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injured interests, but that an intelligent foresight of the results will dissuade from such a step. In order that the European powers may have some chance of rationally proving to the belligerent parties that reconciliation is the best solution, they must first prove that it is the love of peace, the fervor of sentiments of humanity and civilization, which alone inspires them, directing them to measures of sympathy, whence all ideas of supremacy are excluded, and which are made with a profound respect for the independence and the liberty of the States of the American Union."

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,
BAYARD TAYLOR,

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Chargé d'Affaires.

Secretary of State.

No. 19.]

Mr. Taylor to Mr. Seward.

[Extracts.]

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES, St. Petersburgh, November 12, 1862. SIR: I hasten to communicate to you the information promised in my despatch of yesterday. I have just returned from an interview with Prince Gortchacow, who, with the generous frankness which has hitherto characterized his intercourse with me, has placed me in possession of all the facts of which it is necessary that the government of the United States should be informed.

I first asked him whether the proposition of France, announced in the journals of Paris and London, had actually been made to the imperial government. He replied in the affirmative. I then asked whether he was willing to communicate to me its exact terms. He answered in French, apparently quoting the words

of the official communication:

"A conjunctive proposition on the part of France, Russia, and England, to the belligerent parties in America, to agree to an armistice of six months." He further informed me that the proposal was to be considered by the English cabinet on the 11th, (yesterday.)

I stated to the Prince that the declarations of Russia had heretofore been sufficiently frank and explicit; that we could rely upon her action in the matter as that of a friend. and whatever it might be, the government of the United States was assured in advance of the friendly consideration which would inspire it. I judged it necessary to add, however, that the moment was ill chosen for the presentation of such a proposal. After a campaign, the unsatisfactory character of which I could not deny, and the non-fulfilment of promises which ought never to have been made, the prospect of the suppression of the rebellion was now decidedly encouraging. The government was aware of the necessity of the most speedy and vigorous action; three hundred thousand men had been added to our army within the last two months, and the new iron-clad vessels, probably afloat by this time, would, I hope, soon enable us to dispense with the blockade, by putting us in possession of all the southern ports.

The Prince assured me, in reply, that the action of Russia would be governed entirely, as heretofore, by the most friendly feelings toward the United States. He would take no step which could not receive that interpretation. He then offered to read to me his instructions to M. de Stoeckl in regard to the proposed action of the three powers. After stating the proposition, the despatch refers to the position which Russia has occupied since the commencement of the struggle, repeats her desire for a settlement by conciliatory measures, and expresses her

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willingness to tender her good offices in a way that shall be acceptable, and that shall seem to promise a good result.

The despatch having been rapidly read, and in a foreign language, I do not pretend to give you the precise words, but I am sure of having reproduced the material substance of it. Its prevailing tone was a delicate and friendly consideration for the views of the government of the United States.

"There," said Prince Gortchacow, when the reading was finished, "now you know the worst, so far as Russia is concerned." I considered myself justified in assuring him that there was nothing in his instructions to M. de Stoeckl to which the government of the United States could take exception, for it would interpret every act of Russia in the light of her motives. An assurance of this kind seemed to me necessary in return for his frankness. I then retired.

I should do the government ill service by disguising the truth that the European powers most friendly to it are at last becoming impatient. The failure of two campaigns is the prominent fact in their eyes; the important ad vantages which have been gained are overlooked. Nearly all the news which is received comes distorted through English and French channels. The correspondents of the London journals, in particular, continually give currency to malicious falsehoods, the absence of which in American newspapers they pretend to account for by a tyrannical censorship. These statements, copied throughout the continent, and persistently repeated, are beginning to produce their natural effect; to which is added the prestige of apparent success, to a certain extent, on the part of the rebel government. There is a universal sympathy, independent of the principles at stake, with success against odds, and this sympathy is beginning to tell, not only against the government of the United States, but against the wisdom of its friends.

What Russia evidently fears at present is the ultimate exhaustion of the two sections of the Union, which will leave them either divided or reunited, helpless to resist the encroachments of hostile powers. The political equilibrium which she sees in the maintenance of the Union in its original strength would thus be destroyed. No news could be more welcome to her than that which should indicate the speedy overthrow of the rebellion, but a struggle protracted much longer seems to her not less unfortunate than immediate separation.

I believe this to be a strictly correct statement of the predominant feeling of the imperial government. My duty terminates in communicating it, for the possibility of its existence and the course which it suggests have undoubtedly been foreseen by the President and by yourself.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,
BAYARD TAYLOR,
Chargé d'Affaires.

Hon. WILLIAM H. SEWARD,

Secretary of State.

No. 20.]

Mr. Taylor to Mr. Seward.

LEGATION OF THE UNITED STATES,
St. Petersburgh, November 15, 1862.

SIR: The Journal de St. Petersbourg, of to-day, publishes the despatch of Prince Gortchacow to M. d'Oubil, chargé d'affaires of Russia at Paris, in reply to that of M. Drouyn de l'Huys to the Duke de Montebello, French ambassador at this court As the despatch refers particularly to the instructions which have been given to M. de Stoeckl, I herewith translate it as an affirmation and a completion of the oral report contained in my despatch of the 12th instant, No. 19:

"ST. PETERSBURGH, October 27, (Nov. 8,) 1862.

"SIR: I transmit to you herewith a copy of a despatch of M. Drouyn de Huys, which the Duke de Montebello has been charged to communicate to us. It concerns the affairs of North America, and its object is to invite us to join in an understanding with France and England, in order to profit by the existing lassitude of the parties to propose in common a suspension of hostilities.

"In reply to this overture, I have reminded the ambassador of France of the solicitude which our august master has not ceased to bestow on the American conflict since the moment when it broke out, a solicitude inspired by the amicable relations which exist between the two countries, and of which the imperial cabinet has given public evidence. I have assured him that nothing would better correspond with our desires than to be able to hasten the termination of a struggle which we deplore, and that, in this sense, our minister at Washington is instructed to seize all favorable occasions to recommend moderation and conciliation in order to allay the opposing passions, and lead the struggling interests to a wise solution. I have recognized that these counsels would certainly have more value if they were presented simultaneously, and under the same amicable forms, by the great powers which are interested in the issue of the conflict.

"But I have added, that, in our opinion, it was necessary before all things to avoid the appearance of any pressure whatever of a nature to wound the public sentiment of the United States, and to excite susceptibilities which are ready to be aroused at the mere idea of foreign intervention. Now, according to the information which we possess at present, we are led to believe that a combined movement of France, England, and Russia, however conciliatory it might be, and with whatsoever precautions it might be surrounded, if it came with an official and collective character, would incur the risk of bringing about a result opposed to the pacificatory end which the three courts desire.

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We have, therefore, concluded, that if the French government persists in judging that a formal and collective movement is advisable, and if the cabinet of London should partake that opinion, it would be impossible for us at this distance to foresee the reception which such a movement would be likely to meet. But if in this case our minister does not officially participate in it, his moral support is not less assured in advance to every attempt at conciliation.

"In lending such support to his colleagues of France and England, under the semi-official form which he may believe best adapted to avoid the appearance of pressure, M. de Stoeckl will simply continue the attitude and the language which, by order of our august master, he has not ceased to observe since the origin of the American dispute.

"It is in this sense that I desire you to express yourself to the minister of foreign affairs of France, in reply to the communication which he has been pleased to make to us.

"Receive, &c.

"GORTCHACOW."

While I infer from the above that Russia would, to a certain extent, be inclined to take part in a movement which she foresaw to be inevitable on the part of England and France, rather than permit a coalition between those two powers from which she should be wholly excluded, the probable refusal of the English government announced to-day by telegraph relieves me from all apprehension of complications that might arise from the proposition. I stated to Prince Gortchacow, at our recent interview, my belief that England would not accede, and am very glad to find it so soon confirmed.

The day after the proposal of France was announced here, the Duke and Duchess de Montebello called at this legation, although a visit was not required by social etiquette. I interpreted the courtesy as an intimation that the ambassador wished to allay any suspicion of hostile sentiment on the part of France.

The continuance of small successes to the Union arms, in all quarters, is very encouraging; and, if no important reverse occurs, I have hopes of soon being able to restore the shaken confidence in our final success.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,
BAYARD TAYLOR,

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SIR: Judging that you may desire to have regular reports from this legation at the present time, I have the honor to transmit to you an account of all that has occurred in relation to American interests since my despatch of the 15th instant.

With regard to the project of intervention made by France, the impression here is that since the replies of Russia and England it has been temporarily suspended, but is not relinquished by that power. If a renewal of it at any time shall be made to this court, I am convinced that Prince Gortchacow, with the entire absence of reserve which has characterized all his intercourse with me, will inform me promptly of the fact. I have received a confidential communication from Mr. Dayton, giving me an account of his interview with M. Drouyn de l'Huys, and have in return transmitted to him a report of my own conversations with Prince Gortchacow. I have also forwarded a similar confidential despatch to Mr. Adams, as I judged it important that both he and Mr. Dayton should be officially informed of the sentiments of the imperial governI trust that this proceeding will meet your approval.

ment.

Since my last despatch I have had no further personal intercourse with Prince Gortchacow, but I have prepared and sent to him a statement, drawn up with great care, of the present national debt of the United States; the estimated annual revenue under the new laws; the additions made to the active force of our armies during the last three months; the number of iron-clad vessels in process of construction; and the important movements already commenced in the west and on the sea-coast. This statement was forwarded with a private (unofficial) note, informing him that it was not intended as an indirect prediction of results, but as a simple exposition of facts, which would clearly show that an armistice at this time could only be of advantage to the rebellious States, and that no proposition of the kind could be entertained by the federal government. I am aware that, in this act, I may have exceeded the strict line of my duty, but I felt that some such presentation of the brighter aspects of our cause was necessary to strengthen the hopes and refresh the sympathies of the govern ment most friendly to us.

I had a conversation yesterday with the ambassador of France, the Duke de Montebello, in which I expressed to him the same views concerning the proposed intervention of his government. He informed me that immediately after receiving the despatch of M. Drouyn de l'Huys he had called upon me, in order to communicate its contents to me, but had not found me at home. I infer from his expressions, both on this and other occasions, that his personal sympathies are in favor of the preservation of the Union. The only defence of the proposition which he offered was, that it was very carefully worded; did not betray a hostile spirit, and that an armistice need not necessarily include the raising of the blockade.

The British ambassador, Lord Napier, has been especially kind and cordial in his personal intercourse, but seems disposed to avoid any discussion of our national struggle, or the European propositions concerning it.

There are in Russia about 237,000 stand of arms which have been condemned, and offered for sale by the government. Eight or ten thousand of them have percussion locks and bayonets; but the remainder are flint-lock muskets, and carbines of an obsolete pattern, and may be had for 75 copeks (about 58 cents) apiece. A few days ago I discovered that an American here, well known for his treasonable sentiments, had been examining the specimens offered, with the expressed intention of making a large purchase. In the absence of any fund for detective service, I have been voluntarily assisted by two loyal American residents, who have been so successful in following up the transaction that no further steps can be taken without their knowledge. The arms are so worthless, however, that I do not anticipate their purchase.

The imperial court is at present in Moscow, where it will remain for the next three weeks. The internal condition of the empire is generally quiet and satisfactory. Since the promulgation of the plan of judicial reform, the increase in public confidence has been very remarkable. Count Pauin, who opposed its adoption, has been dismissed from the ministry.

I have the honor to be, with the highest respect, your obedient servant,
BAYARD TAYLOR,

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SIR: I have to acknowledge the receipt of your despatches of November 11, (No. 18,) November 12, (No. 19,) and November 15, (No. 20.) These papers, in their order, open and clear up the subject of the action of Russia upon the proposition which was recently made to her and to Great Britain by France, for a joint appeal of all three of the powers to the United States. The consideration which they suggest has, however, already been anticipated in my previous instructions.

I have now only to renew the expression of the satisfaction of the President with the prudent, just, and friendly course pursued by the government of the Czar on that interesting occasion.

On reading your despatches I cannot avoid seeing that some exaggerations of our affairs, which attended the political canvass which has been recently held here, have been presented to Europe, even by friends of this country, as portentous facts, and have been influential in inducing the ill-judged proceeding of Mr. Drouyn de l'Huys, and investing it with an importance far beyond its

merits.

I am

All these exaggerations, having had in some measure their desired local and temporary success, have now passed away. Even those who, on either side, got them up in the heat of argument have forgotten them, and the whole country, with all the departments of the government, has become satisfied that the progress of the government in suppressing the insurrection is satisfactory. not disposed to judge foreign nations harshly for their want of confidence in the maintenance of the Union, since they are naturally misled by our own par. tisan excitements, the nature and character of which must be very imperfectly understood abroad.

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