The federal laws and treaties being thus annulled, the Cherokees appealed to the federal government to protect them from the encroachments of Georgia. The answer they received from the Executive Department, admitted the right of Georgia to annul those laws, and they perceived that the judiciary alone could arrest the state in its arbitrary and oppressive career. With that view measures were taken to bring the question before the federal tribunals, in order to obtain a judicial decision upon the constitutionality of the steps taken by the state government.

In the first case presented, which was in the shape of a bill on the part of the Cherokee nation, praying an injunction against the state of Georgia, the court decided that the Cherokee nation was not a foreign nation, but a dependent tribe, in a state of tutulage; and that it consequently could not be a party in a suit before the Supreme Court, under that provission of the constitution authorizing foreign nations to prosecute suits before the federal tribunals.

From this opinion two judges dissented, and the court strongly intimated an opinion, that the tribe was entitled to protection against the encroachments of the whites, at the hands of the executive.

This decision of the court put an end to all hope on the part of the tribe, of direct relief from judicial authority. The government of Georgia now looked upon the contest as gained. The decision of the court against the claim of the Cherokee tribe to

bring suits as a foreign nation, did not indeed establish the laws of Georgia to be constitutional. On the contrary a strong intimation was given, that they were in violation of the rights of the Cherokees; and it was generally believed, that whenever the question should be properly presented, that those laws must be adjudged unconstitutional and void. The President would then be compelled to enforce laws, which he had already declared to be inconsistent with his construction of the constitution; or to determine no longer to regard the Supreme Court of the United States as the constitutional expounder of the laws. He had sanctioned the steps taken by the state to annul the laws and treaties of the federal government, and while the question as to the constitutionality of those measures was pending before the Supreme Court, marked indications were manifested, of his determination to disregard its decision.

His friends and party readily adopted the same ground, and the leading administration journals throughout the union sought to bring the authority of the Supreme Court into disrepute, and asserted, that each department of the government had an equal right to construe the constitution for itself.

This abandonment of the powers of the government by those, to whom their execution was entrusted, excited great apprehension, as to the result of the collision, which seemed about to ensue between the Supreme Court and the state of Georgia; and it was fortunate for the stabil

ity of the government, that the Supreme Court was not compelled to decide against the constitutionality of the state laws, upon the application made in behalf of the Cherokee nation.

The public attention being called at an early state of the controversy, to the consideration of the right of a state to annul the laws and treaties of the federal government, time was given to the executive to reflect, before he was irrevocably committed by acts, as well as by declarations; and previous to the final decision by the Supreme Court, the State of South Carolina, by asserting her right to annul the revenue laws of Congress, made him aware of the dangerous character of the pretensions of Georgia, and demonstrated, that the existence of the federal government was incompatible with the right of nullification on the part of a state.

The Supreme Court, however, did not suffer itself to be influenced by the course of the President, and when the question was again presented upon a writ of error sued out by some missionaries, who were imprisoned under the laws of Georgia, it promptly decided those laws to be unconstitutional and void, and ordered the prisoners to be discharged. The state authorities refused to obey the mandate, and the President already committed by his precipitate declarations in favor of the course adopted by Georgia, saw the period fast approaching, when he would be compelled to retrace his steps, and to enforce the mandate of the Supreme Court against that state;

or to acquiesce in the pretensions and doctrines advanced by the nullifiers of South Carolina.

Encouraged by the countenance given by the administration to the measures adopted by Georgia, to annul those laws of Congress preventing her occupations of the Indian country, the leading party of South Carolina came to the determination, of testing the sincerity of the administration, in its acquiescence to nullification on the part of a state, by aiming a fatal blow at the power of Congress to impose revenue laws. This doctrine was first promulgated in Georgia; but in December 1827, when the Legislature of that state resolved to submit only to its own construction of the federal compact, the legislature of South Carolina, almost simultaneously asserted the same right; and after questioning the propriety of the Supreme Court's deciding questions, which might occur between a state and the federal government, concluded that, inasmuch as one of the parties must decide, there was a peculiar propriety in the state's undertaking to decide for itself. It then resolved, that all legislation for the protection of domestic manufactures and to promote internal improvement was contrary to the constitution of the United States.

This convenient doctrine, in February 1829, received the sanction of the Legislature of Virginia, which by a vote of 134 yeas 68 nays, resolved, that the constitution of the United States being a federative compact between sovereign states, in construing

which no common arbiter is known, each state has the right to construe the compact for itself. The right of a state to decide what laws were constitutional and what unconstitutional being thus summarily established, and the tariff laws declared to be unconstitutional, it only remained to point out some mode to prevent their operation.

In spite of the argument contained in the report, and the determined resolution expressed in the resolves of these State Legislatures, Congress proceeded to modify and alter the tariff, according to the pleasure of the majority; without conceiving itself bound by the will of the minority.

Even the protests interposed on the part of certain states, were laid upon the table of Congress without comment; as if those respectable bodies were intermeddling with subjects, which were not entrusted to their care.

