12. Patents issued to the Central Pacific Railroad Company under its land-
grant, for any sections lying easterly of range 6 east within the outside
boundaries of the Moquelamos grant, are valid, - there being enough
land lying west of range 7 to satisfy the floating grant of eleven square
leagues. Ib.

--

13. The bill in this case was filed by the Attorney General on behalf of
the United States to vacate a patent granted to the Central Pacific
Railroad Company for lands lying east of range 6 within the claimed
limits of the Moquelamos grant — the ground of relief being, that all
the lands within the exterior limits of that grant were reserved lands:
keld, that the lands in question were not reserved lands, and that the
bill should be dismissed. Ib.

14. Mineral locations on public lands, made prior to the passage of any
mineral law by Congress, are governed by local rules and customs then
in force; but their effect cannot be determined on the demurrer in
this action. Glacier Mountain Silver Mining Co. v. Willis, 471.

PUBLIC LAW.

See PUBLIC LAND, 4.

RAILROAD.

1. A railroad company, all whose stock was owned by four other com-
panies, whose roads connected, having obtained a lease of another
connecting railroad, and improved the terminal facilities, made a con-
tract with the four companies, by which they should have the use of
its tracks and terminal facilities for fifty years, each paying the same
fixed rent and certain terminal charges, and any other company with
the same terminus might, by entering into a similar contract, acquire
like privileges upon paying the same rent and similar charges; and
demanded the making of such a contract by the receiver of another
company, who previously had the use of the road now leased, and of
its terminal facilities, upon terms agreed on between him and the
company owning that road. The receiver objected that the terins
demanded were exorbitant and oppressive, and could not be assented
to by him without an order of the court which appointed him; and it
was thereupon agreed that his company should enjoy like privileges,
paying the like terminal charges as the four companies, and such rent
as the judge should award, and meantime should pay at the same rate
as before. The judge declining to act as an arbitrator, the receiver
was excluded from the use of the tracks. Held, that he had not
assented, and was not liable, to pay the same rent as the four compa-
nies, during the time that he used the tracks and terminal facilities
of the first company. Peoria &c. Railway v. Chicago &c. Railroad, 200.
2. The S. company, owning a railroad extending from S. to M., and
there connecting with the railroad of the H. company from M. to

H., sold a ticket, at a reduced rate of fare, for a passage from S.
to H. and return, containing a contract signed by the purchaser, by
which he agreed "with the several companies" upon the following
conditions: That "in selling this ticket the S. company acts only as
agent and is not responsible beyond its own line;" that the ticket
"is not good for return passage unless the holder identifies himself
as the original purchaser to the satisfaction of the authorized agent of
the H. railroad at H. within eighty-five days from date of sale, and,
when officially signed and dated in ink and duly stamped by said
agent," shall be good for five days from that time; that the original
purchaser shall sign his name and otherwise identify himself, when-
ever called upon to do so by any conductor or agent of either line;
and that no agent or employé of either line has any power to alter,
modify or waive any condition of the contract. The original pur-
chaser was carried from S. to H., and within eighty-five days, and a
reasonable time before the departure of a return train, presented him-
self with the ticket at the office of the agent of the H. railroad at H.,
for the purpose of identifying himself and of having the ticket
stamped, and, no agent being at that office, took the return train on
the H. railroad from H. to M. and a connecting train on the S. rail-
road for S., and, upon the conductor of the latter train demanding his
fare, presented the unstamped ticket, informed him of what he had
done at H., offered to sign his name and otherwise identify himself
to the conductor, and demanded to be carried to S. by virtue of the
ticket; but the conductor refused, and put him off the train. Held,
that he could not maintain an action against the S. company. Mosher
v. St. Louis Iron Mountain and Southern Railway Co., 390.
3. The receiver in a suit for the foreclosure of a railroad mortgage, being
directed by the court to settle and adjust outstanding claims prior to
the mortgage debt, and to purchase in outstanding adverse liens or
titles, agreed with the holder of a debt, which constituted a paramount
lien on a portion of the railroad, for the purchase of his lien and the
payment of his debt out of any money coming into the receiver's
hands from the part of the railroad covered by the lien, or from the
sale of the receiver's certificates, or from the earnings of that portion
of the road, or from the sale of it under the decree of the court; and
this agreement was carried out on the part of the vendor. When it
was made, a decree for a sale had already been made in the foreclos-
ure suit; and afterwards the road was sold as an entirety, with
nothing to show the price paid for the portion covered by the lien, and
payment was made in mortgage bonds without any money passing.
The vendor of the prior lien then intervened in the suit, asking the
court to enforce his agreement with the receiver. Subsequently the
court confirmed the sale, reserving to itself the power to make further
orders respecting claims, rights, or interests in or liens on the prop-
erty. At a subsequent term of court the court found that there was

justly due the intervenor the sum claimed, and ordered the sale set
aside unless the claim should be paid within ninety days. Held, that
the intervenor was entitled to the protection of the court, but that the
proper remedy was, not the annulling of the sale, and confirmation,
and master's deed, if the court had the power to do it, but an order
for a resale of the entire property in satisfaction of the claim of the
intervenor. Farmers' Loan and Trust Company v. Newman, 649.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 3, 5; B;

