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Gardner v. First National Bank of DeQueen
(Arkansas S. C.) Chattel Mortgage-Prior-
ity, ann. case, 338.

Gardner v. Western Union Telegraph Co. (U.
S. C. C. A.) Telegraphs and Telephones-
Limitation of Liability, ann. case, 445.

Gast Realty & Investment Co. v. Schneider
Granite Co (U. S. S. C.) Constitutional Law
-Ordinance Making Unequal Assessment
of Special Taxes, R. D. 189.

Gearing V. Berkson, et al., (Massachusetts)
Sales-Implied Warranty, ann. case, 305.
Georgia & F. R. Co. v. Tapley (Georgia S. C.)
Carrier-Passenger, ann, case, 105.

Gordon V. McLearn (Arkansas) Damages-
Punitive Damages Reduced Because Com-
pensatory are Nominal, R. D. 440.

Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of

Wheat Co. (U. S. C. C A.) Monopoly-Viol-

ation of Notice as to Resale of Manufac-

tured Article, R. D. 3.

Grocer & Merchants Bureau of Nashville, Plain-

tiff in Error v. Dr. W. E. Gray, Defendant

in Error (Tennessee) Attorney and Client--

What is Law Business, ann. case, 13.

Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. The Wolf Bros.

& Co. (U. S. S. C.) The Rule of Recovery

in Trade-Mark and in Unfair Competition,

Ed. 169.

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Landon v. Halcomb (Texas) Bills and Notes-
Alteration, ann. case, 374.

R. D. 278.

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State V. Carta (Connecticut) Evidence-With-
drawal of Plea of Guilty, ann. case, 178.

State v. Cotton (South Dakota S. C.) Criminal
Law-Conviction of Lower Kindred Offense
Charged in Indictment, R. D. 26.

Watson v. Mississippi River Power Co. (Iowa

S. C.) Reform of Court Procedure Awaits

Upon Congress, Ed. 187.

Wells v. Navigation Co. (New York) Unneces-
sary Judicial Opinions Breeders of Confu-
sion, Ed. 277.

Western Union Tel. Co. v. Sharp (Arkansas S
C.) Commerce-Telegram From One Point
to Another in Same State With Wire Cross-
ing Boundary, R. D. 44.

Wheat v. Hill (U. S. C. C. A.) Wills-Computa
tion of Degrees of Kinship by Discredited
Rule, R. D. 99.

Winfield v. Erie R. Co. (New Jersey) Workmen's
Compensation Act-Recovery of Employe in
Interstate Commerce, no Negligence Being
Claimed, R. D. 171.

Winfield v. New York, C. & H. R. Co. (New York)

Recovery Under Workmen's Compensation

Act for Injury Suffered in Interstate Com-

merce Where Employer was Free from

Negligence, Ed. 43.

Wolf v. Harris (Missouri S. C.) Injunction--Li-
bel and Slander, ann. case, 412.

Yaozo & M. V. R. Co. v. Walls (Mississippi S.

C.) Carrier of Passengers-Passenger on

Train not Stopping at Destination on Ticket

R. D. 64.

Youngerman v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.
(Massachusetts) Carrier of Passengers--
Commencement of Relation, ann. case, 231.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., JANUARY 7, 1916.

LORD READING CALLED TO TASK FOR HIS AMERICAN INTERVIEW ON "JUSTICE."

A judge who stoops to flatter public misconceptions of the judicial administration of the law deserves the rebuke con

tained in the sharp comments which the English law journals have made with reference to some after-dinner remarks of Lord Reading while on his recent visit to this country.

Lord Reading is quoted as saying that "the idea that it is the duty of the law courts to dispense law, is becoming obsolete. It is recognized that the true duty of the courts is to dispense justice."

Law Notes (London) in its December, 1915, number, says:

"If his Lordship is correctly reported,

then the observation of the average blunt old lawyer will be short and simple. 'Rot!' The tongue of the most careful man runs away with him in an afterbanquet speech, and if his Lordship did make any such remark he now bitterly repents it. What a nonsensical idea laymen have on this point. 'Well, sir, it may be law, but it ain't justice.' In our experience, we have noticed the remark is generally made by a litigant who has just lost his case. The law of the land is made up of common law and statute law. If this law does not produce what the community regard as justice, then let Parliament amend the law. But in the name of common sense, don't let justice depend on the length and breadth of each judge's foot, or rather, brain."

