Uncertainty of Operation of Negative Power If the legislature is in session at the time the governor vetoes an appropriation measure, he is required to transmit a copy of his reasons for refusing to sign the same to the house in which it originated, and the said house is instructed to reconsider separately the items objected to. Under these circumstances the governor may, if he chooses, get a fair statement of a consistent fiscal policy before the legislature for discussion and action. But usually the legislature has adjourned before the governor has an opportunity to act on many appropriations. He may also spread before the legislature in his messages a survey of the state's finances and recommendations for expenditures and retrenchments, but such a survey and such recommendations are merely pious wishes, so far as compelling even the attention of the legislature is concerned. Positive Requirements under Present System Ineffective A number of states impose upon the governor the constitutional obligation to present to the legislature estimates of the amount of money to be raised by taxation, but such a provision alone does not go very far in establishing executive responsibility for appropriation bills. The Efficiency and Economy Committee of Illinois, where such a constitutional provision exists, remarks in its recent report that as far as it is aware no governor has complied with this important mandate. It adds, in justice to the governors, that failure in this respect may be attributed in the main to the fact that the executive authorities of the state as now organized have not afforded the governor the facilities for securing the requisite information. In no state does the governor seem to have used his constitutional powers to the fullest extent in the direction of complete budget making, but doubtless for the additional reason that the incentive to do so is slight in view of the impossibility of really securing legislative action under proper scrutiny and in the light of effective public discussion. All the expedients have proved ineffective due to lack of provision for responsible executive leadership in matters that are of fundamental importance to the administration. Constitutional Requirement of Executive to Frame, Submit and Defend Money Bills The mere fact that there is an increasing number of states which are giving the governor the power to veto items in appropriation bills is indicative of a condition demanding change. Inasmuch as the finances in our states call for more systematic attention and centralized and responsible control, sound public policy requires that effective measures be adopted for giving the governor a power over the budget which is commensurate with the present responsibility really vested in him as the chief "executive" by popular opinion. Nothing short of a thorough going treatment of the subject which will impose on the governor the duty of formulating, submitting and defending money measures will solve the problem of securing economy and responsibility in the appropriation and management of public funds.* CONSTITUTION LACKING IN MEANS FOR ENFORCING EXECUTIVE RESPONSIBILITY Not only is the constitution lacking in the essentials for developing leadership, but it is also wholly lacking in provisions for enforcing responsibility. In the discussion of the "electorate" and "the organization and procedure of the legislature," it was pointed out that no means has been provided for defining and submitting issues to the voters. (Above, pp. 21-24.) No Provision for Making the "Opposition" Effective As has been shown, the organized official agency of the state for formulating and discussing issues and matters of public policy and administrative proposals is the legislature-an independent elected body representing constituencies. It has also been shown that responsible leadership is necessary to the definition of issues as well as the location of official responsibility. The big principle that has been missed in our constitution making and in establishing the procedures governing the legisla. tive body has been the necessity for making the "opposition" effective, and bringing political criticism to some positive test before the electorate. The Provision for the Prompt Retirement of Officers Who Are Not Supported by a Majority The principles of responsiveness and responsibility in a representative government both call for a means whereby officers who do not have the support of an undoubted and united majority shall retire. This is true of both public and private management. The methods for making the "opposition" effective are: (1) to put it in a position to prevent executive action that does not have the approval of a majority of representatives, and to prevent legislative action by a majority of representatives that does not have the approval of the executive; (2) to provide for a prompt reference to the electorate in case these two independent branches cannot come to an agreement. The Power of Executive Dissolution As in the case of the constitutional provisions for executive leadership we have gone part way and stopped. We have provided for the *See Proceedings of the New York Academy of Political Science for October, 1914, pp. 141-148, for a more adequate discussion of the subject and for definite constructive proposals. negative but not for the positive action. An effective way of enforcing both responsiveness and responsibility is to give to the executive power to dissolve the legislative body and at the same time make the executive conform in his action to the decision of the electorate on the issues presented. Not having provided the machinery that is known to operate effectively in both public and private institutions controlled by representative bodies, the makers of American constitutions have again resorted to new and untried expedients-temporized mechanism and various roundabout and laborious procedures for securing responsibility to the electorate. Historic Reasons for Failure to Adopt Constitutional Plan That Provides for Responsive and Responsible Government Aside from the fact that the mechanics of responsible government under a representative system had not been developed at the time our political independence was won, the circumstances surrounding the establishment of the republic were unfavorable to a government in which provision was made for enforcing responsiveness and responsibility (see above, pp. 55-58). There had been years of ineffective protest against what was regarded as the unwarranted use of executive power. Following