goods or paying the duty at all, he must be concluded to have purposely declined the opportunity furnished him to comply with the law, and have completed the offense of smuggling denounced by section 2865, Revised Statutes. It is not necessary that he should also be permitted to escape entirely from the customs inclosure before the offense is completed.

EVASION OF CUSTOMS OFFICERS.-A conviction of smuggling was upheld under section 2865, Revised Statutes, where a person entering the United States from a ferryboat passed the customs office, with full knowledge of its location and of the fact that he had dutiable goods concealed on his person, and ignored three calls by a customs officer before he halted, and on disclosure of the dutiable goods stated that he had intended to take them to the main customhouse, a mile away, and pay the duty there.-Rogers v. U. S. (C. C. A.), T. D. 31167. Rewards to Informers.

REWARDS TO INFORMERS-FRAUD-POWER OF SECRETARY OF TREASURY.-INFORMANT'S INTEREST.-Under section 4, act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 186), authorizing the payment of such compensation as "shall be just and reasonable, under the direction of the Secretary of the Treasury," to persons furnishing information of fraud on the revenue, the Secretary is the sole judge as to whether there is an informer who is entitled to such reward. Until the Secretary acts the informer merely has the expectancy of a reward.

ASSIGNABILITY OF CLAIM-ALLOWANCE CONDITION PRECEDENT.-An informer as to customs frauds transferred to another his claim for reward under section 4, act of June 22, 1874 (18 Stat., 186), before it had been allowed by the Secretary of the Treasury. Held, that such assignment was void, under section 3477, Revised Statutes, prescribing that “all transfers and assignments made of any claim upon the United States shall be absolutely null and void, unless made after the allowance of such a claim."

PAYMENT TO TRUSTEE IN BANKRUPTCY.-A collector of customs paid to the trustee of the property of a bankrupt informer the reward allowed the latter for information as to customs frauds, though the allowance of such reward was not made till after the adjudication of bankruptcy. Held, that such payment to the trustee was illegal, as under section 70, bankruptcy act of July 1, 1898 (30 Stat., 565), the trustee is vested only with the title of the bankrupt as of the date he was adjudged a bankrupt " to property which prior to such date "he could have transferred or which might have been levied upon and sold under judicial process." This does not include an expectancy of reward.In re Ghazal (C. C. A.), T. D. 30426.

Forfeiture, Smuggling.--A package of diamonds delivered in Europe to the captain of a vessel with a statement that the package contained nothing of value and with the request that on arrival at Philadelphia he send the package by express to a certain address in Cincinnati. On arrival of the vessel a Treasury agent boarded her and demanded the package, which was delivered to him. The owner indicted under R. S. 2865 for smuggling. Held, that mere acts of concealment of merchandise on entering the waters of the United States, however preparatory they may be and however cogently they may indicate an intention of thereafter smuggling or clandestinely introducing, at best are but steps or attempts not alone in themselves constituting smuggling or clandestine introduction.

The offense of smuggling is not committed by an act done before the obligation to pay or account for the duties arises.

The term smuggling" had a well-understood import at common law, and in the absence of a particular definition of its significance in the statute creat

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ing it resort may be had to the common law for the purpose of arriving at the meaning of the word.

A review of the principal statutes enacted in this country regulating the collection of customs duties establishes that so far as they embrace legislation designed to prevent the evasion of duties they proceeded upon the theory of the English law on the same subject, that is, that they forbade all the acts which were deemed by the lawmaker means to the end of smuggling or clandestinely introducing dutiable goods into the country in violation of law, and which were likewise considered as efficient to enable the offender to reap the expected benefits of his wrongful acts. Therefore they forbade and prescribed penalties for everything which could precede smuggling or follow it, without specifically making a distinct and separate offense designated smuggling or clandestine introduction.

An indictment under R. S. 3082 which charges that the defendant on a date named "did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully import and bring into the United States, and did assist in importing and bringing into the United States. to wit, into the port of Philadelphia," diamonds of a stated value "contrary to law and the provisions of the act of Congress in such cases made and provided with intent to defraud the United States," is clearly insufficient, as the allegations are too general and do not sufficiently inform the defendant of the nature of the accusation against him.

An indictment based on R. S. 2865 which charges that the defendant "did knowingly, willfully, and unlawfully, and with intent to defraud the revenue of the United States smuggle and clandestinely introduce into the United States, to wit, into the port of Philadelphia," certain "diamonds" of a stated value, which should have been invoiced and duty thereon paid or accounted for, but which to the knowledge of the defendant and with intent to defraud the revenue were not invoiced nor the duty paid or accounted for, sufficiently describes the offense to make it clear to the common understanding what articles were charged to have been smuggled and is sufficient.

