bar for safe-frames, consisting, substantially as before set forth, of a
right-angled iron bar, one of the sides of which is cut away, with
curved cuts meeting a right-angled cut, whereby the uncut side may
be bent to form rounded corners," and the claim of letters-patent No.
283,136 granted to Moses Mosler, August 14, 1883, for an improvement
in bending angle irons, namely, "The herein described process of
bending angle irons, which consists in cutting away a portion of one
web by a cut which severs the two webs at their junction, for a dis-
tance equal to the arc of the corner to be bent, and removes sufficient
of metal in front of the single part of the uncut web to permit the
same to bend to the desired angle and to insure the edges of the open-
ing meeting to form a close joint as the bar is bent, substantially as
shown and described," are invalid. Mosler Safe and Lock Co. v. Mos-
ler, 354.
5. After a patent is granted for an article described as made by causing it
to pass through a certain method of operation to produce it, the in-
ventor cannot afterwards, on an independent application, secure a
patent for the method or process of producing the identical article
covered by the previous patent, which article was described in that
patent as produced by the method or process sought to be covered by
taking out the second patent. Ib.
6. The claim of letters-patent No. 273,585 granted to Moses Mosler,
March 6, 1883, for an improvement in fire-proof safes, being for the
combination, in a fire-proof safe, of the frames, the sheet metal cover,
bent around the top sides and lower corners, with projecting metal
bars, and removable bottom plate, substantially as described, and
claim 3 of letters-patent No. 281,640, granted to Moses Mosler, July
17, 1883, for an improvement in fire-proof safes, namely, “3. In a
safe, the combination of the front and back frames, formed of single
bent angle bars, having one side cut away to leave curved ends, upon
which the uncut side is bent to form rounded corners, and a metal
sheet, E, bent around and secured to said frames to form the top end
sides of the safe, substantially as described," are invalid. Ib.
7. Claim 1 of letters-patent No. 140,250 granted to James D. Cusenbary
and James A. Mars, June 24, 1873, for an "improvement in ore-stamp
feeders," namely, “The feeding cylinder I, mounted upon the movable
timber H H, substantially as and for the purpose above described,” is
a claim only for making the timbers movable, by mounting them upon
rollers, and does not involve a patentable invention. Hendy v. Golden
State and Miners Iron Works, 370.
8. The defence of non-patentability can be availed of without setting it
up in an answer. Ib.
9. There is no patentable combination, but merely an aggregation of the
rollers and the feeding cylinder. Ib.
10. The specification requires the feeding cylinder to have chambers or
depressions, and claim 1 does not cover a cylinder with a smooth sur-
face not formed into chambers. Ib.
11. A patent for a lead-holding tube of a pencil, having at the lower end
two or more longitudinal slots, a screw-thread inside, and a clamping-
sleeve outside, each part of which, as well as the combination of two
or more slots with the sleeve, or of a single slot with the screw-thread,
has been previously used in such tubes, is void for want of invention.
Holland v. Shipley, 396.
12. Claim 1 of letters-patent No. 154,989, granted to Jacob O. Joyce, Sep-
tember 15, 1874, for an improvement in lifting-jacks, namely, “A
pawl for lever-jack with two or more teeth, and adapted to move in
inclined slots, grooves, or guides formed in the frame, substantially as
described," must be construed as limited to a pawl which acts wholly
by gravity, and not at all by a spring, to press it against the teeth of
the ratchet-bar. Joyce v. Chillicothe Foundry, 557.
13. Such claim is not infringed by a jack in which a spring is used to press
the pawl against the teeth of the ratchet-bar, and in which there are
no slots, guides or grooves formed in the frame, to guide the pawl.
lb.
