provision of the Constitution which simply abolished slavery and involuntary servitude, we should, with few exceptions, invest Congress with power over the whole catalogue of crimes.

There is only one other clause in the Constitution of the United States which can, in any degree, be supposed to sus tain the section under consideration; namely, the second section of article 4. . . But this section, like the Fourteenth Amendment, is directed against State action. . . It was never supposed that the section under consideration conferred on Congress the power to enact a law which would punish a private citizen for an invasion of the rights of his fellow citizens, conferred by the State of which they were both residents, on all its citizens alike.

We have, therefore, been unable to find any constitutional authority for the enactment of sect. 5519 of the Revised StatThe decisions of this court above referred to leave no constitutional ground for the act to stand on.

Civil Rights Act Unconstitutional

109 U. S. Reports, p. 3. Civil Rights Cases. Opinion by Justice Bradley.

[1884]

HAS Congress constitutional power to make such a law [Civil Rights Act, 1875]? Of course, no one will contend that the power to pass it was contained in the Constitution before the adoption of the last three amendments. . . It is State action of a particular character that is prohibited. Individual rights is not the subject-matter of the amendment. It does not invest Congress with power to legislate upon subjects which are within the domain of State legislation; but to provide modes of relief against State legislation, or State action, of the kind referred to. It does not authorize Congress to create a code of municipal law for the regulation of private rights; but to provide modes of redress against the operation of State laws, and the action of State officers executive or judicial, when these are subversive of the fundamental rights specified in the amendment. Positive rights and privileges are undoubtedly

secured by way of prohibition against State laws and State proceedings affecting those rights and privileges, and by power given to Congress to legislate for the purpose of carrying such prohibition into effect: and such legislation must necessarily be predicated upon such supposed State laws or State proceedings, and be directed to the correction of their operation and effect. . Until some State law has been passed, or some State action through its officers or agents has been taken, adverse to the rights of citizens sought to be protected by the Fourteenth Amendment, no legislation of the United States under said amendment nor any proceeding under such legislation, can be called into activity; for the prohibitions of the amendment are against State laws and acts done under State authority. . . It is absurd to affirm that, because the rights of life, liberty and property (which include all civil rights that men have), are by the amendment sought to be protected against invasion on the part of the State without due process of law, Congress may therefore provide due process of law for their vindication in every case; and that because the denial by a State to any persons, of the equal protection of the laws, is prohibited by the amendment, therefore Congress may establish laws for their equal protection. In fine, the legislation. which Congress is authorized to adopt in this behalf is not general legislation upon the rights of the citizen, but corrective legislation, that is, such as may be necessary and proper for counteracting such laws as the States may adopt or enforce, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from making or enforcing, or such acts and proceedings as the States may commit or take, and which, by the amendment, they are prohibited from committing or taking.

Civil rights, such as are guaranteed by the Constitution against State aggression, cannot be impaired by the wrongful acts of individuals, unsupported by State authority in the shape of laws, customs, or judicial or executive proceedings. The wrongful act of an individual, unsupported by any such authority, is simply a private wrong, or a crime of that individual.

If the principles of interpretation which we have laid

down are correct, as we deem them to be it is clear that the law in question cannot be sustained by any grant of legislative power to Congress by the Fourteenth Amendment. .. This is not corrective legislation; it is primary and direct; it takes immediate and absolute possession of the subject of the right of admission to inns, public conveyances, and places of amusement. It supersedes and displaces State legislation on the same subject, or only allows it permissive course. It ignores such legislation and assumes that the matter is one that belongs to the domain of national regulation... Conceding the major proposi tion to be true, that Congress has the right to enact all necessary and proper laws for the obliteration and prevention of slavery with all its badges and incidents, is the minor proposition also true, that the denial to any person of admission to the accommodation and privileges of an inn, a public conveyance, or a theatre, does subject that person to any form of servitude, or tend to fasten upon him any badge of slavery? If it does not, then power to pass the law is not found in the Thirteenth Amendment.

We are forced to the conclusion that such an act of refusal has nothing to do with slavery or involuntary servitude, and that if it is violative of any right of the party, his redress is to be sought under the laws of the State. . . No countenance of authority for the passage of the law in question can be found in either the Thirteenth or Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution; and no other ground of authority for its pas sage being suggested, it must necessarily be declared void, at least so far as its operation in the several States is concerned. . . The first and second sections of the act of Congress of March 1st, 1875, entitled "An Act to protect all citizens in their civil and legal rights," are unconstitutional and void.

6. LEGISLATIVE UNDOING OF

RECONSTRUCTION

Amnesty Act of 1872

Statutes at Large, vol. xvii, p. 142.

[May 22, 1872]

Be it enacted (two-thirds of each house concurring therein), That all political disabilities imposed by the third section of the fourteenth article of amendments of the Constitution of the United States are hereby removed from all persons whomsoever, except Senators and Representatives of the thirty-sixth and thirty-seventh Congresses, officers in the judicial, military, and naval service of the United States, heads of departments, and foreign ministers of the United States.

Limitation on Use of the Army

Public Laws, U. S. A., 45 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 152. Rider to Army Appropriation Act. [June 18, 1878]

SEC. 15. From and after the passage of this act it shall not be lawful to employ any part of the Army of the United States, as a posse comitatus, or otherwise, for the purpose of executing the laws, except in such cases and under such circumstances as such employment of said force may be expressly authorized by the Constitution or by act of Congress; and no money appropriated by this act shall be used to pay any of the expenses incurred in the employment of any troops in violation of this section and any person wilfully violating the provisions of this section shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and on conviction thereof shall be punished by fine not exceeding ten thousand dollars or imprisonment not exceeding two years or by both such fine and imprisonment.

Army not to be Used at Elections

Public Laws, U. S. A., 46 Cong., 2 Sess., p. 81. propriation Act.

Rider to Army Ap[May 4, 1880]

SEC. 2. That no money appropriated in this act is appropriat

ed or shall be paid for the subsistence, equipment, transportation, or compensation of any portion of the Army of the United States to be used as a police force to keep the peace at the polls at any election held within any State: Provided, That nothing in this provision shall be construed to prevent the use of troops to protect against domestic violence in each of the States on application of the legislature thereof or of the executive when the legislature cannot be convened.

Federal Election Laws Repealed

Statutes at Large, vol. xxviii, p. 36. The effect of this Act was to discontinue Federal supervision over state elections.

[February 8, 1894] Be it enacted. . That the following sections and parts of sections of the Revised Statutes of the United States be, and the same are hereby, repealed; that is to say of title "Elective Franchise" sections. . [2002, 2005-2020]. . relating to the appointment, qualifications, power, duties, and compensation of supervisors of election; and also sections. [2021-2031].. relating to the appointment, qualification, power, duties, and compensation of special deputies; and also of title "Crimes," sections. [5506, 5511-5515, 5520-5523]. . relating to election offenses. . .

.

Sec. 2. That all other statutes and parts of statutes relating in any manner to supervisors of election and special deputy marshals be and the same are hereby repealed.

Disabilities Removed

Statutes at Large, vol. xxx, p. 432.

[June 6, 1898]

Be it enacted. That the disability imposed by section three of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States heretofore incurred is hereby removed.