is estimated, by multiplying the vote cast in 1888 by 6, at about 12,000. It will be seen that the bonded debt, to say nothing of a floating debt, which is said to be small, is already largely in excess of the legal limit, and it is proposed to increase it by a subscription that will certainly involve $200,000, and possibly $250,000. If the bill becomes a law, the bonded indebtedness will very closely approximate 10 per cent of the assessed valuation of the property of the county.

The condition of things in the county of Yavapai, lying immediately north of Maricopa, and through which this road is also to run, though not directly affected by this legislation, is very instructive in this connection.

By an act of the legislature of Arizona passed the year before the act of Congress to which I have referred Yavapai County was authorized to subscribe $4,000 per mile to this line of road. The total length of the road in the county was 147 miles, and 74 miles, to Prescott, have been constructed. The secretary of the Territory, in response to an inquiry, states the debt of Yavapai County at $563,000 and the assessment for taxation at "between six and seven millions." There are 73 miles of road yet to be built from the present terminus, Prescott, to the south line of the county, for which Yavapai County must make a further issue of bonds of $292,000, making a total county debt of $855,000, or above 13 per cent upon the taxable assessment (taking that at $6,500,000), and a per capita county debt of nearly $85, taking the population at about 10,600, as stated in the report of the Senate committee. Surely no one will insist that the true and permanent prosperity of these communities will be promoted by loading their energies and their industries with these great debts. I feel the force of the suggestion that the freight charges now imposed upon the farm and orchard products of Maricopa County by the railroads now in operation are oppressive. But this bill does not afford much relief even in that direction. There would be but one competing point, viz, Phoenix. At all other points on the proposed road the people would be subject to the exaction of just such rates as are demanded by the other lines. If this bill contained some effective provision to secure reasonable freight rates to the people who are to be taxed to build the road, it would go far to secure my favorable consideration for it.

I have carefully examined the reports of the committees and every argument that has been submitted to me by the friends of the bill, but I can not bring myself to believe that the permanent welfare of the communities affected by it will be promoted by its passage.

To the House of Representatives:

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, July 9, 1890.

I return herewith without my approval the bill (H. R. 5974) entitled "An act extending the time of payment to purchasers of land of the Omaha tribe of Indians in Nebraska, and for other purposes."

The United States holds the legal title of these lands, which have been sold for the benefit of the Omaha Indians to secure the unpaid purchase money, the time of payment of which it is proposed by this act to extend. There is no objection that I know of, either on the part of the United States or of the Indians, to the extension of the unpaid installments due from purchasers. This relief is probably due to the purchasers. The bill, however, contains the following provision:

That all the lands the payment for which is hereby extended shall be subject to taxation in all respects by and in the State of Nebraska as if fully paid for and patents issued.

Now, while it is entirely proper that the interest of the purchasers in these lands should share the burdens of the communities in which the lands are located, the title of the United States and the beneficial interest of the Indians in the lands should not be subjected to sale for the delinquency of the purchasers in paying tax assessments levied upon the lands. The effect of the provision which has been quoted would, in my opinion, give to the purchaser at a tax sale a title superior to the lien of the Government for purchase money. The bill should have contained a proviso that only the interest of the purchasers from the Government could be sold for taxes, and that the tax sale should be subject to the lien of the United States for unpaid purchase money.

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, September 30, 1890.

To the House of Representatives:

I return herewith without my approval the joint resolution (H. Res. No. 39) declaring the retirement of Captain Charles B. Stivers, of the United States Army, legal and valid, and that he is entitled as such officer

to his pay.

Captain Stivers was dismissed the service summarily by order of the President on July 15, 1863. A subsequent examination into the causes leading to this action seems to have satisfied the President that an injustice had been done to the officer, and on the 11th day of August, 1863, an order was issued revoking the order of dismissal and restoring Captain Stivers to duty as an officer of the Army. On December 30, 1864, by a proper order from the War Department, after examination, Captain Stivers was placed upon the retired list of the Army.

The Supreme Court has decided in the case of The United States vs. Corson (114 U. S. Reports, 619):

First. That at the time of the issuance of the order of dismissal the President had authority under the law to summarily dismiss an officer, and that the effect of such an order was absolutely to separate the officer from the service.

Second. That having been thus separated from the service he could

not be restored except by nomination to the Senate and its advice and consent to the appointment.

Mr. Garland, as Attorney-General, gave an opinion to the Secretary of War in the case of Captain Stivers, based upon the decision of the Supreme Court to which I have referred, holding that Captain Stivers was not an officer on the retired list of the Army. The present Attorney-General, with whom I have conferred, takes the same view of the law. Indeed, the decision of the Supreme Court to which I have referred is so exactly in point that there can be no doubt as to the law of the case. It is undoubtedly competent for Congress by act or joint resolution to authorize the President, by and with the advice of the Senate, to appoint Captain Stivers to be a captain in the Army of the United States and to place him upon the retired list. It is also perfectly competent by suitable legislation for Congress to give to this officer the pay of his grade during the interval of time when he was improperly carried upon the army lists. But the joint resolution which I herewith return does not attempt to deal with the case in that way. It undertakes to declare that the retirement of Captain Stivers was legal and valid and that he always has been and is entitled to his pay as such officer. I do not think this is a competent method of giving the relief intended. The retirement under the law as it then existed was not legal and valid, as the highest judicial tribunal under the Constitution has declared, for the reason that Captain Stivers was not then an officer on the active list. That being so, it follows, of course, that he was not entitled to draw the pay of an office he did not hold.