Under § 51 of the Revised Statutes, a person elected a representative in
Congress to fill a vacancy, caused by a resolution of the House that
the sitting member was not elected and that the seat was vacant, the
sitting member having received the proper credentials, and been placed
on the roll, and been sworn in, and taken his seat, and voted, and
served on committees and drawn his salary and mileage, is entitled to
compensation only from the time the compensation of such sitting
member ceased. Page v. United States, 67.

SECRETARY OF STATE.

1. In answer to a petition for a writ of mandamus to be issued to the Sec-
retary of State to compel him to pay to the petitioner part of an award
made by the Mexican claims commission, the Secretary set up that he
could not recognize the claim of the petitioner without ignoring the
conflicting claim of another person, between whom and the petitioner
litigation in respect to the award was then, and had for a long time,
been pending. On demurrer to the answer: Held, that it was suffi-
cient. Bayard v. White, 246.

2. The Secretary, in view of the litigation, was not bound to decide be-
tween the conflicting claims. Ib.

3. Whether it was a good answer to the petition, that the Secretary was
not invested with authority over the money independently of the

President, and that it was the opinion of the President that the pub-
lic interest forbade the making of payments to the petitioner, in the
condition of things set forth in the answer, quære. Ib.

SET-OFF.

A claim by the State of Louisiana to 5 per cent of the net proceeds of the
sales of the lands of the United States, under § 5 of the act of Feb-
ruary 20, 1811, c. 21, 2 Stat. 641, and a claim by the same State to
the proceeds of the sale by the United States of swamp lands, grow-
ing out of the provisions of the acts of September 28, 1850, c. 84, 9
Stat. 519, and March 2, 1855, c. 147, 10 Stat. 634, are claims against
which the United States can set off the amount due to them by the
State on matured coupons on bonds known as the Indian Trust bonds,
issued by the State. United States v. Louisiana, 182.

SPANISH-AMERICAN CLAIMS COMMISSION.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STAtes, 7.

SPANISH GRANT.

See PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2, 3.

STATE.

See JURISDICTION A, 3, 4.

STATUTE.

A. CONSTRUCTION OF STATUTES.

1. Section 5 of the act of March 3, 1879, 20 Stat. c. 180, 355, 358, did not
operate to repeal § 3962 Rev. Stat.; and when it was itself repealed
by the act of June 11, 1880, 21 Stat. c. 206, 177, 178, § 3962 of the
Revised Statutes remained in force against railroad companies con-
tracting to carry the mails. Chicago, Milwaukee &c. Railway Co. v.
United States, 406.

2. When there are two provisions of law in the Statutes relating to the
same subject, effect is to be given to both, if practicable. Ib.

3. A statute will not operate to repeal a prior statute merely because it
repeats some of the provisions of the prior act, and omits others, or
adds new provisions; but in such cases the latter act operates as a
repeal of the former one only when it plainly appears that it was in-
tended as a substitute for the first act. lb.

4. When there has been a long acquiescence in a Department Regulation,
and by it rights of parties for many years have been determined and
adjusted, it is not to be disregarded, in construing the statute to
which it relates, without the most cogent and persuasive reasons.
Robertson v. Downing, 607.

TAX AND TAXATION.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 1, 2, 7, 8, 13-17; B;
LOCAL LAW, 2, 3, 5;

NATIONAL BANK, 1, 2, 3.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 7, 8, 13-17.

TREATY WITH MEXICO.

See EXTRADITION, 2, 3.

TRIAL BY JURY.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 9, 10, 11.

TRUST.

1. A creditor whose debt is secured by a deed of trust of real estate to a
third party as trustee, may purchase the property at a sale by the
trustee under the terms of the trust; and if he credits the debtor on
the mortgage debt with the amount of the purchase money, it is in
fact and in law a money payment to the use and benefit of the debtor.
Easton v. German-American Bank, 532.

VOL. CXXVII-53