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STATEMENT OF DR. WM. H. WILSON. Dr. WILSON. I thought, Mr. Chairman, I might have something to say; it has been said for me and I feel that if I should make any effort to say anything I might detract from what has preceded me. I shall not use the whole 10 minutes allotted me, making reference to but three things and to them only in passing. The three things I would mention in part are these: In the first place the bill brought before you, as I understand, from its reading, has as its reason for being the assumption that the Negro has concluded there is no justice in America; that you will not do the right thing; will not live up to your laws and will not abide by the Constitution and its amendments. Thus the Negro must leave America because you do not intend to be just. I am unwilling to agree that you gentlemen have any such idea. I do not believe you mean to be hypocrites; that you intend to disavow the country's laws. I am sure, therefore, you will consider no such bill as this.
Mr. DYER. You will understand that there is no such bill as that before us.
Dr. WILSON. I thank you and am very glad to know it is not pending and hope it will never be, even prospective. I had three things to mention, but will now mention only two; that is, one other. Yesterday, before another Judiciary Committee, I heard a report from the Department of Justice on the cause of race riots and Negro unrest in America. It said that these riots had their origin largely in the fact that the I. W. W. was doing its utmost among the Negroes to make them a force against the white nian in America. This is an immaterial factor in the Negroes' discontent. It arises from the fact that the laws and custonis of America as applied to him, are different from those applied to other Americans. He resents being made less than an American, and enjoying less than the protection guaranteed by Anierican laws. I feel that it is possible for the Negro to have Americanization in America as the law stands to-day, becauso I can not conceive that the white man will forever insist that Negroes pay taxes and have no representation; abide by the law but not profit by it, support the Nation, but not be protected by it, and give their all without receiving a commensurate return.
I am bound to believe that insofar as the Negro is concerned his only concern in race riots is the fact that he is being made to feel that he has no hope but that which is in himself. Governments too often offer him no protection and he is forced to the protection of himself and it is unwise to expect that he will not do so. You tell us that the man who will not protect himself is no man. We are putting your teaching into practice. There exists no reason for a consideration of this proposition. The Constitution and the laws which do not abrogate it when obeyed make it possible for all Americans to thrive in contentment in America.
STATEMENT OF REV. R. D. JONES. Rev. Jones. I represent the Ethiopians of Abyssinia. Until there is a consul established here I am the agent of the Ethiopians who are coming here. I saw that Congressman Mason was trying to gather facts. I have been there for 14 years and have some knowledge relative to Liberia, Africa, Ethiopia, and Abyssinia, but I can not give them to you in three minutes. It is a question that this body should give time to consider. The Abyssinians are coming here next month. They are coming here in order that there may be better relations established between this country and Liberia. How many men are there that know that Jesus Christ came from the Hamitic family; that Solomon was married to the Queen of Sheba ? I desire to give information to this committee so that when these Abyssinians conie here you will have the facts, but I can not do so in the time at your disposal.
FURTHER STATEMENT OF MR. MADDEN. Mr. MADDEN. I am astonished at the gentleman who got up here succeeding me. I have stated that when education was introduced among the Negroes and understood by him common sense would do away with race riots, but to take from the Negro his privileges and debar him from them and you are only putting flame to smoking flax. This is not an individual movement; it is a race movement, and I feel safe in saying that 90 per cent of the Negro people would join in it.
Mr. DYER. Will you submit with your statement to this committee the names of any colored people in this town who are in favor of your proposition? I represent a colored district in St. Louis and have had letters from many of them.
(The committee thereupon adjourned.)
SEGREGATION AND ANTILYNCHING.
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY,
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,
Washington, D. C., Thursday, January 29, 1920. The committee met at 10.30 o'clock a. m., Hon. Andrew J. Volstead
Mr. DYER. Mr. Chairman, this hearing is called for the consideration of some bills before the committee touching the question of the enactment of a law to punish those who participate in lynchings or mob riots. There are three bills before the committee. One is by Mr. Moores of Indiana, which is H. R. 11873; there is one, H. R.
