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plaintiff was not a party to any of the actions instituted in the court of claims to test the validity of his bonds, and that he is not bound by any adjudication therein, the opinion says: This position might possibly be very well maintained if the defense here was based simply on the doctrine of res adjudicata; but that is not the ground upon which the defense rests. The true ground is, that, as the State could not be sued except with its own consent, and then only in the mode which it had seen fit to prescribe, and as the State did prescribe a mode by which it could be sued, and the validity of its debt tested upon the same principle by which the contracts of individuals are tested, and hav-ity of any bond purporting to be an obligaing invited all persons having claims against it, whose claims were disputed, to come in and assert and establish their claims, one who has failed to avail himself of the opportunity thus offered cann ot afterward, in another proceeding, not permitted by the State, maintain an action against the State or against any of its officers for refusing to do that which the laws of the State forbid."

The Supreme Court of South Carolina then proceeds to examine the contention on the part of the plaintiff, that the Act of the 24th of December, 1878, entitled, "An Act to Facilitate the Collection of Taxes" (16 Stat. 785), expressly authorizes an action against the county treasurer when such coupons as his have been tendered for taxes and refused. Upon that point its opinion is expressed as follows:

"This position is, we think, based upon a total misconception of the true meaning of that Act. It certainly never was designed to afford an opportunity to a bondholder to reopen the question as to the validity of any portion of the state debt, which it was supposed had been determined by the decision of this court in the ‘Bond Debt Cases,' from which no intimation of appeal had been given. The very object of the legislation of the State hereinbefore considered was, as we have seen, to obtain a final determination of the question of the validity of the state debt; and certainly the Legislature, by an Act passed nearly a year before such final determination was reached, never intended to afford the means of reopening any of the questions thus finally determined. In addition to this, the phraseology of the Act shows that it was never designed to afford a remedy to the bondholder in case his coupons were refused when tendered for taxes, but was intended solely to afford a remedy in case bills of the bank of the State were refused when tendered for taxes. But even if it should be conceded that the terms of the Act to facilitate the collection of taxes were broad enough to cover a case in which coupons of bonds purporting to be bonds of the State are refused when tendered for taxes, as well as a case in which taxes are tendered and refused in other 'funds and moneys' than the collecting officers are authorized by the Act levying such taxes to receive, we do not see how these actions can be maintained. By the express terms of the Act it must be made to appear that the county treasurer has illegally and wrongfully refused to receive payment of the taxes assessed against the plaintiff in anything else but gold and silver coin, United States currency national bank notes, and coupons which shall become

payable during the year 1882, on the valid consolidation bonds of this State, known as 'brown bonds,' as required to do by the 7th section of the 'Act to Raise Supplies and Make Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Commencing November 1, 1881,' approved February 9, 1882 (17 Stat. 1070). Practically this last mentioned Act forbids county treasurers from receiving in payment of taxes any coupons of bonds which have not been ascertained in the manner prescribed by the legislation herein before mentioned to be valid obligations of the State. Now, if, as we have seen, the State had the right to prescribe the mode by which the validtion of the State should be tested and determined, and if, as we have also seen, such mode was prescribed, and the validity of all the various classes of bonds purporting to be obligations of the State was passed upon and finally determined, it would seem to follow necessarily that the State had a perfect right to forbid its officers charged with the collection of its revenue from receiving in payment of taxes any coupons or other form of obligation which had not only not been adjudged to be a valid obligation of the State, but which, on the contrary, had been expressly adjudged to be invalid. There certainly can be nothing illegal or wrongful in an officer of the State yielding obedience to a law of the State passed in the usual form, in pursuance of a judgment of its highest judicial tribunal, from which there had been no appeal to the tribunal of last resort, though express provision had been made for such appeal."

After having thus decided that the present action was not maintainable under the provisions of the Act of December 24, 1878, the Supreme Court of South Carolina proceeds to review the grounds of its prior decisions in the Bond Debt Cases, 12 S. C. 263, 294, and restates and reaffirms the same, going at large into the question of the validity of the bonds held by the plaintiff as obligations of the State, adjudg ing them to be invalid. The conclusion follows and is declared that the Act of the General Assembly entitled "An Act to Raise Supplies and Make Appropriations for the Fiscal Year Commencing November 1, 1881," approved February 9, 1882, alleged by the plaintiff to be void as impairing the obligation of the State contained in the bonds and coupons, is a valid and constitutional law, and justified the defendant, as County Treasurer, in refusing to receive the coupons in payment of taxes when tendered.

It thus appears that in point of fact the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina in its opinion in this case passed upon the federal question sought to be raised by the plaintiff as the foundation of his case, and decided it adversely to him; but the analysis of the case which we have made shows clearly that the decision of that question was not necessary to the judgment. Before reaching that question the supreme court had already decided that the action of the plaintiff could not be sustained, according to the meaning of the provisions of the statute under which it was brought. The decision of that point was final, and was fatal to the plaintiff's right of recovery. That question is not a federal question; it does not arise

the cause, and that it was actually decided, or that the judgment as rendered could no. have been given without deciding it. Brown v. Atwell, 92 U. S. 327 [23: 511]: Citizens Bank v. Board of Liquidation, 98 U. S. 140 [25: 114]; Chouteau v. Gibson, 111 U. S. 200 [28: 400]; Adams County v. Burlington & M. R. R. Co. 112 U. S. 123 [28: 678]; Detroit City R. Co. v. Guthard, 114 U. S. 133 [29: 118]; New Orleans Water Works Co. v. Louisiana Sugar Refining Co. 125 U. S. 18 [31: 607].

Inasmuch, therefore, as the judgment of the Supreme Court of the State of South Carolina, sought to be brought in review by this writ of error, does not involve any question necessarily arising under the Constitution of the United States or the laws and treaties made in pursuance thereof, we must refuse to take jurisdiction in the case.

The writ of error is accordingly dismissed for want of jurisdiction.

under the Constitution of the United States, or affirmatively not only that a federal question under any law or treaty made in pursuance was presented for decision to the highest court thereof. It is not a question, therefore, which, of the State, having jurisdiction, but that its under this writ of error, we have a right to re-decision was necessary to the determination of view. We are not authorized to inquire into the grounds and reasons upon which the supreme court proceeded in its construction of that statute. It is a state statute conferring certain rights upon suitors choosing to avail themselves of its provisions upon certain conditions in certain cases. Who may sue under it, and when, and under what circumstances, are questions for the exclusive determination of the state tribunals, whose judgment thereon is not subject to review by this court. It was competent for the State of South Carolina either to grant or withhold the right to bring suits against the officers of the State for the recovery of money alleged to have been illegally exacted and wrongfully paid. If granted, the action is in substance, though not in name, an action against the State itself, just as an action, permitted by the Act of Congress on the subject, against a collector of customs for the recovery of duties alleged to have been illegally exacted, and paid under protest, is an action against the United States, though nominally against the collector. In such cases, as the State may withhold all remedy, it may attach to the remedy it actually gives whatever conditions and limitations it chooses; and its own interpretation and application of its statutes on that subject, given by its own judicial tribunals, are conclusive upon the parties seeking the benefit of them. No right secured by the Constitution of the United States to any citizen is affected by them unless they are framed or administered so as, in some particular case, to deprive the party of his property without due process of law or to deprive him of the equal protection of the laws. No such question is or can be made in reference to the statute of South Carolina under consideration. It authorizes, in certain enumerated cases, parties found to be within its terms to bring a prescribed action against the State in the name of one of its officers. According to the decision of its highest tribunal, the plaintiff in this action is not within the class entitled to sue. To review that judgment is not within the province of this court, because it does not deny or injuriously affect any right claimed by the plaintiff under the Constitution or laws of the United States.

ANNA E. CAMERON ET AL. Appts.,

v.

ASA HODGES ET AL.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 322-326).

Jurisdiction of circuit courts-citizenship of parties-statement- objection -amendment-remanding suit.

1. It is not sufficient, to give jurisdiction to a Circuit Court of the United States, that the defendant in the suit is a citizen of the State, and that none of the complainants were citizens of that State. The adverse party must be a citizen of some other named State, or an alien.

2. A citizen of a Territory, or of the District of Columbia, can neither bring nor sustain a suit on the ground of citizenship, in one of the Circuit courts.

parties, and of the particular State in which it is 3. A distinct statement of the citizenship of the claimed, is required, in order to sustain the jurisdiction of the circuit court.

objection of the want of jurisdiction in the circuit 4. This court will, on its own motion, take the court, especially as regards citizenship.

