1840. Shellard; 1844. Blake; 1848. Lacey; 1848. Brittain; 1851. Duffield. It is not proposed here to set out the illustrations furnished by the cases on conspiracy of the application to that crime of the general rules of evidence. It may be noted that 3 Russ. by Gr., p. 166, is sometimes cited as extracting from Lord Grey's Case (1682) the proposition that "every person concerned in any of the criminal parts of the transaction alleged as a conspiracy may be found guilty, though there be no evidence that such persons joined in concerting the plan, or that they ever met the others, and though it is probable they never did, and though some of them only join in the latter parts of the transaction, and probably did not know of the matter until some of the prior parts of the transaction were complete." No such passage occurs in Lord Grey's Case, nor does Sir W. Russell cite it as an extract from that case, nor does that case appear to have been prosecuted as a case of conspiracy. The doctrine is no doubt generally correct, but it is true of conspiracy only as it is true of other joint crimes. See at foot of p. 85, inf. It is not part of the present design to consider the subjects of pleading and of procedure in conspiracy. They will be found treated in 3 Russ. by Gr. 159 seq. But in general it may be said that the ordinary rules of criminal pleading apply to conspiracy, with exceptions arising from the fact that the design of the conspirators need not have been executed or completely ripened in detail, and that the details consequently not only cannot be stated in all cases, but may commonly be immaterial. Thus there may be a criminal design to defraud persons of things by means not yet completely determined; and in such a case these undetermined matters must necessarily be treated as to the jurors unknown or stated generally; and this necessity has given rise to more general rules, such as that in an indictment for a conspiracy to defraud by false pretences-the false pretences, even where they are known, need not be particularly set out. The averment in the indictment of the criminal purpose must show clearly that the purpose was one for which it is criminal to agree;--by general words of art, if such exist which are applicable to the case; or by details. If the averment of the purpose fails in this, but overt acts are laid in such a mode as to show matter indictable irrespectively of the combination, the averment of conspiracy may be disregarded, and the parties may be tried for the joint offence so disclosed; but an insufficient averment of criminal purpose will not be aided by averments of overt acts not shown to be criminal independently of combination (1844. King). Questions of great difficulty may occur with respect to jurisdiction in conspiracy. In Brisac's Case (1803) it was held, that although the agreement was made at a place out of the jurisdiction of the common law courts, it was yet triable in the ordinary criminal courts in England if an overt act in execution of it was done in England; and that an act done in England by an innocent agent of one of the conspirators was the act of the conspirators for this purpose. In Bernard's Case (1858) a question occurred whether a person could be indicted in England for having counselled in England the murder of an alien in Paris. The defendant was ac quitted, and the point was not determined; but in 1861 the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 4, provided for conspiracies and other offences of this kind, not however by applying to the offenders the general clauses relating to accessories, but by a special enactment making the offence a misdemeanor. (See 1 Russ. by Gr. 760, 967.) In Kohn's Case (1864) a conspiracy was formed in England by the defendant and others for casting away a foreign ship in order to prejudice the underwriters. The ship was scuttled when out of the jurisdiction by the defendant and others, who appear all to have been foreigners. Willes, J., is reported to have told the jury that-- “The ship was a foreign ship, and she was sunk by foreigners far from the English coast, and so out of the jurisdiction of our courts. But the conspiracy in this country to commit the offence is criminal by our law. And this case does not raise the question which arose in R. v. Bernard, as to a conspiracy limited to a criminal offence to be committed abroad. For here, if the prisoner was party to the conspiracy at all, it was not so limited, for it was clearly contemplated that the ship might be destroyed off the bar at Ramsgate, which would be within the jurisdiction. The offence of conspiracy would be committed by any persons conspiring together to commit an unlawful act to the prejudice or injury of others, if the conspiracy was in this country, although the overt acts were abroad. For the principal offence the prisoner could not be indicted in this country, as he is a foreigner, and the ship was foreign and the offence was committed on the high seas.' (See as to Wakefield's Case, inf., å 17, p. 63.) It appears to be implied in Brisac's Case that a conspiracy by British subjects abroad to violate an English law is not at common law indictable in this country unless an overt act is committed here. It is not easy to collect the