this came the Revolution-a phase of opposition to the reactionary monarch, which in this country brought about national independence, but which in England finally resulted in the establishment of a procedure for establishing and controlling responsible leadership. Without experience to guide them, as a safeguard against usurpation, the American mind became attached to another principle of control, viz.: to render persons in office comparatively harmless by limiting their powers through innumerable checks which hamper positive action but do not prevent neglect, wastefulness and malfeasance. Provision Made to Prevent a Misuse of the Powers of Government No way having been found to make governing agents responsible to the people for the manner in which their powers were exercised, the initial plan of employing constitutional inhibitions and one branch of the government to prevent abuse of power by another was developed to such a degree of complication that it has at last broken down by its own. weight and has forced upon public attention the need of change. Nowhere in the world is there such a chaos of conflicting powers, agencies, authorities, officers and jurisdictions. Use of the Governor as a Negative Force Against the Legislature At the very beginning of the history of New York as a state fear was expressed lest "laws inconsistent with the spirit of the constitution or with the public good may be hastily and inadvisedly passed." In 1777, therefore, it was ordained "that the governor for the time being, the chancellor and the judges of the supreme court, or any two of them, together with the governor, shall be and hereby are constituted a council to revise all bills about to be passed into laws by the legislature and that all bills which have passed the senate and the assembly shall, before they become laws, be presented to said council for their revisal and consideration; and if upon such revision and consideration, it should appear improper to the said council or a majority of them, that the said bill shall become a law of this state, that they shall return the same, together with their objections thereto in writing, to the senate or house of assembly (in whichsoever it shall have originated), who shall enter the objections sent down by the council at large in their minutes, and proceed to reconsider the said bill." If any bill so returned by the council of revision was repassed by a majority of two-thirds in both houses, it became a law. With a view to preventing unwise legislation the governor was also given the power to prorogue the legislature for a period of not more than sixty days. These methods of executive control over legislation were abandoned in the constitution of 1821 which swept away the council of revision and vested the straight veto power in the governor. Since that date the chief executive has enjoyed the veto power alone and all of the states of the union except North Carolina have now adopted the principle. The Use of the Courts as a Negative Force Between the years 1777 and 1821, however, a radical change had taken place in the growth of the doctrine of judicial control over legislation. A number of state statutes had been declared invalid on constitutional grounds in several of the states before the end of the eighteenth century, and in 1803, Chief Justice Marshall laid down the doctrine in unmistakable language in the case of Marbury vs. Madison, which at once became a precedent for all other courts. As early as 1811 judicial control over legislation was used in New York, in the case of Dash vs. Van Kleech (7 Johns. 477), and five years later Kent blocked the enforcement of an act of the legislature on the ground of its invalidity. From that time forward, the principle that it was the duty of the courts to act as a check on the legislature was applied with increasing frequency. Almost correlative with this growth of judicial power was the multiplication of specific constitutional limitations on the legislature. In the beginning, almost sovereign power was entrusted to that branch of the government, but by steady process its authority over finances, the affairs of cities, special legislation, and even its own procedure has been cut away until it has lost a large share of its former high prerogatives. Our System of Checks and Balances To this system of pitting the governor and the courts against the legislature are added innumerable other devices for breaking and distributing authority and responsibility until no one knows who is responsible for anything, except the unofficial boss, whose tenure usually outlasts that of all the official agents. Among these devices may be mentioned the following: 1. A large variety of methods of appointing administrative officers so that no single agency can claim complete authority. 2. Diversity in the terms of officers, applied also to the legislature where senators hold for two years and assemblymen for one year. 3. Diversity in the methods of removal, various agencies being 5. Popular election of some executive officers and appointment of 6. The necessity of constant resort to the courts to determine the limitations on officers in purely administrative matters. 7. Distribution of kindred functions among many authorities in order to prevent centralization. Development of the Irresponsible Boss. Operating under the system of checks and balances-on the doctrine of "original sin" in politics, that no one can be safely entrusted with any substantial authority-the legislature, through its control over the finances and over the structure and powers of offices and officers, developed an administrative system in which no leadership was contemplated. The result was that a non-official, outside, irresponsible, partisan organization came to have a dominant influence in determining what should be done, and the affairs of state were shaped through what came to be known as the American system of "log-rolling" legislation and "pork barrel" politics. This irresponsible leadership has been the most conspicuous factor in the American governmental system for the last 140 years—a system which depends on satisfying the demands of small independent geographical constituencies through representatives whose controlling motives have been to commend themselves to the voters of their locality by furthering schemes for local development and by employing methods styled "invisible government" under the leadership of an irresponsible "boss." Reaction Against Irresponsibility During the first century after the Revolutionary War, while each |