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To the exposition made by the Richmond Congress of the humane endeavours of the Confederacy, with respect to prisoners of the war, there is yet an addition to be made. Impressed with the exaggerations of the newspapers on this subject, and desiring to secure the publication of the truth from time to time, Commissioner Ould, in January, 1864, wrote to Gen. Hitchcock the following letter :

CONFEDERATE STATES OF AMERICA,

WAR DEPARTMENT. RICHMOND, VA., Jan. 24th, 1864.

MAJOR-GENERAL E. A. HITCHCOCK,

Agent of Exchange;

SIR: In view of the present difficulties attending the exchange and release of prisoners, I propose that all such on each side shall be attended by a proper number of their own surgeons, who under rules to be established, shall be permitted to take charge of their health and comfort. I also propose that these surgeons shall act as commissaries, with power to receive and distribute such contributions of money, food, clothing and medicines as may be forwarded for the relief of the prisoners. I fürther propose that these surgeons shall be selected by their own Government, and that they shall have full liberty at any and all times through the Agents of Exchange, to make reports not only of their own acts, but of any matters relating to the welfare of the prisoners.

Respectfully your obedient servant,
RO. OULD, Agent of Exchange.

To this letter Commissioner Ould received no reply. In January, 1865, the proposition was renewed to Gen. Grant, with the following remarks: It is true your prisoners are suffering. It is one of the calamities and

unsteady gait; that all talked continually of 'something to eat '-of the good dinner, or breakfast, or supper they had had at times and places that seemed very long ago, and very far off; that they slept but to dream of sitting down to tables groaning with rich viands, where they ate, and ate, and still could not be satisfied; that with miserly care they picked up every crumb; that they pounded up old bones, and boiled them over and over, until they were as white as the driven snow; that they fished in the swill-barrel at the prison hospital; that they greedily devoured rats and cats ; that they resorted to all manner of devices and tricks to cheat the surgeon out of a certificate; that they became melancholy and dejected; that they fell an easy prey to disease and death! Ah! there is many a poor fellow in his grave on Johnson's Island to-day, who would not be there had he been allowed wholesome food and enough of it."

A personal friend of the author gives a long and painfully interesting account of his experience in a trans-shipment of prisoners from Hilton Head to Fort Delaware, the terrible facts of which rival all that is known of the horrours of the "middle passage." Of 420 prisoners shipped by sea, only sixty-two could walk when the vessel arrived at Fort Delaware; the others were all down with sickness and exhaustion, and had to be taken to their cells on stretchers and ambulances. Many of them had lost their teeth by scurvy, and many were blind from disease. For months they had been subsisted on eight ounces of corn meal (ground in 1860) and one ounce of pickle (vitriol and salt), as a substitute for sorghum. Their rations were improved for a little while at Fort Delaware. But the regulations for cooking there allotted for such purpose to a company of 100 men every twenty-four hours, a log, 10 feet long and eight inches in diameter. There were no cooking utensils. Old pieces of tin were used over the fire. The men were locked up eighteen out of twentyfour hours, and only twenty at a time were allowed to pass out for the offices ofnature.

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necessities of the war, made so not by our choice. We have done everything we can consistently with the duty we owe to ourselves. We intend to do the same in the future. But that great suffering must ensue if your prisoners remain in our hands, is very certain. For that reason, I propose that all of them be delivered to you in exchange, man for man, and officer for officer, according to grade, for those of ours whom you hold. Will not the cause of humanity be far more promoted by such a course, even if, as you suggest, the friends of prisoners, both North and South, are satisfied of the exaggeration of the reports of suffering so rife in both sections? If, however, prisoners are to remain in confinement, at least, let us mutually send to their relief and comfort stationary agents, whose official duty requires them to devote all their time and labour to their sacred mission.”

Gen. Grant did not reply. Perhaps he thought matters were too near the end to entertain any new negotiations on the subject referred to. However this may be, whatever was to be the catastrophe, the conclusion is simply stated: it was to leave the Confederacy with a complete record of justice, a testimony of humanity, on the whole subject of the exchange and treatment of prisoners, which must ever remain among the noblest honours and purest souvenirs of a lost cause.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