14. Claim 1 of reissued letters-patent No. 6990, granted March 14, 1876, to
Thomas R. Bailey, Jr., for an "improvement in hydrants," namely,
"In combination with a hydrant or fire-plug, a detached and surround-
ing casing C, said casing adapted to have an independent up and
down motion sufficient to receive the entire movement imparted by
the upheaval of the surrounding earth by freezing, without derange-
ment or disturbance of the hydrant or plug proper, substantially as
shown," is invalid, as being an unlawful expansion of the original
patent. Flower v. Detroit, 563.
15. The drawing of the original patent was materially altered, and new
matter was introduced into the specification of the reissue. Ib.
16. The decision in Parker & Whipple Co. v. Yale Clock Co., 123 U. S. 87,
applied to this case. Ib.
17. In the present case the reissue was not applied for until nearly eight
years after the original patent was granted, and the reissue was taken
with the manifest intention of covering, by an enlarged claim, struc-
tures which in the meantime had gone into extensive public use, and
which were not covered by any claim of the original patent. Ib.
18. Claim 3 of the reissue, namely, "The combination of the hydrant or
fire-plug pipe A, supply pipe B, valve D, casing C, and stuffing-box H,
substantially as and for the purpose shown," is either an unlawful ex-
pansion, in regard to the casing, of what is found in the original
patent, or, if construed narrowly, in regard to the casing, is antici-
pated, on the question of novelty. Ib.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 12.
1. After hearing counsel the court of its own motion dismisses a case for
want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff in error moves to reinstate it, support-
ing the motion by affidavits as to the value of the property in dispute.
The court orders service on the other party, and on return vacates the
judgment of dismissal. Glacier Mountain Silver Mining Co. v. Willis,
471.
2. There being nothing in the record to show that the Circuit Court had
jurisdiction of the case, this court of its own motion reverses the judg-
ment and remands the cause for further proceedings. Hegler v. Faulk-
ner, 482.
3. A cause under submission having been dismissed by the court of its
own motion for want of jurisdictional amount, the appellant moves to
reinstate and submits affidavits. The court orders the motion contin-
ued, with leave to each party to file further affidavits. Hunt v. Black-
burn, 774.
4. The court, for reasons stated in its opinion, denies a motion to vacate a
supersedeas or to make an order that the appeal boud filed in the case
does not operate as a supersedeas. Western Air Line Construction Co. v.
McGillis, 776.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 6;
EQUITY;
JUDGMENT, 1;
JURISDICTION, B, 4, 7.
PRECATORY TRUST.
See WILL, 3, 4, 5.
A collector of customs is not personally liable for a tort committed by his
subordinates, in negligently keeping the trunk of an arriving passenger
on a pier, instead of sending it to the public store, so that it was de-
stroyed by fire; where there is no evidence to connect the collector
personally with the wrong, or that the subordinates were not compe-
tent, or were not properly selected for their positions. Robertson v.
Sichel, 507.
1. A promissory note which reads: "Four months after date we promise
to pay to the order of George Moebs, Sec. & Treas., ten hundred sixty-
one & dollars, at Merchants' & Manufacturers' National Bank,
value received," signed: "Peninsular Cigar Co., Geo. Moebs, Sec. &
Treas.," and indorsed: "Geo. Moebs, Sec. & Treas.," is a note drawn
by, payable to, and indorsed by the corporation, and without ambi-
guity in the indorsement; and evidence is not admissible to show that
it was the intention of the indorser in making the indorsement to bind
himself personally. Falk v. Moebs, 597.
