If career appointees are to constitute a substantial proportion of our Chiefs of Mission, the Foreign Service must produce more senior officers of great ability. One important approach is to give promising officers throughout their career roughly a 50-50 division of service between Washington and the field, thus exposing them regularly to the wider perspectives of American government at home. Other useful steps include: the recent emphasis on more rapid promotion of outstanding younger officers; giving potential Chiefs of Mission consular posts and managerial jobs in operating agencies like AID and USIA-to test their mettle as executives; and reserving the post of deputy chief of mission to potential candidates for ambassadorial assignment. Ambassador Samuel D. Berger made this point to the Subcommittee: The deputy position is the final testing and training ground for Ambassadors, and this assignment should be reserved for officers whose record clearly indicates that they are promising material for ambassadorships. The deputy chief of mission position should not be filled by any officer who is clearly not promising in this respect, nor should it be offered as a reward to an officer for long service, when it is clear that he cannot make the grade to Ambassador. TOURS OF DUTY Experience is a priceless asset, yet it is constantly thrown away by the government's traditional here-today-gone-tomorrow attitude toward Ambassadors. We do not yet make good use of retired Ambassadors who possess particular competence in problems and areas of emerging importance. The government has only begun to tap this special reservoir of skills and experience. The talents of our active Ambassadors are wasted by unduly abbreviated tours. The average tour of duty of Chiefs of Mission is now about 2 years and 10 months-but the shakedown period eats up about a year. In Ambassador Merchant's words: One usually has to be at a post at least a year before one has gotten one's bearings, and established one's relationships, and sensed the important people that you want to cultivate and develop, and established your own rating system for the validity of the information and the soundness of the judgments that you extract, and learned the country and its problems. Testimony to the Subcommittee was unanimous that the average ambassadorial term abroad should be longer-except in hardship posts. Ambassador Briggs said this: No single move in the field of foreign affairs would pay greater dividends than leaving American envoys at their posts for sufficient time to capitalize on their knowledge and their experience. Ideally, 4-year tours for Ambassadors would seem desirable, but the President and Secretary of State need to decide in each individual case when an Ambassador's service in a country passes the point of full effectiveness. In the case of other officers working abroad, the turnover has tended to be too rapid. There is much to be said for 3 to 4 year terms for deputy chiefs of mission so arranged as to overlap with a new Ambassador for a year or so when this seems helpful-for it is highly important to have at least one experienced man in one of these two top jobs. In general, knowledgeable Foreign Service Officers who have special training in a particular area should not be yanked out short of a 3 to 4 year stay. In some posts, our performance has been strengthened by returning an able officer for a second tour of duty at a senior level. Also, a really long-time officer can be useful. As Ambassador Berger expressed it: In many countries it is desirable to keep a superior intermediate officer for longer than 4 years, so that he can develop language facility, wide contacts, and an encyclopedic knowledge of the country that can be tapped by his colleagues. One such long-time officer, with another being readied to take his place when he is transferred, can be invaluable in order to provide continuity in an embassy. A further point: The government should move fast to fill an ambassadorship that becomes vacant. And, above all, the departure of an incumbent should not be announced until the last possible moment, and should be accompanied by the designation of his successor. An Ambassador loses influence from the moment it becomes known that he is leaving-and the longer the gap between then and the arrival of his successor, the more we invite trouble in a world where trouble always seems to be waiting on the doorstep. A GREAT TRADITION The American Foreign Service has a long and proud tradition dating from the diplomacy of Benjamin Franklin for the 13 colonies and continued to the present. Members of the Service have made distinguished contributions to the conduct of our foreign relations despite long periods when the nation was little aware of their existence and paid little heed to their sound advice. As recently as the 30's the nation would have greatly benefited had it listened to the warnings of some of its soldiers and diplomats, and the world might even have been spared what Winston Churchill has called "The Unnecessary War." More recently, our diplomats gave notice of the hardening of Soviet policy, long before Stalin launched the Cold War. At any period the Foreign Service inevitably reflects in some degree the points of view and prejudices characteristic of the times. There are always some members of the Service who cannot keep up with the continuous succession of new problems and new requirements. But our Foreign Service has come a long way in recent years and it has first-rate officers who can hold their own in any company and in any country in the world. In the swift moving currents of the 60's the nation needs as much as it ever has, the cool, professional advice and skill of those Americans who are devoting their lives to the study and practice of diplomacy. HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS OF THE COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS UNITED STATES SENATE EIGHTY-EIGHTH CONGRESS COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS JOHN L. MCCLELLAN, Arkansas, Chairman SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS HUBERT H. HUMPHREY, Minnesota KARL E. MUNDT, South Dakota DOROTHY FOSDICK, Staff Director JUDITH J. SPAHR, Chief Clerk LAUBEL A. ENGBERG, Minority Consultant 12 72 ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY MONDAY, MARCH 11, 1963 U.S. SENATE, SUBCOMMITTEE ON NATIONAL SECURITY STAFFING AND OPERATIONS, COMMITTEE ON GOVERNMENT OPERATIONS, Washington, D.C. The subcommittee met at 10 a.m., pursuant to notice, in room 3302, New Senate Office Building, Senator Henry M. Jackson (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding. Present: Senators Jackson, Pell, Ribicoff, Mundt, Javits, and Miller. Also present: Senators Saltonstall and Goldwater. Staff members present: Dorothy Fosdick, staff director; Robert W. Tufts, chief consultant; Richard S. Page, research assistant; Judith J. Spahr, chief clerk; and Laurel A. Engberg, minority consultant. OPENING STATEMENT OF THE CHAIRMAN Senator JACKSON. The committee will come to order. This is the first public meeting of the Subcommittee on National Security Staffing and Operations. The Senate has charged the subcommittee with the task of reviewing the administration of national security policies and processes in this country and abroad, and of making recommendations for improvement where appropriate. The present subcommittee is a successor to the Subcommittee on National Policy Machinery, and will build on its work. In the 2 years since that subcommittee submitted its main findings, a new administration has taken over the direction and management of national affairs and has made some major changes in national security policies and processes. Difficult administrative problems remain, however, as is to be expected in undertakings as large and complex as any government has had to face. It can be taken for granted that the national security policies and processes of the past need to be adjusted to fit the needs of today and tomorrow. Administrative flexibility and adaptability are therefore important to national security. But institutions-Congress includedresist change. Almost every President has had problems in reforming and reshaping the executive branch so that it could effectively serve as an instrument for the wise development and use of American power and influence. 52-721 0-65——6 |