HOW SHERMAN'S MARCH THROUGH GEORGIA DEVELOPED A CRISIS IN THE CONFEDERACY.-GEOGRAPHICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF THE CONQUEST OF THE SOUTH.-ADDRESS OF THE CONFEDRRATE CONGRESS.—A VULGAR AND FALSE ESTIMATE OF THE ENEMY'S SUCCESS.-MAPS OF CONQUEST AND COBWEB LINES OF OCCUPATION.-GENERAL DECAY OF PUBLIO SPIRIT IN THE CONFEDERACY.-POPULAR IMPATIENCE OF THE WAR.-WANT OF CONFIDENCE IN PRESIDENT DAVIS' ADMINISTRATION.-BEWILDERED ATTEMPTS AT COUNTER-REVOLUTION. —EXECUTIVE MISMANAGEMENT IN RICHMOND.-HOW THE CONSCRIPTION LAW WAS CHEATED.—DESERTERS IN THE CONFEDERATE ARMIES.—PECULIAR CAUSES FOR IT.—ITS FRIGHTFUL EXTENT.-HOW IT WAS NOT A SIGN OF INFIDELITY TO THE CONFEDERATE CAUSE.CONDITION OF THE COMMISSARIAT.—BREAD TAKEN FROM GEN. LEE'S ARMY TO FEED PRISONERS.ALARMING REDUCTION OF SUPPLIES.-MAJOR FRENCH'S LETTER.-—LEE'S TROOPS BORDERING ON STARVATION.-EIGHT POINTS PRESENTED TO CONGRESS.—WHAT IT DID. THE CONDITION OF THE CURRENCY.-CONGRESS CURTAILS THE CURRENCY ONE

THIRD.—ACT OF 17TH FEBRUARY, 1864.-SECRETARY SEDDON GIVES THE coup de grace

TO THE CURRENCY.-HIS NEW STANDARD OF VALUE IN WHEAT AT FORTY DOLLARS A BUSHEL.-DISORDERS OF THE CURRENCY AND COMMISSARIAT AS CONTRIBUTING TO DESERTIONS.-IMPRACTICABILITY OF ALL REMEDIES FOR DESERTIONS.-NO DISAFFECTION IN THE CONFEDERACY, EXCEPT WITH REFERENCE TO FAULTS OF THE RICHMOND ADMINISTRATION. —PRESIDENT DAVIS AND THE CONFEDERATE CONGRESS, &C.-THREE PRINCIPAL MEASURES IN CONGRESS DIRECTED AGAINST THE PRESIDENT.-REMONSTRANCE OF THE VIRGINIA DELEGATION WITH REFERENCE TO THE CABINET.-RESIGNATION OF MR. SEDDON.-PERSONAL RELATIONS BETWEEN PRESIDENT DAVIS AND GEN. LEE.-WHY THE LATTER DECLINED TO TAKE COMMAND OF ALL THE ARMIES OF THE CONFEDERACY.-WANT OF SELFASSERTION IN GEN. LEE'S CHARACTER. WHY HIS INFLUENCE IN THE GENERAL AFFAIRS OF THE CONFEDERACY WAS NEGATIVE.-RECRIMINATION BETWEEN PRESIDENT DAVIS AND CONGRESS.-A SINGULAR ITEM IN THE CONSCRIPTION BUREAU.-REMARK OF MRS. DAVIS TO A CONFEDERATE SENATOR. THE OPPOSITION LED BY SENATOR WIGFALL. HIS TERRIBLE AND ELOQUENT INVECTIVES.-A CHAPTER OF GREAT ORATORY LOST TO THE WORLD.-AN APPARENT CONTRADICTION IN THE PRESIDENT'S CHARACTER.—THE INFLUENCE OF SMALL FAVOURITES."-JOHN M. DANIEL'S OPINION OF PRESIDENT DAVIS' TEARS.-INFLUENCE OF THE PRESIDENT ALMOST ENTIRELY GONE IN THE LAST PERIODS OF THE WAR. THE VISIBLE WRECKS OF HIS ADMINISTRATION.-HISTORY OF PEACE PROPOSITIONS IN CONGRESS. THEY WERE GENERALITIES.-ANALYSIS OF THE UNION PARTY IN THE SOUTH.-HOW GOV. BROWN, OF GEORGIA, WAS USED BY IT.—ITS PERSISTENT DESIGN UPON THE VIRGINIA LEGISLATURE.~HOW IT WAS REBUFFED.-HEROIC CHOICE OF VIRGINIA.-PRESIDENT

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GEOGRAPHICAL IMPOSSIBILITY OF SUBJUGATION.

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DAVIS' TRIBUTE TO THIS STATE.-WANT OF RESOLUTION IN OTHER PARTS OF THE CONFEDERACY.-SUMMARY EXPLANATION OF THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE CONFEDERACY.PROPOSITION TO ARM THE SLAVES OF THE SOUTH INDICATIVE OF A DESPERATE CONDITION. -HOW IT WAS IMPRACTICABLE AND ABSURD.-NOT FIVE THOUSAND SPARE MUSKETS IN THE CONFEDERACY.-PALTRY LEGISLATION OF CONGRESS.-GRASPING AT SHADOWS.

