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poses,' approved March 3d, 1870, and subsequently, on the 2d day of May, 1872, passed an act entitled 'An act supplementary to an act entitled An act to incorporate the Texas Pacific Railroad Company and to aid in the construction of its road, and for other purposes,' approved March 3d, 1871. 16 Stat. 573, c. 122; 17 Stat. 59, c. 132.

"That immediately after the passage of said act of March, 1871, the Texas Pacific Railroad Company was organized in pursuance thereof, and it and defendant accepted all the terms and conditions of each of said acts of 1871 and 1872, and have fully and in every respect complied therewith and under them, and in compliance with the spirit and intent of said acts, have completed the roads mentioned in the third finding": [to wit, the line of the defendant's railroads herein before described.]

An examination of the acts referred to in these findings shows that Congress authorized the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to connect with the Atlantic and Pacific Railroad, at such point near the boundary line of the State of California, as it should deem most suitable for a railroad line to San Francisco, and, to aid in the construction of such a railroad line, Congress declared that the company should have similar grants of land, and should be required to construct its road on the like regulations, as to time and manner, with the Atlantic and Pacific. Like powers were also given to the Southern Pacific Railroad Company to construct a line of railroad from Tehachapa Pass, by way of Los Angeles, to the Texas Pacific road at the Colorado River (Fort Yuma). The Southern Pacific Company was not authorized by its original charter to extend its railroad to the Colorado River, as we already know by other cases brought before us, and as appears by the act of the state legislature passed April 4th, 1870, which assumed to authorize the company to change the line of its railroad so as to reach the eastern boundary line of the State; thus duplicating the power given to it by the act of Congress. (See the state act quoted in 118 U. S., p. 399.) This state legislation was probably procured to remove all doubts with regard to the company's power to construct such roads. It is apparent, however, that the franchise to do so was fully conferred by

Statement of the Case.

Congress, and that franchise was accepted, and the roads have been constructed in conformity thereto.

It conclusively appears, therefore, that the Southern Pacific Railroad Company did receive from the United States government, and still enjoys, important franchises connected with its railroads.

It follows that in each one of the cases now before us, the assessment made by the State Board of Equalization comprised the value of franchises or property which the board was prohibited by the constitution of the State or of the United States from including therein; and that these values are so blended with the other items of which the assessment is composed that they cannot be separated therefrom. The assessments are, therefore, void. This renders it unnecessary to express any opinion on the application of the Fourteenth Amendment, as the result would not be different whatever view we might take on that subject.

The judgments in all the cases are affirmed.

PROVIDENCE AND STONINGTON STEAMSHIP COMPANY v. CLARE'S ADMINISTRATRIX.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK.

No. 265. Argued April 26, 1888. Decided May 14, 1888.

In this case, which was an action for damages for a death caused, in a collision, by the alleged negligence of the owner of a vessel on which it was claimed the deceased was a passenger, the judgment below is reversed for error in refusing to direct a verdict for the defendant on the ground that there was no evidence that the deceased lost his life by reason of the collision, or by the negligence of the defendant, and in refusing to grant the request of the defendant to go to the jury on the question whether the deceased lost his life by reason of the collision.

THIS was an action to recover damages for injuries resulting to the widow and children of Charles C. Clare by reason of

Opinion of the Court.

his death, alleged to have been caused by the negligence of the steamship company as common carriers, while he was a passenger on one of their steamers. Verdict for plaintiff and judg ment on the verdict. Defendant sued out this writ of error. The case is stated in the opinion.

Mr. Wheeler H. Peckham for plaintiff in error.

No appearance for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BLATCHFORD delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action at law, brought in the Supreme Court of the State of New York, by Almira R. Clare, as administratrix of the estate of Charles C. Clare, deceased, against the Providence and Stonington Steamship Company, a Rhode Island corporation, to recover the sum of $5000, with interest from June 11, 1880, as statutory damages, for the death of Charles C. Clare. The plaintiff is his widow, and he left four minor children, his heirs at law and next of kin.

