the exclusive right to sell property, the owner may sell by his own efforts without becoming liable for commission.-Snook v. Page, Cal. App., 155 Pac. 107.

47. -Completion of Sale.-Where a contract between a broker and the owner specified that the purchaser procured should pay the broker's commission, the broker could not recover commissions from the owner under the contract, though he refused to complete a sale to the procured.-Robinson purchaser V. Oklahoma

Fire Ins. Co., Okla., 155 Pac. 202.

Cancellation of Instruments-Intervention.-Intervener, whom decedent owed work done, could enforce, so far as it affected her, the trust to pay "all present just debts, charges and expenses" of decedent decreed in the latter's suit to set aside a deed and for a reconveyance, though she did not accept the trust in writing.-Rice v. Merrill, Mass., 111 N. E. 860.

of

49. Carriers of Goods-Bill of Lading.-Railroad delivering carload of beans to defendant on his innocent presentation of false bill lading held entitled to recover against defendant, on ground of misrepresentation of a material fact by mistake, upon which it had been induced to act.-Louisville & N. R. Co. v. McKay & Morgan, Tenn., 182 S. W. 585.

50. Corpse.-Son, undertaking to bury mother's body and assuming responsibility for funeral expenses and transportation charges, held entitled to sue carrier for mishandling of the corpse and box containing it in his presence.-Wall v. St. Louis & S. F. R. Co., Mo. App., 182 S. W. 1057.

51. Discrimination.-Act Feb. 4, 1887, § 15, as amended by Act June 18, 1910, § 12, empowering the Interstate Commerce Commission to prevent unlawful discrimination, authorizes the commission to prescribe the maximum allowance out of the joint rates which trunk line railways may make to tap lines owned by persons owning timber and mills which they prinwas fixed cipally serve, though no jont rate either by the commission or by the carriers, and they had not been afforded an opportunity to agree in respect to the division.-O'Keefe v. United States, U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 Sup. Ct. 313.

52.- -Inspection.-A railroad company properly allowed inspection, where the shipper sent out circular letters that it would allow inspection, but the bill of lading prohibited inspection without shipper's written permission.-Elm City Lumber Co. v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., N. C., 88 S. E. 139.

53.- Live Stock.-A railroad can decline to accept a shipment of live stock by showing that its stockyard, where it is required to rest cattle in transit by federal statute, is infected with a contagious disease, of which it had no knowledge in time to remedy the condition.-Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. v. Farrell & Braley, Ala. App., 50 So. 986.

54.

-Live Stock.-A shipper of live stock who set up a claim for damages for loss of a horse, not having paid the freight or feeding charges, held not entitled to recover the statutory penalty, of $50 for nonpayment of his claim. Southern Ry. Co. v. Kimball, S. C., 88 S. E. 14.

55. Negligence.-Plaintiff held not entitled to recover for killing of cattle placed by him in defendant railroad's stockyard as invitee and without notice, and left no guard; there being no obligation on defendant to furnish a guard. -Smith v. Maine Cent. R. Co., Me., 96 Atl. 778. Express 56. Warehouseman. company, which on consignee's refusal to take a personal delivery and his direction to leave on station platform put goods in station to protect from trespassers, held liable only as warehouseman, so that on burning of station without its fault it was not liable for their value.-Southern Express Co. v. Potter Bros., Tenn., 183 S. W. 157.

57. Carriers of Passengers-Alighting.—It cannot be said as a matter of law that it is negligent to alight from a moving car, but the circumstances attending it and the speed of the car make it a question for the jury.-Johnson v. Portland Ry., Light & Power Co., Ore., 155 Pac. 375. Taxicabs.-A taxicab company engaged 58.in transporting passengers and baggage in and

about a city held to be a common carrier governed by the principles applicable to carriers doing business on a larger scale.-Brown Shoe Co. v. Hardin, W. Va., 87 S. E. 1014.

59.-Warning of Strike.-Where interurban carrier sold ticket to city without warning of a strike preventing its entry therein and put off passenger at outskirts of city where there was no accommodation, she was not limited to recovery for loss of time and expense, but could recover for discomfort directly resulting.Louisville & N. Ry. & Lighting Co. v. Comley, Ky., 183 S. W. 207.

60.

Chattel Mortgages-Foreclosure.-A purchase-money note for an amount exceeding $100, containing merely reservation of title to the personalty sold, cannot be foreclosed as a mortgage. Puett v. Edwards, Ga. App., 88 S. E. 36. 61. Constitutional Law-Due Process of Law. -A presumption of negligence on proof of the killing of an animal on railroad tracks does not work a deprivation of defendant's property without due process of law.-Moorer v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., S. C., 88 S. E. 15.

