ADMINISTRATION OF NATIONAL SECURITY THE AMERICAN AMBASSADOR I. The Ambassador's Problem I am sorry to know nothing more of the subject than that letter after letter has been written to you thereon, and that the office is in possession of nothing more than acknolegements of your receipt of some of them so long ago as Aug. 1786. and still to add that your letter of Jan. 24. 1791. is the only one received of later date than May 6. 1789. You certainly will not wonder if the receipt of but one letter in two years & an half inspires a considerable degree of impatience. Secretary of State Thomas Jefferson, Letter to William Carmichael, Secretary Jefferson's "impatience" with Mr. Carmichael is not likely to be echoed in 1964. Today the daily volume of telegraphic traffic alone between the State Department and the embassies is more than 400,000 words. The jet plane and electronic communications, on the one hand, and America's world involvements, on the other, have combined to complicate enormously and in part transform the role of American Ambassador. The traditional functions-negotiation, representation, and reporting-have changed because issues can be referred rapidly to Washington, or handled by officers coming from Washington, or decided in Washington in talks with visiting heads of state, prime ministers, foreign ministers, or other high officials. If all roads once led to Rome, all airways now lead to Washington. With respect to negotiation, the role of the modern Ambassador is much reduced often he is but one part of a negotiating team in a complex diplomatic operation. If an issue is of some importance, the matter will probably be handled directly between the Department of State and the Foreign Office, with the Ambassador playing an intermediary or supporting role. When the Ambassador conducts negotiations, he will receive detailed instructions. To be sure, the modern Ambassador is not a mere onlooker-his advice will be sought. Particularly men in remote posts, off diplomacy's beaten tracks, or assigned to countries not at the top level of Washington concern, have some scope in practicing the art of negotiation. Even so the cables run hot and heavy, and it is a far cry from the day when an Ambassador had to operate alone for long periods, guided by his own wisdom and wit, with very general instructions. With respect to representation, it used to be that an Ambassador represented his sovereign at the court of the other sovereign. Now things are different. An Ambassador still has the tedious round of official parties and entertainment. He must still participate in the pomp and ceremony of official life. But he must also hold the hands of newsmen, open doors for businessmen, and attend to visiting Congressmen. Besides, today's Ambassador is expected to get away from the capital and to acquire first-hand knowledge of the country's political, social and economic life. What the people are saying is often more important than the gossip of high society, and his business suits and even more informal attire may wear out sooner than his white tie and tails. Posts, of course, vary greatly. In an emerging African nation, the host government may turn to the American Ambassador for advice on economics, or administration, or military affairs, or even internal political matters which would seldom, if ever, be sought by older and more established governments. In some areas, work with regional and international organizations is an added dimension for American diplomacy. With respect to reporting, 50 years ago it may have been sufficient to cover the affairs of the court and the capital. No more. Now an Ambassador is called upon to view the society as a whole, to analyze the forces working for change, and to relate the problems of his country to wider problems and policies. Hence his reports must penetrate more deeply while the horizon of relevance has widenedand at the same time the number of reporters other than the Ambassador has grown with the number of agencies making up the American establishment. Thus each of the elements of an Ambassador's traditional responsibility has altered. Meanwhile, a new executive role has been laid upon our Ambassadors. Since World War II the American Executive Branch has reproduced itself abroad in something approaching its full panoply of separate agencies-with all that implies in terms of overlapping jurisdictions, incompatible assignments, mutual jealousies, surplus staff, and the ruminations of innumerable committees. Not only State, but AID, USIS, the service attachés (Army, Navy, and Air Force), military assistance advisory groups (MAAGS), CIA, Treasury, Agriculture, science attachés, and the Peace Corps may be found at our major posts. There may also be an area military commander. In Britain, for example, with which we have old ties and many common interests, at least 44 American agencies are represented in the Embassy. In the Soviet Union, where the "court" is still a dominating fact of life, the American mission more nearly resembles the classic embassy with limited tasks. In Korea our involvement is recent but very deep and the American establishment includes sizable American forces and military bases as well as a host of civilian agencies. Except for the Communist bloc and a few small posts where our responsibilities are limited, the number of agencies and operating programs demands on-the-spot coordination and central supervision, lest inter-agency pulling and hauling dissipate American influence. To meet this need Washington has turned to the Ambassador, whose authority is reinforced by his Presidential appointment and diplomatic precedence. Gradually, if unevenly, since World War II, the Truman, Eisenhower, and especially the Kennedy Administrations have tried to build the Ambassador's coordinating role into our tradition and get it accepted in the day-to-day operations of government agencies. But Washington giveth and Washington taketh