V. The Modern Ambassador: Executive *** Government has now become gigantic at the very moment in history when time itself is not merely a measure, or a dimension, but perhaps the difference between life and death *** This huge organization would be hard enough to run if authority were given where responsibility was placed. Yet, that frequently is not the case. Robert A. Lovett, Statement before the Senate Subcommittee on Secretary of State Dean Rusk made this comment to officers of the State Department in 1961: If the Department of State is to take primary responsibility for foreign policy in Washington, it follows that the Ambassador is expected to take charge overseas. Because an Ambassador serves as the personal representative of the President and because his primacy in the mission has been affirmed in directives by three Presidents-that might seem to take care of the problem. But it does not. The catch is this: in practice, the primacy of an Ambassador among American representatives is no more fully accepted than the primacy of the State Department with respect to matters administered by other agencies. A military assistance advisory group (MAAG), for example, which is deep in operations and has its own reporting line to the Pentagon, does not welcome an Ambassador stepping between it and the Pentagon on matters of budget, program, personnel, or operations. The political counselors and other members of the diplomatic staff, however, have no line of reporting except through the Ambassador; they are fully dependent on him, and naturally have great interest in supporting him. Other elements fall somewhere between these two positions. USIS is closer to the diplomatic position, while CIA comes closer to the MAAG position, and AID is somewhere in the middle. Important elements of our major missions thus look beyond the Ambassador to intermediate headquarters or Washington for guidance, support, and staff, and their loyalties tend to run in the same direction. This fact was recognized in President Kennedy's 1961 letter to Chiefs of Mission: Needless to say, the representatives of other agencies are expected to communicate directly with their offices here in Washington, and in the event of a decision by you in which they do not concur, they may ask to have the decision reviewed by a higher authority in Washington. The differences of concern and loyalty separating elements in a modern diplomatic mission are the cause of much past difficulty, distracting interagency rivalry, and confusion of effort. They will continue to be a source of trouble. On specific issues, however, an Ambassador's support may be useful and this strengthens his influence. It is also evident that a strong Ambassador can do a great deal to pull a mission together and give the American effort in a country focus and impact. He is the "boss"-if he wants to be and works at it until and unless he is overruled by Washington. THE COUNTRY TEAM Each Ambassador struggles afresh to make the units and people he finds around him work in ways which match his idea of what is needed. Many Ambassadors have found the country team concept a helpful coordinating technique. "Country Team" entered the language via the Clay Paper in 1951-an interdepartmental agreement providing that the Ambassador and the heads of the military and economic aid programs were to "constitute a team under the leadership of the Ambassador." The country team concept was introduced in many embassies during the 50's, and has generally been used to good advantage. The prudent Chief of Mission composes the country team meeting according to his own view of the scope and priorities of the job facing him. If skillfully managed and chaired by strong Ambassadors, country team meetings can be useful to assure regular consultation by an Ambassador with his key civilian and military advisers, to give each adviser his say, and to provide a set procedure for an Ambassador to hear conflicting viewpoints before committing himself. Yet, like other inter-agency committees, some country teams exact a toll by diluting the authority of the Ambassador, obscuring the responsibility for getting things done, slowing decision-taking, and generally wasting time. The itch to get in the act-what Robert Lovett has called the "foulup factor in our equation of performance"plagues the field as well as Washington. It is worth commenting that the purpose of the country team has become at least as much to make the ambassadorship serve the needs of the members of the mission as to make the latter serve the former. In a 1960 circular instruction, Secretary of State Christian A. Herter gave this warning: *** The country team concept which is used to such excellent advantage in many countries as a vehicle of coordination under the leadership of the Ambassador must not be permitted to become a vehicle for decisions which are in the final analysis the responsibility of the Chief of Mission. Wisely, the Department of State has opposed mandatory introduction of the country team technique, on the assumption that Chiefs of Mission should be free to exercise their discretion as to the best coordinating methods for the task in a given country. Where there is an area commander of U.S. forces, for example, a critical factor is the direct relationship between the Ambassador and the commander. It is obvious that a Chief of Mission is not going to interfere in the conduct of campaigns and troop training, but he can help the commander function within general U.S. policy. Speaking of the embassy and U.S. forces in Japan, Ambassador Edwin O. Reischauer made this comment before the Subcommittee: Actually, we have an extremely close relationship. We have a country team which formalizes this relationship, but the essence of it is the fact that the commander of the U.S. forces in Japan *** and I are in very close contact. It is like the traditional school, one person at each end of a log. We are two people at each end of a sofa, and we get together all of the time and talk over each of our problems Similarly, in a country where our Ambassador finds himself dealing with a commander of NATO forces-or United Nations forces-his personal relationship with the commander may be a key to accomplish ment. NEXT STEPS If the Ambassador is to play the supervisory and coordinating role which postwar Presidents have verbally assigned him, the time has arrived to strengthen his hand. The following steps commend themselves: First: Arrangements could be made which permit an Ambassador, as part of a State Department review at Budget Bureau invitation, to comment on proposed annual and supplemental budget and program requests for activities of all departments and agencies affecting his assigned country. He could be permitted to raise objections regarding the foreign policy implications of the programs, where appropriate. This would bring the Ambassador into one of the key coordinative processes in government, the budget process. Such a possibility is now under study in the Executive Branch. The arrangement would reinforce an Ambassador's authority by increasing the dependence of the various mission elements on him. At the same time, such advance information would help him in his forward planning. Second: It should become standard practice to consult with an Ambassador prior to the assignment of key representatives of other agencies to his embassy and prior to the designation of a commander of U.S. forces who will be stationed in the country. Such advance consultation is a sensible form of insurance where the quality of the relationship between an Ambassador and an appointee