had become holders of them. In June, 1874, the Board was abolished,
and a Board of Audit was created to examine and audit for settlement
the outstanding certificates of indebtedness issued by it. In October,
1874, G. filed a bill in equity for the purpose, among other things, of
restraining the Board of Audit from allowing these certificates to their
holders. On demurrer a restraining order, which had been made
under this bill, was dissolved. The Board of Audit then allowed the
certificates to their holders, and 3.65 bonds of the District were issued
for them. G. then commenced this action against the District. Held,
that he had been guilty of gross negligence in the matter, which pre-
vented him from recovering against the District. Gleason v. District
of Columbia, 133.
See CORPORATION, 1;
LIMITATION, STATUTES OF.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 8, 9.
The United States are not bound by any statute of limitations, nor barred
by laches of their officers in a suit brought by them, as sovereign, to
enforce a public right, or to assert a public interest; but where they
are formal parties to the suit, and the real remedy sought in their
name is the enforcement of a private right for the benefit of a private
party, and no interest of the United States is involved, a court of
equity will not be restrained from administering the equities between
the real parties by any exemption of the government, designed for the
protection of the rights of the United States alone. United States v.
Beebe, 338.
See BANKRUPTCY;
CORPORATION, 1;
1. Under the Code of Civil Procedure of California a plaintiff asserting
title to lands, though out of possession, may maintain an action to
determine an adverse claim, estate, or interest in the premises. More
v. Steinbach, 70.
2. While it is quite competent for the State of Virginia to impose upon
the movable personal property of the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad
Company, (a corporation organized under the laws of Maryland,)
which is brought within its territory and there habitually used and
employed, the same rate of taxation which is imposed upon similar
property used in like way by its own citizens, it has not done so in the
taxing laws of the State which were in force when the tax in contro-
versy was imposed. Marye v. Baltimore and Ohio Railroad, 117.
3. The statutes of Virginia relied upon by the plaintiff in error are not
applicable to the Baltimore and Ohio Railroad Company, but are
confined to corporations which derive their authority from the laws
of Virginia. Ib.
4. In Michigan a declaration of trust which declares that the parties exe-
cuting it hold the property in trust for themselves and two other
persons is an express trust, and under the laws of that State the whole
estate in law and in equity is vested in the trustees. Culbertson v.
The H. Witbeck Co., 326.
5. When a party to an action of ejectment in Michigan sets up a tax title,
several years old, it is competent for the other party, after showing by
the official records that an illegal expenditure of public money was
ordered, sufficient under the laws of the State to vitiate the whole tax
if paid from it, to prove by parol evidence that the sum so ordered
to be paid was paid out of the moneys raised by the tax in question.
lb.
6. In a suit in Louisiana against a corporation for damages for refusal to
permit a transfer of shares on its books, the prescription of ten years
applies but that prescription is not available in this case.
v. Levee Steam Cotton Press Co., 614.
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 4;
CORPORATION,
DEED;
EVIDENCE, 1, 2;
JUDGMENT, 2;
NATIONAL BANK;
TRUST, 3;
WILL, 6.
When the amount in controversy in a case decided in the Circuit Court is
too small to come here by writ of error, this court is without power
by writ of mandamus to compel the judge of the Circuit Court to
reverse his own judgment. In re Burdett, 771.
See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 7;
MEXICAN GRANT.
See PUBLIC LAND, 1, 2, 3, 8-13.
MINERAL LAND.
See EJECTMENT;
PUBLIC LAND, 6, 7, 14.
1. When a mortgage contains no provision for the payment of rents and
profits to the mortgagee while the mortgagor remains in possession,
the mortgagee is not entitled, -as against the owner of the equity of
redemption, to the rents and profits of the mortgaged premises until
he takes actual possession, or until possession is taken in his behalf;
even though the income may be expressly pledged as security for the
mortgage debt, with the right in the mortgagee to take possession
upon failure by the mortgagor to perform the conditions of the mort-
gage. Freedman's Saving and Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 494.
2. When a decree of foreclosure and sale of mortgaged property grants to
the purchaser a credit for part of the purchase money, reserving a lien
upon the property to enforce its payment, the court may, if the pur-
chaser make default, and no rights of innocent third parties have
intervened, order a resale of the property upon a rule to the purchaser
to show cause why it should not be done. Stuart v. Gay, 518.
3. The decree of foreclosure in this case conferred upon the purchaser at
the foreclosure sale no such right of acquiring the securities of the
lower classes to be paid from the fund realized from the sale, as would
authorize him, as such purchaser, to dispute in a proceeding in the
original suit for foreclosure to compel payment of the amount remain-
ing due of the purchase money, the computations by the master, con-
firmed by the decree of the court, of the amounts which the creditors
of the higher classes were to receive from the fund. Ib.