away. In theory, the Ambassador is now more than primus inter pares. He is the active leader and director of American policies and programs. But practice often falls short, not least because Washington frequently undercuts the leadership and direction it asks him to provide. In principle, our modern Chiefs of Mission are, like the President they serve, chief executives of large complex establishments, and as their other roles have changed-sometimes diminishing-this new executive role has come to the fore. The result may be called the Ambassador's dilemma. One: He is expected to perform his traditional diplomatic functions in a most untraditional setting, with less independence and less policy authority than Ambassadors once exercised-and with far more people under foot; Two: He is expected to contribute to the policy process from the perspective of a single-country mission, while those at home who have to make the policies treat almost nothing as a single-country problem; Three: He is expected to serve as leader and coordinator of his "country team" while lacking power or even much influence over the budgets, the personnel systems, the reporting requirements, and the operating policies of many of the field staffs theoretically subordinate to him. His dilemma places a great burden on an Ambassador and ways must be found to improve and increase the support Washington gives him. II. The President and the Ambassador I have made choice of [John Doe], a distinguished citizen of the United States, to reside near the Government of Your Excellency in the quality of Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary of the United States of America. He is well informed of the relative interests of the two countries and of the sincere desire of this Government to cultivate to the fullest extent the friendship which has so long subsisted between them. My knowledge of his high character and ability gives me entire confidence that he will constantly endeavor to advance the interests and prosperity of both Governments and so render himself acceptable to Your Excellency. President Lyndon B. Johnson, Letter of Credence of an Ambassador to a Chief of State, 1964 An Ambassador is the personal representative of our Chief of State and Government to the Chief of State to whom he is accredited. In fact, however, most Ambassadors have only a remote relation to a President himself and are not recognized as members of his intimate official family. The very multitude of Ambassadors is one of the problems. Since 1960 the number of Chiefs of Mission to other governments has burgeoned over the one hundred mark, and this is too many for any President to know well. A Chief of Mission customarily works in the framework of the State Department; he reports to the Department; his salary and administrative support come from the Department. The source of his instructions is normally the Secretary of State, acting for the President, 52-721 0-655 or, in appropriate cases, an Assistant Secretary of State, acting for the Secretary. This is as it should be. But, in practice, an Ambassador needs status as the President's man. Present and former Ambassadors emphasized in testimony to the Subcommittee that a chief asset an Ambassador can bring to his job is the reputation for having the special confidence and trust of the President. When an Ambassador overseas negotiates, or speaks in private or in public, his audience needs to feel that he has the confidence and speaks with the authority of the President of the United States. It is to the advantage of a President himself to have direct knowledge of his Chiefs of Mission. Under Secretary of State Averell Harriman made this comment to the Subcommittee: The more Ambassadors that the President knows personally and has confidence in, the easier it is for him to act on the advice which comes from that embassy. More Presidential directives stating that the Ambassador is the personal representative of the President are not likely to help. Whatever can be done in this regard by Presidential letter or order has already been accomplished by the successive efforts of the last three Presidents. It is an advantage, of course, when a President has known some of his appointees at an earlier time. But no President is likely to be widely acquainted with members of the Foreign Service, especially with those at the deputy chief of mission (DCM) level who ought to be the main source of candidates. In these circumstances, the Department of State should make a special effort to bring promising career candidates to the personal attention of a President. Fortunately, in our time, good men do not lack occasions to distinguish themselves, to become known to a President, and to win his respect. Beyond that, the Department of State, the White House, and an ambassadorial appointee should cooperate to make the relationship of President and Ambassador more than routine. Hopefully, a President will come to know his key Chiefs of Mission at least as well as he does his top Washington officials and chief military leaders. III. The Modern Ambassador: Diplomat Confidentially, and you must not betray my radical statement, it is a crime the way the higher staffs submerge the staffs and units below them with detailed instructions, endless paper reports and other indications of unfamiliarities with troop doings. I have come almost to feel that my principal duty as a Commander is to be out with the troops protecting them against my own staff * * * I have gotten to the point where the sight of paper inflames me. Brigadier General George C. Marshall, Letter to Major Paul E. The modern Ambassador plies his diplomatic trade with less autonomy than in earlier days. But he is still the spearhead of American influence abroad. A President and a Secretary of State, in setting and maintaining our national course, are heavily dependent upon him for advice and help. And no quantity of messages and visitors from |