A SUPERSTAFF FOR NATIONAL SECURITY? A "super-Cabinet" official charged with broad responsibilities for national security would, of course, require major staff assistance. Indeed, most proposals for a First Secretary assume he will have the help of a sizable staff. Some who would stop short of the First Secretary concept would nonetheless establish major White House or Executive Office staffs for national security planning and coordination. A representative proposal of this type would replace the present National Security Council staff, the Planning Board, and the Operations Coordinating Board with a Presidential Staff Agency for National Security Affairs. The appeal of such an above-the-department staff agency is readily apparent. Those associated with this Agency could presumably view national security problems "in the round"; their horizons would not be limited to the more parochial perspectives of the departments. And not being burdened with day-to-day operating responsibilities, they could presumably do a better job of long-term planning than their harassed counterparts within the departments. But how much assistance would such an agency give the President? Its plans would lack the coloration, the perspectives, and the realism which come from actual involvement in operating problems. It would be hard to avoid ivory tower thinking. Beyond this, the Agency would create a new layer of planning between the President and the departments and thus insulate and shield him from the full flavor of the planning of responsible operating officials. Such an agency would, of course, be a bureaucratic rival of the historic departments. It seems safe to say the rivalry would be one sided. The Staff Agency would confront the traditional unwillingness of the departments to surrender their own responsibility for policy development and execution. Lacking the autonomy and fixed entrenchments of a departmental base, such an agency could not compete for long, on favorable terms, with State, Defense, or Treasury. The end result, in fact, might be the worst of two possible worlds, with the Staff Agency lacking enough power to give the President effective assistance, but sufficiently powerful nonetheless to meddle in the affairs of the great departments. A President will, of course, need some assistants who concern themselves primarily with national security policy. But such assistants would act as extensions of the President's eyes and ears in a confidential relationship, not as members of a large and highly institutionalized "superstaff." CONCLUSION This study has argued that "super-Cabinet" officers or above-thedepartment "superstaffs" would not ease the problems now faced by the President in setting and maintaining our national course. In fact, such additions to the policy process would make his burdens heavier. Reforms, to be effective, must be made in terms of the real requirements and possibilities of the American governmental system. That system provides no alternative to relying upon the President as the judge and arbiter of the forward course of policy for his administration. It provides no good alternative to reliance upon the great departments for the conduct of executive operations and for the initiation of most policy proposals relating to these operations. Departments possess the statutory authority, the knowledge and experience and the technical staffs needed to advise the President, and the line administrators who alone can implement executive decisions. They will always be the main wellsprings of policy ideas and innovations. Finally, the American system provides no good alternative to reliance on the budget process as a means of reviewing the ongoing activities of the departments and raising periodically for Presidential decision issues of effectiveness in actual performance. But to reject the radical solutions is not at the same time to dismiss the besetting problems in which they have their origin. The problems remain. They cannot be solved by maintaining the status quo. Forthcoming staff reports will make wide-ranging recommendations for changes in the policy process. The promising paths to reform lead in these general directions: First: There are better ways for the President to delegate more authority for decisionmaking to individual heads of departments and agencies. There has been too much emphasis on coordination and too little on delegation. Policymaking has tended to be reduced to a group effort where no single person has real authority to act and where no one individual can be rewarded for success or penalized for failure. In the words of Mr. Robert Lovett: The authority of the individual executive must be restored: The derogation of the authority of the individual in government, and the exaltation of the anonymous mass, has resulted in a noticeable lack of decisiveness. Committees cannot effectively replace the decisionmaking power of the individual who takes the oath of office; nor can committees provide the essential qualities of leadership Second: There are better ways to make the National Security Council a forum for more meaningful debate on issues which the President alone can decide. One should not ask the National Security Council to do what it is not really capable of doing. The Council is an interagency committee: It can inform, debate, review, adjust, and validate. But, as a collective body, the Council cannot develop bold new ideas or translate them into effective action. Yet the Council can still be a highly useful advisory mechanism to a President. The evidence strongly suggests that this role can best be discharged by a Council which has fewer rather than more participants in its meetings; which concerns itself only with issues of central importance for Presidential decision; which works through less, rather than more, institutionalized procedures; which relates its activities more closely to the budgetary process; and which gives the Secretary of State a greater role in the development of broad policy initiatives. Third: There are better ways to enable the Secretary of State to serve the President as first adviser in national security problems. The Secretary of State is the First Secretary of the Government. He should be able to advise the President on the full range of national security matters, from the point of view of their relation to foreign problems and policies. The Secretary of State need not and should not have any legal or supervisory authority over other Cabinet officers. Any moves in this direction would have many of the disadvantages of the "superCabinet" officer proposal. The goal is not to give the Secretary of State greater command authority: it is to enlarge the scope of his guidance and influence. If the President is to ask more, and to get more, from the Secretary of State, the Secretary must be better staffed to offer policy guidance and initiatives across the whole span of national security problems. This does not mean a larger Department of State; it may well mean a smaller one. But it does mean a Department competently staffed with generalists, economists, and military and scientific experts to support the Secretary in understanding and following all fields falling within his broad concern. Fourth: There are better ways to relate military power more closely to foreign policy requirements. The Secretary of Defense shares with the Secretary of State the main burden of advising the President on national security problems. A full and welcome partnership of the Departments of State and Defense is the prerequisite of coherent political-strategic counsel for the President. In viewing the Pentagon, one must guard against seeking organizational solutions for problems which are not really organizational in origin. Yet there are reforms which are promising of results. They point in the direction of more vigorous employment of the broad authority already invested in the Secretary of Defense; more active participation of the Secretary of Defense in the deliberations of the Joint Chiefs of Staff; increased reliance upon the Joint Staff for planning; an acceleration of existing trends toward functional commands; a budgetary process more consonant with the requirements of modern weapons technology; a promotion system which encourages officers to become versed in the broad problems of national security; a Pentagon career service which does more to develop outstanding civilian officials; and selecting for top policy positions only candidates willing to remain in their posts well beyond the period of apprenticeship on their jobs. Fifth: There are better ways to make the budgetary process a more effective instrument for reviewing and integrating programs and performance in the area of national security. There is need to return to the earlier tradition which regarded the budgetary process as a key program management tool of the President. Budget targets should be regarded not primarily as fiscal instruments but as policy instruments. The investigative analyses needed to achieve and adjust these targets must begin and end with substantive concerns and not simply considerations of administrative organization and financial management. Sixth: There are better ways to organize the Presidency to intervene flexibly, imaginatively, and fast where gaps in policy development or execution threaten to upset the President's cardinal objectives. This does not require new and elaborate staff offices or highly institutionalized interdepartmental committees. It calls rather for more discriminating use of able staff assistants right in the immediate office of the President himself who are alert to trouble spots and sensitive to the President's own information needs. Seventh: There are better ways to attract and retain outstanding officials for both appointive and career posts in the national security departments and agencies. Poor decisions often result less from poor organization than from poor policymakers. The one thing which could do the most to improve national security policy would be to raise the standards of excellence among career and appointive officials. The Nation should be grateful for the skill and dedication of those who now man the posts of responsibility in the area of foreign and defense policy. But there is still room for vast improvement in developing and using the rich resources of talent now found among our career officials. There is room for equally great improvement in eliminating the legal and financial problems which now discourage highly qualified private citizens from serving governmental tours of duty. And, above all, there is need to abandon the outmoded conventions which have often deprived an administration of the service of members of the opposite political party. The yardstick for making appointments to key national security posts must be ability to do the job, regardless of party. Specific recommendations for speeding progress in these seven areas, together with suggestions for other reforms of the policy process, will be contained in succeeding staff reports. ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY FRIDAY, JUNE 14, 1963 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3302, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Jackson, Muskie, Pell, Mundt, Javits, and Miller. Also present: Senator McIntyre. Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant. OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN Senator JACKSON. The committee will come to order. This morning our subcommittee opens hearings on the role of the Ambassadors and the missions they head in the conduct of our relations with other countries. The subcommittee's study of this subject forms one part of its broad nonpartisan inquiry into problems of national security staffing and operations. At our first hearings, held earlier this session, three outstanding Americans Gen. Lauris Norstad, the Honorable Averell Harriman, and Prof. Richard E. Neustadt-gave the subcommittee their views on basic issues of national security administration at home and in the field. We will start this phase of our hearings with testimony from two recently retired career Ambassadors-the Honorable Ellis O. Briggs and the Honorable H. Freeman Matthews-both of whom speak with the authority of nearly four decades of distinguished performance in the Foreign Service. In the near future we will hear from other outstanding Ambassadors who are drawn from the career service or are appointees temporarily working for the Government. The initial staff study of January 1963-"Administration of National Security: Basic Issues," and particularly chapter 4 entitled "The Ambassador and the Country Team"-indicates the kind of questions we are concerned with in this part of our inquiry. We are privileged to have as our witness today the Honorable Ellis O. Briggs who has been a member of the Foreign Service of the United States for almost 40 years, and who has served as U.S. Ambassador in seven important posts-the Dominican Republic, Uruguay, Czech 52-721 0-65 -14 |