INDEX.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT OF DEED.

See EVIDENCE, 1, 2.

ACTION.

See CORPORATION, 2;
EQUITY.

ALABAMA CLAIMS.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 2, 3.

ASSIGNMENT.

See CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES, 8, 9.

ATTORNEY GENERAL.

See PUBLIC LAND, 5.

ATTORNEY'S LIEN.

1. In this case it was held, on the facts, that the plaintiff in a suit in equity had not established his right to a decree that he is entitled to the one half of the attorney's fees in an award against Mexico by the joint United States and Mexican commission, which fees had been collected by the defendant. Porter v. White, 235.

2. The plaintiff failed to establish any equitable lien on the award, by showing a distinct appropriation of a part of it in his favor, or any agreement for his payment out of it. Ib.

BAIL BOND.

See INTEREST, 1;

JURISDICTION, B, 5.

BANKRUPTCY.

An assignee in bankruptcy appeared in a suit of equity which had been commenced by a bank against the bankrupt before his bankruptcy, to obtain a decree for the sale of securities pledged to the bank as col

lateral, and defended upon the ground of usury and usurious payments of interest. More than five years after the appointment of the assignee the bank filed a supplemental bill, setting up a former adjudication between the bankrupt and the bank made after the commencement of the suit, but before the bankruptcy upon the matter so set up in defence by the assignee. Held, that the supplemental bill set up no new cause of action, but only matters operating as an estoppel which were not subject to the limitation prescribed by Rev. Stat. § 5057. Jenkins v. International Bank, 484.

CITATION.

See WRIT OF Error, 1.

CITIZENSHIP.

See JURISDICTION, B, 6, 7, 8.

CLAIMS AGAINST THE UNITED STATES.

1. In order to make a claim against the United States one arising out of a treaty within the meaning of Rev. Stat. § 1066, excluding it from the jurisdiction of the Court of Claims, the right itself, which the petition makes to be the foundation of the claim, must derive its life and existence from some treaty stipulation. United States v. Weld, 51.

2. A claim against the United States made under the provisions of the act of June 5, 1882, 22 Stat. 98, c. 195, "reëstablishing the Court of Commissioners of Alabama Claims and for the distribution of unappropriated moneys of the Geneva Award," is not a claim growing out of the treaty of Washington within the sense of the word "treaty," as used in Rev. Stat. § 1066. Ib.

3. The payment of the expenses of the Geneva Arbitration has not been charged by Congress upon the fund received under the award made there. Ib.

4. A statute entitled "An act referring to the Court of Claims,” etc., “for examination and report," and enacting that "the claims" "be, and the same are hereby, referred to the Court of Claims for adjudication according to law, on the proofs heretofore presented, and such other proofs as may be adduced, and report the same to Congress" confers upon that court full jurisdiction to proceed to final judgment, as in the exercise of its ordinary jurisdiction. United States v. Irwin, 125. 5. A statute conferring upon the Court of Claims power to consider and render judgment for claims "for property claimed to have been taken and impressed into the service of the United States in the year 1857 by orders of Colonel Albert Sidney Johnston in command of the Utah expedition, as well as for property alleged to have been sold to the government" does not authorize that court to consider and give judgment for losses consequent upon the refusal of Colonel Johnston to

permit the trains of the claimant to proceed upon their journey, arising from the mere detention and delay occasioned thereby. Ib. 6. It appearing from the findings of the court below that "plaintiff's animals were often used to aid in hauling government trains; and thus did extra work on insufficient food; " and this being a possible ground for recovery to some extent for property taken and impressed into the service of the United States; and it not appearing in the findings what amount is properly allowable therefor, the case is remanded for further proofs and findings in that respect. Ib.

7. On a petition for a writ of mandamus to the Secretary of State to compel him to pay to the petitioner the interest or income derived from the investment of a sum of money received by a predecessor of his, in office, as part of an award made by the Spanish-American Claims Commission, which sum of money had been eventually paid to the petitioner: Held, that the Secretary was not liable to pay such interest or income, because (1) The award was to be paid by the Spanish government to the government of the United States; (2) It was paid by the Spanish government to the Secretary of State of the United States, representing the government of the United States; (3) The money withheld was withheld by the United States, and the petitioner's claim, based on the withholding, was a claim against the United States. Angarica v. Bayard, 251.

