Opinion of the Court.

of printing for all forms of instruments, such as deeds, bonds, tickets, tokens for the payment of goods, etc., have seemed to demand that where, either by the common law or by statute, such instruments are required to be in writing, the term "writing" should be held to include printing as well as script.

In Henshaw v. Foster, 9 Pick. 312, reference was made to the provision of the constitution of the State of Massachusetts which declared that "every member of the House of Representatives shall be chosen by written votes." A party offered his ballot, which was rejected, and he thereupon sued the inspectors of the election for their refusal to receive his vote. They declined to accept it upon the ground that the ballot was printed, and was not therefore "written" within the meaning of the constitution. The court, however, in a very well considered opinion, decided that the printed vote came within the meaning of the law requiring votes to be in writing.

In the subsequent case of Commonwealth v. Ray, 3 Gray, 441, the defendant was indicted for forgery, and the question was whether the instrument which he presented constituted a forgery at common law. The court said: "It is objected that the crime of forgery cannot be committed by counterfeiting an instrument wholly printed or engraved, and on which there is no written signature personally made by those to be bound. The question is whether the writing, the counterfeiting of which is forgery, may not be wholly made by means of printing or engraving, or must be written by the pen by the party who executes the contract. In the opinion of the court, such an instrument may be the subject of forgery, when the entire contract, including the signature of the party, has been printed or engraved. The cases of forgery generally are cases of forged handwriting. The course of business, and the necessities of greater facilities for dispatch, have introduced, to some extent, the practice of having contracts and other instruments wholly printed or engraved, even including the name of the party to be bound. . . . It has never beer. considered any objection to contracts required by the statute of frauds to be in writing that they were printed."

Then after speaking of the cases in which a signature made

Opinion of the Court.

by the pen is necessary to the execution of a contract, the court proceeds: "But if an individual or a corporation do in fact elect to put into circulation contracts or bonds in which the names of the contracting parties are printed or lithographed, as a substitute for being written with the pen, and so intended, the signatures are to all intents and purposes the same as if written. It may be more difficult to establish the fact of their signatures; but if shown, the effect is the same. Such being the effect of such form of executing like contracts, it would seem to follow that any counterfeit of it, in the similitude of it, would be making a false writing purporting to be that of another, with the intent to defraud."

It was, therefore, held in that case that, although he did not personally aid in the manual operation of engraving or lithographing the spurious instrument, yet it being conceded that it was done by his procuration, the defendant was responsible. That was the case of a railroad ticket, and the applicability of the decision to the matter now before us is unquestionable."

The case of The People v. Rhoner, 4 Parker's Crim. Rep. 166, is strikingly like the present one in almost every particular. There the prisoner had been committed by a justice of the peace on the preliminary examination, upon a charge of having in his possession, knowingly, counterfeited notes of the Austrian National Bank, with intent to defraud. He was brought before the Supreme Court in the State of New York by a writ of habeas corpus, and the same question which is raised here was there presented. It was said that every part of these bank-notes upon which the charge was founded, which appeared to be complete and entirely filled up, including the signature of the cashier or director, was evidently a print or impression from an engraved plate. The argument was there pressed, as in this case, that these notes could not be forgeries for that reason, nor could they be the subject of forgery. whole question was very fully reviewed by Judge Sutherland in his opinion, in which he held that "the word 'instrument' includes not only written instruments' and 'writings,' but also engraved or printed instruments, being or purporting to

The

Syllabus.

be the act of another; indeed, all and every kind of instrument by the forging of which any person may be affected, bound, or in any way injured in his person or property. I do not see why an engraved or printed instrument, or an engraved or printed name, affixed to an instrument by a person is not his act, and may not purport to be the act of another."

The same principle is reaffirmed by the Supreme Court of Massachusetts in the case of Wheeler v. Lynde, 1 Allen, 402.

We are of opinion that the decision of Commissioner Lyman, committing the prisoner to the custody of the marshal to await the requisition of the Mexican government, was justified, and the judgment of the Circuit Court dismissing the writ of habeas corpus is accordingly

Affirmed.

GLACIER MOUNTAIN SILVER MINING COMPANY v. WILLIS.

ERROR TO THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE UNITED STATES FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLORADO.

No. 166. Submitted April 9, 1888. Decided May 14, 1888.