The complaint alleges that the defendant was the owner of two steamboats, the Narragansett and the Stonington, running between Stonington, Connecticut, and New York City; that, on or about the 11th of June, 1880, the defendant received Clare on the Narragansett for the purpose of conveying him therein as a passenger from New York City to Stonington, for a reasonable compensation paid to it by Clare; that the Narragansett, under the management and direction of the defendant, having Clare on board as a passenger, and proceeding through the waters of Long Island Sound, met the Stonington proceeding on her way to New York City; that, by the negligence of the defendant, the two vessels came into collision, whereby the Narragansett was so injured that fire immediately broke out on her, and she sank within a few moments, and Clare, without any neglect on his part, was drowned; that the collision occurred either in the State of New York or in the State of Connecticut; that 9, of c. 6, title 19, of the Laws of 1875 of the State of Connecticut, provides that all damages resulting in death, recovered in an

Opinion of the Court.

action brought by an executor or administrator, shall inure to the benefit of the husband or widow and heirs of the deceased person; and that § 1, c. 78, of the Laws of 1877 of the State of Connecticut, provides that, in all actions by an executor or administrator, for injuries resulting in death from negligence, such executor or administrator may recover from the party legally in fault for such injuries just damages, not exceeding $5000, to be distributed as provided in 9 of c. 6, title 19, of the Laws of 1875, but such action must be brought within one year from the neglect complained of. This suit was brought within the year.

By the Code of Civil Procedure of the State of New York, § 1902, it is provided as follows: "The executor or administrator of a decedent, who has left, him or her surviving, a husband, wife, or next of kin, may maintain an action to recover damages for a wrongful act, neglect, or default, by which the decedent's death was caused, against a natural person who, or a corporation which, would have been liable to an action in favor of the decedent, by reason thereof, if death had not ensued." It is provided by § 1904, that in the case of a trial by jury, "the damages awarded to the plaintiff may be such a sum, not exceeding five thousand dollars, as the jury

deems to be a fair and just compensation for the pecuniary injuries, resulting from the decedent's death, to the person or persons for whose benefit the action is brought;" and that, "when final judgment for the plaintiff is rendered, the clerk must add to the sum so awarded, interest thereupon from the decedent's death, and include it in the judgment."

The action was removed by the defendant into the Circuit Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, on the ground that the plaintiff was a citizen of New Jersey and the defendant a citizen of Rhode Island. The answer, put in in the Circuit Court, contains a denial in the prescribed form, covering the allegation of the complaint that the defendant received Clare on the Narragansett for the purpose of conveying him therein as a passenger from New York City to Stonington, for a reasonable compensation paid to it by Clare. It also denies the negligence alleged, and

Opinion of the Court.

denies all liability to the plaintiff. It also sets up, that it had, by proper proceedings in the District Court of the United States for the Southern District of New York, taken the benefit of the statute of the United States for the limitation of the liability of ship-owners, in respect to the Narragansett, by a transfer of its interest in her to a trustee appointed by that court.

At the trial, before a jury, a verdict was, by direction of the court, rendered for the sum of $5000, on the 20th of April, 1885; the interest was, under the statute of New York, computed by the clerk at the sum of $1522.50; the plaintiff's costs were taxed at $78.25; and a judgment was rendered for the plaintiff for the damages, interest, and costs, amounting in all to $6600.75.

At the trial, the plaintiff called as witnesses the master of the Narragansett, and the pilot and the engineer of the Stonington, for the purpose of showing negligence on the part of the Stonington. The plaintiff also called as a witness one Fisher, who testified as follows: "In June, 1880, I resided in Jersey City. I knew Charles C. Clare; he was a friend of mine. On the Sunday following the 11th of June, 1880, I went to Stonington and found the body of Charles C. Clare, and brought the same to Jersey City for burial. What first led me to go to Stonington was newspaper reports, and then information coming to me, that Mr. Clare had lost his life by this accident. I found his body in the lower part of a furniture establishment, which was being temporarily used as a morgue." The defendant then called as a witness a steamboat captain, and examined him on the general question as to whether the Stonington, at the speed at which she was running, was going at a moderate speed in a fog, under the requirement of Rule 21 of § 4233 of the Revised Statutes, which provides that "every steam-vessel shall, when in a fog, go at a moderate speed." The defendant also called as a witness the bow watchman of the Stonington. After both sides had rested, the plaintiff moved for a direction to the jury to find a verdict for the plaintiff for $5000. The defendant then moved that the court direct the jury to find a verdict for the defend