The Constitution As Political StructureOxford University Press, 1995 M01 5 - 240 páginas Over the last forty years modern constitutional scholarship has concentrated on an analysis of rights, while principles of constitutional law concerning the structure of government have been largely downplayed. The irony of this interpretive emphasis is that the body of the Constitution contains relatively little dealing directly with rights. Rather, it is primarily a blueprint for the establishment of a complex form of federal-democratic structure. This work emphasizes the central role served by the structural portions of the Constitution. Redish argues that these structural values were designed to provide the framework in which our rights-based system may flourish, and that judicial abandonment of these structural values threatens the very foundations of American political theory. |
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Resultados 1-5 de 33
Página vii
... Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory , " by Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar , 41 Duke Law Journal 449 ( 1991 ) . Chapter 5 , however , is completely new , and , as already noted , the other chapters represent ...
... Pragmatic Formalism in Separation of Powers Theory , " by Martin H. Redish and Elizabeth J. Cisar , 41 Duke Law Journal 449 ( 1991 ) . Chapter 5 , however , is completely new , and , as already noted , the other chapters represent ...
Página ix
... Pragmatic Formalism and Separation of Powers , 99 5. Legislative Delegation , Pragmatic Formalism , and the Values of Democracy , 135 6. Conclusion : Liberalism , Constitutional Theory , and Political Structure , 163 Notes , 167 Table ...
... Pragmatic Formalism and Separation of Powers , 99 5. Legislative Delegation , Pragmatic Formalism , and the Values of Democracy , 135 6. Conclusion : Liberalism , Constitutional Theory , and Political Structure , 163 Notes , 167 Table ...
Página 9
... pragmatic formalism " —one that rejects the constraints that flow from an all - or - nothing approach to constitutional interpretation . By this I mean that one need not -- and should not be forced to make a choice be- tween rigid ...
... pragmatic formalism " —one that rejects the constraints that flow from an all - or - nothing approach to constitutional interpretation . By this I mean that one need not -- and should not be forced to make a choice be- tween rigid ...
Página 10
... pragmatic concerns . The concept of " pragmatic formalism " will be explained in greater detail in the subsequent discussions of the concept's practical operation.34 Suffice it to note at this point that both textualism and principled ...
... pragmatic concerns . The concept of " pragmatic formalism " will be explained in greater detail in the subsequent discussions of the concept's practical operation.34 Suffice it to note at this point that both textualism and principled ...
Página 98
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Contenido
3 | |
2 Federalism the Constitution and American Political Theory | 23 |
3 The Dormant Commerce Clause and the Constitutional Balance of Federalism | 63 |
4 Pragmatic Formalism and Separation of Powers | 99 |
5 Legislative Delegation Pragmatic Formalism and the Values of Democracy | 135 |
Liberalism Constitutional Theory and Political Structure | 163 |
Notes | 167 |
Table of Cases | 223 |
Index | 227 |
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Términos y frases comunes
action American political theory analysis argued argument Article Articles of Confederation authority basis Choper commerce power common law concept Congress congressional Constitution's text constitutional text decision democratic discussion in chapter discussion infra discussion supra dormant Commerce Clause dual federalism effectively enact enforcement enumerated powers exclusive executive branch executive power exercise federal courts federal government federal power federal system Federalist footnote omitted Framers function goals governmental Herbert Wechsler imposed inherent interpretation invalidation issues judicial review judiciary jurisdiction Justice Korematsu League of Cities legislative power limited Madison majoritarian Martin H ment Montesquieu National League Necessary-and-Proper Clause nondelegation doctrine normative originalist policy choices political commitment principle power to regulate pragmatic formalism president Privileges-and-Immunities Clause Professor prohibition protection reason Redish regulate interstate commerce rejected representative require role separation of powers separation-of-powers statute substantial supra note Supreme Court t]he Tenth Amendment tion tional tive tutional U.S. Const undermines United voters Wickard
Pasajes populares
Página 50 - We admit, as all must admit, that the powers of the government are limited, and that its limits are not to be transcended. But we think the sound construction of the constitution must allow to the national legislature that discretion, with respect to the means by which the powers it confers are to be carried into execution, which will enable that body to perform the high duties assigned to it, in the manner most beneficial to the people.
Página 68 - In imposing taxes for state purposes they are not doing what congress is empowered to do. Congress is not empowered to tax for those purposes which are within the exclusive province of the states.
Página 208 - The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, self-appointed, or elective, may justly be pronounced the very definition of tyranny.
Página 68 - They form a portion of that immense mass of legislation which embraces everything within the territory of a State not surrendered to the General Government; all which can be most advantageously exercised by the States themselves.
Página 51 - Let the end be legitimate, let it be within the scope of the Constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consistent with the letter and spirit of the Constitution, are constitutional.
Página 179 - The adversaries of the Constitution seem to have lost sight of the people altogether in their reasonings on this subject; and to have viewed these different establishments not only as mutual rivals and enemies, but as uncontrolled by any common superior in their efforts to usurp the authorities of each other.
Página 70 - Whatever subjects of this power are in their nature national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may justly be said to be of such a nature as to require exclusive legislation by Congress.
Página 106 - If men were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be necessary. In framing a government which is to be administered by men over men, the great difficulty lies in this : you must first enable the government to control the governed ; and in the next place oblige it to control itself.
Referencias a este libro
Beyond the Republic: Meeting the Global Challenges to Constitutionalism Charles J. G. Sampford,Tom Round Sin vista previa disponible - 2001 |
Fundamental Rights and Democratic Governance: Essays in Caribbean Jurisprudence Simeon C. R. McIntosh Vista previa limitada - 2005 |