Opinion of the Court.

on "all beads and bead ornaments." At the trial, the court directed the jury to find a verdict for the defendant. The plaintiffs excepted to this direction and, after such a verdict and a judgment accordingly, brought this writ of error.

The component materials of the rosaries in question were, 1. Beads, glass; chain and cross, metal. 2. Beads, wood; chain and cross, metal. 3. Beads, chain, and cross all of steel. 4. Beads, bone; chain and cross, metal. 5. Beads, ivory; chain and cross, metal. 6. Beads, chain, and cross all of silver. 7. Beads, mother-of-pearl; chain and cross, metal. It was proved at the trial that the rosaries are composed of beads, a metal chain, and a cross, the beads being fastened on the chain at regular intervals; that a rosary is not complete without a cross; that they are used by Roman Catholics in counting their prayers; that they are carried in the pocket when not so in use, and are never used for ornament; that, in all cases, the beads are the component material of chief value; that they are dealt in only by dealers in religious and devotional articles pertaining to the Catholic Church, and are not dealt in by those who deal generally in beads and bead ornaments, and are not known to them; and that the expression "I say the beads," is sometimes applied to the devotional exercises which are performed on rosaries. The witnesses for the plaintiffs testified that the articles in question are known to importers and wholesale dealers as rosaries, and are dealt in under that name, and are not dealt in under the name of beads; that dealers in rosaries also deal in the beads not made up into rosaries, but fastened together on a cotton string, which they sell to parties to be made up into rosaries; that an order for beads would be understood to mean these beads and not the ones made up into rosaries; and that the people who use rosaries sometimes call them "beads " and sometimes "rosaries." The witness for the defendant testified that they are called beads or rosaries, and are bought and sold under the name of beads; that, in point of fact, they are made of beads, and are called beads and rosaries, irrespective of the material of which the beads are composed. On cross-examination he testified as follows: "Q. What class of

Opinion of the Court.

people call them beads? A. Well, I think people in New York. Q. What class of people in New York? A. A great many Catholics call them beads, and a great many call them rosaries. Q. Don't the dealers call them rosaries, and so catalogue them? A. Yes, sir."

The plaintiffs claim that the rosaries were not dutiable under the head of "beads and bead ornaments," but were dutiable, under various provisions of the Revised Statutes, at 35 per cent, as manufactures of wood, bone, ivory, and shells; at 40 per cent, as manufactures of glass and silver; and at 45 per cent, as manufactures of steel.

The principle adopted by the Treasury Department in directing the collector to assess a duty of 50 per cent on these rosaries, was that, as they were not enumerated as "rosaries" in the tariff act, and were composed of beads with steel, silver and other metals, the beads being the component material of chief value, although they might not be "bead ornaments," they were dutiable at the rate of duty imposed on beads, by virtue of the provision of § 2499 of the Revised Statutes, which enacts that "on all articles manufactured from two or more materials, the duty shall be assessed at the highest rates at which any of its component parts may be chargeable.' This provision does not apply to any enumerated articles, but applies only to non-enumerated articles. The articles in question were known to importers and dealers as "rosaries." As such, they were not an enumerated article, but were dutiable, under the above provision of § 2499, at the duty imposed on "beads."

The cases of Lottimer v. Lawrence, 1 Blatchford, 613, and Arthur v. Sussfield, 96 U. S. 128, cited by the plaintiffs, have no application to the present case. In the former case, the article in question, thread lace, was enumerated in the tariff by that name. In the second case, the article was spectacles, made of glass and steel. A duty of 45 per cent was exacted on the spectacles, as being "manufactures of steel, or of which steel shall be a component part." It was held by this court that the article was dutiable at only 40 per cent under the head of pebbles for spectacles and all manufactures of glass, or of

Argument for Plaintiff in Error.

which glass shall be a component material." The ground of the decision was that, as there could be no spectacles without pebbles or glass, the duty of 40 per cent was imposed on the pebbles or glass as materials to aid the sight, the steel being incidental merely, and that, in fact, spectacles were designated under the description of "pebbles for spectacles."

Judgment affirmed.

WISNER v. BROWN.

ERROR TO THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF MICHIGAN.

Submitted January 13, 1887.- Decided May 27, 1887.

