been accepted of God, is, in itself, insufficient to establish the divine institution of primitive sacrifice because, agreeably to the apostolic direction, a mere commandment of men may, under certain aspects, be well pleasing to God.

2. The true question, therefore, in the matter of primitive sacrifice, is this: Whether that ordinance, viewed as a commandment of men, could, on just scriptural grounds, have been acceptable to God; when, by the hypothesis, God himself was NOT its

institutor?

To solve this question, we must resort to the apostle's direction, as amplified and exemplified in his account of what he denominates Ethelothrescy or Will-worship.

Now, if we read his account of Will-worship, nothing can be more evident, than that the matter, stigmatized and reprobated by him as offensive to God, is a divinely uncommanded and a humanly self-imposed superstition, deemed by its votaries praiseworthy and meritorious and expressive of a fond humility, and even obligatory upon the conscience*. It is not that decent and orderly arrangement of the public worship of God, which St. Paul enjoins, though he leaves its specific modification to the human prudence * Coloss. ii. 18-23

of the Church: but it is a rank and palpable and gross and unauthorised superstition.

Here then we have a test, by which we may easily settle the case of divinely uncommanded sacrifice.

If divinely uncommanded sacrifice be a decent and reasonable service, then it may be acceptable to God, though nothing more than a mere ordinance of man: but, if it be no better than a self-imposed and unauthorised superstition; then, according to St. Paul's very distinct account of Will-worship, it clearly cannot be pleasing to God. The test, in short, respects the inherent character of divinely uncommanded sacrifice and, to answer the question now before us, we have simply to consider, Whether the inherent character of divinely uncommanded sacrifice be, or be not, essentially and palpably superstitious.

3. To my own apprehension, a gross and unreasonable superstition marks every form and mode of sacrifice, when viewed as not commanded by God.

(1.) As for the rite of expiatory oblation, Mr. Davison himself being judge, it can be deduced neither from the light of nature nor from the principles of reason. Hence, if uncommanded of God, it cannot have been adopted by man, as

N

Mr. Davison justly remarks, until he was fallen under a deplorable superstition *.

(2.) With respect to deprecatory sacrifice, which is built upon the crude notion that God may be bribed by gifts to remit merited punishment, as it was at no time ever sanctioned by the Supreme Governor, so a most offensive superstition is clearly its leading characteristic.

(3.). Nor can the rite of homologetic sacrifice be exempted from a similar imputation. To con fess our sins is a dictate of right reason: and, even if not specially enjoined upon us from above, we may be morally certain, that the performance of such an act would be well pleasing to the Lord. But the matter assumes a very different aspect, when we gratuitously attempt to represent the amount of our confession by the slaughter of an unoffending animal. The scenical representation may very possibly be quite accurate and, by the death of the victim, we may distinctly shew our acknowledgment, that we ourselves merit the death to which we have consigned our dramatic representative. This, however, I take it, is not altogether the point in debate. The real matter is, Whether, save under the influence of mere groundless superstition, we

Inquiry, p. 27, 29.

can imagine, that we are performing a service acceptable to God, when, without a shadow of authority from himself, we slay one of his harmless creatures for no better reason than practically to evince our acknowledgment that death is the meet recompense of our misdoings. Confession itself is a decent and rational service, even if not absolutely commanded of God: but I find it no easy matter consistently thus to designate confessional sacrifice, when, according to our hypothesis, uncommanded by the voice of Heaven.

(4.) It may be thought, that the rite of eucharistic sacrifice at least, whatever may be the case with other modes of oblation, bids fair to be exempt from all just charge of superstition. Gratitude to God is a sentiment which he cannot but approve and to express that gratitude by the free presentation of gifts, out of the substance which he himself has bountifully bestowed upon us, is an act so natural, that, even if not directly commanded by him, we can with no shew of reason brand it by the name of superstition.

The whole of this I readily allow but, unfortunately, such a statement does not meet the precise case before us. That case respects, not gifts simply, but gifts offered up in sacrifice. To present gifts simply to God, as expressive tokens

of our gratitude, is clearly no superstition: but, concerning gifts offered up in sacrifice, we cannot, I fear, safely hazard any such assertion. Gratefully to contribute from our substance for the purpose of promoting God's glory, by relieving the poor, by instructing the ignorant, or by providing the community with suitable and sufficient places of worship, were doubtless an act well pleasing to the Most High: but wantonly to destroy and wastefully to burn upon an altar the entire amount of our gifts, under the gratuitous and unauthorised belief that God will accept an eucharistic sacrifice though uncommanded by himself, as it would effectually preclude all possibility of usefulness, so it seems allied not very remotely to that species of superstition which the Apostle denominates Willworship. If an unauthorised Touch not, taste not, handle not, after the commandments and doctrines of men, be censured, as having a mere specious and unreal shew of wisdom in willworship and humility*: it is not, I think, very easy to exempt, from a similar charge of gratuitous superstition, all divinely uncommanded sacrifice of whatsoever description.

4. After all, should any doubt on this point

*Coloss. ii. 21-23.