4. In marshalling the classes of debts entitled to be paid out of a fund
arising from a sale of mortgaged property under a decree of foreclos-
ure, it is immaterial whether the master calculates the interest to a
day prior to the date of the decree of sale, or up to that day, for the
purpose of determining the principal sum that is to bear interest
thereafter. lb.
See RAILROAD, 3;
TRUST, 1.
See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
1. In this case certain negotiable bonds, issued by the town of Milan, Ten-
nessee, were held to have been issued without lawful authority. Kelley
Milan, 139.
2. A municipal corporation, in order to exercise the power of becoming a
stockholder in a railroad corporation, must have such power expressly
onferred by a grant from the legislature; and even such power does
not carry with it the power to issue negotiable bonds in payment of
the subscription, unless the latter power is expressly, or by reasonable
implication, conferred by statute. lb.
3. Certain provisions of the statutes of Tennessee considered and held
not to confer power on the town of Milan to issue the bonds in ques-
tion. Ib.
4. In a suit in chancery, brought by the town authorities to have the bonds
declared invalid, a decree had been entered declaring them valid, on a
consent to that effect signed by the mayor of the town: Held, that the
consent of the mayor could give no greater validity to the bonds than
they before had, and that the decree was not an adjudication of the
question of such validity. Ib.
5. In this case, certain negotiable bonds issued by the town of Dyersburg,
Tennessee, were held to have been issued without lawful authority.
Norton v. Dyersburg, 160.
6. Certain provisions of the statutes of Tennessee considered and held not
to confer power on the town of Dyersburg to issue the bonds in ques-
tion.
7. The grant to a municipal corporation of the power to subscribe for stock
in a railroad company does not carry with it the implied authority to
issue negotiable bonds therefor; and such is the view of the Supreme
Court of Tennessee. Ib.
8. In a suit at law against the town to recover on the bonds, no question
growing out of the liability of the town for the subscription to the
stock can be inquired into. Ib.
See CONTRACT, 2;
DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA;
EQUITY.
1. The auditor of Cuyahoga County, Ohio, fixed the taxable value of shares
in a national bank at 60 per cent of their true value in money, in ac-
cordance with the practice adopted for the valuation of other moneyed
capital of individuals in the counties and State, and transmitted the
same to the State Board of Equalization for incorporated banks.
That board increased the valuation to 65 per cent, and this value,
being certified back to the auditor, was placed by him on the tax list
without a corresponding change being made in the valuation of other
moneyed capital of individuals. Held, that this was such a discrimi-
nation as is forbidden by § 5219 of the Revised Statutes of the United
States. Whitbeck v. Mercantile Bank, 193.
2. The statutes of Ohio regulating assessments for taxation allow an
owner of moneyed capital other than shares in a national bank to
have a deduction equal to his bona fide indebtedness made from the
amount of the assessment of the value of such moneyed capital; but
they make no provision for a similar deduction from the assessed value
of shares in a national bank, and provide no means by which such
a deduction may be obtained. Held: (1) That the owners of such
shares are entitled to have a deduction of their indebtedness made
from its assessed value as in the case of other moneyed capital; and (2)
that the right to it is not lost by not making a demand for it until the
entire process of the appraisement and equalization of the value of the
shares for taxation is completed, and the tax duplicate is delivered to
the treasurer for collection. Ib.
3. The laws of Ohio regulating the taxation of shares in national banks
considered.
NEGLIGENCE.
See COURT AND JURY, 1.
See CORPORATION, 3;
WRIT OF ERROR, 2.
1. Letters-patent No. 243,674, granted to James Forncrook, June 28, 1881,
for an "improvement in sectional honey-frames," on an application
filed May 13, 1879, are invalid, for want of novelty. Forncrook v.
Root, 176.
2. The claim of the patent, namely, "As a new article of manufacture, a
blank for honey-frames formed of a single piece of wood, having
transverse angular grooves c, longitudinal groove d, and recesses b, all
arranged in the manner shown and described," is not infringed by a
blank which does not contain the longitudinal groove, or any substi-
tute or equivalent for it. Ib.
3. A patent for a bushing, or tapering ring of metal, for the bungs of
casks, with a screw-thread on its outer surface, and with a notched
flange at the edge, so as to enable the bushing to be forced into place
by a wrench having a projection to fit the notch, was reissued, nearly
seven years afterwards, for a bushing without any notch. Held, that
the reissue was void. Cornell v. Weidner, 261.
4. Claims 1 and 2 of letters-patent No. 281,640, granted to Moses Mosler,
July 17, 1883, for an improvement in fire-proof safes, namely, "1. An
angle bar for safe-frames, consisting substantially as before set forth,
of a right-angled iron bar, one of the sides of which is cut away, leav-
ing a curve facing the uncut side, whereby said uncut side may be
bent to bear upon said curve to form a rounded corner. 2. An angle
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