259, introduced by myself.
I do not care to take the time of the committee in calling attention to the features of my bill. Mr. Moores of Indiana is here and also Mr. Dallinger, and perhaps they would like to say a word about their bills before we take up the hearings generally.
The CHAIRMAN. Do you care to be heard at this time, Mr. Dallinger?
Mr. DALLINGER. Certainly; if it is agreeable, Mr. Chairman.
STATEMENT OF HON. FREDERICK W. DALLINGER, A REPRE
SENTATIVE IN CONGRESS FROM THE STATE OF MASSACHUSETTS.
Mr. DALLINGER, I will state that the bill which I introduced is very similar, almost identical, to the one introduced by Mr. Dyer. I did not know Mr. Dyer had introduced his bill in this Congress. Both of these measures, H. R. 259 and 4123, are substantially the bill that was drafted by Hon. William H. Moody at the time he was a Member of Congress. Mr. Moody was one of the leading lawyers of the United States and was, as you know, Attorney General of the United States and later Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States. He believed that this bill was constitutional. The first section reads:
That the putting to death within any State of any citizen of the United States by a mob or riotous assemblage of three or more persons openly acting in concert, in violation of law and in default of protection of such citizen by the officers thereof, shall be deemed a denial to such citizen by that State of the equal protection of the laws and a violation of the peace of the United States and an offense against the same.
In other words, it is based, as I understand, upon the provision of the fourteenth amendment of the Constitution, which guarantees to
Miederal la rotect
every citizen of the United States the equal protection of the laws and denies or prohibits the passage of any law by any State denying the equal protection of the laws.
The CHAIRMAN. Simply the fact that a State did not take any action to protect him is supposed to be sufficient?
Mr. DALLINGER. Yes, Mr. Chairman, that is the ground on which it is made a Federal offense.
Mr. SCANERS. Mr. Dallinger, does your bill go to the extent that this Federal law would be applicable in the event the State made no effort to protect? Would not the fact that the State did not protect, regardless of the question of whether an effort was made or not, give the Federal court jurisdiction under the bill ?
Mr. DALLINGER. The section reads in default of protection.
Mr. SUWNERS. Do you consider default to mean the absence of an effort to protect, or in the absence of protection?
Mr. DALLINGER. I should say in the absence of protection.
Mr. SUWNERS. That is what I thought. That is the way I construe the bill; the fact that a man was lynched, the issue of whether or not an effort was made to protect would not be involved?
Mr. DALLINGER. Of course there might be some insincere efforts to protect.
Mr. SCANERS. Yes, I understand. I was asking for information, purely; I was just trying to get at the legal status.
· The CHAIRMAN. Take, for instance, where a sheriff tries to protect and fails, he is overawed; would this afford any protection ?
Mr. SUMNERS. He may be shot and the prisoner taken away from him.
Mr. DALLINGER. I think it would; I do not think that would be protection. If a community where those things are occurring does not give to the sheriff and the officers of the law the protection which
that there is the equal protection to which every citizen is entitled.
Mr. HUSTED. Does not default of protection mean the default of adequate protection ?
Mr. DALLINGER. I think so, sir.
Mr. IGOE. Have you examined the authorities and decisions under the fourteenth amendment, Mr. Dallinger, as to the extent of the authority of the United States in the way of legislation under that amendment?
Mr. DaLLINGER. I do not think this matter has ever come up or ever been passed upon—this particular phase of it.
Mr. IGOE. Yes, I recall one case; I can not put my hand on it now, but a case came up from Alabama. There was one case that arose; I think it came up in the Federal court for the District, perhaps in the Court of Appeals, which indicated that Congress might go pretty far, and subsequently there was a case that came up from Alabama. I can not recall just now what the case is, but it seemed to overrule that District case or to overrule at least the reasoning of that case. And I wondered if you had those authorities. I will find it after awhile.
