conditions with reference to the property in controversy, reciting that no legal title thereto was vested in McFarland, but that it then belonged to C. W. Fogg by virtue of his purchase thereof in delinquent proceedings." But the paper purported to be a disclaimer; it was accepted and treated by the court as a disclaimer; and it was given the full effect of a disclaimer by the award of a judgment thereon giving the land to Curtin. In view of these facts it seems clear to us that the defendant cannot be heard to say that it was not a disclaimer. And manifestly Curtin was not entitled to a judgment in his favor in an ejectment suit against McFarland because, if such be the fact, the title of the latter had been forfeited to the state. [6] It is further held by the learned judge that the District Court ought not to take jurisdiction because the proper remedy of the plaintiff, if any he has, is to go into the state court which rendered the judgment and move to set it aside. The opinion says: "From a review of the federal authorities on this phase of the case, it seems to be well established that federal courts ought not to review, modify, or annul the judgment of a state court, unless such a review is sought on a state of facts dehors the record in the state court." But the judgment here sought to be set aside is entirely regular and valid upon the face of the record. Granted the authority of Thurmond to file the disclaimer, the state court had before it everything needful for the judgment rendered, and there is nothing of record by which that judgment can be impeached. The plaintiff's case rests upon the charge that the disclaimer was filed without authority and has never been ratified. It is not the record in the state court which is called in question, but its judgment is alleged to be unwarranted and invalid for reasons which the record does not disclose or suggest. Nor are we satisfied that the remedy mentioned was available at the time this action was brought. The statute of West Virginia to which the court refers, in saying that McFarland had five years from the date of the judgment in which to move to set it aside, appears to apply only to judgments taken by default, and plainly this was not a default judgment. If there be any other statute of the state under which McFarland could have moved to set aside the judgment, four years after it was rendered, its provisions have not been brought to our attention. But, even if it was open to plaintiff to move in the state court to set aside the judgment, we perceive no reason why he should be required to take that course. As a citizen of another state he had the right to invoke the aid of a federal court to annul the judgment, entered upon a disclaimer filed without authority, which operated to deprive him of his property. A bill in equity was the appropriate remedy, and it cannot be said that resort to it was an interference with the jurisdiction of the state court. This is distinctly held in Robb v. Vos, 155 U. S. 13, 38, 15 Sup. Ct. 4, 12 (39 L. Ed. 52) in which the Supreme Court says: "As the proceedings in the Gugenheim Case were regular upon their face, and extrinsic evidence was required to show their invalidity, we think a court of equity was the proper tribunal to afford effectual relief. Slater v. Maxwell, 6 Wall. 268 [18 L. Ed. 796]; Cocks v. Izard, 7 Wall. 559 [19 L. Ed. 275]; Oelrichs v. Spain, 15 Wall. 211, 228 [21 L. Ed. 43]; Freeman on Judgments, §§ 449, 500. Nor do we think that the contention that for the Circuit Court of the United States to grant such relief would be to interfere with the jurisdiction of the state court, is well founded. Pennover v. Neff, 95 U. S. 714 [24 L. Ed. 565]; Johnson v. Waters, 111 U. S. 640 [4 Sup. Ct. 619, 28 L. Ed. 547]; Arrowsmith v. Gleason, 129 U. S. 86 [9 Sup. Ct. 237, 32 L. Ed. 630].” Upon the record here presented we are of opinion that a case was made out for setting aside the judgment in the ejectment suit, and it follows that the decree dismissing the bill should be reversed. Reversed. (233 Fed. 733) GLOVER et al. v. GLOVER et al. (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. May 2, 1916.) No. 1429. Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina, at Charleston; Henry A. Middleton Smith, Judge. Suit between Francis St. Clair Glover and others and Eunice Glover and others. From a decree for the latter, the former appeal. Affirmed. W. B. Gruber, of Walterboro, S. C., and James Simons, of Charleston, S. C. (Howell & Gruber and Fishburne & Fishburne, all of Walterboro, S. C., Edward W. Hughes, of Charleston, S. C., and Claude E. Sawyer, of Aiken, S. C., on the brief), for appellants. George F. Von Kolnitz, of Charleston, S. C., George F. Von Kolnitz, Jr., of Spartanburg, S. C., and J. M. Moorer, of Walterboro, S. C. (Padgett & Moorer, of Walterboro, S. C., on the brief), for appellees. Before PRITCHARD, KNAPP, and WOODS, Circuit Judges. WOODS, Circuit Judge. By stipulation the questions involved in this case are decided by the opinion filed in No. 1406, Glover et al. v. Bradley et al., 233 Fed. 721, 147 C. C. A. 487. Affirmed. (233 Fed. 733) In re VIDAL, In re RAMIREZ-QUIÑONES. (Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit. May 23, 1916.) 1. BANKRUPTCY No. 1148. 