THERE was nothing fatal in a military point of view in Sherman's memorable march; and yet it dated the first chapter of the subjugation of the Confederacy. It brought the demoralization of the country to the surface; it had plainly originated in the pragmatic and excessive folly of President Davis; it furnished a striking occasion for recrimination, and was accompanied with a loss of confidence in his administration, that nothing but a miracle could repair.

We have already referred in another part of this work to the physical impossibility of the subjugation of the South at the hands of the North, as long as the integrity of the public resolution was maintained. This impossibility was clearly and distinctly stated, in an address of the Congress to the people of the Confederate States as late as the winter of 1864-5. That body then declared, with an intelligence that no just student of history will fail to appreciate: "The passage of hostile armies through our country, though productive of cruel suffering to our people, and great pecuniary loss, gives the enemy no permanent advantage or foothold. To subjugate a country, its civil government must be suppressed by a continuing military force, or supplanted by another, to which the inhabitants yield a voluntary or forced obedience. The passage of hostile armies through our territory cannot produce this result. Permanent garrisons would have to be stationed at a sufficient number of points to strangle all civil government before it could be pretended, even by the United States Government itself, that its authority was extended over these States. How many garrisons would it require? How many hundred thousand soldiers would suffice to suppress the civil government of all the States of the Confederacy, and to establish over them, even in name and form, the authority of the United States? In a geographical point of view, therefore, it may be asserted that the conquest of these Confederate States is impracticable."

The "geographical point of view" was decisive. The Confederacy was yet far from the extremity of subjugation, even after Sherman had marched from Northern Georgia to the sea-coast. He had left a long scar on the State; but he had not conquered the country; he had been unable to leave a garrison on his route since he left Dalton; and even if he passed into the Carolinas, to defeat him at any stage short of Richmond would be to re-open and recover all the country he had overrun. It was the fashion in the North to get up painted maps, in which all the territory of the South traversed by a Federal army, or over which there was a cob-web line of military occupation, was marked as conquest, and the other parts desig

nated as the remnant of the Confederacy. This appeal to the vulgar eye was not without effect, but it was very absurd. Lines drawn upon paper alarmed the multitude; it was sufficient for them to know that the enemy was at such and such points; they never reflected that a title of occupation was worthless, without garrisons or footholds, that it often depended upon the issue of a single field, and that one or two defeats might put the whole of the enemy's forces back upon the frontiers of the Confederacy.

But the military condition of the Confederacy must be studied in connection with the general decay of public spirit that had taken place in the country, and the impatience of the hardships of the war, when the people had no longer confidence in its ultimate results. This impatience was manifested everywhere; it amounted to the feeling, that taking the war to be hopeless, the sooner it reached an adverse conclusion the better; that victories which merely amused the imagination and insured prolongation of the war, were rather to be deprecated than otherwise, and that to hurry the catastrophe would be mercy in the end. Unpopular as the administration of President Davis was, evident as was its failure, there were not nerve and elasticity enough in the country for a new experiment. The history of the last Confederate Congress is that of vacillating and bewildered attempts to reform and check the existing disorder and the evident tendency to ruin--weak, spasmodic action, showing the sense of necessity for effort, but the want of a certain plan and a sustained resolution.

In the last periods of the war, the demoralization of the Confederacy was painfully apparent. The popular resolution that had been equal to so long a contest, that had made so many proffers of devotion, that had given so many testimonies of sacrifice and endurance, had not perhaps inherently failed. But it had greatly declined in view of Executive mismanagement, in the utter loss of confidence in the Richmond Administration, and under the oppressive conviction that its sacrifices were wasted, its purposes thwarted, and its efforts brought to nought, by an incompetent government. This official mismanagement not only impaired the popular effort, but by the unequal distribution of burdens incident to weak and irregular governments, even where such is not designed, incurred the charge of corrupt favour, and exasperated large portions of the community. Rich and powerful citizens managed to escape the conscription-it was said in Richmond that it was "easier for a camel to go through the eye of a needle than for a rich man to enter Camp Lee;" but the rigour of the law did not spare the poor and helpless, and the complaint was made in the Confederate Congress that even destitute cripples had been taken from their homes, and confined in the conscription camps, without reference to physical disability so conspicuous and pitiful. It was not unusual to see at the railroad stations long lines of squalid men, with scraps of blankets in their hands, or small pine boxes of provisions, or whatever else they

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