Mr. HUSTED. There is a case in 184 U. S., holding that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws means no person or class of per
sons shall be denied the same protection of the laws which is enjoyed by other citizens or other classes in the same places and under like circumstances. The equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of the equal laws and does not subject the individual to the arbitrary exercise of the power of the Government.
Mr. IGOE. This case I have in mind was a case which came up from Alabama. I do not know just the point that was involved, but I will look it up and find it. I thought maybe you had it there.
Mr. DYER. I have made an investigation and have some authorities. I submit the following:
The early theory that the United States has no police power, so called, or power to protect life or punish crimes of violence within the States, is already superseded by judicial decision. It is now determined by the highest authority that the United States has such power, when a Federal right or duty is invaded or involved. This principle is neither new nor startling, though modern applications of it have attracted attention. For example, it is now held that the United States, by the hand of its marshal, may lawfully kill one who assaults a Federal judge traveling through a State in the course of his duty, and that the State can not hold the marshal to account for such killing (in re Neagle, 135 U. S., 1); and that the United States may punish, as for murder, one who kills a prisoner in the custody of a Federal officer within a State (Logan v. United States, 144 U. S., 263). The principle is that the persons so assailed are within the peace of the United States; that the United States owes them the duty of protection, and that the power of protection follows upon the duty.
The equality clause of the fourteenth amendment forbids the States to deny to any person within their jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. This clause is judicially held to confer immunity from any discrimination as a Federal right. The protection which the State extends to one person must be extended to all. It does not forbid discrimination merely in the making of laws, but in the equal protection which the laws are designed to afford. Forbidding the State to deny equal protection is equivalent to requiring the State to provide it. Equal protection is withheld if a State fails to provide it, and the guaranteed immunity is infringed. The constitutional requirement may be violated by acts of omission no less than by acts of commission. The omission of the proper officers of the State to furnish equal protection in any case is the omission of the State itself, since the State can act only by its officers. (Tenn. v. Davis, 100 U. S., 257, 266; Strauder v. W. Va., 100 U. S., 303, 306, 310; Va. v. Rives, 100 U.'S., 313, 318; Ex parte Va., 100 U. S., 339, 345; U. S. v. Harris, 106 U. S., 629, 639; Civil Rights Cases, 109 U. S., 3, 13, 23; Ex parte Yarbrough, 110 U. S., 651, 660 et seq.; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S., 356, 373; Baldwin v. Franks, 120 Ú. S., 683 and (Harlan, J.) 700; In re Coy, 127 U. S., 731; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S., 442, 447.) It would seem to follow that when a citizen or other person is put to death by a lawless mob, in default of the protection which the State is bound to provide for all alike, there is a denial of equal protection by the State, in the sense of the equality clause, which Congress may prevent or punish by legislation applying to any individuals who participate in or contribute to it, directly or indirectly
The United States has, as all governments have, a political and legal interest in the lives of its citizens. If it had not full power to protect them in their lives within the States as it has elsewhere, it can be, as already observed, only because that duty rests solely upon the States. If so, it is a duty owed to the United States as well as to individual citizens. It would seem that open and notorious neglect or omission of this duty on the part of the State, by suffering lawless mobs to murder citizens for want of legal protection, may be declared an offense against the United States, and if so, that the United States may punish all persons who contribute to it.
Section 5508 of the Revised Statutes, which is taken from the act of May 31, 1870, is as follows:
"If two or more persons conspire to injure, oppress, threaten, or intimidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any privilege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, or because of his having so exercised the same, or if two or more persons go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of another, with intent to prevent or hinder his free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privilege so secured, they shall be fined not more than $5,000 and imprisoned not more than 10 years, and shall, moreover, be ineligible to any office or place of honor, profit, or trust created by the Constitution or laws of the United States."
A part of section 1980 of the Revised Statutes is as follows: