16. The property of a telegraph company, situated within a State, may be taxed by the State as all other property is taxed; but its business of an interstate character cannot be thus taxed. Ib.

17. The Western Union Telegraph Company established an office in the city of Mobile, Alabama, and was required to pay a license tax under a city ordinance, which imposed an annual license tax of $225 on all telegraph companies, and the agent of the company was fined for the non-payment of this tax: in an action to recover the fine, he pleaded the charter and nature of occupation of the company, and its acceptance of the act of Congress of July 24th, 1866, and the fact that its business consisted in transmitting messages to all parts of the United States, as well as in Alabama: Held, a good defence. Ib.

18. The Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution was not designed to interfere with the exercise of the police power by the State for the protection of health, the prevention of fraud, and the preservation of the public morals. Powell v. Pennsylvania, 678.

19. The prohibition of the manufacture out of oleaginous substances, or out of any compound thereof other than that produced from unadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk, of an article designed to take the place of butter or cheese produced from pure unadulterated milk or cream from unadulterated milk; or the prohibition upon the manufacture of any imitation or adulterated butter or cheese, or upon the selling or offering for sale, or having in possession with intent to sell, the same, as an article of food, is a lawful exercise by the State of the power to protect, by police regulations, the public health. Ib. 20. Whether the manufacture of oleomargarine, or imitation butter, of the kind described in the act of the legislature of Pennsylvania of May 21, 1885, (Laws of Penn. of 1885, p. 22, No. 25,) is, or may be, conducted in such a way, or with such skill and secrecy, as to baffle ordinary inspection, or whether it involves such danger to the public health as to require, for the protection of the people, the entire suppression of the business, rather than its regulation in such manner as to permit the manufacture and sale of articles of that class that do not contain noxious ingredients, are questions of fact and of public policy, which belong to the legislative department to determine. Ib. 21. The Statute of Pennsylvania of May 21, 1885, "for the protection of the public health, and to prevent adulteration of dairy products and fraud in the sale thereof" neither denies to persons within the jurisdiction of the State the equal protection of the laws; nor deprives persons of their property without that compensation required by law; and is not repugnant in these respects to the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States. lb.

22. No mode is provided by the Constitution and laws of the United States by which a person, unlawfully abducted from one State to another, and held in the latter State upon process of law for an offence against the State, can be restored to the State from which he was abducted. Mahon v. Justice, 700.

23. There is no comity between the States by which a person held upon an indictment for a criminal offence in one State can be turned over to the authorities of another State, although abducted from the latter. Ib.

24. A, being indicted in Kentucky for felony, escaped to West Virginia. While the governor of West Virginia was considering an application from the governor of Kentucky for his surrender as a fugitive from justice, he was forcibly abducted to Kentucky, and when there was seized by the Kentucky authorities under legal process, and put in jail and held to answer the indictment. Held, that he was not entitled to be discharged from custody under a writ of habeas corpus from the Circuit Court of the United States. Ib.

25. The authority of Congress to protect the poll books which contain the vote for a member of Congress, from the danger which might arise from the exposure of these papers to the chance of falsification or other tampering, is beyond question, and this danger is not removed because the purpose of the conspirators was to falsify the returns as to state officers found in the same poll books and certificates, and not those of the member of Congress. In re Coy, 731.

See COSTS;

INDICTMENT;

JURISDICTION, A, 4;
PUBLIC LAND, 5.

B. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF A STATE.

By the constitution of California two modes of assessment for taxation are prescribed: one, by a state board of equalization; the other, by county boards and local assessors. All property is directed to be assessed in the county, city, etc., in which it is situated, except that the franchise, roadway, road-bed, rails, and rolling-stock of any railroad operated in more than one county, are to be assessed by the state board, and apportioned to the several counties, etc. By an act of the legislature the state board is required to include in their assessment steamers engaged in transporting passengers and freights across waters which divide a railroad. This act was held by the Supreme Court of California, in San Francisco v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 63 Cal. 469, to be contrary to the constitution, and steamboats were held to be assessable by the county board, and not by the state board. This court, following that decision, and that of Santa Clara County v. Southern Pacific Railroad Co., 118 U. S. 394, holds that the assessment of the steamers of a railroad company by the state board is in violation of the constitution of California, and void; and, being inseparably blended with the other property assessed, it makes the whole assessment void. California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 1.

CONTRACT.

1. A contract in writing, by which a mining company agrees to sell and deliver lead ore from time to time at the smelting works of a partnership, to become its property upon delivery, and to be paid for after a subsequent assay of the ore and ascertainment of the price, cannot be assigned by the partnership, without the assent of the mining company, so far as regards future deliveries of ore. Nor is the mining company, by continuing to deliver ore to one of the partners after the partnership has been dissolved and has sold and assigned to him the contract, with its business and smelting works, estopped to deny the validity of a subsequent assignment by him to a stranger. Arkansas Valley Smelting Co. v. Belden Mining Co., 379.