Law and justice are not interchangeable terms. The one is objective; the other subjective. Law, in the practical use of that term, is society's conception of justice, concretely expressed in statute and decision. Abstract justice is an

ever advancing but never completely attainable ideal toward which society keeps steadily striving. This ideal is realized in some measure from time to time by legislation changing or modifying rules of law. It must be borne in mind, however, that the popular assembly of the people is alone authorized to make the changes which the people regard as necessary to bring practical legal rules and abstract principles of justice into closer working relationship, and a judge is justified neither in lagging behind nor in going ahead of the community's conception of justice as expressed in the action. of the legislature. A. H. R.

FALSE PERSONATION IN CLAIMING TO BE A FEDERAL OFFICER OF A NONEXISTING OFFICE.

The U. S. Supreme Court reverses ruling by District Court reported in 221 Fed. 140, that false personation of an officer or

employe of the United States under the

Federal Statute, "must be personation of some particular person or class of persons, since there cannot be a false personation of a suppositious individual who never existed or whose class never existed." United States v. Barrow, 36 Sup. Ct. 19.

The Supreme Court holds to a broader meaning of the federal statute, saying that: "To 'falsely assume or pretend to be an officer or employe acting under the authority of the United States' *** is the thing prohibited. One who falsely assumes to pretend to hold office that has a de jure existence is admittedly within its meaning. That is, where the assumption or pretense is false in part; but contains a modicum of truth the statute is violated. Why should it be deemed less an offense where the assumption or pretense is entirely false, as where the very office or employment to which the accused pretends title has no legal or actual existence?"

The pretense in this case was that defendant falsely pretended to be an employe

of the United States to sell the "Messages
and Papers of Presidents," and it was
claimed that as there was no such federal
employment, the United States had no con-
cern in the pretense, but this was an of-
fense, if any, under state law alone, and
state authority could not be encroached

upon.

Mr. Justice Whitney, speaking for a
unanimous court, except McReynolds, J.,
not sitting, quoted from a cited case by
defendant in error, as follows: "An act
committed within a state, whether for a
good or a bad purpose, or whether with
an honest or criminal intent, cannot be
made an offense against the United States
unless it have some relation to the execu-
tion of a power of Congress, or to some
matter within the jurisdiction of the United
States."

It is then said: "Accepting this criterion
the legislation now under consideration is
well within the authority of Congress. In
order that the vast and complicated opera-
tions of the government of the United
States shall be carried on successfully,
and with a minimum of friction and ob-
struction, it is important-or, at least, Con-
gress reasonably might so consider it-not
only that the authority of the governmental
officers and employes be respected in par-
ticular cases, but that a spirit of respect
and good will for the government and its
officers shall generally prevail. And what
could more directly impair this spirit than
to permit unauthorized and unscrupulous
persons to go about the country falsely as-
suming, for fraudulent purposes, to be en-
titled to the respect due to an officer of the
government. *** It is surely the same,
and the power of Congress to prevent it is
quite the same, whether the pretender
names a non-existing office or officer."

good will for the government and its of
ficers" by criminal enactments, this seems
the announcement of an era more in con-
formity to notions in monarchical, than in
republican rule.

The genius of our government lies par-
ticularly in the principle that all of our
citizens, whether some of them are ser-
vants in official capacity during a brief
period or during good behavior, are all
equal and all obedient and respectful and
with good will for law and order. No other
obedience, respect or good will is required
or necessary or considered more than sur-
plusage where this is had. It follows, as
the night follows the day, that, if all of
these are given to the law, its ministers will
not be obstructed, and when there is speech
of extra respect and good will to such min-
isters, it is misspeech only or an anomaly.

But is it not hard, indeed, to see how
there is any lack of respect and good will
for the federal government, in its dele-
gated functions, for one to pretend to per-
sonate a federal officer under an authority
that has no existence in federal law? It
might deceive one ignorant of federal law,
but it would be proof conclusive of fraud-
simple fraud, only-to one informed. When
the ignorant one shall become informed, he
would say, "I will prosecute the cheat for
the fraud," and he would go to the jurisdic-
tion which enforces a penalty for such a
deception. Can this jurisdiction be taken
away by the offender telling a lie? This
would be the case were objection made be-
fore a state court.

