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WABASH R. CO. v. HANNAHAN et al.

(Circuit Court, E. D. Missouri, E. D. April 1, 1903.)

1. INJUNCTION-CONSPIRACY IN RESTRAINT OF INTERSTATE COMMERCE-TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.

A bill filed by a railroad company against the officers of certain labor organizations alleged a malicious conspiracy on the part of defendants to interfere with the carrying of the mails by complainant, and to restrain interstate commerce, by inducing and compelling complainants' employés engaged in operating its trains, some of whom were members of such organizations, to strike in violation of their contracts, although they had no grievance and were entirely satisfied with their wages and conditions of service, and to prevent connecting carriers from interchanging traffic with complainant, the purpose being to compel complainant to recognize the organizations represented by defendants, and to employ no men who were not members thereof. Held, that such bill was sufficient to authorize and require a federal court to grant a temporary restraining order enjoining defendants from ordering or causing a strike of complainant's employés, or in any manner interfering with complainant in the discharge of its duties as a common carrier of interstate traffic and the mails, until a hearing could be had on a motion for a preliminary injunction.

2. LABOR STRIKES-RIGHT OF COMBINATION.

An employé has an unquestionable right to place a price and impose conditions upon his labor at the outset of his employment, or, unless restrained by contract obligations, upon the continuance of his labor at any time thereafter, and, if the terms and conditions are not complied with by the employer, he has a clear right not to engage, or having engaged in the service to cease from work, and what one may do all may lawfully con. ae to do for the purpose of rendering their action more effective. But this right of combination and to strike or quit the employment must be exercised in a peaceable and lawful manner, without violence or destruction of property or other coercive measures intended to prevent the employer from securing other employés, or otherwise carrying on his business according to his own judgment.

3. SAME-LABOR ORGANIzations-DeLEGATION OF POWERS TO OFFICERS OR COMMITTEES.

It is the right of labor to organize for lawful purposes, and by organic agreement to subject the individual members to rules, regulations, and conduct prescribed by the majority; and the courts cannot enjoin the officers or committees of such an organization from counseling or ordering a strike in the exercise of authority given them by the laws and sanctioned by a majority of its members, nor can such action be made the basis of a charge of malicious conspiracy.

4 SAME-LEGALITY OF ACTION-EVIDENCE CONSIDERED.

Evidence considered on a motion for a preliminary injunction, and held insufficient to sustain the charge of conspiracy to interfere with interstate commerce or prevent the carrying of the mails by complainant, in violation of the laws of the United States, or to support the allegations of the bill that defendants, as officers of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen and of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, respectively, in declaring their purpose to order a strike of the members of such orders in complainant's employ, acted without due authority from the employés affected, or with any purpose other than to enforce, by peaceable and lawful methods, demands previously made relating to wages and rules of work.

In Equity. On motion for preliminary injunction.

Wells H. Blodgett, C. N. Travous, and Boyle, Priest & Lehmann, for complainant.

F. A. Judson, E. J. Pinney, J. H. Murphy, and W. T. Irwin, for defendants.

ADAMS, District Judge. This is a suit commenced by the railroad company against John J. Hannahan, grand master of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Firemen, W. G. Lee, vice grand master of the Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen, and officers and members of the joint protective board of the first-mentioned and of the general grievance committee of the second-named order.

The bill of complaint charges that the labor organizations above named, and the defendants, as officers, representatives, and agents. of such organizations, "have unlawfully and maliciously conspired, combined, and confederated together for the purpose of forcing your orator to recognize said organizations as representing and controlling said employés in all their relations with your orator, and compelling its said lines of railroad within the United States to become and be operated as exclusively union or brotherhood roads, and thus prevent your orator, through its officers and agents, from dealing with its employés in respect to any difference or controversy between it and such employés, and from adjusting any such difference or controversy directly with its employés, as heretofore, and compelling your orator to discharge and discriminate against and keep out of its employ all persons not members of such organizations, and retain and employ in its service only such persons as are members of said organizations." Such is the purpose of the alleged conspiracy.

