CORRESPONDENCE BETWEEN SENATOR HENRY M. JACKSON AND THE HONORABLE DONALD M. WILSON, ACTING DIRECTOR, U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, AND THE HONORABLE WILLIAM P. BUNDY, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D.C., November 1, 1963. Hon. EDWARD R. MURROW, DEAR MR. MURROW: As you know, the Senate has given our subcommittee the task of reviewing the administration of national security in Washington and in the field, and of making suggestions for improvement where appropriate. Our approach to this task is professional and nonpartisan. From the start of our inquiry we have been concerned with certain basic problems of coordinating national security policy and operations. As part of our inquiry, we would greatly appreciate a statement from you on some of the key issues of our study. With your special experience and perspective, I believe that you could make a most important contribution to our thinking. We have in mind that your views would be particularly helpful on the following topics: 1. The present administration has made much use of the interagency task force as a device for the day-to-day handling of complex and critical operations. The interagency task force seems to provide one answer to the problem of coordination, at least for critical issues. But the experience has been mixed. Some have been successful; others have been disappointing. The record is extensive enough so that it should be possible to find out why one works but not another. We would welcome any comments you may have as the result of your experience on what distinguishes the more successful task force from the less successful, using examples, if possible, although our interest is of course in the procedural and not the substantive aspects of task force operations. 2. The enormous growth of U.S. oversea programs since 1942 and the division of authority among departments and agencies in Washington has produced large-scale problems of coordination in the field. The historical record indicates a long struggle to put the Ambassador in the driver's seat in U.S. missions abroad. President Kennedy's letter of May 29, 1961, is the most recent action to confirm the Ambassador's authority. We would welcome any comments you may have on what distinguishes the more successful country team operation from the less successful. In general, in other words, we would appreciate your evaluation of what steps might be taken to improve interagency planning and coordination in Washington and in the field. I am enclosing a copy of our initial staff report entitled "Basic Issues," together with the subcommittee's hearings to date, which indicate the kinds of problems we have been examining. It would be most helpful to us if we could have your statement by December 1, together with any materials you might wish to include with it, so that we can benefit from its study during this part of our inquiry, and include it in our formal record. With appreciation for your help in this matter, HENRY M. JACKSON, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and NOTE. A similar letter was addressed to the Honorable William P. Bundy. U.S. INFORMATION AGENCY, Washington, D.C., December 2, 1963. Hon. HENRY M. JACKSON, Chairman, Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations, U.S. Senate. DEAR SENATOR JACKSON: I am happy to respond to your request of November 7, as originally embodied in your letter to Mr. Murrow of November 1. You ask specifically for our views on what distinguishes the successful interagency task force from the less successful, and the successful country team from the less successful. In your initial staff report "Basic Issues," of January 18, 1963, the term "interagency task force” is used to encompass a variety of interdepartmental committees, ranging from groups dealing at the highest level with a single highly critical issue to those constituted to engage broader problems over a continuing time. For the purposes of my comments, I should like to separate the temporary ad hoc task force from the continuing group, whether it be known as task force, working group, or interagency committee. THE AD HOC TASK FORCE In my opinion, the ad hoc task force is a successful procedural device when it meets the following criteria: (1) The issue at hand has a degree of criticality requiring attention at the decisionmaking level. It follows that representation from all agencies and departments concerned must be at a high level. This does not preclude the use of interagency subgroups for integrated staff work at one or even two lower levels. (2) The ad hoc task force must exist only so long and meet only so often as the unfolding situation requires. When conditions permit, it should be disbanded as quickly and definitively as it was formed, and its responsibilities returned to normal channels. (3) The task, the authorities, and the limitations of the task force must be defined with precision, as well as the line of report up and the line of execution down. Failure to define the task, authorities, and limitations may lead to indirection. Imprecision in the line of report up may delay critical decisions. Failure in execution may negate sound decisions. The less successful task force is, conversely, the one lacking these characteristics in whole or in part. I would cite the Berlin Task Force as an example of both the successful and less successful aspects. The Berlin Task Force was convened at a critical time, and met the criteria described