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Opinion of the Court.

v. Robbins, 8 Gray, 329, 341, in which it was said, on behalf of the majority of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts: "And we believe it has been generally understood and practised here and in Maine, and perhaps in other States having a similar provision, that as the object of the clause is to secure a benefit to the accused, which he may avail himself of or waive, at his own election; and as the purpose of the provision is to secure the right, without directing the mode in which it shall be enjoyed; it is not violated by an act of legislation, which authorizes a single magistrate to try and pass sentence, provided the act contains a provision that the party shall have an unqualified and unfettered right of appeal, and a trial by jury in the appellate court, subject only to the common liability to give bail, or to be committed to jail, to insure his appearance and to abide the judgment of the court appealed to."

Somewhat different views have been expressed by the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. Charles A. Dana having been charged by information in the Police Court of the District of Columbia with having published a libel, and having been arrested in New York, the warrant to authorize his being brought here was refused and he was discharged, upon the ground that, if brought to this District, he would be tried in a manner forbidden by the Constitution. Mr. Justice Blatchford said In re Dana, 7 Benedict, 14: "Even if it were to be conceded that notwithstanding the provision in the Constitution, that the trial of all crimes, except in cases of impeachment, shall be by jury,' Congress has the right to provide for the trial, in the District of Columbia, by a court without a jury, of such offences as were, by the laws and usages in force at the time of the adoption of the Constitution, triable without a jury, it is a matter of history, that the offence of libel was always triable, and tried, by a jury. It is, therefore, one of the crimes which must, under the Constitution, be tried by a jury. The act of 1870 provides that the information in this case shall not be tried by a jury, but shall be tried by a court. It is true that it gives to the defendant, after judgment, if he deems himself

Opinion of the Court.

aggrieved thereby, the right to appeal to another court, where the information must be tried by a jury. But this does not remove the objection. If Congress has the power to deprive the defendant of his right to a trial by jury, for one trial, and to put him, if convicted, to an appeal to another court, to secure a trial by jury, it is difficult to see why it may not also have the power to provide for several trials by a court, without a jury, on several successive convictions, before allowing a trial by a jury. In my judgment, the accused is entitled, not to be first convicted by a court and then to be acquitted by a jury, but to be convicted or acquitted in the first instance by a jury."

Without further reference to the authorities, and conceding, that there is a class of petty or minor offences, not usually embraced in public criminal statutes, and not of the class or grade triable at common law by a jury, and which, if committed in this District, may, under the authority of Congress, be tried by the court and without a jury, we are of opinion that the offence with which the appellant is charged does not belong to that class. A conspiracy such as is charged against him and his codefendants is by no means a petty or trivial offence. "The general rule of the common law," the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts said in Commonwealth v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111, 121, "is, that it is a criminal and indictable offence, for two or more to confederate and combine together, by concerted means, to do that which is unlawful or criminal, to the injury of the public, or portions or classes of the community, or even to the rights of an individual.” In State v. Burnham, 15 N. H. 396, 401, it was held that "combinations against law or against individuals are always dangerous to the public peace and to public security. To guard against the union of individuals to effect an unlawful design is not easy, and to detect and punish them is often extremely difficult." Hawkins, in discussing the nature of conspiracies as offences against public justice, and referring especially to the statute of 21 Edw. I, relating to confederacies to procure the indictment of an innocent person, says that "notwithstanding the injury intended to the party against whom such

Opinion of the Court.

a confederacy is formed may perhaps be inconsiderable, yet the association to pervert the law, in order to procure it, seems to be a crime of a very high nature, and justly to deserve the resentment of the law." 1 Hawk. P. C. c. 72, § 3. So in Regina v. Parnell, 14 Cox C. C. 508, 514, it was observed that an "agreement to effect an injury or wrong to another by two or more persons is constituted an offence, because the wrong to be effected by a combination assumes a formidable character. When done by one alone it is but a civil injury, but it assumes a formidable or aggravated character when it is to be effected by the powers of the combination." Tomlin says that "the word conspiracy was formerly used almost exclusively for an agreement of two or more persons falsely to indict one, or to procure him to be indicted, of felony," but that "now it is no less commonly used for the unlawful combinations of journeymen to raise their wages, or to refuse working, except on certain stipulated conditions." Toml. Law Dict., Title Conspiracy. See, also, Commonwealth v. Carlisle, Brightly (Penn.), 40; 3 Whart. Crim. Law, § 1337 et seq., 8th ed.; 2 Archibold's Cr. Pr. & Pl. (Pomeroy's ed.) 1830, note.