8. Section 3737 of the Revised Statutes respecting the transfer of contracts with the United States does not embrace a lease of real estate, to be used for public purposes, under which the lessor is not required to perform any service for the government, and has nothing to do, in respect of the lease, but to receive from time to time the rent agreed to be paid. Freedman's Saving and Trust Co. v. Shepherd, 494. 9. When the government, as lessee of real estate occupied by it, recognizes through its proper officers a transfer of the property and an assignment of the lease, and an assignment of rent under it, and pays the rent, there is nothing in § 3477 Rev. Stat. respecting transfers and assignments of claims against the United States which invalidates that transaction for the benefit of a third party. lb.

CONFLICT OF LAW.

See JURISDICTION, A, 6; B, 9; E.

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW.

A. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF THE UNITed States.

1. The State Board of Equalization of California having included in their assessment all the franchises of a railroad company, amongst which were franchises conferred by the United States, of constructing a railroad from the Pacific Ocean across the State as well as across the Territories of the United States, and of taking toll thereon; held, that the assessment of these franchises was repugnant to the Constitution and laws of the United States and the power given to Congress to regulate commerce among the several States. California v. Central Pacific Railroad Co., 1.

2. Franchises conferred by Congress cannot, without its permission, be taxed by the States. 1b.

3. Congress has authority, in the exercise of its power to regulate commerce among the several States, to construct, or authorize individuals or corporations to construct, railroads across the States and Territories of the United States. Ib.

4. The Statute of Missouri which, as construed by the Supreme Court of that State, authorizes a special administrator, having charge of the estate of a testator pending a contest as to the validity of his will, to have a final settlement of his accounts, conclusive against distributees, without giving notice to them, is not repugnant to the clause of the Constitution of the United States which forbids a State to deprive any person of his property without due process of law. RoBards v. Lamb, 58.

5. The statute of Kansas of 1874, c. 93, § 1, p. 143, Comp. Laws Kansas, 1881, p. 784, which provides that "Every railroad company organized or doing business in this State shall be liable for all damages done to any employé of such company in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanagement of its engineers, or other employés, to any person sustaining such damage," does not deprive a railroad company of its property without due process of law; and does not deny to it the equal protection of the laws; and is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States in either of these respects. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, 205. 6. This case is affirmed on the authority of Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, ante, 205. Minneapolis & St. Louis Railway v. Herrick, 210. 7. A single tax, assessed under the laws of a State upon receipts of a telegraph company which were partly derived from interstate commerce and partly from commerce within the State, and which were capable of separation but were returned and assessed in gross and without separation or apportionment, is invalid in proportion to the extent

that such receipts were derived from interstate commerce, but is otherwise valid; and while a Circuit Court of the United States should enjoin the collection of the tax upon the portion of the receipts derived from interstate commerce, it should not interfere with those derived from commerce entirely within the State. Ratterman v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 411.

8. The decisions of this court respecting the taxation of telegraph com

panies reviewed. Ib.

9. The provision in article 3 of the Constitution of the United States that "the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury," is to be construed in the light of the principles which, at common law, determined whether or not a person accused of crime was entitled to be tried by a jury; and, thus construed, it embraces not only felonies punishable by confinement in the penitentiary, but also some classes of misdemeanors the punishment of which may involve the deprivation of the liberty of the citizen. Callan v. Wilson, 540. 10. The provisions in the Constitution of the United States relating to trial by jury are in force in the District of Columbia. Ib.

11. A person accused of a conspiracy to prevent another person from pursuing a lawful avocation, and, by intimidation and molestation, to reduce him to beggary and want, is entitled, under the provisions of the Constitution of the United States, to a trial by jury. Ib. 12. The Police Court of the District of Columbia is without constitutional power to try, convict, and sentence to punishment a person accused of a conspiracy to prevent another person from pursuing his calling and trade anywhere in the United States and to boycott, injure, molest, oppress, intimidate and reduce him to beggary and want, although the Revised Statutes relating to the District of Columbia provide that "any party deeming himself aggrieved by the judgment of the Police Court may appeal to the Supreme Court" of the District. Ib. 13. Where a telegraph company is doing the business of transmitting messages between different States, and has accepted and is acting under the telegraph law passed by Congress July 24th, 1866, no State within which it sees fit to establish an office can impose upon it a license tax, or require it to take out a license for the transaction of such business. Leloup v. Port of Mobile, 640.

14. Telegraphic communications are commerce, as well as in the nature of postal service, and, if carried on between different States, they are interstate commerce, and within the power of regulation conferred upon Congress, free from the control of state regulations, except such as are strictly of a police character; and any state regulations by way of tax on the occupation or business, or requiring a license to transact such business, are unconstitutional and void. Ib.

15. A general license tax on a telegraph company affects its entire business, interstate as well as domestic or internal, and is unconsti tutional. Ib.