Opinion of the Court. receiver of the rents of the mortgaged property, Bradley and Shepherd, with the consent of Shepherd's trustees, had pledged the rents of the property as security for Thompson's debts. As Bradley's deed of trust did not pledge the rents as security for his notes to the Trust Company, the pledge of such rents by himself and Shepherd, his assignee, for Thompson's benefit, did not violate any right secured to it; for, as we have shown, until a sale was had, pursuant to the deed of trust, and possession taken under such sale, it had no right, by the terms of the deed, to take the income of the trust property. So that, if a receiver had been appointed immediately upon the filing. October 25, 1877, of the cross-bill of the Trust Company, and if all the rents represented by the two drafts of $1800 and $3475 had been collected by the receiver, they would still, in virtue of the assignment of June 21, 1877, by Bradley and Shepherd, have belonged to Thompson, as between him and the Trust Company; unless, as contended, the transfer by Bradley to Shepherd of the lease to the United States, and their assignment for the benefit of Thompson, are absolutely void, for every purpose, and as to everybody, under the provisions of the statutes relating to the transfer and assignment of contracts with, or claims against, the United States. It is insisted by the Trust Company that the transfer by Bradley to Shepherd of the lease of June 6, 1873, was void under § 3737 of the Revised Statutes, which provides: “No contract or order, or any interest therein, shall be transferred by the party to whom such contract or order is given to any other party, and any such transfer shall cause the annulment of the contract or order transferred so far as the United States are concerned. All rights of action, however, for any breach of such contract by the contracting parties are reserved to the United States." This provision was brought forward from an act of Congress, approved July 17, 1862, entitled "An act to define the pay and emoluments of certain officers of the army, and for other purposes." 12 Stat. 594, 596. In the original act it immediately followed a section providing "that all contracts made for, or orders given for the purchase of goods or sup Opinion of the Court. plies by any department of the government, shall be promptly reported to Congress by the proper head of such department, if Congress shall at the time be in session, and if not in session, said reports shall be made at the commencement of the next ensuing session." We are of opinion that, whatever may be the scope and effect of § 3737, it does not embrace a lease of real estate to be used for public purposes, under which the lessor is not required to perform any service for the government, and has nothing to do, in respect to the lease, except to receive from time to time the rent agreed to be paid. The assignment of such a lease is not within the mischief which Congress intended to prevent. Although a lease, such as Bradley made, is a "contract," in the broadest sense of that word, we are not prepared to hold that it is of the class of contracts, the transfer of which or of any interest therein is prohibited by § 3737. It is also contended that the assignment made on June 21, 1877, by Bradley and Shepherd is void under § 3477 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that "all transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States, or of any part of it or share thereof, or interest therein, whether absolute or conditional, and whatever may be the consideration therefor, and all powers of attorney, orders, or other authorities for receiving payment of any such claim or any part or share thereof, shall be absolutely null and void, unless they are freely made and executed in the presence of at least two attesting witnesses, after the allowance of such a claim, the ascertainment of the amount due, and the issuing of a warrant for the payment thereof." This court has frequently had occasion to construe this section. United States v. Gillis, 95 U. S. 407; Erwin v. United States, 97 U. S. 392; Spofford v. Kirk, 97 U. S. 484; Goodman v. Niblack, 102 U. S. 556; Bailey v. United States, 109 U. S. 432; St. Paul &c. Railroad v. United States, 112 U. S. 733; Hobbs v. McLean, 117 U. S. 567. Undoubtedly, the lease made by Bradley to the United States created, in his favor what, in some sense, was a "claim upon the United States" for each year's rent as it fell due. And, if the statute Opinion of the Court. embraces a claim of such a character, there could not have been any valid transfer or assignment of it in advance of its allowance, which could have been made the basis of a suit by the assignee against the United States, or which would compel the government to recognize the transfer or assignment. It is, perhaps, also true that, under some circumstances, the assignor, before the allowance of the claim and the issuing of the warrant, may disregard such an assignment altogether. But when the government ascertained the amount of rent due under Bradley's lease, and, with his consent, allowed the same to him for the use of Shepherd, for the use of Taylor, Bacon, and Cross, trustees, we perceive nothing in the words or the policy of the statute preventing Thompson from asserting his rights either against the parties or any of them, named in the warrants issued by the government, or against the Trust Company, the mortgagee of the premises. The object of the statute, as was said in