These authorities are sufficient to show the nature of the crime of conspiracy at common law. It is an offence of a grave character, affecting the public at large, and we are unable to hold that a person charged with having committed it in this District is not entitled to a jury, when put upon his trial. The jurisdiction of the Police Court, as defined by existing statutes, does not extend to the trial of infamous crimes or offences punishable by imprisonment in the penitentiary. But the argument, made in behalf of the government, implies that if Congress should provide the Police Court with a grand jury, and authorize that court to try, without a petit jury, all persons indicted—even for crimes punishable by confinement in the penitentiary - such legislation would not be an invasion of the constitutional right of trial by jury, provided the accused, after being tried and sentenced in the Police Court, is given an unobstructed right of appeal to, and trial by jury in, another court to which the case may be taken. We cannot assent to that interpretation of the Constitution.

Syllabus.

Except in that class or grade of offences called petty offences, which, according to the common law, may be proceeded against summarily in any tribunal legally constituted for that purpose, the guarantee of an impartial jury to the accused in a criminal prosecution, conducted either in the name, or by or under the authority of, the United States, secures to him the right to enjoy that mode of trial from the first moment, and in whatever court, he is put on trial for the offence charged. In such cases a judgment of conviction, not based upon a verdict of guilty by a jury, is void. To accord to the accused a right to be tried by a jury, in an appellate court, after he has been once fully tried otherwise than by a jury, in the court of original jurisdiction, and sentenced to pay a fine or be imprisoned for not paying it, does not satisfy the requirements of the Constitution. When, therefore, the appellant was brought before the Supreme Court of the District, and the fact was disclosed that he had been adjudged guilty of the crime of conspiracy charged in the information in this case, without ever having been tried by a jury, he should have been restored to his liberty.

For the reasons stated,

The judgment is reversed, and the cause remanded with directions to discharge the appellant from custody.

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Claim 1 of letters patent No. 154,989, granted to Jacob O. Joyce, September 15, 1874, for an improvement in lifting-jacks, namely, "A pawl for lever-jack with two or more teeth, and adapted to move in inclined slots, grooves, or guides formed in the frame, substantially as described," must be construed as limited to a pawl which acts wholly by gravity, and not at all by a spring, to press it against the teeth of the ratchet-bar.

Opinion of the Court.

Such claim is not infringed by a jack in which a spring is used to press the pawl against the teeth of the ratchet-bar, and in which there are no slots, guides or grooves formed in the frame, to guide the pawl.

IN EQUITY for the infringement of letters patent. Decree dismissing the bill. Complainant appealed. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. E. E. Wood for appellant. Mr. Edward Boyd was with him on the brief.

No appearance for appellees.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is a suit in equity, brought in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of Ohio, by Jacob O. Joyce against the Chillicothe Foundry and Machine Works Company and F. M. De Weese, to recover for the infringement of letters patent of the United States, No. 154,989, granted to Jacob O. Joyce, September 15, 1874, for an improvement in lifting-jacks, on an application filed March 16,

1874.

The specification, claims, and drawings of the patent are as follows:

"Be it known that I, Jacob O. Joyce, of Carlisle Station, Warren County, Ohio, have invented certain improvements in lever-jacks, of which the following is a specification:

"My invention relates to the pawl of such jacks; and its objects are, first, to substitute the weight of the pawl, sliding in inclined slots, grooves, or guides, for the elastic spring usually employed to press it against the teeth of the ratchet-bar; and, second, to obtain greater strength by dividing the load among several teeth of the pawl and ratchet-bar, instead of supporting it all on one tooth, as is commonly done.

"Figure 1 of the accompanying drawings [see next page] is a vertical section of so much of a jack as is necessary to show my improvements; and Fig. 2 is a modification of the same, in which the pins and slots of Fig. 1 are exchanged for the tongue and groove in Fig. 2.

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