effect of Kohn's case with respect to conspiracies here for acts to be done abroad. If the contemplated act, when done, will not, by reason of the place and of the nationality of the actors, be punishable here, there would be much difficulty in holding criminal by our law an agreement here for doing that which when done would not be a crime against our laws. Again, suppose that aliens agree abroad to do or to procure to be done here an act which will be in violation of English law, it is clear that their agreement is so far no crime against our law. But suppose further that they procure an innocent agent to do an overt act here; or that one of them does an overt act here. Can each of them in the former case, or can those who remain abroad in the latter case, be said to have broken our law? It is conceived that our law of criminal participation or agency could not be applied in such a case. But these and similar questions appear still to await judicial determination. The punishment of conspiracies in general is now by fine and imprisonment with or without sureties, as in the case of other common law misdemeanors. By the 14 & 15 Vict. c. 100, s. 28, hard labour may be added in the case of any conspiracy to cheat or defraud, or to extort money or goods, or falsely to accuse of any crime, or to obstruct, prevent, pervert or defeat the course of public justice. The misdemeanor of conspiracy to murder may, under the 24 & 25 Vict. c. 100, s. 4, be punished with penal servitude for not more than ten years, or with imprisonment for not more than two years, with or without hard labour. The crime of conspiracy to commit a crime or offence does not merge in the crime or offence when the conspiracy is executed. (1844. O'Connell, per Lord Campbell, C. J.: 1848. Button.) Nor is the punishment limited to the punishment prescribed by law for the complete offence. (1851. Rowlands.) Nor, as it seems, does expiration of the time limited by a statute for a prosecution for an offence against its provisions, bar a prosecution for conspiracy to commit that offence. (1851. Thompson.) the It seems never to have been considered whether the ancient exception from the law of conspiracy, properly so called, of grand jurors or other persons acting under colour of judicial office or duty (1608. Floyd v. Barker, &c.) applies to the modern form of the crime. The ancient writ of conspiracy appears not to have lain against husband and wife alone, It is said to have lain against husband, wife and a third person. (See Yearb. 38 Edw. 3, 3a: 40 Edw. 3, 19: 41 Edw. 3, 29: Fitzh. N. B. 116 1: Staundf. 174.) But the ef fect of the ancient authorities is doubtful; and it may be questioned whether a husband and wife could not be convicted of conspiracy in any of its modern forms. Proof, however, of coercion by the husband would in such a case have the effect of negativing the fact of conspiracy, since the force would avoid the agreement. Reports of the Criminal Law Commissioners of 1834-1848, The Criminal Law Commissioners in 1848 (Mr. Starkie, Mr. Kerr, Mr. Amos, 4th Rep. p. 205) reported the following articles as a consolidation of the law of Conspiracy: 2. The crime of conspiracy consists in an agreement by two persons (not being husband and wife), or more than two persons, to commit any offence, or to defraud or injure the public or any individual person. "It is immaterial to the crime of conspiracy whether the causing such fraud or injury be the ultimate object of such agreement, or be merely incidental to that object or to the means of effecting it. 4. Every agreement to defraud or injure the public in respect of any property, or to endanger the public safety or peace, or to annoy or disturb the public in the enjoyment of any civil right, or to subvert or deprave religion or morals, or to prevent, pervert or obstruct the adminisiration of justice or any other branch of executive authority, or to hinder or obstruct the due operation of any law for the regulation of marriage, the maintenance of the poor, or any other law for the regulation of the state or condition of society, or to occasion any other public injury or nuisance, or which directly tends to produce any such injury or nuisance, is an agreement within article 2. “5. Every agreement with intent to injure or prejudice any other in his perSon, reputation, office, profession, occupation, state, or condition in society, or to inj ure or disturb him in the possession or exercise of any civil right, or to defraud or injure him in respect of his property, is within the meaning of article 2. "6. It is not essential to the crime of conspiracy, as regards any fraud upon or injury to the public, that the agreement should be injurious or hurtful to the public in its aggregate capacity or all her Majesty's subjects; it is sufficient if it be injurious or hurtful to a class or portion only of those subjects. "7. Whosoever shall commit the crime of conspiracy, shall in case he shall conspire to commit a felony, or to defraud or injure or annoy the public, incur the penalties of the 11th class" (imprisonment up to three years, with or without fine); "and shall, in respect of any other conspiracy, incur the penalties of the 12th class" (imprisonment up to two years, with or without fine). These