or the Constitution of the United States, it can be rejected, and the remainder of the assignment permitted to stand. The statute under which the assignment was made does not require that such surplus shall be paid over to the debtors. The supreme court of that State has held that such a fund may be arrested when proper proceedings are had before it gets to the debtor's hands, and, certainly, wherever that surplus may be found, and however it may be got at by any of the processes of law, it is liable to be taken by the nonreleasing creditor. He can pursue all the remedies which the law gives him as against any fund, property, chose in action, or estate liable to the payment of his demand.

But it is said that this Statute of Minnesota is void under the principles laid down by this

"State Legislatures may pass insolvent laws. provided there be no Act of Congress establishing a uniform system of bankruptcy conflictlaw itself be so framed that it does not impair the obligation of contracts. Certificates of discharge, however, granted under such a law, cannot be pleaded in bar of an action brought by a citizen of another State in the Courts of the United States, or of any other State than that where the discharge was obtained, unless it appear that the plaintiff proved his debt against the defendant's estate in insolvency, or in some manner became a party to the proceedings. Insolvent laws of one State cannot discharge the contracts of citizens of other States; because such laws have no extraterritorial operation; and consequently the tribunal sitting under them, unless in cases where a citizen of such other State voluntarily becomes a party to the proceeding, has no jurisdiction of the cause."

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This is conceived to be a clear and accurate presentation of the doctrine of the preceding cases, and it will be seen that the substance of the restrictive principle goes no farther that to prohibit or to make invalid the discharge of a debt held by a citizen of another State than that where the court is sitting, who does not appear and take part, or is not otherwise brought within the jurisdiction of the court granting the discharge. In other words, whatever the court before whom such proceedings are had may do with regard to the disposition of the property of the debtor, it has no power to release him from the obligation of a contract which he owes to a resident of another State, who is not personally subjected to the jurisdiction of the court. Anyone who will take the trouble to examine all these cases will perceive that the objection to the extraterritorial operation of a state insolvent law is that it cannot, like the Bankrupt Law passed by Congress under its constitutional grant of power, release all debtors from the obligation of the debt. The authority to deal with the property of the debtor within the State, so far as it does not impair the obligation of contracts, is conceded; but the power to release him, which is one of the usual elements of all bankrupt laws, does not belong to the Legislature where the creditor is not within the control of the court.

The Minnesota Statute makes no provision for any such release. The creditor who became such after the statute was passed cannot complain that the obligation of his contract is impaired, because the law was a part of the contract at the time he made it; nor can he say that his contract is destroyed and the debtor discharged from it, which is of the essence

of a bankrupt law, because no such decree can be made by the court, neither does the law have any such effect, though the obligation of the debtor to pay may be canceled or discharged by the voluntary act of the creditor who makes such release for a consideration which to him seems to be sufficient.

Mr. Justice Harlan, dissenting:

I cannot assent to a judgment of affirmance in this case.

1. The Statute of Minnesota of 1881, upon which the defendant in error rests his suit for damages, provides, among other things: "Whenever the property of any debtor is atThe other assignment of error, pressed by tached or levied upon by any officer, by virtue counsel for plaintiff in error, that the proceed- of any writ or process issued out of a court of ings in the Circuit Court of the United States, record of this State in favor of any creditor or in relation to the dissolution of the attachment garnishment made against any debtor, such and Bennett's becoming a party to the suit debtor may, within ten days after the levying there pending, are an estoppel of the claim of such attachment, process, or garnishment now set up by him, is not in our opinion entitled shall have been made, make an assignment of to much consideration. The order of the court all his property and estate, not exempt by law, in relation to that matter, above quoted, mere- for the equal benefit of all his creditors, in proly gave leave to the assignee to become a party portion to their respective valid claims, who to that suit, at the same time overruling the shall file releases of their debts and claims other branch of the motion asking for a disso- against such creditors as hereinafter provided lution of the attachment. It does not appear and, upon the making of such assignby the record that Bennett ever did make him- ment, all attachments, levy or garnishment so self a party to that suit, and of course could be made shall be dissolved upon the appointment bound by no judgment rendered in regard to and qualification of an assignee or receiver; it. Even if he can be supposed to be a party, and thereupon the officers shall deliver the so far as the motion to dissolve the attachment property attached or levied upon to such asis concerned, we concur with the Supreme signee or receiver, unless the assignee shall, Court of the State of Minnesota (Bennett v. within five days after such assignment, file in Denny, 33 Minn. 530) in holding that "It was the office of the clerk of the court where such atmerely a decision of a motion or summary ap-tachment was issued or judgment was rendered plication, which is not to be regarded in the a notice of his intention to retain such attachlight of res adjudicata, or as so far conclusive ment, levy or garnishment, in which case any upon the parties as to prevent their drawing such attachment, levy or garnishment shall inure the same matters in question again in the more to the benefit of all the said creditors, and may regular form of an action." For this they cite be enforced by the assignee by his substitution the decisions of their own court. in the action as such in the same manner as the plaintiff might have enforced the same had such assignment not been made; Provided, however, That this section shall not apply to cases where an execution has been issued upon a judgment in an action where the complaint has been filed in the office of the clerk of the court twenty days prior to the entry of the judgment.'

In aid of this view of the subject we may also refer to the opinion of Judge Nelson in deciding the motion to dissolve. After reciting the circumstances under which that motion was made, he said:

"It is by virtue of this seizure that the marshal bolds the property. On this statement of the facts I shall not decide on this motion who has the better title and right to the possession of the property taken The writ of attachment properly issued in this suit against the debtor; and if the marshal has seized the property which belonged to Bennett, he is certainly liable in an action of trespass for the damages thereby sustained.' Lapp v. Van Norman, 19 Fed. Rep. 406. See Buck v. Colbath, 70 U. S. 3 Wall. 334 [18: 257].

It is therefore clear that the order of the judge refusing to dissolve the attachment was not predicated upon any decision as to the right of the possession of the property, but that he intended to leave the marshal liable to the present action, if the facts justified the claim of the assignee. Apart from this we are not at all satisfied that the effect of this action of the circuit court on the suit afterwards brought by the assignee in the state court is a question of federal cognizance. Its decision, as shown by the opinion of Judge Nelson, was not based upon any law or principle of federal jurisprudence, and must have rested upon the general rules which govern the conclusiveness of former judicial proceedings when called in question in another case.

The judgment of the Supreme Court of Minnesota is affirmed.

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This statute did not operate to dissolve the attachment which issued from the Circuit Court of the United States in favor of Lapp & Flershem; for it applies only to writs or process issued out of "a court of record of this State,' that is, a court of record established under the Constitution and laws of Minnesota. If intended to embrace writs of attachment from a court of the United States, so as to vacate levies under such writs, without an order to that effect by the court under whose authority they were made, it would be inoperative. No state enactment can, proprio vigore, work the dissolution of an attachment issuing from a federal court.

A different construction is inadmissible upon other grounds. By the 10th section of the statute it is provided that "No creditor of any insolvent debtor shall receive any benefit under the provisions of this Act, or any payment of any share of the proceeds of the debtor's estate, unless he shall have first filed with the clerk of the district court, in consideration of the benefits of the provisions of this Act, a release to the debtor of all claims other than such as may be paid under the provisions of this Act, for the benefit of such debtor, and thereupon the court or judge may direct that judgment be

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