The means which the defendants are alleged in the bill of complaint to have devised and adopted to accomplish their purpose are as follows: (1) To maliciously induce and compel complainant's employés engaged in the operation of its trains as brakemen, switchmen, and locomotive engineers, who the bill alleges "are entirely satisfied as to all matters concerning their service and compensation," to quit the service of complainant, and that, too, in violation of their different contracts of employment; (2) to maliciously interfere with and prevent complainant from operating its trains and performing its contracts with shippers for the transportation of property; (3) to maliciously prevent complainant "from affording reasonable, proper, and equal facilities for the interchange of traffic between its lines of railroad and other lines of railroad connecting therewith, and from receiving, forwarding, and delivery of passengers and property to and from its lines of railroad with other railroads connecting with such lines, and making a continuous carriage of freight from the place of shipment to place of destination"; (4) to maliciously prevent connecting lines and their employés "from interchanging traffic with and affording like facilities to your orator, as required by the interstate commerce act"; (5) to maliciously prevent complainant from carrying the United States mail in accordance with its contracts in that regard, and as required by the statutes of the United States; (6) to maliciously obstruct complainant in the discharge of its duties. as common carrier of interstate commerce, and to restrain and interfere with the commerce of the country, in violation both of the interstate commerce act (24 Stat. 379 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3154]),

and the act of July 2, 1890 (26 Stat. 209 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 3200]), "to protect trade and commerce against unlawful restraints and monopolies."

The bill of complaint further shows that the defendants, in order to accomplish their purpose, had threatened and were about to exercise the power and authority conferred upon them as officers, agents, and representatives of their brotherhoods to order and cause complainant's employés to forthwith strike and quit its service, and to incite and induce the employés of connecting lines to refuse to interchange traffic with complainant or to afford facilities therefor, and it is averred that unless an immediate restraining order be issued the threats and purpose aforesaid would be speedily executed, and irreparable injury done to complainant.

From the foregoing analysis of the bill of complaint it is observed that the jurisdiction of this court is invoked to prevent the execution of a conspiracy to accomplish the purpose of the defendants to secure recognition of their labor organizations, by violating and inducing others to violate the laws of the United States, in relation to interstate commerce, the mail service, and unlawful restraints and combinations. The threats of the defendants to subserve their own purposes by precipitating a strike on the part of complainant's employés, who, as already stated, are alleged to have been entirely satisfied with their present wages and conditions of service, is averred in the bill of complaint to be the initial act leading up to the culmination of the gist of the complaint, namely, preventing complainant from performing its duties and obligations, and thereby subjecting it to the pains and penalties of the interstate commerce and other acts of congress.

Upon the filing of this bill, duly verified, and upon motion of the complainant, a restraining order was forthwith made and served on the defendants, commanding them to refrain from ordering or causing a strike of complainant's employés, and from in any other way or manner interfering with complainant in the discharge of its duties as common carrier of interstate traffic and the mails of the United States, until the further order of this court, and the defendants were given 15 days within which to appear and show cause why the restraining order should be dissolved or modified.

Such an order, on the showing made by the bill of complaint, was not only warranted, but imperatively required, by well-recognized principles of equitable jurisprudence, as well as by controlling, satisfactory, and abundant authority in cases of similar character in this country and in England. On this point it will suffice to refer to the leading cases in this country of In re Debs, 158 U. S. 564, 15 Sup. Ct. 900, 39 L. Ed. 1092; Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209, 63 Fed. 310, 25 L. R. A. 414, in which Mr. Justice Harlan of the Supreme Court of the United States, sitting in the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, delivered the opinion of the court; and Toledo Railway Co. v. Pennsylvania Company (C. C.) 54 Fed. 730, 19 L. R. A. 387, and Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co. (C. C.) 62 Fed. 803, in both of which Circuit Judge Taft delivered the opinion, and to the numerous cases therein referred to. See, also, Vegelahn

v. Guntner (Mass.) 44 N. E. 1077, 57 Am. St. Rep. 443, 35 L. R. A. 722.

Reference is also made to the recent case in England, decided by the House of Lords on appeal from the decision of the Court of Appeal, wherein it was held not only that an injunction was an available remedy against the agents of a trades union and against the union itself for preventing interference with the workmen and business of complainant, but that an action at law was also maintainable against the union itself, although unincorporated, for damages sustained by the conduct of its agents. The Taff Vale Railway Company_v. The Amalgamated Society of Railway Servants, App. Cas. Law Reports 1901, p. 426. Subsequently it is currently reported (North American Review, March, 1903, p. 413) that a civil suit for damages was instituted by the same plaintiff, which resulted December last in a recovery of $135,000 against the society and its officers for damages for a conspiracy to produce a strike by terrorizing plaintiff's employés.

