66 "is secured; and at the very moment when, under the name of an "amicable explanation, you renew to me in the same terms the promise of respecting the independence and the rights of England " and her allies, you announce to me, that those in whose name you speak intend to maintain these open and injurious aggressions. "It is not, certainly, on such a declaration as this that any re"liance can be placed for the continuance of public tranquillity. 66 "But I am unwilling to leave, without a more particular reply, "what you say on the subject of the Scheldt. If it were true that "this question is in itself of little importance, this would only serve "to prove more clearly that it was brought forward only for the LL purpose of insulting the allies of England, by the infraction of their "neutrality, and by the violation of their rights, which the faith of "treaties obliges us to maintain. But you cannot be ignorant, that "here the utmost importance is attached to those principles which "France wishes to establish by this proceeding, and to those consequences which would naturally result from them; and that not "only those principles and those consequences will never be admitted "by England, but that she is, and ever will be, ready to oppose "them with all her force. 66 "France can have no right to annul the stipulations relative to "the Scheldt, unless she has also the right to set aside equally all the "other treaties between all the powers of Europe, and all the other " rights of England, or of her allies. She can even have no pretence "to interfere in the question of opening the Scheldt, unless she were "the sovereign of the Low Countries, or had the right to dictate "laws to all Europe. 66 "England never will consent that France shall arrogate the power "of annulling at her pleasure, and under the pretence of a pretended "natural right of which she makes herself the only judge, the political "system of Europe, established by solemn treaties, and guaranteed by "the consent of all the Powers. This Government, adhering to the "maxims which it has followed for more than a century, will also never see with indifference, that France shall make herself, either directly or indirectly, sovereign of the Low Countries, or general "arbitress of the rights and liberties of Europe. If France is really "desirous of maintaining friendship and peace with England, she "must show herself disposed to renounce her views of aggression "and aggrandizement, and to confine herself within her own territory, "without insulting other Governments, without disturbing their tranquillity, without violating their rights. 66 66 "With respect to that character of ill-will which is endeavoured "to be found in the conduct of England towards France, I cannot "discuss it, because you speak of it in general terms only, without alleging a single fact. All Europe has seen the justice and the generosity which have characterized the conduct of the King. His Majesty has always been desirous of peace: he desires it still; but "such as may be real and solid, and consistent with the interests " and dignity of his own dominions, and with the general security of "Europe. "On the rest of your paper I say nothing. As to what relates to "me and my colleagues, the King's Ministers owe to his Majesty the "account of their conduct; and I have no answer to give to you on "this subject, any more than on that of the appeal which you proแ pose to make to the English Nation. This nation, according to "that constitution by which its liberty and its prosperity are secured, "and which it will always be able to defend against every attack, "direct or indirect, will never have with foreign powers connection "or correspondence, except through the organ of its King; of a "King whom it loves and reveres, and who has never for an instant "separated his rights, his interests, and his happiness, from the rights, the interests, and the happiness of his people. "I have the honour to be, &c. "GRENVILLE." APPENDIX II. PAGE 54. CAUSE BELLI JUSTIFICE. Letter of Mr. Canning to Sir Charles Stuart, as to the State of Spain in 1823.-From State Papers (Spain), 1822, 1823. Vol. 10. p. 25. Foreign Office January 28, 1823. "SIR,-Shortly after I had despatched the messenger yesterday, "M. de Marcellus delivered to me the official answer of M. de "Chateaubriand to the note addressed by me to M. de Marcellus on "the 10th instant. "As it appears from your Excellency's despatch of the 24th, "which also reached me yesterday, that M. de Chateaubriand, though "he stated to your Excellency the substance of this note, had not 66 furnished you with a copy of it, I think it right to inclose a copy "for your information. "Upon a first consideration, I am by no means sure that it will "be necessary to reply officially to this note of M. de Chateaubriand; "since it, in effect, admits all the material propositions of the note to "which it is an answer. "The questions brought forward by France at Verona are ac"knowledged to have been French questions, in the sense in which "they are in my note described to have been such; that is to say, "the interest of France is stated in those questions, not as distinct "from the interest of Europe, but as more immediate:—and it is "not denied that the refusal of his Majesty's Plenipotentiary to (( concur in the decisions of Verona was founded on the omission "by France to substantiate any specific ground of complaint against "the Spanish Government. "In the subsequent part of M. de Chateaubriand's note, while the "assertion of my note of the 10th instant-that Great Britain had, "in 1820, declined anticipating hypothetical cases in which it might "be impossible to remain at peace with Spain-is disputed; the "only two cases which are cited in exception of that assertion are cases "wholly independent of the principle of