5. This court may reverse the decree of the court below because it had no jurisdiction, but has no power to amend the record so as to give jurisdiction to that court.

6. Where it appears upon the face of the affidavit or petition for removal of a suit from a state court that the suit has been improperly removed into the circuit court, it is the duty of that court at any time to remand the suit to the state court. [No. 208.]

It is a well settled rule, limiting the jurisdiction of this court in such cases, that "where it appears by the record that the judgment of the state court might have been based either upon a law which would raise a question of repugnancy to the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States, or upon some other independent ground, and it appears that the court did, in fact, base its judgment on such of the United States for the Western Disindependent ground, and not on the law rais-trict of Tennessee dismissing a bill in regard to

Argued April 5, 1888. Decided April 30, 1888.

APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court

the title to real estate. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion. Messrs. D. H. Poston and W. K. Poston, for appellants:

ing the federal question, this court will not take jurisdiction of the case, even though it might think the position of the State court an unsound one." Klinger v. Missouri, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 257, 263 [20: 635, 637] per Mr. Justice Bradley. And it has been repeatedly decided, under section 709 of the Revised Statutes, that, to give this court jurisdiction of a McLard v. Linnville, 10 Humph. 163, Trabue writ of error to a state court, it must appear | v. Turner, 10 Heisk. 447.

The bill being on oath, the answer only makes an issue, and one witness will overturn it.

The plaintiff may waive an answer under oath, and the answer will then be entitled to no more weight as evidence than the bill.

Lindsley v. James, 3 Coldw. 487.

In Tennessee a party failing to testify as to matters shown to be necessarily within his personal knowledge affords a presumption against him.

Dunlap v. Haynes, 4 Heisk. 479; Alley v. Connell, 3 Head, 578; Louisville & N. R. R. Co. v. Garrett, 8 Lea, 438.

The refusal of the party to produce his books or papers raises a presumption adverse to the

party.

Clifton v. U. S. 45 U. S. 4 How. 242 (11; 957); Hanson v. Eustace, 43 U. S. 2 How. 653 (11: 416); 2 Whart. Ev. §§ 1265, 1266.

The nonproduction of evidence clearly within the power of a party creates a strong sumption against him.

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"To the Hon. W. W. McDowell, Chancellor: time of the institution of this suit was, a citizen "Your petitioner states that he is, and at the of the State of Arkansas, and not of the State of Tennessee, and that none of the complain

ants are or were at that time citizens of the

State of Arkansas; that said suit is of a civil exclusive of costs, in value the sum of five hunnature, and the matters in controversy exceed, dred dollars; that the controversy affects the pre-sas, and can be wholly decided between comownership of real estate in said State of Arkanplainants and this defendant. Wherefore he prays an order for the removal of said cause from this court to the United States Circuit Court for the Western District of Tennessee, at Memphis, and he tenders herewith the requisite bond, as required by law, for the removal thereof.

Miller v. Jones, 32 Ark. 337.
Messrs. W. G. Weatherford and T. B.
Turley, for appellees:

An assignment that points to no specific error is too vague and indefinite, and should be disregarded.

Deitsch v. Wiggins, 82 U. S. 15 Wall. 539 (21: 228); Ryan v. Koch, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 19 (21: 611).

The questions involved being matters of fact, this court will affirm the decree.

Harrell v. Beall, 84 U. S. 17 Wall. 590 (21: 692); Alviso v. U. S. 75 U. S. 8 Wall 337 (19: 305); Parker v. Phetteplace, 68 U. S. 1 Wall. 684 (17: 675); Lytle v. Arkansas, 63 U. S. 22 How. 193 (16: 306).

Acknowledgment cannot be proven by parol

testimony.

Elliott v. Peirsol, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 338 (7:169). In Arkansas, the executory and unacknowledged contract of a married woman to convey her real estate is void.

Wood v. Terry, 30 Ark. 385.
Voidable at her election.
Milwee v. Milwee, 44 Ark. 112.
She cannot make executory contracts to con-

vey.

Chrisman v. Partee, 38 Ark. 31; Wood v. Terry, supra.

When a written contract is to be proven by parol, the substance of the agreement ought to be proven satisfactorily.