Bailey v. United States, 109 U. S. 432, was to protect the government and not the claimant, and to prevent frauds upon the Treasury; and that "an effectual means to that end was to authorize the officers of the government to disregard any assignment or transfer of the claim, or any power of attorney to collect it, unless made or executed after the allowance of the claim, the ascertainment of the amount due thereon, and the issuing of the warrant for the payment thereof." Here, the officers of the government chose to recognize the assignment, and of their action neither Bradley nor Shepherd, nor Shepherd's trustees, can rightfully complain. The government is acquitted of any liability in respect to the claim for rent, for its officers have acted in conformity with the directions, not only of the original claimant, but of his assignee, Shepherd, and of Shepherd's trustees. The simple question is, whether the money received from the government shall be diverted from the purpose to which Bradley, Shepherd, and Shepherd's trustees agreed in writing that it should be devoted, namely, to the payment of the debts Thompson holds against Shepherd. This question must be answered in the negative; and in so adjudging we do not contravene the letter or the spirit of the statute relating to the assignment of claims upon the United States. Syllabus. It only remains to say a word in reference to that part of the decree giving to Shepherd's trustees the rent which Bradley, as receiver, collected. We have already shown that Bradley, not having pledged the income of the property to the Trust Company, could pledge it as security for debts held against him by other creditors. After executing the deed of 1873, he conveyed the premises to Shepherd, and also assigned to him the benefit of the lease made to the government. Shepherd included the premises in his deed to Taylor and others of November 15, 1876, and expressly agreed that the rents, issues, and profits therefrom should be applied in payment of the debts named in that deed. The right of those trustees to the rents, issues, and profits which accrued before any sale under Bradley's deed to the Trust Company, and prior to actual possession being taken under such sale, was, consequently, superior to any that company had. That right could not be defeated by anything the company did, whether by means of a receiver or otherwise. Whether the money in the hands of the receiver belonged to Thompson rather than to Shepherd's trustees is a question not before us, since Thompson has not appealed from the decree. Upon the whole case, we are of opinion that there is no error in the decree to the prejudice of either of the appellants, and it is, in all respects, ROBERTSON v. SICHEL. Affirmed. ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK. No. 269. Argued and Submitted May 1, 1888. - Decided May 14, 1888. A collector of customs is not personally liable for a tort committed by his subordinates, in negligently keeping the trunk of an arriving passenger on a pier, instead of sending it to the public store, so that it was destroyed by fire; where there is no evidence to connect the collector personally with the wrong, or that the subordinates were not competent, or were not properly selected for their positions. Statement of the Case. THIS was an action at law, brought in the city court of the city of New York, by Emilie Sichel, an infant, by Joseph Sichel, her guardian ad litem, against William H. Robertson, collector of customs for the port and collection district of New York, and removed by the defendant into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York. The object of the suit was to recover damages for the loss of the contents of a trunk belonging to the plaintiff, who was a passenger by the steamship Egypt of the Inman line, from Liverpool, and arrived at New York, at the pier of the ship, on the 31st of January, 1883. She was sixteen years of age, and was a first-cabin passenger. She made a baggage declaration, under oath, which stated that she had two trunks and two bags, containing "wearing apparel in actual use and personal effects not merchandise." She declared "nothing new or dutiable." Her baggage was examined on the dock, and one trunk was detained by the customs officers, who gave her a receipt therefor, signed by an inspector, which stated that the inspector had sent the one trunk, for appraisement, to the public store, under a baggage permit. She was di rected by the officers to call, the next day, at the public store to receive the trunk. This trunk contained her personal effects, which cost her $400. The only thing in the trunk not wholly intended for her own use was ten pounds of chocolate, valued at about $2.50, part of which she ate, and she intended to eat the balance in company with some of her young friends. This was her first visit to America. She was a native of Germany, and at the time of her arrival was unfamiliar with our language and customs. She did not know and could not understand the nature and effect of the baggage declaration which she was asked to sign, and it was not explained to her. In the trunk, with her clothing and wearing apparel, were some paper boxes containing some brass ornamental jewelry on cards, given to her abroad, of the value in all of about one dollar, some of which she had worn, some old lace curtains, six table-cloths and twelve napkins, a gift from her mother, the ten pounds of chocolate, and three corsets, one of which she had worn. On the next day, the |