62. Due Process of Law.-The opportunity of landowners within a proposed district to be heard as to benefits, afforded by such acts is no less sufficient to satisfy the requirements of due process of law, because the particular road to be improved is yet to be selected.-Embree v. Kansas City & Liberty Boulevard Road Dist., U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 Sup. Ct. 317.

63. Interest in Controversy.-No one. may question the validity of a statute unless his interests have been, or are about to be, prejudicially affected by its operation.-Barth Pock, Mont., 155 Pac. 282.

64.

V.

Contracts-Public Policy. All agreements for pecuniary considerations to control the business operations of the government are void as against public policy, without reference as to whether improper means are attempted or used in their execution.-Kuhn v. Buhl, Pa., 96 Atl. 977.

65. Copyrights-Common Law Rights. The publication of a book or play, in order to obtain a copyright, is a waiver of the author's common-law rights thereunder.-O'Neill v. General Film Co., N. Y. Sup. Ct., 157 N. Y. Sup. 1028.

66.- -Motion Pictures.-Assuming that publisher of story held copyright as trustee for against comauthor, preliminary injunction panies acquiring motion picture rights without notice of author's rights held properly denied, in view of Rev. St. § 4955.-Brady v. Reliance Motion Picture Corp., U. S. C. C. A., 229 Fed. 137. 67. Corporations-Evidence.-Evidence that person having business with corporation called at principal office, was shown to contract department, and introduced to vice-president, apparently in charge, will support inference of his agency for corporation.-City of Bridgeton v. Fidelity & Deposit Co. of Maryland, N. J., 96 Atl. 918. restriction

68.

Covenants-Restrictions.-A on the use of land fronting on navigable waters extends over lands afterwards acquired by accretion.-Bridgewater v. Ocean City Ass'n, N. J. Ch. Ct., 96 Atl. 905.

69. Customs and Usages-Evidence.-In an action for price of lumber sold and for incidental expense, the contract containing no stipulation as to inspection and shortage, evidence was admissible to show a custom in the lumber business as to inspection, report of defects and adjustment.-O. H. Folley & Co. v. Smith, S. C., 88 S. E. 24.

70.

Customs Duties-Prize Fights.-Negatives of prize fight, from which positives are to be made and exhibited before members and guests of clubs, etc., without limitation as to number of guests, held excluded from importation by Act July 31, 1912, as supplemented by Act Oct. 3. 1913. c. 16, par. 380, 38 Stat. 151.-Kalisthenic Exhibition Co. v. Emmons, U. S. C. C. A., 229 Fed. 124. 71. Descent and Distribution-Advancement. -An amount of her mother's money used by a daughter in purchasing a house. for which such daughter signed a receipt acknowledging the amount as a payment to her in advance out of her expectation in the mother's estate, the mother understanding the transaction, and not thereafter pressing the daughter for

repay

ment, held an "advancement" to the daughter. -Hayes v. Welling, R. I., 96 Atl. 843.

re

72. Contract.-Where heirs who had ceived a conveyance of land from the intestate in consideration of their promise to quitclaim to the other heirs as to other property, they were not relieved from so doing because all heirs did not require them to do so.-Stennett v. Stennett, Iowa, 156 N. W. 406.

73. Divorce-Cruelty.-A husband who, on one or two occasions, spat at or on his wife, is not guilty of the matrimonial offense of cruelty. Calichio v. Calichio, N. J., 96 Atl. 658. 74.- -Contract of Marriage.-Where a marriage was merely one of convenience, and the parties were unable to reside together amicably, held that neitner party was entitled to a divorce. Spady v. Spady, Ore., 155 Pac. 169.

75. Easements-Burden of Proof.-Before an applicant can have obstructions removed from a private way, he must show, not only an uninterrupted use for more than 7 years, but that the way is not more than 15 feet wide, that he has kept it open and in repair, and that it is the same 15 feet originally appropriated.-Forrester v. McKaig, Ga., 87 S. E. 1060.

on

76. Electricity Electric Service. Where electric service was discontinued for default in payments by customer while he had a sum deposit as collateral security, the company was entitled to recover its meter and electric lamps from the customer.-Georgia Ry, & Power Co. V. Peck, Ga. App., 88 S. E. 33.