350-STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-STATES-"STATE." Under Bankr. Act July 1, 1898, c. 541, § 64b (5), 30 Stat. 563 (Comp. St. 1913, § 9648), declaring that debts owing to any person, who by the laws of the states or the United States is entitled to priority, shall have priority and be paid in full out of the bankrupt estate, the word "state," in view of section 1, cl. 24 (section 9585), declaring that it shall include territories, includes Porto Rico, and so one entitled to priority by Porto Rican laws is entitled to priority under the Bankruptcy Act. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 537; Dec. Dig. 350. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, State.] For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes 2. BANKRUPTCY 350-PRIORITY-PREFERENCE CLAIMS. Under Civ. Code Porto Rico, § 1825 (4) a, declaring that preference shall be given to indebtedness which, without a special privilege, appears in a public instrument, a debtor, by authenticating and acknowledging notes by notarial deed, cannot secure priority for the payment of such notes. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 537; Dec. Dig. 350.] 3. BANKRUPTCY 9(2)—STATUTE-EFFECT ON LOCAL LAWS. Under Organic Act April 12, 1900, c. 191, § 14, 31 Stat. 80 (Comp. St. 1913, § 3762), declaring federal statutes not locally inapplicable effective in Porto Rico, local laws relating to distribution of insolvent estates are unavailing, in so far as the matter is governed by the Bankruptcy Act, and those provisions contrary to the act are of no effect. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 8; Dec. Dig. ~~9(2).] Civ. Code Porto Rico, § 1825 (4) a, declaring that preference shall be given to indebtedness which, without a special privilege, appears in a public instrument, is part of a comprehensive system for distributing the estates of insolvents, the preferences provided for being different from the priorities created by the Bankruptcy Act, in that they establish various classes of claims which are to be paid in varying orders. Bankr. Act, § 64b (5), while giving preference to liens created by local laws, does not discriminate between such liens. Held that, in the distribution of the estate of a bankrupt, the Bankruptcy Act alone governs, and, though they be treated as not repealed by Organic Act April 12, 1900, making the Bankruptcy Act applicable to Porto Rico, isolated provisions of the Porto Rico Civ. Code, as the above section, do not apply. [Ed. Note.-For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 537; Dec. Dig. 350.] On a petition to revise, in matter of law, an order of the District Court in bankruptcy, a finding of the District Court cannot be reviewed, where the evidence was not preserved. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. § 929; Dec. Dig. 446.] 6. BANKRUPTCY 159 "PREFERENCES"-WHAT CONSTITUTES. Section 1825(4) a of the Porto Rico Code, relating to acknowledgment of notes by notarial seal, if resorted to by a creditor and an insolvent debtor within four months of his bankruptcy, for the purpose of defeating and evading the provisions of the Bankruptcy Act, cannot be recognized as establishing a priority in such creditor's favor. [Ed. Note. For other cases, see Bankruptcy, Cent. Dig. §§ 247, 248, 262, 268-281; Dec. Dig. 159. For other definitions, see Words and Phrases, First and Second Series, Preference.] Petition to Revise in Matter of Law the Proceedings of the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico; Hamilton, Judge. In the matter of the bankruptcy of Felipe Ramírez-Quiñones. Ermelindo Vidal, having been denied priority by the District Court of the United States for Porto Rico, petitions to revise the proceedings in matter of law. Petition dismissed, and order affirmed. See, also, 230 Fed. 603, 145 C. C. A. 13. Harry F. Besosa, of San Juan, Porto Rico, for respondent. For other cases see same topic & KEY-NUMBER in all Key-Numbered Digests & Indexes Before DODGE and BINGHAM, Circuit Judges, and ALDRICH, District Judge. DODGE, Circuit Judge. Felipe Ramírez-Quiñones was adjudged bankrupt by the District Court in Porto Rico, March 3, 1915, upon his voluntary petition filed February 28, 1915. A claim against his estate for $5,987.49, presented by the petitioner, has been allowed as an ordinary creditor's claim. The petitioner sought to have it allowed as a claim having priority under section 64b (5) of the Bankruptcy Act; but the referee held it not entitled to such priority. On review, the District Court affirmed the referee, of which decision and order the petitioner now seeks revision in matter of law by this court. The petitioner's proof of claim as presented to and allowed by the referee is not before us in the record. It appears from the referee's certificate to the District Court to have been based on certain promissory notes payable to the petitioner, given him by the bankrupt, and aggregating $5,442.85 in original amount. The record does not show how many notes there were, nor their separate dates and amounts. [1] Section 64b (5) includes among debts to have priority and to be paid in full out of bankrupt estates, "debts owing to any person who by the laws of the states or the United States is entitled