1. The act of Congress of March 3, 1851, "to ascertain and settle the
private land claims in the State of California," 9 Stat. 631, c. 41,
created a board of commissioners to which all persons, claiming land
by virtue of any right or title derived from the Spanish or Mexican
government, were required to present their claims for examination and
determination within two years from its date, with such documentary
evidence and testimony of witnesses as they relied upon to support
their claims, and provided, in substance, that if upon examination
they were found by the board, and by the courts of the United States,
to which an appeal could be taken, to be valid, the claims should be
confirmed and surveyed, and patents issued therefor to the claimants;
but that all lands, the claims to which were not presented to the board
within that period, should be considered as a part of the public domain
of the United States. Held, (1) That this provision requiring the
presentation of their claims was obligatory on claimants, and that
they were bound by the judgment of the board, if confirmed by the
courts of the United States on appeal, and by the survey and location
of the claim by the officers of the Land Department, following the
final decree of confirmation; (2) That the patent of the United
States, issued after the claim was surveyed and located, is conclusive,
both as to the validity of the title of the claimant and the extent and
boundaries of his claim, as against all parties not claiming by superior
title, such as would enable them to contest the action of the govern-
ment respecting the property. More v. Steinbach, 70.
2. In order that a perfect title to land might vest under a grant from the
Mexican government a delivery of possession by its officers was neces-
sary. The proceeding was termed a judicial delivery of possession. Ib.
3. The authority and jurisdiction of Mexican officials in California termi-
nated on the 7th of July, 1846. No alcalde appointed or elected
subsequent to that date was empowered to give judicial possession of
land granted by the previous government. Ib.
4. The doctrine that the laws of a conquered or ceded country, except so
far as affected by the political institutions of the new government,
remain in force after conquest or cession until changed by it, does not
apply to laws authorizing the alienation of any portions of the public
domain, or to officers charged under the former government with that
power. No proceedings affecting the rights of the new government
over public property could be taken, except in pursuance of its author-
ity on the subject. Ib.
5. The Attorney General has authority, under the Constitution, to file a
bill in equity in the name of the United States to set aside a patent
of public land alleged to have been obtained by fraud or mistake,
when the government has a direct interest in the tract patented, or is
under an obligation respecting the relief invoked by the bill. United
States v. Beebe, 338.
6. When the location of a mineral lode or vein, properly made, is perfected
under the law, the lode or vein becomes the property of the locators or
their assigns, and the government holds the title in trust for them.
Noyes v. Mantle, 348.
7. Where a location of a vein or lode of mineral or other deposits has been
made under the law, and its boundaries have been specifically marked
on the surface, so as to be readily traced, and notice of the location
has been recorded in the usual books of record within the district,
that vein or lode is "known to exist" within the meaning of that
phrase as used in Rev. Stat. § 2333, although personal knowledge of
the fact may not be possessed by the applicant for a patent for a placer
claim. lb.
8. The boundaries of the Mexican grant, called the Moquelamos grant,
considered, the same being described as "bounded on the east by
the adjacent sierra:" held, as the result of the evidence adduced, that
its eastern limit was at the point where the foot hills of the sierra
begin to rise above the plain, near the range line between ranges 7
and 8. United States v. McLaughlin, 428.
9. Mexican grants were of three kinds: 1, grants by specific boundaries,
where the donee is entitled to the entire tract; 2, grants of quantity
within a larger tract described by outside boundaries, where the donee
is entitled to the quantity specified and no more; 3, grants of a cer-
tain place or rancho by name, where the donee is entitled to the whole
place or rancho. The second kind, grants of quantity in a larger
tract, are, properly, floats, and do not attach to any specific land until
located by authority of the government. The Moquelamos grant was
of this kind. Ib.
10. In the case of floating grants, as above described, it was only the quan-
tity actually granted which was reserved during the examination of
the validity of the grant; the remainder was at the disposal of the
government as part of the public domain. If within the boundaries
of a land-grant made in aid of a railroad, such land-grant would take
effect, except as to the quantity of land, or float, actually granted in
the Mexican grant. If that quantity lying together was left to satisfy
the grant, the railroad company would be entitled to patents for the
odd sections of the remainder. Ib.
11 In the case of a floating Mexican grant the government retained the
right of locating the quantity granted in such part of the larger tract
described as it saw fit; and the government of the United States suc-
ceeded to the same right: hence, the government might dispose of any
specific tracts within the exterior limits of the grant, leaving a suffi-
cient quantity to satisfy the float. Ib.
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