77. Eminent Domain-Abutting Owners.Under the general law of eminent domain consequential damages to abutting land are not recoverable, except where a part of a tract is taken, and the value of the remainder diminished. Gaylord v. City of Bridgeport, Conn., 96 Atl. 936.

company

78. Damages.-Where a railway has appropriated and improved low vacant land, and thereafter sues to expropriate it, the value of the land is to be taken as of the date of commencement of suit, without regard to the company's improvements.-New Orleans Ry. & Light Co. v. Lavergne, La., 70 So. 921.

79.-Public Use.-The taking of land by a telephone company for the construction and operation of its line is not a taking for a private use. Mitchell v. Southern New England Telephone Co., Conn., 96 Atl. 966.

80. Estoppel-Standing By-Where plaintiff, who sold a cow, reserving title until the purchase-money note was paid, stood by at a public sale and allowed the buyer's vendee to sell the animal to defendant without asserting his title, held not to estop him from claiming the animal.-Jones v. Savin, Del. Sup. Ct., 96 Atl.

756.

81. Exchange of Property-Rescission.-Although representations were made by defendant as to the surface conditions of land offered in trade, yet, if plaintiffs did not make the trade relying thereon, but went upon the land and had a fair opportunity to examine it, they could not demand rescission on the ground of such representations.-Windedahl v. Harris, S. D., 156 N. W. 489.

and

82. Executors Administrators Assignment of Interest.-The only interest an administrator has is to see that the estate is preserved for the creditors, and not wasted if there are heirs whose interest he is bound to protect, but he is not a guardian for the heirs, and cannot complain if an heir assigns or disposes of his interest.-Dunn v. Wallingford, Utah, 155 Pac. 347.

83.- -Commissions. Where the same trust company was appointed executor and trustee. it was entitled to commissions in both capacities. In re Howard's Estate, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 157 N. Y. Sup. 1114.

charged

84. Extradition — Evidence.- One with crime in a foreign state from whence he came into the state of the forum will not, having been arrested for extradition, be liberated on evidence showing alibi; that being a matter for the foreign court's determination.-Edmunds V. Griffin, Iowa, 156 N. W. 353.

85. Frauds, Statute of Suretyship.-The statute of frauds, invalidating an oral agreement of suretyship in favor of the creditor,

infant, en

88. Infants-Disaffirmance.-An tering into a contract for purchase of books, had an absolute right to disaffirm, and tender back the books.-Grolier Soc. of London v. Forshay, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 157 N. Y. Sup. 776.

89. Insurance Change in Possession.-A provision that a change in possession of the property insured against fire should avoid the policy applies rather to the person than the location of the property.-Steil v. Sun Ins. Office of London, Cal., 155 Pac. 72.

90. Estoppel-Where a policy is delivered to insured, insurer is estopped from denying, after a loss that an unsigned supplement attached to it is a part thereof, notwithstanding a provision of the policy to the contrary.-Curran v. National Life Ins. Co. of United States, Pa., 96 Atl. 1041.

91. Mortgagor and Mortgagee.-The mortgagor and mortgagee have several and distinct interests in the premises mortgaged, which either may insure for his own benefit.-Gould v. Maine Farmers' Mut. Fire Ins. Co., Me., 96 Atl. 732.

-Non-Forfeiture.-Under

92. an "automatically non-forfeitable clause" held that on insured's failure to pay a premium, it was the company's duty to charge against the policy as a loan the amount due for that premium, and thus retain the policy in force for a length of time authorized by the table of cash loans and guaranteed surrender value" contained in the policy, though the premium was represented by a note.-Perkins v. Empire Life Ins. Co., Ga. App., 87 S. E. 1094.

on

94.- Waiver. That a fraternal insurer accepted checks in payment of assessments mailed in which they the last day of the month could be paid shows no waiver of the provision for payment within the month under penalty of forfeiture, but merely of the right to demand payment in cash.-Crawford v. North American Union, Mo. App., 182 S. W. 1043.

95. Intoxicating Liquors Municipal Ordinance. Under a town ordinance prohibiting the storing of intoxicating liquors and their sale, a defendant is guilty who stores and sells a liquid or liquor which is used as a beverage and produces intoxication, irrespective of how the bottle is labeled.-Town of Belton v. Campbell, S. C., 88 S. E. 30.

96. Recovery for Death. To authorize a recovery for death resulting from sale of liquor to decedent, the liquors furnished need not be the sole or even the principal cause of the injury.-Moran v. Slattery, Neb., 156 N. W. 663.