is a critical factor. Third: President Kennedy's 1961 letter to Chiefs of Mission includes this paragraph: If in your judgment individual members of the Mission are not functioning effectively, you should take whatever action you feel may be required, reporting the circumstances, of course, to the Department of State. To enhance an Ambassador's authority in this connection, Ambassador Merchant made this useful suggestion: *** when an Ambassador is appointed to his post, and periodically when he is back in Washington, I think that he should go around and talk to the heads of the other departments and agencies who have representatives attached to his embassy, and establish the understanding that the head of that other department or agency will without argument withdraw and replace an individual representative of his department or agency if the Ambassador discreetly and privately communicates to him that he is dissatisfied with his performance or his attitude or his cooperation in the mission. *** then you give effectively to representatives of the other agencies a sense of uncertainty as to whether their sole source of future preferment is the head of their own agency. Fourth: Ways should be found to give an Ambassador more freedom to use the good officers in his own mission where they are most needed. Under present practices, with each department and agency staffing its own overseas posts, each Washington headquarters tries to put its best people in its most critical spots around the world. As a result, talents are unevenly distributed and any one mission will have a limited number of first-rate officers. It is obviously important that an Ambassador have considerable flexibility to use his best people in the most urgent tasks. In recent years, Washington agencies, like mother hens, cluck too much when an Ambassador dares reassign one of their chicks. Fifth: Chiefs of Mission should take the lead in jogging Washington to trim excess field staff and consolidate overlapping jobs. In particular, the administrative complement in a mission-often more generous than is needed-should be held down. Understaffing can be the best staffing. If officers have more to do than they can possibly do, they are more likely to do what is important. Sixth: In some missions economic activities can be further integrated. For example, an embassy's economic section and the AID mission can be placed under the direction of a single officer who is both Minister for Economic Affairs and director of the AID mission. This practice has proved its worth in many posts. Seventh: Too many military representatives report directly to the Ambassador-a situation which tends to weaken rather than strengthen their position in the mission. Serious thought should be given to a single Defense Attaché designated by the Department of Defensewho could be an officer of the U.S. military service that was also the most important U.S. service in the country or area-with such assistants as needed from the three services. Eighth: In missions where military problems are important, Foreign Service Officers with relevant experience and other qualifications to assist with politico-military problems are being assigned to the Ambassador, sometimes as special assistants. This appears to be a helpful approach to problems of political-military coordination, and should be encouraged. Ninth: On many fronts our government is seeking to accomplish its goals through regional programs and international agencies, but it has not yet taken adequate steps to relate the American country mission and program (AID, MAAG, USIA and Cultural Exchange) to multilateral efforts. This is a complicated and emotionally charged area that warrants careful appraisal. Tenth: If an Ambassador is to meet his responsibilities, he needs swift, secure and survivable communication with Washington and with our Ambassadors at other posts. But the State Department has been tardy in making use of modern communications equipment and personnel. As things stand, an Ambassador may not have immediate access to as rapid, reliable and sophisticated means of communication as other American elements in his country of assignment. The State Department recently commented: In the fall of 1962 the full pressure of the Cuban crisis overwhelmed the technical capabilities then available leading to the initiation of basic and sweeping improvement in planning and action. A start has been made; much more remains to be done. In designing and operating the National Communications System (NCS), Executive Branch officials should ensure that the needs of our Chiefs of Mission in every part of the world are fully met. VI. The Ambassador in the Nation's Service As the personal representative of the President of the United States *** you are part of a memorable tradition which began with Benjamin Franklin and Thomas Jefferson, and which has included many of our most distinguished citizens. President John F. Kennedy, Letter to American Ambassadors, There is, of course, no ideal Chief of Mission. In the modern circumstances, there is heavy emphasis on the Ambassador as Executive. Strong executive leadership is important. But perhaps the most valuable attributes an Ambassador can possess are the capacity to understand the forces building up in a society and the skill to influence events in some degree in accordance with our national policy. Today, the caliber of our Chiefs of Mission is high. The American people should be thankful for the ability and dedication of those who now head our missions abroad. But there is still room for improvement in matching persons and posts, and in keeping a competent Ambassador on the job long enough for him to become fully effectiveand longer. CAREER AND NONCAREER AMBASSADORS In appointing an Ambassador, there is no good alternative to reliance upon the Secretary of State-working with the Director General of the Foreign Service and other top Department officersto give the President a short slate of candidates for his consideration and choice of a nominee for proposal to the Senate for "advice and consent." Time was when an ambassadorial post was a normal means of rewarding men for their services or contributions to a political party. It has almost passed. Today two out of three Ambassadors have risen through the ranks of the career service, and a substantial proportion of the rest qualify as professionals by virtue of long diplomatic service or experience in closely related fields. The old argument about the merits of career versus noncareer appointments is getting a hollow ring. At present and in future most American Ambassadors will come from the career Foreign Service, although there will continue to be room for noncareer Ambassadors with special qualifications. There is no justification for the appointment of noncareer men and women who lack such qualifications, for there are no "safe" posts left in today's world. In this matter, the occasional exception will prove the rule, and the rule is to choose an individual of unquestioned competence for the particular post. All Embassy posts should be open to the ambition of a professional officer. In this connection Ambassador Bruce commented: *** to have it known that the American Government does not make it possible for a career officer, unless he has outside resources, to be Ambassador to Great Britain, I think, is almost a national shame. Funds should be provided and allocated for maintenance allowances, entertainment, salary, etc. so that no Ambassador need draw on private means to meet the legitimate financial burdens of his post. Again, Congress take note. |