that "

course or privateering which the Declaration falsely declared to be abolished.'

1 The Times of 25th October, 1876, in a letter from its Prussian correspondent, dated Berlin, 24th October, published the following:

66

"The Moscow Gazette advises the Russian Government to "issue lettres de marque against England in case of war. As to "the prohibition of lettres de marque, agreed upon in the Paris Treaty, the Moscow Gazette disposes of the engagement by the "remark that treaties cease to be valid in war; and as it might "be urged by some that this particular treaty was concluded "for the very purpose of coming into force in war, the Gazette "adds that no treaties can be morally binding unless equally "advantageous to all parties concerned."

CHAPTER XIII.

THE EFFECT OF THE DECLARATION OF PARIS.

AND now as to the effect of this Declaration.

It affirmed four rules or laws of Maritime Warfare, of which two are old and true, and two new and false.

Those which are old and true are the third and fourth, which declare (1) that, "neutral merchandise, "with the exception of contraband of war, is not "liable to capture under the enemy's flag;" and (2), that "blockades, in order to be obligatory must "be effective, that is to say, maintained by a "sufficient force really to prevent access to the coast "of the enemy."

Those which are new and false are the first and second, which declare (1) that "Privateering is and "remains abolished;" (2) that "the neutral flag "covers the enemy's merchandise, with the exception "of contraband of war."

The two former rules of the Declaration can not only be admitted, but must be affirmed to be truly consonant with the Law of Nations; the two latter are as absolutely in contradiction of it and of the facts, as has already been shown; and with these two latter we are therefore alone concerned.

The effect of them upon Great Britain is, without doubt and beyond question, greater than upon any other Power; because Great Britain being the principal

maritime Power in the world, must feel more than any other the effects of any change in the laws of Maritime Warfare. And the fact that Great Britain had shown herself, before the change was made, able to resist the whole of Europe in arms, and to come victorious out of the struggle, by the very aid of the very principles now declared to be abrogated and reversed, must lead us to conclude in limine, that the change made is one fraught with especial disadvantage to her. Let us however examine the changes themselves and their effects.

PRIVATEERING AS AFFECTED BY THE DECLARATION.

I.—“ Privateering is and remains abolished "—that is to say, is abolished for Great Britain whenever she is at war with any one of the signatory States; but not when she is at war with a non-signatory State, such as Spain or the United States. The effect of this is to deprive Great Britain of the service of volunteers at sea, and to preclude her from employing in warlike operations either the vessels or the half million of able fighting men of her vast mercantile and fishing marine; for a Privateer is but a private vessel commissioned by the State. She loses thus not only an offensive but also a defensive weapon; for Privateers do not only capture enemy's vessels, but also recapture those of their own nation; and they are to the State Navy a most valuable auxiliary, without which an amount of power proportioned to the size of the mercantile marine of the State remains unemployed in time of war. She loses the power of withdrawing a considerable number of merchant-vessels from exposure to the enemy as unarmed merchantmen by turning them into offensive weapons as armed cruisers,

and the power of thus at once diminishing the number of vessels liable to be captured, and increasing the number of those able to capture. She loses one of the best schools for the formation of daring and adventurous sailors, and with it those traditions of prize-money won in conflict, which have always been found the most urgent incentive to daring and adventurous men.

It has indeed been said that the general exercise of the right to arm and commission Privateers would act most injuriously for Great Britain, seeing that she of all nations in the world has the largest amount of commerce on the seas exposed to capture by Privateers. And the abolition of privateering which was pretended to be made by the Declaration of Paris of 1856 has even been represented-as is indeed suggested by Lord Clarendon's condition already quoted -as a gain to Great Britain sufficient to warrant her in giving up the right to capture enemy's goods in neutral vessels.

This argument is a specious one, but when examined it entirely falls to pieces.

Privateers are sea-going Volunteers.' They are found, fitted out, and maintained by private individuals in order to capture enemy's property on the seas, which property, when duly captured and condemned as good Prize by a Prize Court, is handed over to them, partly or wholly, as a reward for their exertions. They must be duly commissioned by the Sovereign of a State actually at war, or they are no Privateers but Pirates; they have always been required in Great Britain to lodge a considerable sum of caution-money

1

See President Jefferson's defence of Privateers, page 97.

2 See Privateer's Commission, in Appendix, page 223.

to ensure that they shall observe the special regulations laid down for them, and the laws of war in general; and, like men-of-war, they are liable in costs and damages should they make unlawful captures or commit unlawful acts. It is necessary to repeat this, because it has been more than once ignorantly suggested that Privateers are a sort of Pirates acting without commission, subject to no laws, and bound by no rules.

In the first place it is clear that to take merchant vessels, and to arm and commission them as privateers, is at once to withdraw those vessels from the category of undefended merchantmen liable only to capture, and to bring them into the category of State vessels able themselves to capture. Every Privateer is at once a vulnerable point the less and a weapon the more. Every commission issued to a merchantman therefore diminishes the number of defenceless vessels by one ship, and adds one ship to the number of defending vessels.

Moreover it is to be remembered that the more commerce a nation has afloat the more vessels are there required for its defence, and therefore the more reason for accepting the services of volunteers to aid in that defence.

It is apparent then, that to reject the assistance of the merchant navy, whether to defend itself alone by virtue of letters of marque, or at once to defend and to attack by virtue of letters of marque and reprisals, such as the Privateer properly so-called receives, is to reject a defence of higher and greater importance to Great Britain-because more easily and in greater numbers obtainable by her than to any other

country.

An important element in the matter, and one which