time?"-North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-2; Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, Georgia, no-8.

On the question, "Shall the Executive continue for seven years?" It passed in the negative,-* Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-3; * New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, no-5; Massachusetts, North Carolina, divided.

Mr. KING was afraid we should shorten the term too much.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS was for a short term, in order to avoid impeachments, which would be otherwise necessary.

Mr. BUTLER was against the frequency of the elections. Georgia and South Carolina were too distant to send electors often.

Mr. ELLSWORTH was for six years. If the elections be too frequent, the Executive will not be firm enough. There must be duties which will make him unpopular for the moment. There will be outs as well as ins. His administration, therefore, will be attacked and misrepresented.

Mr. WILLIAMSON was for six years. The expense will be considerable, and ought not to be unnecessarily repeated. If the elections are too frequent, the best men will not undertake the service, and those of an inferior character will be liable to be corrupted.

On the question for six years,—Massachusetts, Connecticut, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Maryland,

In the printed Journal, Connecticut, no: New Jersey, aye.

Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-9; Delaware, no.

Adjourned.

FRIDAY, JULY 20TH.

In Convention,-The proposed ratio of Electors for appointing the Executive, to wit: one for each State whose inhabitants do not exceed two hundred thousand, &c., being taken up,

Mr. MADISON observed that this would make, in time, all or nearly all the States equal, since there were few that would not in time contain the number of inhabitants entitling them to three Electors; that this ratio ought either to be made temporary, or so varied as that it would adjust itself to the growing population of the States.

Mr. GERRY moved that in the first instance the Electors should be allotted to the States in the following ratio: to New Hampshire, one; Massachusetts, three; Rhode Island one; Connecticut, two; New York, two; New Jersey, two; Pennsylvania, three; Delaware, one; Maryland, two; Virginia, three; North Carolina, two; South Carolina, two; Georgia, one.

On the question to postpone in order to take up this motion of Mr. GERRY, it passed in the affirmative, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-6; Connecticut, New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, no-4.

Mr. ELLSWORTH moved that two Electors be allotted to New Hampshire. Some rule ought to be

pursued; and New Hampshire has more than a hundred thousand inhabitants. He thought it would be proper also to allot two to Georgia.

Mr. BROOM and Mr. MARTIN moved to postpone Mr. GERRY'S allotment of Electors, leaving a fit ratio to be reported by the Committee to be appointed for detailing the Resolutions.

On this motion,-New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, aye-3; Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, no-7.

Mr. HOUSTON seconded the motion of Mr. ELLSWORTH to add another Elector to New Hampshire and Georgia.

On the question,-Connecticut, South Carolina, Georgia, aye-3; Masssachusetts, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, Delaware, Maryland, Virginia, North Carolina, no-7.

Mr. WILLIAMSON moved as an amendment to Mr. GERRY'S allotment of Electors, in the first instance, that in future elections of the National Executive the number of Electors to be appointed by the several States shall be regulated by their respective numbers of representatives in the first branch, pursuing as nearly as may be, the present proportions. On the question on Mr. GERRY's ratio of Electors, Massachusetts, Connecticut, Pennsylvania, Virginia, North Carolina, South Carolina, aye-6; New Jersey, Delaware, Maryland, Georgia, no-4.

On the clause, " to be removable on impeachment and conviction for malpractice or neglect of duty," (see the ninth Resolution),—

281

Mr. PINCKNEY and Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS moved VOL. I.-73

Mr.

to strike out this part of the Resolution. PINCKNEY observed, he ought not to be impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. DAVIE. If he be not impeachable whilst in office, he will spare no efforts or means whatever to get himself re-elected. He considered this as an essential security for the good behaviour of the Executive.

Mr. WILSON Concurred in the necessity of making the Executive impeachable whilst in office.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS. He can do no criminal act without coadjutors, who may be punished. In case he should be re-elected, that will be a sufficient proof of his innocence. Besides, who is to impeach? Is the impeachment to suspend his functions? If it is not, the mischief will go on. If it is, the impeachment will be nearly equivalent to a displacement; and will render the Executive dependent on those who are to impeach.

Colonel MASON. No point is of more importance than that the right of impeachment should be continued. Shall any man be above justice? Above all, shall that man be above it who can commit the most extensive injustice? When great crimes were committed, he was for punishing the principal as well as the coadjutors. There had been much debate and difficulty as to the mode of choosing the Executive. He approved of that which had been adopted at first, namely, of referring the appointment to the National Legislature. One objection against Electors was the danger of their being corrupted by the candidates, and this furnished a peculiar reason in favor of impeachments whilst in office. Shall

the man who has practised corruption, and by that means procured his appointment in the first instance, be suffered to escape punishment by repeating his guilt?

Doctor FRANKLIN was for retaining the clause as favorable to the Executive. History furnishes one example only of a First Magistrate being formally brought to public justice. Every body cried out against this as unconstitutional. What was the practice before this, in cases where the Chief Magistrate rendered himself obnoxious? Why, recourse was had to assassination, in which he was not only deprived of his life, but of the opportunity of vindicating his character. It would be the best way, therefore, to provide in the Constitution for the regular punishment of the Executive, where his misconduct should deserve it, and for his honorable acquittal, where he should be unjustly accused.

Mr. GOUVERNEUR MORRIS admits corruption, and some few other offences, to be such as ought to be impeachable; but thought the cases ought to be enumerated and defined.

Mr. MADISON thought it indispensable that some provision should be made for defending the community against the incapacity, negligence, or perfidy of the Chief Magistrate. The limitation of the period of his service was not a sufficient security. He might lose his capacity after his appointment. He might pervert his administration into a scheme of peculation or oppression. He might betray his trust to foreign powers. The case of the Executive magistracy was very distinguishable from that of the Legislature, or any other public body, holding