When it was seen how little effect these protests produced, it was proposed in a meeting of the South Carolina delegation, that they should withdraw from Congress. This having been deemed inexpedient, it was recommended to wait, until an opportunity had been given for the new administration to develope its policy. Still, however, the right to annul the law was insisted upon, although it was deemed proper at first to try conciliatory measures. During the first session of the 21st Congress the duties were reduced on coffee, cocoa, tea and molasses; but as these were not articles which came within the scope of

the protecting policy, it was not regarded as a sufficient concession by those, who aimed to overthrow the American System.' Efforts were accordingly made to obtain a majority in the Legislature of South Carolina, in order to carry the remedy of nullification into effect. They succeeded so far as to obtain a majority in the legislature, but not sufficiently large to authorize a convention; which was the body, that, in the opinion of the nullifiers, emphatically represented the majesty of the people. The bill for that purpose was introduced into the Legislature, which met 22d November, 1830, and received in the Senate 23 in favor of and 12 against it, and in the House the vote stood 60 yeas, and 56 nays, but it was lost, two thirds of the Legislature being required for its passage. Certain resolutions were then introduced, some of which being abstract principles, were acceded to, and those which set forth the doctrines of nullification were carried by a party majority. The near prospect of success, stimulated the nullification party to unwonted exertions.

An association was formed to advocate the doctrines of their party, under the specious titles of the rights of the states and the principles of free trade, and every effort was made to raise the public feeling to that pitch, when it seems on the point of exploding. Tracts and pamphlets advocating their cause with zeal and ability, were distributed in all parts of the state, and the people were exhorted to be ready to defend the sovereignty of the state against the

slavery, which awaited them and their children, in case they failed in this last attempt to resist the usurpations of the federal government. Payment of bonds, which had been given for duties, was refused with the view of testing the constitutionality of the tariff of 1828; but the court decided, that no evidence could be given of the want of consideration, on the ground of the unconstitutionality of the tariff; and the jury accordingly found in favor of the United States.

Having been disappointed in evading the execution of the act in this mode, the nullifiers proceeded to carry their scheme into execution, by operating on public opinion through the fears of the timid and prudent.

The friends of free trade were invited to meet in convention at Philadelphia on the fifth of October 1831, with a view of concerting a plan of action, and alarming the public mind as to the consequences, unless Congress should abandon the policy deliberately adopted, upon the requisition of South Carolina. On the other hand, the friends of the tariff met in convention at New York on the 26th of the same month, to sustain the system and to combat the arguments, which might be urged against it, by the free trade convention.

When this body had assembled it was speedily discovered, that the doctrines of nullification had but few friends out of South Carolina, and it was agreed that it was inexpedient to insist upon the unconstitutionality of the tariff: but that the policy of pro

tecting duties should be questioned, and the danger of alienating the affections of the people of the southern states be strongly insisted upon. A memorial setting forth these views was accordingly prepared by Albert Gallatin, and transmitted to congress, while a counter memorial was drawn by Alexander H. Everett on the part of the tariff convention. By the former memorial it appeared, that although the nullifiers could not induce the free trade convention to adopt their doctrines on the subject of nullification, they were enabled so far to influence its councils as to procure a recommendation of an average duty on importations in general of twenty per cent, which should in no case exceed twentyfive per cent. This was in effect a recommendation to abandon the protecting policy, and the contest now between the tariff party and their opponents, was not so much as to the amount of the revenue to be annually raised, but as to what articles it should be levied upon. It was conceded, that as soon as the national debt was paid off, an event about to take place, the revenue must be diminished.

The advocates of the 'American system,' however, contended that the duties should be diminished or entirely taken off upon such articles as did not come into competition with the objects of domestic industry: as coffee, tea, &c: while their opponents insisted, that the reduction should be extended to the peculiar objects of protection, as woollen, cotton and iron manufactures. Some went further and advocated

a reduction of duties on the protected articles only, with the view of rendering the United States more dependent upon European commerce, and in that manner increasing the market for the productions of the southern states. Others again opposed too great a reduction of the revenue, and reminded Congress, that many objects deemed worthy of the attention of the federal government and involving a large expenditure, had been postponed on account of the annual appropriation for the payment of the public debt; and that when that was discharged, the country would expect that these great national subjects should not befurt her neglected, from considerations of economy, which was no longer necessary. They also called, upon Congress, to provide for the payment of many private claims, which had been postponed from session to session, without any satisfactory reason, and of many public debts, the adjustment of which was imperiously required by the national

character.

Among these were enumerated, sums due to revolutionary officers for depreciation of their pay; to the holders of unfunded stock; and to the merchants for their claims upon France for spoliations prior to 1800, which were surrendered in order to relieve the United States from an onerous treaty stipulation. Until these debts were discharged, it was justly remarked, that no fears need be expressed as to the disposition of the surplus revenue. These differences of opinion concerning the reduction of the rev

enue were however chiefly confined to those, who ad.nitted the constitutional power of congress over the whole subject. The leading party in South Carolina were willing to effect the reduction upon any terms; but they declared that nothing short of an abandonment of the principle of protection could entirely satisfy those, who asserted it to be unconstitutional, and that a state had a right to annul a law of Congress.

Upon the meeting of the Legislature of South Carolina in the winter of 1831, the governor called the attention of that body to a letter written by the President in answer to an invitation to dine at Charleston on the fourth of July. In that letter the President expressed his determination to perform his duty in case any attempt should be made to annul the laws of the union: and this was regarded, as an attempt to overawe South Carolina by threats of using force. The subject was referred to a committee in the state senate, and they reported a resolution declaring, that the letter was at variance with the duties of the President and the rights of the states.

The adjoining states indicated an unwillingness to sanction the remedy of nullification, North Carolina expressly repudiating the whole doctrine, and South Carolina found it expedient to wait another year, during which time Congress might be persuaded or intimidated into a relinquishment of the policy. While, therefore, the state government threatened loudly, it took care not to take any step, which