Examining the case made by the record, it results that, whether we consider the testimony of the captain alone or all the testimony, it unquestionably establishes that there was no passage of the package of diamonds through the lines of the customs authorities, but that the package was delivered to the customs officer on board the vessel itself at a time when or before the obligation to make entry and pay the duties arose and that the offense of smuggling was not committed within the meaning of the statute. Reversing the district court.Keck v. U. S., 172 U. S., 434, 437, 438, 445, 446, 450, 455.

Forfeiture-Waiver-Estoppel-Entry After Forfeiture Accrues.-After a cause of forfeiture had accrued under section 2802, Revised Statutes, for failure of a person from abroad to mention dutiable articles of baggage, but before seizure had been made, the owner of the articles was permitted to make regular entry and pay proper duties. Held, that such permission did not amount to a waiver of the Government's right of forfeiture nor estop the assertion of such right.-U. S. v. One Purple Cloth Costume, etc. (D. C.), T. D. 28777.

Forfeiture.

ILLEGAL IMPORTATION-FORFEITURE-FRAUD-ABSENCE OF INTENT-FAILURE TO DEFRAUD.-In an action under section 3082, Revised Statutes, for the forfeiture of merchandise imported contrary to law, it is no defense that there was no intent to defraud the United States or that the United States was not actually defrauded of any sum.

MERCHANDISE EXEMPT FROM DUTY-INTENTIONAL EVASION OF LAW.-Where, in importing merchandise, the importer, for the purpose of serving his own pecuniary interests, intentionally omits to enter it at a customhouse and fails otherwise to comply with the laws of the United States and the regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury, authorized by law, such merchandise, even though entitled to admission free of duty if properly imported, becomes liable to forfeiture, as provided in section 3082, Revised Statutes, relating to persons who knowingly import or bring into the United States merchandise contrary to law.".

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FREE GOODS-NECESSITY OF COMPLYING WITH LAW.-The requirements of law regarding the importation of merchandise apply to goods entitled to come in free of duty as much as to those that are dutiable.

TREASURY REGULATIONS-CONTINUATION TO NEW TARIFF ACT.-The rules and regulations of the Secretary of the Treasury promulgated under the authority of one tariff act may properly be continued by him under a subsequent act by adopting and continuing to act under and to enforce them.

SAME-FAILURE TO PROMULGATE ILLEGAL IMPORTATION.-Where the law authorizes the admission free of duty of certain classes of merchandise, the proof of identity of which is to be made "under general regulations to be prescribed by the Secretary of the Treasury," the failure of the Secretary to make such regulations would not justify the importer in omitting to comply with the customs laws of the United States, and if he does so he imports "contrary to law" within the meaning of section 3082, Revised Statutes.

OFFENSES AT COMMON LAW-ILLEGAL IMPORTATION.-The importation of merchandise into the United States without entering it at a customhouse and otherwise in contravention of the laws of the United States would not constitute an offense at common law.-U. S. v. 50 Waltham Watch Movements (D. C.), T. D. 26546.

Forfeiture of Team Used in Smuggling.

FORFEITURES-INTENT OF OWNER.-Sections 3061-3063, Revised Statutes, relating, among other things, to the forfeiture in revenue cases of property used in smuggling, must be construed fairly and reasonably to arrive at the intent of Congress, and without regard to the intent of the owner of the property or to his ignorance of its use in a manner offensive to the statute.

SEIZURE OF VEHICLES OF INNOCENT OWNER.-Section 3062, Revised Statutes, provides that every vehicle on which is found merchandise brought into the United States contrary to law shall be subject to seizure and forfeiture. In construing this provision, together with that in section 3063 (id.), that vehicles owned by common carriers, unless used with the consent or privity of the common carriers, shall not be subject to such seizure, held that it is not necessary that the unlawful use of such vehicle should be consented to or known by the

owner.

A smuggler hired a team at a livery stable and, leaving it near the Canadian boundary, effected the unlawful importation of certain merchandise. On the return journey the team was seized. The seizure was held legal under sections 3061-3063, Revised Statutes, though the owner of the team had no knowledge of the illegal use to be made of it, and though it had been used wholly within the United States.-U. S. v. One Black Horse (D. C.), T. D. 25396.

Ownership of Smuggled Goods. The right of the United States to forfeit goods seized from the purchaser of the goods while he was attempting to smuggle them into the United States is not subject in any way to the right of the seller of the goods, as against the purchaser, to rescind the sale on account of the fraud of the purchaser and to recover them. To permit secret claims of ownership to be asserted after forfeiture would be in plain violation of the statute.-581 Diamonds v. U. S., 119 Fed. Rep., 556,