2. A proposition to pave streets in a municipality, made in writing by a contractor to the head of a board consisting of several members which by law was charged with the care and paving of the streets, although considered and agreed to by the head of the board, and although by his directions the secretary of the board wrote under it that it was "accepted by order of the board" and affixed his signature as secretary thereto, is not a "contract in writing signed by the parties making the same," if the action of the secretary was made without official acceptance of the proposition by the board, and without authority from them to write it. Brown v. District of Columbia, 579. 3. On the facts in this case the court holds: (1) that the alleged contract with the board of public works was not a valid contract; (2) that it was never ratified by the board; (3) that it was never ratified by Congress; (4) that the portion of the plaintiff's claim which was for work performed was rejected by the board of audit, and that the Court of Claims was therefore without jurisdiction to entertain it. Ib. 4. Analyzing the contract which is the subject of litigation, and which is set forth at length in the opinion, this court holds that the court below was in error in sustaining and allowing against Robbins, Rollins's claim for the payment of the two mortgages or deeds of trust, and subrogating him to the rights of the mortgagees Low, and the Mutual Benefit Life Insurance Company; and that the deed of subrogation from the latter company to the German-American Savings Bank was wrong and unauthorized, and should be vacated and declared void without the necessity of the intervention of a cross-bill for that purpose. Robbins v. Rollins, 622.

5. On the proof in this case the court holds that the plaintiff has failed to show such an agreement as can be made the basis of a decree in her behalf. Nickerson v. Nickerson, 668.

See ATTORNEY'S LIEN;

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA;
RAILROAD, 1, 2.

CORPORATION.

1. A bill in equity filed in the Circuit Court of the United States in 1882 by a stockholder in a New York corporation, whose corporate term expired in 1878, to correct a deed of land in North Carolina made to the corporation in 1853, is barred by the statute of limitations in North Carolina, and by the general principles of courts of equity with regard to laches, unless a better reason for not instituting the suit earlier is given than the one given in this suit. Taylor v. Holmes, 489.

2. A stockholder in a corporation which has passed the term of its corporate existence, and has long ceased to exercise its corporate franchises, who desires to obtain equitable relief for it, must, in order to maintain an action therefor in his own name, show that he has endeavored in vain to secure action on the part of the directors, if there are any, or to have the stockholders elect a new board of directors, and must disclose when he acquired his interest in the corporation. 1b.

3. If a corporation by negligence cancels a person's stock, and issues certificates therefor to a third party, the true owner may proceed against the corporation to obtain the replacement of his stock, or its value, without pursuing the purchaser or those who hold under him. St. Romes v. Levee Steam Cotton Press Co., 614.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, A, 2.

COSTS.

This court has power, and it is its duty, to issue writs of attachment, for costs here against persons who intervene in this court by leave of court, and also against their sureties, in bonds for costs furnished by them by order of court on intervening. Craig v. Leitensdorfer, 764. See JURISDICTION, B, 4.

COURT AND JURY.

1. In this case, which was an action for damages for a death caused, in a collision, by the alleged negligence of the owner of a vessel on which it was claimed the deceased was a passenger, the judgment below is reversed for error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was no evidence that the deceased lost his life by reason of the collision, or by the negligence of the defendant, and in refusing to grant the request of the defendant to go to the jury on the question whether the deceased lost his life by reason of the collision. Providence and Stonington Steamship Co. v. Clare, 45.

2. In the courts of the United States the presiding judge may, in submitting a case to the jury, express his opinion on the facts; and when no rule of law is incorrectly stated, and all matters of fact are ultimately submitted to the jury, such expression is not reviewable on writ of error. Rucker v. Wheeler, 85.

3. In this case there was no error in the charge of the court to the jury. Ib.

COURT OF CLAIMS.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 1, 2;
JURISDICTION, D.

CUSTOMS DUTIES.

1. Tissue paper, mainly if not exclusively used for making letter-press copies of letters or written matter, when imported into the United States, is not subject to duty as "printing paper," under Schedule M, § 2504 Rev. Stat., but as " 'other paper not otherwise provided for." Lawrence v. Merritt, 113.

2. Goods made of calf hair and cotton were imported in November, 1876. The collector assessed duties on them at 50 cents a pound, and 35 per cent ad valorem, as upon goods made of wool, hair, and cotton, under Schedule L of § 2504 of the Revised Statutes, p. 471, 2d ed. The goods contained no wool. The importer protested that the goods were liable to less duty under other provisions. In an action to recover back the alleged excess paid, the defendant, at the trial, sought to support the exaction of the duties under the first clause of § 2499, commonly called the "similitude" clause. Held, that this was a proper proceeding under the pleadings in the case. Herrman v. Arthur, 363. 3. The court below having directed a verdict for the defendant, this court reversed the judgment, on the ground that the question of similitude was one of fact, which should have been submitted to the jury, as it appeared that the imported goods were of inferior value and material as compared with the goods to which it was claimed they bore similitude. lb.

4. The case of Arthur v. Fox, 108 U. S. 125, commented on. Ib.

5. Hosiery, composed of wool and cotton, was imported in 1873. The collector assessed the duties at 35 per cent ad valorem, and 50 cents a pound, less 10 per cent, under § 2 of the act of March 2d, 1867, c. 197, 14 Stat. 561, as manufactures made in part of wool, “not herein otherwise provided for." The importer claimed that the goods were dutiable under § 22 of the act of March 2, 1861, c. 68, 12 Stat. 191, and § 13 of the act of July 14, 1862, c. 163, 12 Stat. 556, as stockings made on frames, worn by men, women, and children, at 35 per cent ad valorem, less 10 per cent. In a suit to recover back the excess of duties, the court directed a verdict for the importer: Held, that this was error, because the hosiery was not otherwise provided for in the act of 1867, and was a manufacture made in part of wool. Arthur v. Vietor, 572.

6. The case of Vietor v. Arthur, 104 U. S. 498, commented on, and explained, and distinguished. Ib.

7. Under Rev. Stat. § 2907, and the act of June 22, 1874, c. 391, 18 Stat. 186, § 14, p. 189, as construed by the Treasury Department for many years without any attempt to change it or until now to question its