After hearing counsel the court of its own motion dismisses a case for want of jurisdiction. Plaintiff in error moves to reinstate it, supporting the motion by affidavits as to the value of the property in dispute. The court orders service on the other party, and on return vacates the judg ment of dismissal.

In an action of ejectment, the description of the land claimed was as follows: "commencing near the base of said mountain east of Bear Creek and running southeast and parallel with Coley tunnel through said mountain five thousand feet from the mouth or starting point of said tunnel at a stake marked and in or at the mouth of said Silver Gate tunnel and two hundred and fifty feet northeast and two hundred and fifty feet southwest from said stake or tunnel to its termination." Held, that it was a sufficient description.

In ejectment for the possession of a mine in Colorado, the complaint, after describing the land and a tunnel claim therein, averred that the said tunnel claim so located embraces many valuable lodes or veins which have been discovered, worked, and mined by the plaintiff and its grant

Statement of the Case.

ors." Held, that this was a sufficient description of the lodes for which recovery was asked.

A complaint in ejectment in Colorado, for a mine, which alleges a valid and legal location by those under whom the plaintiff claims, and possession and occupation by the plaintiff for more than five consecutive years prior to the ouster, and payment of taxes by him during that time, sets up a sufficient claim to title as against everybody except the United States. Mineral locations on public lands, made prior to the passage of any mineral law by Congress, are governed by local rules and customs then in force; but their effect cannot be determined on the demurrer in this action.

THE case, as stated by the court, was as follows:

This was a writ of error to the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Colorado to review a judgment of that court sustaining a demurrer to the "second amended complaint" filed by the Glacier Mountain Silver Mining Company, plaintiff in error, against J. Frank Willis, Charles Buckland, and Donald M. Frothingham, defendants in error, which complaint is in the words and figures following, to wit: "For second amended complaint the plaintiff complains and alleges that it is a corporation organized and existing under the laws of the State of Ohio and is a citizen of the State of Ohio; that the defendants are and each of them is a citizen of the State of Colorado, and that the property in controversy exceeds the value of $500.

"Plaintiff further alleges that on the 21st day of June, 1865, one Joseph Coley and one George C. Reeves, each being a citizen of the United States, went upon the public domain of the United States theretofore wholly unoccupied and unclaimed and located on said day a tunnel and tunnel site at the base of Glacier Mountain, in Snake River mining district, county of Summit, State of Colorado.

"That afterwards and on the same day they marked the boundaries of their said location and commenced to run a tunnel into said Glacier Mountain, and, after fully complying with the laws of the United States, the laws of the State of Colorado, and the local rules and regulations of the said Snake River mining district, they caused to be made out and recorded in the recorder's office of the county of Summit afore

Statement of the Case.

said a location certificate of said tunnel claim, which said certificate described the location and boundaries of said tunnel claim.

"That from the day of said location until the ouster hereinafter set forth the said locators of said tunnel claim and their grantees remained continuously in possession of said tunnel claim, working and mining thereon, and have expended thereon more than the sum of $5000.

"That the plaintiff is the owner of the said tunnel claim above described by location and purchase, and is now entitled to the quiet and peaceable and exclusive possession thereof by virtue of a full compliance on its part and on the part of its grantors with the laws, rules, and customs above set forth; that the plaintiff and its grantors have been in the peaceable and undisputed possession of said tunnel claim, by virtue of such location, occupation, preëmption, and record, for more than five years prior to the ouster hereinafter complained of.

"That plaintiff and its grantors, for more than five consecutive years prior to the acts of the defendants hereinafter mentioned, paid all taxes legally or otherwise assessed upon said tunnel claim, and have worked and mined the same from said. 21st day of June, 1865, up to the time of the acts of the defendants hereinafter set forth.

"That the said tunnel claim so located embraces many valuable lodes or veins which have been discovered, worked, and mined by the plaintiff and its grantors.

"That the said tunnel claim was by its locators named the Silver Gate tunnel claim, and is described more fully as follows: Commencing at the base of said Glacier Mountain east of Bear Creek, and running southeast and parallel with Coley tunnel through said mountain five thousand feet from the mouth or starting point of said tunnel at a stake marked and in or at the mouth of said Silver Gate tunnel, and two hundred and fifty feet northeast and two hundred and fifty feet southwest from said stake or tunnel to its termination.

"Said tunnel site is situate on Glacier Mountain, in Snake River mining district, county of Summit and State of Colorado, and is five thousand feet in length by five hundred feet in width.

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