97. Jury Quashing Panel.-Where a majority of the names put into a jury box were persons residing in the supervisor's district in which a homicide occurred, the court erred in refusing to quash the jury box.-Eddins v. State, Miss.. 70 So. 898.

98. Justices of the Peace-Surplusage.-The words "by default" in a justice judgment are to be treated as surplusage, the record showing

it was after hearing and considering plaintiff's proofs and allegations under oath, at the day to which adjournment had been had by mutual consent.-Gears v. Ryan, Del. Sup. Ct., 96 Atl.

756.

99. Landlord and Tenant-Contract.-Where land was rented verbally, and, after entry by the tenant, the landlord stated that as long as the tenant paid her rent she could have the place, the contract was not unilateral.-Hamlett v. Coates, Tex. Civ. App., 182 S. W. 1144.

100. Marriage Annulment.-Entering into marriage with the intention to abandon the wife is a fraudulent misrepresentation, which entitles her to an annulment.-Moore v. Moore, N. Y. Sup. Ct., 157 N. Y. Sup. 819.

101. Master and Servant-Course of Employment. When an accident to an eye, which at first appears not serious, results shortly after in a diseased condition which destroys the sight, the "injury occurred" within the Employers' Liability Act, in view of Rev. St. 1913, $3693b, when the diseased condition culminated.-Johansen v. Union Stockyards Co. of Omaha, Neb., 156 N. W. 511.

102. Malpractice.-Under Workmen's Compensation Law (St. 1915, § 2394-25, subds. 1, 2), held that an employe who had made a claim against his employer and received compensation, including medical expenses, on his physician's discovery of defendant's malpractice might elect to hold defendant and to release his employer.-Pawlak v. Hayes, Wis., 156 N. W.

464.

103. -Respondeat Superior.-Where a chauffeur made a side trip of several blocks from a main trip of one block, on an errand of his own, and at a point twice as far from, and beyond, the place to which he was directed to go, as the garage, an accident occurred, he was not in his master's employ, as his acts constituted an abandonment of his service.-Eakin's Adm'r v. Anderson, Ky., 183 S. W. 217.

104. Statutory Construction.-Liability and compensation statutes cannot be grouped together, since they are the antipodes of labor legislation, having their foundation in essentially different social and economic ideas.-Lewis and Clark County v. Industrial Acc. Board of Montana, Mont., 155 Pac. 268.

106. Municipal

Corporations-Ordinance.The occupation of soliciting contributions for charitable purposes may be regulated by laws or ordinances providing for reasonable supervision over the persons engaged therein and for the application and use of the contributions to and in purposes intended.-Ex parte Dart, Cal., 155 Pac. 63.

107.-Ordinance.-An ordinance of a township, prohibiting the building of any privy, stables, or stalls nearer a neighbor's residence than the owner's, and providing that no privy shall be constructed within 25 feet of any public street, held unconstitutional as not uniform.-State v. Bass, N. C., 87 S. E. 972.

108.- -Quantum Meruit.-Where a city's contract is set aside for irregularity, there may be recovery as on quantum meruit for reasonable cost and expense incurred in prosecuting the contract before legal attack, irrespective of any benefit therefrom.-Armitage v. Essex Const. Co., N. J., 96 Atl. 889.

109. Negligence - Imputability.-Negligence of a husband in driving will not be imputed to his wife riding with him, she having no control, and no relation of principal and agent existing. Fisher v. Ellston, Iowa, 156 N. W. 422. 110. Last Clear Chance.-The last clear chance doctrine does not apply where both parties are equally negligent at the very time when the injury occurs.-Stephenson v. Parton, Wash., 155 Pac. 147.

111.- -Licensee.-Plaintiff, a tailor, going aboard defendant's ship to deliver a uniform to

one of its officers, as he had been permitted to do, held a "licensee," to whom defendant owed no duty except to refrain from wanton and willful injury.-Freeman v. United Fruit Co., Mass., 111 N. E. 789.

112. Proximate Cause.-The act of a child, injured from its clothes catching on fire when it put additional leaves on a fire negligently left in a street by defendant, held not to destroy the casual connection between defendant's acts and the injury.-Davenport v. McClellan, N. J., 96 Atl. 921.

113. Res Ipsa Loquitur.-That an automobile skids is not of itself evidence of negligence. -Loftus v. Pelletier, Mass., 111 N. E. 712.