The relief should have taken the form usual in such cases, which is to authorize the appointment of the officer to a place made for him on the retired list.

To the Senate:

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 1, 1890.

I return to the Senate without my approval the bill (S. 473) "for the relief of the Portland Company, of Portland, Me."

This bill confers upon the Court of Claims jurisdiction to inquire into and determine how much certain steam machinery built for the United States under contract, and to be used in the vessels Agawam and Pontoosuc, cost the contractors over and above the contract price and any allowances for extra work which have been made, and requires the court to enter judgment in favor of the claimant for the excess of cost above such contract price and allowances.

The bill differs from others which have been presented to me, and one of which I have approved, in that it does not make the further allowance to the contractors contingent upon the fact that the additional expense was the result of the acts of the Government through its officers' causing delays and increased cost in the construction of the work.

The bill in effect directs the court to ignore the contract entirely, except as payments under it are to be treated as credits, and to allow the contractors the cost of the work, and that without reference to their own negligence or want of skill in executing the work. There would seem to be no object in the Government's making a contract for work if the contract is only to be binding upon the parties in the event that the contractor realizes a profit.

I can not give my approval to the proposition applied here, which if allowed here should be given general application, that every contractor with the Government who during the early days of the war failed to realize, by reason of increase in the cost of labor and materials, a profit upon the contract shall now have access to the Court of Claims to recover upon the quantum meruit the cost of the work.

To the Senate:

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 1, 1890.

I return without my approval Senate bill No. 1857, "for the relief of Charles P. Chouteau, survivor of Chouteau, Harrison & Valle."

This claim has been once presented to the Court of Claims and fully heard. This bill authorizes a rehearing. I find upon examination that every fact connected with the case necessary to the determination of the question whether the claim should be appropriated for has already been found and stated by the Court of Claims in a published opinion. Judgment was given against the claimant upon the ground that a settlement had been made and a receipt given in full. If in the opinion of Congress this receipt, given under the circumstances which accompanied it, should not be held a bar to such further appropriation as is equitable, all the facts have been found that can be necessary to determine the question what further payment should be made to the contractors. There can be no reason, as it seems to me, for a retrial of the case in the Court of Claims in the absence of any showing of newly discovered evidence. The result would only differ from the result already obtained in that under the bill which I return the court would enter a judgment instead of a finding, and the judgment could only be paid after Congressional action.

The finding which has already been made, as I have said, is a complete basis for any such action as Congress may think should be taken in the premises.

To the Senate:

BENJ. HARRISON.

EXECUTIVE MANSION, October 1, 1890.

I return without my approval the bill (S. 3830) "to prohibit bookmaking of any kind and pool selling in the District of Columbia for the purpose of gaming.”

My objection to the bill is that it does not prohibit bookmaking and pool selling, but, on the contrary, expressly saves from the operation of its prohibitions and penalties the Washington Jockey Club "and any other regular organizations owning race tracks no less than 1 mile in length," etc.

If this form of gambling is to be prohibited, as I think it should be, the penalties should include all persons and all places.

BENJ. HARRISON.

PROCLAMATIONS.

BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA.

A PROCLAMATION.

Whereas it is provided in the act of Congress approved March 2, 1889, entitled "An act to divide a portion of the reservation of the Sioux Nation of Indians in Dakota into separate reservations and to secure the relinquishment of the Indian title to the remainder, and for other purposes"

That this act shall take effect only upon the acceptance thereof and consent thereto by the different bands of the Sioux Nation of Indians, in manner and form prescribed by the twelfth article of the treaty between the United States and said Sioux Indians concluded April 29, 1868, which said acceptance and consent shall be made known by proclamation by the President of the United States, upon satisfactory proof presented to him that the same has been obtained in the manner and form required by said twelfth article of said treaty, which proof shall be presented to him within one year from the passage of this act; and upon failure of such proof and proclamation this act becomes of no effect and null and void.

And whereas satisfactory proof has been presented to me that the acceptance of and consent to the provisions of the said act by the different bands of the Sioux Nation of Indians have been obtained in manner and form as therein required:

Now, therefore, I, Benjamin Harrison, President of the United States, by virtue of the power in me vested, do hereby make known and proclaim the acceptance of said act by the different bands of the Sioux Nation of Indians and the consent thereto by them as required by the act, and said act is hereby declared to be in full force and effect, subject to all the provisions, conditions, limitations, and restrictions therein contained. All persons will take notice of the provisions of said act and of the conditions, limitations, and restrictions therein contained, and be governed accordingly.

I furthermore notify all persons to particularly observe that by said act certain tracts or portions of the Great Reservation of the Sioux Nation in the Territory of Dakota, as described by metes and bounds, are