Tayloe v. Riggs, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 600 (7: 279); Findley v. Hinde, 26 U. S. 1 Pet. 245 (7:130); Vattier v. Hinde, 32 U. S. 7 Pet. 266 (8: 680); Nichols v. Kingdom Iron Ore Co. 56 N. Y. 618; Edwards v. Noyes, 65 N. Y. 125.

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an appeal from the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee.

The suit was originally brought in the Chancery Court of Shelby County, held in the City of Memphis in that State, in regard to a controversy which arose concerning the title to certain real estate situated in the State of Arkansas. The principal defendant, Asa Hodges, was a citizen of Arkansas, and upon that ground procured an order in the chancery court to remove the case into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of

"Asa Hodges, the petitioner, being sworn, says the matters set forth in the above petition are true as far as stated on his own knowledge; the rest he believes to be true. Asa Hodges. "Sworn to this October 2, 1882.

"J. M. BRADLEY, Deputy Clerk and M." While this petition sets forth the citizenship of Hodges to be in the State of Arkansas, both at the commencement of the suit and at the time of the application for removal, it does not state that of any of the complainants, but merely says "that none of the complainants are or were at that time citizens of said State of Arkansas;" nor have we been able to find in the record any evidence, allegation or statement as to the citizenship of any of them. That the defendant Hodges was a citizen of Arkansas, in connection with the fact that none of the complainants were citizens of that State, is not sufficient to give jurisdiction in a Circuit Court of the United States. Brown v. Keene, 33 U. S. 8 Pet. 115 [8: 886].

The adverse party must be a citizen of some other named State than Arkansas, or an alien. All the complainants might be residents and citizens of the District of Columbia, or of any Territory, and they might not be citizens of the State of Tennessee where the suit was brought, or indeed, of any State in the Union. A citizen of a Territory, or of the District of Columbia, can neither bring nor sustain a suit on the ground of citizenship, in one of the circuit courts. Barney v. Baltimore, 73 U. S. 6 Wall. 280 [18: 825].

This court has always been very particular in requiring a distinct statement of the citizenship of the parties, and of the particular State in which it is claimed, in order to sustain the jurisdiction of those courts; and inasmuch as the only citizenship specifically averred and set out in the case before us is that of the defendant Hodges, at whose instance the cause was removed, and as that is the only ground upon which the removal was placed, it seems clear that the circuit court did not have jurisdiction of it, and that the suit should have been

Robert

dismissed or remanded for that reason. son v. Cease, 97 U. S. 646 [24: 1057]. The allegation which was made in that case, that Cease, who was the plaintiff, in the action in the Circuit Court for the Western District of Texas, "resides in the County of Mason and State of Illinois," was held not to be a sufficient averment of his citizenship in Illinois. See, also, Godfrey v. Terry, 97 U. S. 171 [24: 944]. This court has uniformly acted upon the principle that, in order to protect itself from collusive agreements between parties who wish to litigate their controversies in the federal courts, it would, on its own motion, take the objection of the want of jurisdiction in the circuit court, especially as regards citizenship. Hilton v. Dickinson, 108 U. S. 165 [27: 688]; Morgan v. Gay, 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 81 [22: 100]. We have considered the application of Hodges, the defendant in error, to supply the want of averments in regard to the citizenship of the complainants in this suit. The difficulty here, however, does not relate to the jurisdiction of this court,-in regard to which evidence by affidavit has sometimes been received where the defect was as to the amount in controversy, and perhaps in relation to some other point. The jurisdiction of this court in the present case is undoubted, but, as the previous remarks in this opinion shows, the circuit court never had jurisdiction of it; and while we may be authorized to reverse the decree so rendered we have no power to amend the record so as to give jurisdiction to that court by proceedings here. The case in this court must be tried upon the record made in the circuit court. În this instance there has been a removal from a tribunal of a State into a Circuit Court of the United States, and there is no precedent known to us which authorizes an amendment to be made, even in the circuit court, by which grounds of jurisdiction may be made to appear which were not presented to the state court on the motion for removal. In fact, under the fifth section of the Act of March 3, 1875, it being manifest upon the face of the affidavit or petition for removal in the present suit that the case had been improperly removed into the circuit court, it was the duty of that court, at all times and at any time during its pendency before it, to have remanded the case to the tribunal of the State where it originated. We can do no more, however, than to reverse the action of the court below, from which this appeal was taken, because it had no jurisdiction of the

case.