114. New Trial-Jury.-Where defendant claimed new trial because one of the jurors was defective in hearing, refusal of the court to examine juror, who was not present, where there was a showing by affidavits that his hearing was not such as to warrant the vacation of the verdict, was not an abuse of discretion.Safran v. Meyer, S. C., 88 S. E. 3.

115. Nuisance-Pleasure Resort.-A public pleasure resort and picnic ground is not necessarily a common-law nuisance.-Rockville Water & Aqueduct Co. v. Koelsch, Conn., 96 Atl. 947. of

116. Removal of Causes-Limitation Amount.-A suit by a state, for the use of depositors in a state bank, citizens of such state, bank against a former commissioner, now a non-resident, and the non-resident surety on his bond, to recover the several losses of such depositors from the neglect of the commissioner, may not be removed to the federal court for diverse citizenship; none of the individual claims amounting to $3.000.-Title Guaranty & Surety Co. of Scranton, Pa., v. State of Idaho, U. S. Sup. Ct., 36 Sup. Ct. 345.

117. Robbery-Evidence.-In a prosecution for robbery, where money was taken from a ticket office, it was done "in the presence of" the station agent, who had been shot, and was lying on the floor of the waiting room, and could hear the noise through the open ticket window, which connected the two rooms.State v. Williams, Mo., 183 S. W. 308.

118. Sales Evidence.-Where a tenant, an ignorant negro, who was authorized by the landlord to sell cotton to one who had made him advances on condition that the landlord's lien was satisfied, objected to the purchaser's retention of the cotton without satisfying the lien, there was no sale.-Caswell v. Lensing & Bennett, Tex. Civ. App., 183 S. W. 75.

119.- -Repudiation of Contract. Where a motor truck was sold under a warranty of materials and workmanship for one year, the buyers' failure to repudiate the contract as soon as it discovered that the truck was useless will not bar recovery, where the contract was repudiated within a year.-Avery Co. of Texas v. Staples Mercantile Co., Tex. Civ. App., 183 S. W. 43.

120. Rescission.-Where, in an action to rescind for fraud an executed sale of a half interest in a mercantile corporation for which plaintiff had deeded land, and to cancel the deed and compel reconveyance, it appeared that plaintiff had managed the business for 11⁄2 years, that the store and contents were destroyed by fire. and that the parties could not be placed in statu quo, held that the action should be dismissed and plaintiffs left to an action for damages.-Rosenwater v. Selleseth, N. D., 156 N. W.

540.

a

121. Street Railroads-Pedestrian.-After motorman has passed a pedestrian on a street crossing in safety with the front end of his car, he cannot be held to have knowledge of any danger she assumed by changing her position.-Wood v. Los Angeles Ry. Corp., Cal., 155 Pac. 68.

122. Wills-Advancement.-Where a parent or one standing in loco parentis, having made advancements to a child, afterwards makes a will disposing of his whole estate without provision for reduction of the advancements, such advancements will not be deducted from the child's share under the will.-Hayes v. Welling, R. I., 96 Atl. 843.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., MAY 26, 1916.

NEGLIGENCE IN OWNER OF AUTOMOBILE LEAVING SAME FULLY CHARGED IN PUBLIC PLACE.

Automobile law has risen into so great importance as to become something of an independent department in the gathering of what may be called instances in decision. A new machinery has come into existence and it calls for the application of old principles to new conditions.

Automobile machinery is regarded in many respects as dangerous outside of the establishments in which it is constructed and in the midst of the public on its highways and its places of exhibition to which people are invited.

On the highways other citizens have more than the rights of licensees and, if they are invited to inspect automobiles elsewhere, they at least have the rights of

Two soldiers

One tried,

The other

that and two other levers: seeing the lorry, mounted it. but failed to set it in motion. succeeded in starting it backwards so that it ran into plaintiff's shop front.”

The court arrived at the conclusion that defendant could not be held, saying: "This is not the case of a horse left unattended in the street, which may start of its own accord, and which, however quiet, may yet be startled or other cause accidental or intentional. It is impossible to say that those who leave standing unattended in a road a machine which will not move unless some person intentionally puts it in motion are prima facie guilty of negligence."

Here it is seen that, though the machine was charged so as to start, yet it could not be started, or at least was not, by the mere casual touch of another. Also nothing is said as to such a machine being a lure for children, whose propensities should have been anticipated. Besides, the absence was only momentary.