Pursuant to the leave given in the restraining order, the defendants appeared and filed their answer under oath, denying the alleged conspiracy in all its alleged phases, and denying each and all the threats and purposes alleged in the bill to interfere with or prevent the complainant from performing its duties as common carrier, or to interfere with or prevent connecting lines from interchanging traffic, and fully disavowing any such intention or purpose. The answer further explicitly denies that complainant's employés were satisfied with the condition and compensation of their present service, but avers, in substance and effect, that they (the defendants) were officers and agents of the brotherhoods already referred to, of which many of complainant's employés were members, and that they at the time the restraining order was made were engaged in the performance of the functions and duties imposed upon them by their constitution, rules, and regulations, and at the request and by authority of a large majority of complainant's employés, who were members of their brotherhoods, were in good faith making an effort to better the conditions of their service, and to secure a higher rate of wages therefor, and that any strike which they were about to sanction was intended only for the purpose of peaceably asserting the rights which they demanded. At the same time the defendants filed numerous affidavits in support of their answer, and with this answer and accompanying affidavits the defendants filed a motion to set aside the restraining order. Whereupon both sides, by leave of court, filed further affidavits in support of and against the right to a preliminary injunction, and have now been fully heard in argument on the question.

The ad interim restraining order was made conformably to the provisions of section 718, Rev. St. 1878 [U. S. Comp. St. 1901, p. 580], without notice to the defendants, because it appeared from the averments of the bill that there was immediate danger of irreparable injury unless it was so made. The same statute, however, clearly contemplates that such restraining order is to have no other effect than to preserve in statu quo the rights and property of the parties until a hearing, after notice to defendants, can be had in due form on the motion for a preliminary injunction.

It results from the foregoing that the present status of this case is as follows: The complainant has moved the court for a preliminary injunction, restraining the defendants until the final hearing of this case as prayed for in its bill. The defendants have had due time to appear and have appeared, and both sides have been heard on the

motion.

I may here properly remark that counsel have not by proof or argument drawn the federal anti-trust act of July 2, 1890, into consideration in this case. The same will, therefore, not be specially considered, notwithstanding the fact that defendants, by the bill of complaint, are alleged to have threatened its violation.

The question now to be answered is whether on the whole showing, irrespective of the provisional order already made, the complainant is entitled to a preliminary injunction.

Attention has already been called to the law applicable to a situation as disclosed by complainant's bill, and before proceeding to a consideration of the facts it will probably be beneficial to briefly state the law applicable to the situation disclosed by defendants' answer. It is held by the Supreme Court in the case of Hopkins v. United States, 171 U. S. 578, 19 Sup. Ct. 40, 43 L. Ed. 290, in substance and effect, that the agreements among employés of a railroad company which are condemned as in restraint of interstate commerce are such as have some direct and immediate effect upon such commerce, and do not include agreements not to work for less than a certain sum, or not to work except under certain conditions, even though the cost of interstate traffic would be thereby enhanced.

In the case of Hopkins v. Oxley Stave Co., 28 C. C. A. 99, 83 Fed. 912, 917, Judge Thayer, speaking for the Court of Appeals of this circuit, makes use of the following language:

"While the courts have invariably upheld the right of individuals to form labor organizations for the protection of the interests of the laboring classes, and have denied the power to enjoin the members of such associations from withdrawing peaceably from any service, either singly or in a body, even where such withdrawal involves a breach of contract (Arthur v. Oakes, 11 C. C. A. 209, 63 Fed. 310, 25 L. R. A. 414), yet they have very generally condemned those combinations usually termed 'boycotts,' which are formed for the purpose of interfering, otherwise than by lawful competition, with the business affairs of others, and depriving them, by means of threats and intimidation, of the right to conduct the business in which they happen to be engaged according to the dictates of their own judgment."

In the case of Arthur v. Oakes, supra, page 219, 11 C. C. A., pages 320-321, 63 Fed., and 25 L. R. A. 414, Mr. Justice Harlan expresses the rule thus:

* *

"It is the right of the employés, without reference to the effect upon the property or upon the operation of the road, to confer with each other upon the subject of the proposed reduction in wages, and to withdraw in a body from the service of the receivers, because of the proposed change. If in good faith and peacefully they exercise that right of quitting the service, intending thereby only to better their condition by securing such wages as they deem just, but not to injure or interfere with the free action of others, they cannot be legally charged with any loss to the trust property resulting from their cessation of work in consequence of the refusal of the receivers to accede to the terms upon which they are willing to remain in the service."

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