above. However, when the critical phase of the confrontation was passed, it was not disbanded. Because it continued to exist in name, agency and departmental officials continued to be specifically assigned to the task force after it ceased to be a full-time job. (At one time USIA had two high-ranking officers assigned full time to the Berlin Task Force, later one, and subsequently the work became a part-time responsibility of our desk officer for German and Austrian affairs.) More important, there was confusion over where responsibility for Berlin rested, with the task force or the appropriate area and country offices. In my opinion, the Berlin Task Force should have been formally dissolved and its responsibilities returned to the regular organization. From our point of view there are two clear conclusions: the device of ad hoc task forces should be used sparingly, and such arrangements should be dissolved formally as soon as conditions permit. CONTINUING INTERAGENCY COMMITTEES The characteristics of the successful continuing interagency committee, whether formalized by Executive order or ad hoc, are similar to the task force but vary in degree: (1) By definition, its work involves a longer time frame. Not all of its policy determinations nor actions have the same degree of urgency, and can be studied and resolved at a more deliberate pace. A high official can chair or participate in several such groups without undue sacrifice to his other duties. More of the basic work can and should be undertaken at staff levels for final action at a higher level. (2) A high level of participation is desirable, but not essential. High-level chairmanship, not lower than an Assistant Secretary of State or the equivalent, is nevertheless essential. A chairman at that level is able to effect a response from other agencies and departments, even though the latter's participants in the group itself may not be able to speak with final authority. An example of this is the Latin American Policy Committee, which has been a singularly effective body since it was set up. I am generally opposed to interagency committees below that level (unless they function as a subgroup to a higher level committee) for two reasons: (a) issues capable of resolution or coordination at that level can normally be resolved or coordinated through the existing executive structure; (b) groups operating well below the decisionmaking level tend to become discussion societies. Their written products, if any, seldom reach the decision stage. The vast bulk of our interagency business, at all levels, is done in regular and more or less traditional channels, day after day, week after week. (3) High-level interest in any successful continuing interagency committee must be sustained. If the representation becomes progressively lower and, worse, if the chairing is left to deputies or assistants, the inevitable tendency is to turn prime attention to what appears to be more pressing business. This is in direct contradistinction to the task force. The problem of the continuing committee is to sustain interest in, and to galvanize the resources of the Government to deal with, stubborn, often perplexing problems which may be with us for years. I would cite as an example of a successful continuing group the Inter-Agency Committee on Youth and Student Affairs. This Committee was established on an ad hoc basis to deal with what the Kennedy administration recognized as a specific, continuing, and growing problem-the widespread anti-American and/or proCommunist orientation of youth and students in many nonbloc countries. The Committee is chaired by the Assistant Secretary of State for Educational and Cultural Affairs. His interest and the interest of other agencies at a high level has been sustained. The results have been substantially stepped up and better coordinated U.S. programs for youth and students abroad, continuing attention to countries where students are an important political factor, assignment of additional student affairs officers overseas, specific coordination of activities within most U.S. missions under a designated coordinator for youth and student activities, and widespread recognition in all affected agencies that this administration is determined to continue the effort as long as necessary. The problem is by no means solved-the program may have to be continued for years-but the machinery to grapple with it is functioning. From our point of view these conclusions may be drawn: (1) The device of a continuing interagency committee should also be used sparingly. (2) Its assignment must be of such proportions as to require high-level attention over a considerable timespan. (3) Its area of activity, its authority, and its limitations must be capable of fairly precise definition. (4) The chairmanship must be at a sufficiently high level to induce adequate responses from participating agencies. (5) Interest must be sustained. THE COUNTRY TEAM My evaluation of the country team operation is based in part on direct observation of our field activities, in part on the reports of my senior colleagues and USIA assistant directors who spend much of their time in the field directly supervising our USIS missions. I am convinced that the success or failure of the country team concept depends primarily on the personality, executive methods, and interests of the chief of mission. Some Ambassadors use the country team effectively as such. Others accomplish the purposes embodied in |