It avails little to criticise a ruling, even
though it be not unanimous, of our Federal
Supreme Court, but the reasoning adduced
in its support seems to us to smack too
much of countries whose officials in civil
life strut with the importance which mili-
tary discipline tolerates, not to say encour
ages. We trust this is not the forerunner
of what shall obtain in the times of greater

Verily do we find the United States,
though with limited and delegated powers
and those incidental thereto for the protec-
tion of such powers, a touchy institution. | preparedness which seem to be coming.
And when those incidental powers take on
the enforcing of "a spirit of respect and

This decision does not greatly help to keep-
ing well-defined the boundaries between

federal and state power, where regulation
ends for the special purpose of our govern-
mental agency enforcing the duties de-
volved on it and where the state power
to punish crime as crime exists without
interference.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

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FOREIGN CORPORATIONS CARRYING
ON BUSINESS WITHOUT LICENSE.-The
Federal Supreme Court reverses Kentucky
Court of Appeals in a holding by the latter
court, that a foreign insurance company con-
tinued to do business in Kentucky where as to
policies in force in that state it received pay-
ment of premiums necessary to be paid to
keep the policies alive. Provident S. L. Assur.
Co. v. Kentucky, 36 Sup. Ct. 34.

The Supreme Court said: "It (the company)
had sought to withdraw itself completely from
the state. The conclusion that it continued
to do business within the state, notwithstand-
ing this withdrawal, appears to be based solely
upon the fact that it continued to be bound to
policy holders resident in Kentucky under poli-
cies previously issued in that state, and that
it received the renewal premiums upon these
policies. As the policies remained in force, it
is said that the company continued to furnish
protection to citizens of Kentucky. The re-
newal premiums, as already stated, were paid
in New York. There is, however, a manifest
difficulty in holding that the mere continuance
of the obligation of the policies constituted
the transaction of a local business for which
a privilege tax could be exacted. As a priv-
ilege tax, the tax rests upon the assumption
that what is done depends upon the state's
consent. But the continuance of the contracts
of insurance already written by the company
was not dependent on the consent of the
state. ** Neither the continuance of the ob-
ligation in itself, nor acts done elsewhere on
account of it, can be regarded as being within
the state's control."

It is stated that were the company to main-
tain an office in the state to collect premiums
on old policies, or in renewal of them, this
would subject the company to the privilege tax
spoken of.

All of this proceeds upon the idea, that a
regulation aimed at the foreign company
would not impair the obligation of the con-
tract between the company and its stockhold-

ters, so far at least as the latter were concern-
ed, and if state construction of the statute
had this necessary result this construction
would be rejected. And we think that, if the
reasonably necessary way of preserving stock-
holders' rights required an office in the state
for a limited purpose, this also should be
granted. But it was unnecessary for the Su-
preme Court to go to this extent.

MONOPOLY-VIOLATION OF NOTICE AS
ΤΟ RESALE OF MANUFACTURED AR-
TICLE.-We called attention in 81 Cent. L. J.
127, to an apparent conflict in U. S. v. Kellogg
Toasted Corn Flakes Co., 222 Fed. 725, and
Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v. Cream of
Wheat Co., 224 Fed. 566, as to whether a man-
ufacturer could, without violating the anti-
trust act, fix resale price, at retail, of a manu-
factured product.

The first of these cases held that this could
not be done, while the second held it could.
Now, the ruling in the second case has been
affirmed on appeal to Second Circuit Court of
Appeals. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co. v.
Cream of Wheat Co., 227 Fed. 46.

The difference in decision between these
two cases seems not to lie at all in the fact,
that the United States was prosecuting and
plaintiff was seeking to establish his right to
purchase from a manufacturer unwilling to
sell.

Lacombe, C. J., in speaking for a unanimous
court in the affirming opinion, speaks of the
business as follows: "The business of de-
fendant is not a monopoly, or even a quasi-
monopoly. Really, it is selling purified wheat
middlings, and its whole business covers only
about 1 per cent of that product. It makes
its own selections of what by-products of the
milling process it will put up, and sells what
it puts up under marks which tell the pur-
chaser that these middlings are its own selec-
tion. It is open to Brown, Jones and Robinson
to make their selections out of the other 99
per cent of purified middlings and put them
up and sell them; possibly one or more of them
may prove to be better selectors than de-
fendant, or may persuade the public that they
are." The opinion goes on in this way and
concludes by saying: "We have not yet reach-
ed the stage where the selection of a trader's
customers is made for him by the government."

This opinion is about as inconclusive as that
which it affirms. Its language in some view is
broad enough to include an article of necessity
and it hedges by a recital that this article is
not such. When merely by reason of the fact
a manufacturer has not yet captured the mar

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