to priority." "States," as here used, includes territories, according to section 1 (24); and it is not disputed that if the petitioner is entitled to "priority" by the laws of Porto Rico in respect of his debt, in the sense in which section 64b (5) uses the term, the debt is within the provisions of that section. [2] The petitioner's alleged right to priority is based by him solely on section 1825 (4) a of the Revised Civil Code of Porto Rico, which, as he has set it forth in his petition, is as follows: "Sec. 1825. With regard to all other personal and real property of the debtor, preference shall be given to: * (4) Indebtedness which without a special privilege appear (a) in a public instrument." In his petition he alleges that the promissory notes referred to "had been authenticated and acknowledged by said bankrupt debtor" by “a certain notarial deed executed by the bankrupt herein and your petitioner on the 21st day of November, 1914," and annexed to his proof of claim in bankruptcy. The "notarial deed" here mentioned does not appear in the record, any more than the proof of claim to which the petitioner says it was annexed. But the trustee in bankruptcy in his answer to the petition, filed in this court December 10, 1915, has admitted that the petitioner did at the first creditors' meeting file "a proof of claim for $5,987.49 against the estate of the bankrupt herein, attaching to his said proof of claim a certain notarial deed executed by the bankrupt, Felipe Ramírez-Quiñones (his father-in-law), and the said Ermelindo Vidal, on the 21st day of November, 1914, whereby certain promissory notes in favor of the said Ermelindo Vidal, of different maturity dates and for a total sum of $5,442.85 had been authenticated and acknowledged by his father-in-law, the said bankrupt herein." The answer denied the further allegation of the petition that said authentication and acknowledgment of the notes aforesaid was in ac cordance with section 1825, subd. 4, par. (a) of the Code, and averred that: "On the contrary, they are directly and expressly in contravention of said section and of the laws of Porto Rico." 1. In his opinion, the learned District Judge states as one reason for his decision denying priority to the petitioner's debt, the following: "(3) It has also been decided in this court (Re Juan Boucet), January 4, 1915, that the Civil Code (section 1825 [4] a), does not apply to promissory notes. Promissory notes are covered by the Code of Commerce, and not by the Civil Code, and merely reciting them in an instrument executed before a notary does not change the obligation in any respect. No new obligation is created. To come within the meaning of section 1825 (4) a, there must be an instrument for a present consideration which creates some right. Unless this is so, the transaction is not protected under the terms of the Bankruptcy Act as to local liens." If, as above held, section 1825 (4) a of the Porto Rico Code is not applicable to promissory notes, there is nothing to support the petitioner's claim to priority, and we need not inquire further as to the true meaning or proper application of the section. While the petition assigns the above ruling as an alleged error of the District Court (paragraph D), and the trustee in bankruptcy denies that the ruling was erroneous in his answer to the petition (paragraph 11), little or no reference to the ruling has been made by either party in the briefs filed or the arguments; nor have we been furnished with any report of the decision in Re Juan Boucet mentioned by the District Judge. The petitioner can hardly be said to have attempted to show that the District Court was wrong in ruling as it did upon this point. We find the mere terms of section 1825 (4) a, as submitted to us, insufficient to satisfy us that the Porto Rican law really permits the payee of a note to secure its payment in preference to claims of the maker's other creditors merely by agreement with him to that effect made and recorded before a notary. In this case, as also appears from the opinion, the notes were due when the agreement relied on was so made and recorded. [3, 4] 2. In the next place, even if section 1825 (4) a is capable of application to promissory notes, and the maker's indebtedness may by virtue of it become entitled to "preference" under such circumstances by Porto Rican law, the petitioner does not satisfy us that the "preference" so obtained is the equivalent of "priority" within the meaning of the Bankruptcy Act. Title XVII of the Porto Rican Code, which includes section 1825, deals with "Concurrence and Preference of Credits." In its three chapters the application of a bankrupt's assets to the payment of creditors' claims is regulated according to an elaborate and complete system, differing widely from that established by the Bankruptcy Act. Chapter I (sections 1812-1821), "General Provisions," relates to the institution and effect of bankruptcy proceedings. Chapter II (sections 1822-1826), "Classification of Credits," prescribes an order in which debts of various kinds are to rank for payment out of various classes of assets forming the estate to be distributed. Section 1823 provides that the various kinds of debts mentioned shall have "preference," with |