The decree in this case is reversed for want of jurisdiction in the Circuit Court, and the case remanded for further proceedings.

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3. A record from the office of the register of deeds of a county in Michigan, containing a certified copy of a will executed and proved in New as probated in Michigan, where the record shows York, is admissible in evidence, to show the will due notice by publication and due proof of its execution. evidence to impeach the conveyance of the trustees, 4. A declaration of trust, held not admissible in where it appears that they had power and authority to sell and convey the property, and that the proceeds were to be divided according to the instrument creating the trust.

5. A tax deed in Michigan is void where it appears that a portion of the tax for which it was given was excessive and invalid; and such deed is not admissible to sustain the grantee's title.

6. Parol evidence of the payment of part of the tax for illegal purposes is admissible, where the records show that it was raised for such purpose. [No. 217.]

Argued April 11, 1888. Decided April 30, 1888.

States for the Western District of Michigan, to review a judgment for plaintiff in an action to recover land. Affirmed.

ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. D. H. Ball, A. T. Britton, A. B. Browne and Walter H. Smith, for plaintiff in error:

The deed from William A. Pratt should not have been received in evidence.

Howell, Stat. § 5658; Crane v. Reeder, 21 Mich. 60; Brown v. Cady, 11 Mich. 535; Clark v. Graham, 19 U. S. 6 Wheat. 577 (5:334.)

The record of the will of Edward C. Wilder should have been excluded.

Howell, Stat. § 5806; Pope v. Cutler, 34 Mich. 152.

The deputy auditor-general had power to execute conveyances on sale of lands for taxes. Westbrook v. Miller, 56 Mich. 148.

These deeds were prima facie evidence of the regularity of all proceedings, to and including the sale, and of title in the grantee.

Groesbeck v. Seeley, 13 Mich. 329; Hunt v. Chapin, 42 Mich. 24; Stockle v. Silsbee, 41 Mich. 615.

The record cannot be contradicted. Taymouth v. Koehler, 35 Mich. 22; Young v. Duvall, 109 U. S. 577 (27:1037).

Messrs. B. J. Brown and Edward Cahill, for defendant in error:

The deed from William Pratt is an old deed, and the courts will sustain it.

Carpenter v. Dexter, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 513 (19: 426); Morse v. Hewett, 28 Mich. 481.

Probate courts are courts of record, and all presumptions will aid their judicial action. Church v. Holcomb, 45 Mich. 29; Alexander

WILLIAM C. CULBERTSON, Piff. in Err., v. Rice, 52 Mich. 451.

V.

THE H. WITBECK COMPANY.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 326-337.)

The deed of October 29, 1855, from William A. Pratt and wife to Manning & Wright, was an absolute conveyance in fee.

Trask v. Green, 9 Mich. 358; Maynard v. Hoskins, Id. 485; Weare v. Linnell, 29 Mich.

Witnesses to deed-acknowledgment-Michigan 224.
record-declaration of trust-Michigan tax
deed-evidence.

1. A deed in Michigan held to be sufficiently witnessed by two persons where the signatures of the witnesses follow a memorandum of interlineation.

It was not the purpose of the statute (How. Stat. 5569) to require resulting trusts to be declared in writing.

Fisher v. Fobes, 22 Mich. 454; Bumpus v. Bumpus, 53 Mich. 346.

Certainty has always been an essential ele- | Pratt and two witnesses to the signature of Mrs. ment of a valid trust.

Wheeler v. Smith, 50 U.S. 9 How. 55 (13:44); Barnes v. Barnes, 3 Cranch, C. C. 269.

A trustee conveys by virtue of the legal estate vested in him, and not by virtue of a power.

81.

Bank of U. S. v. Benning, 4 Cranch, C. C.

The plaintiff could bring ejectment. Everts v. Beach, 31 Mich. 136; Davis v. Filer, 40 Mich. 316.

When a sum of money is voted in gross, without specifying the purpose for which it is raised, it may be shown, dehors the record, that it was in fact raised in part for an illegal purpose.

Fay v. Wood, 8 West. Rep. 835.

A tax sale of lands for a sum which includes an illegal item of any considerable amount is void.

Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 140; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 12; Edwards v. Taliafero, 34 Mich. 13; Hammontree v. Lott, 40 Mich. 195; Silsbee v. Stockle, 44 Mich, 561.

Evidence must be produced, by the party objecting, which will exclude any reasonable presumption of regularity. When this is done, the burden of proof is shifted to the holder of the tax deed.

Lacey v. Davis, 4 Mich. 157, 158; Case v. Dean, 16 Mich. 37; Blackw. Tax Titles, 83, note and cases cited.

Mr. Justice Miller delivered the opinion of the court:

This is an action of ejectment, originally brought in the Circuit Court for the County of Marquette, in the State of Michigan, by the H. Witbeck Company, plaintiff, against William C. Culbertson, defendant.

The object of the suit was to recover certain lands situated in the County of Marquette, to which the plaintiff claimed title in fee. The case was removed to the Circuit Court of the United States, where a trial was had which resulted in a verdict in favor of the plaintiff. This, as a matter of right, was set aside, upon motion, under the law of Michigan, and a new trial granted, which also resulted in a verdict and judgment in favor of the plaintiff. It is this which the present writ of error brings up for review.

Pratt, but it is denied that there was a second witness to the signature of the former. The part of the record containing the testimonium is as follows:

"In witness whereof the said party of the first part have hereunto set their hands and seals the day and year first above written. "WM. A. PRATT. [L. S.] "HARRIET W. PRATT. [L. S.] Signed, sealed and delivered in presence

of

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"STEPHEN WALSH,

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For William A. Pratt.

"W. H. ROCKWELL,

"GEO. HOWE,

"For Harriet W. Pratt.

"The word 'half' in the twelfth line was interlined before signing [on the second page]. "STEPHEN WALSH.

"EBENEZER WARNER."

Ebenezer Warner was the justice of the peace who took the acknowledgment of Pratt on the 29th day of October, 1855, which is also the date of the deed, and in his certificate of such acdnowledgment he says: "I certify that I know the person who made the said acknowledgment to be the individual described in and who executed the within instrument." It will also be noted that he signs with Walsh as a witness, and that their signatures immediately follow the statement as to the word "half" having been interlined before signing.

These circumstances are sufficient to show that Walsh and Warner were witnesses to the signature of Mr. Pratt, and the matter may be easily explained by supposing that Rockwell and Howe, the two witnesses for Harriet W. Pratt, inserted their names above those of Walsh and Warner as witnesses for William A. Pratt. Under all the circumstances we think the court was correct in admitting the deed in evidence. Carpenter v. Dexter, 75 U. S. 8 Wall. 513 [19:426].

The second assignment of error also rests upon an alleged insufficiency in the acknowledgement of another deed which was offered in evidence by the plaintiff, from Still Manning and wife and William Wright and wife to Edward C. Wilder, conveying all the lands in controversy. To the admission of this deed defendant's counsel objected "for the reason that it does not appear on said certificate that the persons acknowledging were the same persons as those named as grantors in said deed." The acknowledgment in this case was taken in the State of New Jersey, before William A. Richter, a master in chancery and notary public, who says in his certificate that the parties, naming them, personally appeared before him, "who, I am satisfied, are the grantors in the within deed of conveyance. This language is the defect complained of by defendant.

During the progress of the trial the plaintiff established title by various conveyances, beginning with patents from the United States, in William A. Pratt. As a link in the chain of title from Pratt, the plaintiff offered in evidence the record of a deed from Pratt and wife to Still Manning and William Wright, which was executed and acknowledged in the State of Michigan. This was objected to by the defendant upon the ground that it was attested by only one witness as to the signature of Wil- We are inclined to the opinion that this is liam A. Pratt. The instrument was, however, sufficient evidence that the parties who ap admitted in evidence notwithstanding the ob-peared before him were the grantors in the jection; to which the defendant excepted. This deed. If he was satisfied of that fact the ruling is made the ground of the first assign-court cannot now inquire into the evidence by ment of error.

The deed offered in evidence was signed, acknowledged and recorded according to the laws of the State of Michigan. It is admitted that there was one witness to the signature of Mr.

which he reached that conclusion. But any difficulty on this subject is removed by the certificate of the clerk of the county of Essex in that State, that said Richter was a master in chancery and a notary public in and for said

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