Three late decisions, one by English Court of Appeal and the other two by New York Supreme Court, Appellate Division, illustrate phases in claimed negligence against owners of automobiles in the highway and in places for exhibition, which it seems well to bring into juxtaposition. Ruoff v. Long & Co., L. R. 1916, 1 K. B. 148; Frashella v. Taylor, 157 N. Y. Supp. 881; Austin v. Buffalo Electric Vehicle Co., 158 N. Y. Supp. 118.

In the English case the facts show that defendant's servants "momentarily left stationary but unattended in a highway a steam motor lorry. In order to start the lorry it was necessary to withdraw a handpin from the gear lever and then to move

goods for delivery. Some small boys jumped on the machine and started it, injuring plaintiff's premises. The court said: "The only negligence which the plaintiff has attempted to prove is negligence in leaving the car in a situation where the boys could reach the lever without being seen or stopped. The defendant was not Lound to provide against the act of willful wrongdoers, even though the wrongdoers were small boys."

This case is very much closer than the English case. It is something of judicial assumption to call the act by the small boys willful, if it was an act that should have been anticipated as one furnishing a lure for boyish propensities. And then the act of starting the car seemed a much more. simple affair than was the case of the soldiers mounting the car and starting it after

considerable effort. Besides, the willful act of a grown man is not so much to be anticipated as a prank by boys.

The third case concerns a car placed in a hall for exhibition. It was open and accessible to any visitor at the exhibition and so charged with electrical power that it could be started by the pressing of a button or shifting of a lever. It was left open and was started by some visitor entering the car and pushing the button or shifting the lever. It started and injured plaintiff, a visitor to the exhibition.

The majority in a per curiam opinion said the owner was not in possession and the proximate cause of the injury was the negligent act of a third person, for which defendant was not responsible.

A dissent said: "What did happen in this case was precisely what might have been and should have been anticipated, if the car was left in such condition that it could be started. It surely would have been easy to lock the car, or to take out the storage batteries or in some way to assure that the car could not be inadvertently started."

It seems to us that the dissent is sound, especially as it should have been presumed rather that there was inadvertence by the stranger, than that there was a willful or intentional starting. If by inadvertence the injury could have been caused, this was something that should have been guarded against.

The English case appears to distinguish the facts as they should have been distinguished. The first mentioned New York case does not seem to take into sufficient account the principle in the turntable cases and the second New York case fails to take into account an inadvertent act by a third person as to a machine of potential danger. The third of these cases, it seems quite evident, was decided without sufficient regard to the careless act of defendant owner in leaving his machine as he did, when he could so easily have avoided consequences he should have anticipated as likely to en

sue.

NOTES OF IMPORTANT DECISIONS.

HIGHWAYS-USE OF SAME BY SPECIAL BUSINESS.--In 82 Cent. L. J. 313, there appeared a comment in an editorial way upon the position of one of the judges of the Supreme Court of Louisiana, to the effect that the streets of a city could no more be denied to jitney busses than to any other users.

In Kurtz v. Southern Pac. Co., 155 Pac. 367, the Supreme Court of Oregon distinguishes absolute rights from special rights to use of traveled streets as follows: "The right of a person to drive a team hitched to a carriage, or to control a vehicle upon a traveled street, or to haul by ordinary means his own goods thereon without let or hindrance, is common to all citizens who have occasion to use the highways for pleasure, profit or advantage. When, however, a person engages in the transportation of passengers or freight, or both, for hire, he is pursuing a special business, and in order legally to exercise that privilege the municipality may require of him the payment of a license fee. So, too, a city might by ordinance grant to one person, firm or corporation the right to transact any business which without such permission might be regarded in the nature of a nuisance."

All of this is incidental to the proposition that the grant of the franchise to use the public highway does not place the donee on the same footing as is the ordinary user of a highway, but renders him liable for any special injury his use may cause to one distinct from that suffered by the public at large. What we seek, however, is to present some support for our views in criticising the judge of the Louisiana Supreme Court.

FEDERAL EMPLOYERS' LIABILITY ACTMEANING OF PHRASE, "NEXT OF KIN.”— In Seaboard Air Line Railway v. Kenney, 36 Sup. Ct. 458, the question was whether the words "next of kin" in the Federal Employers' Liability Act, as designating parties entitled to maintain an action for the death of an employe in interstate commerce were to be construed by the common law or by the law of the State where the death occurred.

The Chief Justice said: "There can be no question that the act of Congress, in so far as it deals with the subjects to which it relates is paramount and exclusive. *** But this is ir relevant, since the controversy concerns only the meaning of the act."