and firemen in not seeing him and arresting the train. Held, that he
had been guilty of contributory negligence, and that the court below
had properly directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant.
Goodlett v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad, 391.

See COMMON CARRIER;

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1;
CORPORATION, 1;
EQUITY PLEADING, 2;
JURISDICTION, A, 4;

LA CROSSE AND MILWAUKEE RAILROAD
FORECLOSURE;

LOCAL LAW, 10;

TAX AND TAXATION, 4, 5, 6;
TRESPASS ON THE CASE, 1.

REMOVAL OF CAUSES.

1. When a petition for a removal of the cause to a Circuit Court of the
United States is filed in a cause pending in a state court, the only
question left for the state court to determine is the question of law
whether, admitting the facts stated in the petition to be true, it appears
on the face of the record, including the petition, the pleadings and the
proceedings down to that time, that the petition is entitled to a re-
moval; and if an issue of fact is made upon the petition, that issue
must be tried in the Circuit Court. Burlington & Cedar Rapids
Railway v. Dunn, 513.

2. If a cause pending in a state court against several defendants is removed
thence to the Circuit Court of the United States on the petition of one
of the defendants under the act of 1875, 18 Stat. 470, on the grounds
of a separate cause of action against the petitioning defendant, in
which the controversy was wholly between citizens of different states,
it should be remanded to the state court if the action is discontinued
in the Circuit Court as to the petitioning defendant. Texas Transpor-
tation Co. v. Seeligson, 519.

3. An Illinois corporation recovered judgment against P., a citizen of
Minnesota, in a court of that state. An execution issued therein was
placed in the sheriff's hands with directions to levy on property of P.
which had been transferred to F., and was in F.'s possession, the cor-
poration giving the officer a bond with sureties. F. sued the officer in
trespass, and he answered, setting up that the goods were the property
of the execution debtor. The corporation and the sureties then inter-
vened as defendants, and answered, setting up the same ownership of
the property, and further, that the sheriff had acted under their direc-
tions, and that they were the parties primarily liable. The plaintiffs
in that suit replied, and the intervenors then petitioned for the removal
of the cause to the Circuit Court of the United States, setting forth as
a reason therefor that the plaintiff and the sheriff were citizens of
Minnesota, the intervenors and petitioners citizens of Illinois; that the
real controversy was between the plaintiff and the petitioners; and
that the petitioners believed that through prejudice and local influence
they could not obtain justice in the state court. The cause was
removed on this petition, and a few days later was remanded to the

!

state court on the plaintiff's motion. Held, that, on their own,showing
the intervenors were joint trespassers with the sheriff, if any trespass
had been committed, and by their own act they had made themselves
joint defendants with him, and that on the authority of Pirie v. Tvedt,
115 U. S. 41, and Sloane v. Anderson, 117 U. S. 275, the cause was not
removable from the state court. Thorn Wire Hedge Co. v. Fuller, 535.
See PRACTICE, 4.

1. When a supersedeas has been obtained on an appeal to this court, it is to
be presumed that parties submit to it; and an order to stay execution
will not be granted in the absence of proof of its necessity. Lanier v.
Nash, 630.

2. There is no such merger of the judgment nor supersedeas in this case
as will operate to stay a proceeding against other property not in-
volved herein. Lanier v. Nash, 637.

TAX AND TAXATION.

any, 154.

1. Stanley v. Supervisors of Albany, 121 U. S. 535, affirmed to the point that a party who feels himself aggi eved by overvaluation of his property for purposes of taxation, and does not resort to the tribunal created by the state for correction of errors in assessments before levy of the tax, cannot maintain an action at law to recover the excess of taxes paid beyond what should have been levied on a just valuation. His remedy is in equity, to enjoin the collection of the illegal excess upon payment or tender of the at nt due upon what is admitted to be a just valuation. Williams V 2. The mode in which property all be appraised; by whom and when that shall be done; wha. & cate of their action shall be furnished by the board which does it; and when parties may be heard for the correction of errors, are all matters within legislative discretion; and it is within the power of a state legislature to cure an omission or a defective performance of such of the acts required by law to be performed by local boards in the assessment of taxes as could have been in the first place omitted from the requirements of the statute, or which might have been required to be done at another time than that named in it; provided always, that intervening rights are not impaired. Ib.

3. The statute passed by the legislature of New York, April 30, 1883, to legalize and confirm the assessments in Albany for the years 1876, 1877, and 1878, was not in conflict with the acts of Congress respecting the taxation of shares of stock in national banks, and was a valid exercise of the power of the legislature to cure irregularities in assessments. Ib.