articles are reported without citation of authority and without discussion, except some observations on a case or combination to defraud (1816. Pywell). Substantially similar articles were in like manner reported by former commissioners (Mr. Starkie and Mr. Kerr) in 1843 (7th Rep. p. 89), without authorities or discussion, except some observations on the cases of Turner (1811), and Pywell (1816). It is conceived that the articles contain generalizations from exceptional cases, and some propositions for which no statutory or judicial authority appears to exist. See further 4th Rep. 1848, pp. 81, 91, 112, for articles relating to seditious conspiracy, to combinations prohibited by the acts of Geo. 3, and to conspiracies falsely to charge with crime. § 16. Foreign Laws. No general title corresponding to that of conspiracy in English law appears in either of the Penal Codes of France, Belgium, North Germany, Bavaria, Austria, Holland, Italy or British India. They contain various general provisions concerning abettors, accomplices and participators in crimes, and special provisions for punishing agreements of a treasonable character, riotous assemblies, and secret associations. The French Code and the codes derived from it further specially punish combinations by officials for abuse of their official position, and combinations to disturb prices by fraudulent means, or to engross merchandise, and all the above mentioned codes except those of North Germany and India, contain some special provisions against coalitions by employers and workmen. The former provisions of the French Code with respect to these coalitions were very comprehensive, but they were modified in 1864 by a law which . "consecrating [says Sirey] the system of absolute liberty of coalition whether between employers or between workmen, and confining itself to the repression of violence and fraud " repealed the then existing provisions of the code, and substituted the following provisions (Codes. Roger et Sorel. 1873):— "414. Sera puni d'un emprisonnement de six jours à trois ans et d'une amende de 16 francs à 3,000 francs, ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement, quiconque, à l'aide de violences, voies de fait, menaces ou manoeuvres frauduleuses, aura amené ou maintenu, tenté d'amener ou de maintenir, une cessation concertée de travail, dans le but de forcer la hausse, ou la baisse des salaires, ou de porter atteinte au libre exercice de l'industrie ou du travail. "415. Lorsque les faits punis par l'article précédent auront été commis par A to suite d'un plan concerté, les coupables pourront être mis, par l'arrêt ou le jugement, sous la surveillance de la haute police pendant deux ans au moins et cinq ans au plus. "416. Seront punis d'une emprisonnement de six jours à trois mois et d'une amende de 16 francs à 300 francs, ou de l'une de ces deux peines seulement, tous ouvriers, patrons et entrepreneurs d'ouvrage qui, à l'aide d'amendes, défenses, proscriptions, interdictions prononcés par suite d'un plan concerteé, auront porté atteinte au libre exercice de l'industrie ou du travail." The Italian Penal Code (385-388), includes concert by employers to compel their workmen to accept payment in kind, and makes the absence of "reasonable cause or "just motive" the test of the criminality of combinations to strike or to prevent work or to raise wages. Feuerbach's original Bavarian Code punished such combinations when the workmen of more than one master engaged in them, but by the later forms of that code, combinations, whether of employers or of workmen, appear to be punishable only when their purpose is to resist or obstruct the enforcement of public regulations relating to works. (Art. 141.) All the continental codes and the Indian Code (503), contain comprehensive provisions of general application against intimidation and insult. (See, for a discussion by Belgian jurists of the principles on which legislation against combinations by workmen ought to be based, the Report of the Commission for the revision of the Belgian Penal Code, Book IL Tits. 5, 6; Brussels, 1861, pp. 32-42.) 66 Livingston's draft Penal Code (1828, p. 140), proposed to punish as conspiracies (i) conspiracy to commit an offence; (ii) conspiracy falsely to accuse and prosecute another of committing an offence; " (iii) agreements not to buy labour or goods at more, or not to sell labour or goods at less, than an agreed price, or to enhance the price of victuals, or maliciously "to injure any individual or description of persons in their reputation or profession or trade or property, by agreeing not to employ them, or by other means that would not otherwise amount to an offence." An exception from the third head is proposed in the case of partners, unless the partnership is "specially entered into for the purpose of making such conspiracy.' The draft Penal Code for the State of New York (1865), proposes the following provisions:— Criminal Conspiracies defined. 224. If two or more persons conspire, either: 1. To commit any crime; or, 2. Falsely and maliciously to indict another for any crime; or to procure 3. Falsely to move or maintain any suit, action or proceeding; or 5. To commit any act injurious to the public health, to public morals, they are |