An assignee in bankruptcy cannot transfer to a purchaser the bankrupt's adverse interest in real estate in the possession of another claiming title, if two years have elapsed from the time when the cause of action accrued therefor in the assignee; and the right of the purchaser in such case is as fully barred by the provisions of Rev. Stat. § 5057, as those of the assignee.

It is unnecessary to decide in this case whether the provisions contained in Rev. Stat. § 5063 refer to a case in which only the interest of the bankrupt is ordered to be sold, without attempting to affect the title or interest of other persons.

THIS was a writ of error to bring before the court for review a judgment rendered by the Supreme Court of Michigan in an action of ejectment in which the plaintiff in error, who was plaintiff below, claimed title under a deed from an assignee in bankruptcy. The case is stated in the opinion of the court.

Mr. S. S. Burdett and Mr. H. H. Hoyt, for plaintiff in error, submitted on their brief, which contained the following reference to the point on which it turned in the Supreme Court of Michigan, and which is referred to in the opinion of the court.

We are not called upon to determine what the rights of the plaintiff would have been if the assignee had attempted to dispose of this property under § 5063, Rev. Stat., because

Opinion of the Court.

no such authority was asked for and no such proceedings were had.

Hence the decisions of the court as to proceedings under that section of the statute have no force in determining the rights of the parties in this controversy.

The case is simply this: The assignee being the legal owner of this property, and being in possession of it, (the presumption of law being that possession follows the legal title, and this presumption remains until an ouster has been shown,) he desired to dispose of the land, and for that purpose obtained the authority of the court to sell it, and by virtue of that authority did sell the same to the plaintiff. How can it be said that the assignee did not part with the legal title to it, because it subsequently appeared that some other person claimed an interest in the property under a void conveyance, and he had no notice of the application to the court by the assignee for an order to sell? It will be observed, that the assignee in his petition did not ask, and the judge did not order the sale of the entire interest free from all claims, but only of the interest that was vested in the assignee, and what right had an adverse claimant to be heard on the question of making such an order? or if he had notice, would he be allowed to oppose it?

Under such an order the adverse claimant loses no rights that he had to the land before the order and the sale under it were made. What rights he had in the land remain the same, and there is no evidence in the record that if he had had notice, and attended the sale, and the sale had been public, he would have given any more for the assignee's title to the land than the plaintiff did, nor is there any evidence in the case that the interest that the assignee had in the land was worth any more than was given by the plaintiff in this case.

No appearance for defendant in error.

MR. JUSTICE BRADLEY delivered the opinion of the court.

This is an action of ejectment, brought by Wisner, the plaintiff in error, against the defendants in error, for a lot of land

Opinion of the Court.

in Isabella County, Michigan. The plaintiff claims the land as purchaser from one Gillette, assignee in bankruptcy of Alfred Willey. The defendants claim the same under a number of tax sales, and a deed from Willey, the bankrupt. It appeared on the trial that Willey filed his petition in bankruptcy September 19, 1871, in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Michigan, and set forth, in the schedule thereto annexed, the land in question (with other lands) as his property; and it was shown that he had purchased it several years before. He was decreed a bankrupt September 3, 1872, and Gillette was appointed his assignee February 21, 1873. On the 3d day of April, 1880, more than seven years after his appointment, Gillette filed a petition in the District Court, praying for leave to sell the land in question and the several other lots mentioned in the schedule at private sale for any sum not less than $100. The petition alleged that Willey, at the time of filing his petition in bankruptcy, claimed an interest in the lands, describing them, and then proceeded as follows:

"Your petitioner, having no funds belonging to said estate in his hands, did not investigate the title of said bankrupt to said land, and believing that said lands were of little value paid no attention to them until recently, when application was made to your petitioner to purchase the right of said bankrupt in said lands. From examination of the records it appears that the lands have been sold for taxes to private parties for a number of years, beginning in 1867; that the right acquired by virtue of the sale of said lands for delinquent taxes is held by one party; in addition to such title has been obtained a deed from the bankrupt of said lands; that another party has, by virtue of a sale on execution, based upon a judgment obtained against said bankrupt before he was adjudicated a bankrupt, acquired a title to said lands; that the title to said lands is complicated in this manner, both parties claiming to own said lands by virtue of the title they have acquired thereto in the manner above stated; that, from inquiry and examination, your petitioner believes that the title which may be vested in him as assignee of said bankrupt is of but little value with