4. It being now conceded that the taxes in suit in this case refer not only to the branch referred to in the former opinion of the court in this case, reported in 120 U. S. 569-575, but to the taxes assessed upon that part of the main line which extends from Unionville in Putnam County to the boundary line between Missouri and Iowa, the court now decides, on an application for a rehearing of this case: (1) That it is satisfied with the construction which it has already given to the statute of the legislature of Missouri of March 21, 1868; (2) That the statute of that legislature enacted March 24, 1870, as interpreted by the court, in its application to the main line, does not impair the obligation of any contract which the St. Joseph and Iowa Railroad Company had, by its charter, with the state of Missouri. Chicago, Burlington & Kansas City Railroad v. Guffey, 561.

5. The statute of Missouri of March 24, 1870 (Art. 2, c. 37, § 57, Wagner's Statutes of Missouri, 1872), subjecting to taxation railroads acquired by a foreign corporation by lease, also applies to roads acquired by such corporations by purchase. Ib.

6. No question arises in this case under the provision in the charter of the St. Joseph and Iowa Railroad Company which authorizes it to pledge

its property and franchises to secure an indebtedness incurred in the construction of its road. Ib.

See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 2;

MANDAMUS, 1, 2.

TELEGRAPH COMPANIES AND TELEGRAMS.
See CONSTITUTION. L LAW, 3, 4, 5.

TREAY.

The provisions in the treaty of friend

commerce, and navigation with the king of Denmark, concluded il 26, 1826, and revived by the convention of April 11, 1857, do 1 by their own operation, authorize the importation, duty free, from Danish dominions, of articles made duty free by the convention of January 30, 1875, with the king of the Hawaiian Islands, but otherwise subject to duty by a law of Congress, the king of Denmark not having allowed to the United States the compensation for the concession which was allowed by the king of the Hawaiian Islands. Bartram v. Robertson, 116.

TRESPASS ON THE CASE.

1. The Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railway Company was in peaceable possession of a railroad from Alamosa to Pueblo, and while so in possession the Denver and Rio Grande Railway Company, by an armed force of several hundred men, acting as its agents and employes, and under its vice-president and assistant general manager, attacked with deadly weapons the agents and employes of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railway Company having charge of the railroad, and forcibly drove them from the same, and took forcible possession thereof. There was a demonstration of armed men all along the line of the railroad seized, and while this was being done, and the seizure was being made, the plaintiff, an employe of the Atchison, Topeka and Santa Fé Railway Company, while on the track of the road, in the line of his employment, was fired upon by men as he was passing, and seriously wounded and injured. Immediately upon the seizure of the railroad as aforesaid the Denver and Rio Grande Company accepted it, and entered into possession and commenced and for a time continued to use and operate it as its own. The plaintiff brought this suit to recover damages for his injuries. Held, that the Denver and Rio Grande Company was liable in tort for the acts of its agents, and that the plaintiff could recover damages for the injuries received, and punitive damages under the circumstances. Denver & Rio Grande Railway v. Harris, 597.

2. In trespass on the case to recover for injuries caused by gunshot wounds inflicted by defendant's servants, evidence of the loss of power to have offspring, resulting directly and proximately from the nature

of the wound, may be received and considered by the jury, although the declaration does not specify such loss as one of the results of the wound. Ib.

3. In an action of trespass on the case against a corporation to recover damages for injuries inflicted by its servants in a forcible and violent seizure of a railroad, punitive damages, within the sum claimed in the declaration, may be awarded by the jury, if it appears to their satisfaction that the defendant's officers and servants, in the illegal assault complained of, employed the force with bad intent, and in pursuance of an unlawful purpose, wantonly disturbing the peace of the community and endangering life. Ib.

USURY.

The transaction between the parties, so far as disclosed by the record, was not a loan of money, and consequently no question of usury could arise. Struthers v. Drexel, 487.

WAREHOUSEMAN.

See COMMON CARRIER, 2.

WARRANTY.

In an action in tort for the breach of an express warranty, in the sale of bonds of a municipality, that they were genuine and valid bonds of the municipality, when in fact they were forgeries, and false and fraudulent, the warranty is the gist of the action, and it is not necessary to allege or to prove a scienter. Shippen v. Bowen, 575.

See COMMON CARRIER, 1, 2;

INSURANCE, 1.