interference in the internal 66 concerns of other nations. "It is averred, that we admitted the necessity of war against "Spain; first, if Spain herself should be guilty of aggression against "other states; and, secondly and specifically, if she should attempt "to possess herself of Portugal. "Unquestionably, with respect to either of those cases, Great "Britain would admit, not only prospectively and hypothetically, "and as to Spain, but positively and directly as to any Power "whatever, that aggression against any of its neighbours would "justify war; and that aggression against Portugal would impose upon Great Britain the duty of protecting her ally. 66 "But these admissions leave the question, as to the right of in"terference in the affairs of Spain, where it was. 66 "With respect to that part of M. de Chateaubriand's note which "describes the nature of the demands intended to be made by France upon Spain, and takes credit for the moderation of them; your "Excellency will not fail to observe, that our difference with France "and the allies throughout is not as to the arrangements which it might be desirable to obtain from Spain, but as to the principle upon which France and the allies propose to require them. "We disclaim for ourselves, and deny for other Powers, the right "of requiring any changes in the internal institutions of independent "States, with the menace of hostile attack in case of refusal. "moderation of such demands in no degree justifies in our eyes such 66 The a mode of enforcing them; and this distinction it is the more im"portant to keep steadily in view, and to impress upon the French "Government at a moment when, for their sake, and at their desire, we are suggesting to Spain, in a tone of friendly counsel, altera"tions similar to those which France is proposing as the alternative "of hostilities. "Your Excellency will speak in this sense to M. de Chateaubriand, "when you acknowledge on my part the receipt of his official note; "from the general tone of which, and from the friendliness of its ex"pressions towards this country, you will inform M. de Chateau"briand that his Majesty's Government derives the liveliest satis"faction; at the same time that it views with deep regret the tendency of that part of the Note which appears to indicate an "expectation of hostilities with Spain. "I am, &c. "H. E, the Rt. Hon. Sir Charles Stuart." "GEORGE CANNING." APPENDIX III. PAGE 10. MEDIATION AND INTERVENTION. Despatch of Mr. Canning on the State of Spain.-From State Papers (Spain). Vol. 10. p. 19. "The undersigned, His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for "Foreign Affairs, has received from the Duke of Wellington, late His "Majesty's Plenipotentiary at the Congress of Verona, and has laid "before the King his master the answer of the Minister for Foreign "Affairs of His Most Christian Majesty, to the Official Note, in "which the Duke of Wellington, on his return from Verona, ten"dered to the French Government the mediation of the King, for "the adjustment of differences between France and Spain. 66 "The undersigned is commanded to address to M. de Marcellus, Chargé d'Affaires of His Most Christian Majesty, the following "observations on the Note of His Excellency the Duke de Mont"6 morency, to be transmitted by M. de Marcellus to his Court. "The King has seen with pleasure, that His Most Christian Majesty does justice to the sentiments which dictated the offer of "His Majesty's mediation: and although the view which is taken in "M. de Montmorency's Note, of the nature of the differences be"tween the French and Spanish Governments, has induced His Most "Christian Majesty to decline that mediation, the King will not the "less anxiously employ, in every way that is yet open to him, those "conciliatory dispositions,' for which His Most Christian Majesty gives him credit, to bring about a state of things less menacing to "the peace of Europe, than that which is exhibited in the present "position of those two Governments towards each other. แ 66 "The British Cabinet had not to learn how fearfully the tranquillity of all Europe must be affected by the hostile collision of "France and Spain. Accordingly, in the Duke of Wellington's "Official Note, the adjustment' of the supposed differences "between the French and Spanish Governments,' was stated as 'auxiliary to the preservation of the peace of the world.' But the "British Cabinet certainly did not understand the questions brought "forward at Verona, by the Plenipotentiary of His Most Christian Majesty, with respect to the actual situation and possible conduct "of Spain, to be questions in which the concern of France was so "little distinguishable from that of other Powers, as the Duke de "Montmorency's Note represents it. "The Plenipotentiary of the King of France solicited from His "Most Christian Majesty's allies a Declaration:-1st. Whether, if "France should find herself obliged to recall her Minister from Madrid, and to break off all diplomatic relations with Spain, they "would be disposed to take the like measure, and to recall their "several Legations? "2nd. If war should break out between France and Spain, in "what form, and by what acts, would they afford to France that "moral support which would give to her proceedings the whole "force of the alliance, and would inspire a salutary fear into the "revolutionists of all countries? "3rd. What were the intentions of the several Powers, both as to "the substance and the form of the direct assistance which they "would be disposed to give to France, in a case in which, upon her "demand, their active intervention should become necessary ? "France, therefore, originated the discussions upon Spanish affairs "at Verona; and the answers of the three continental members of "the Alliance were addressed to the cases supposed, and to the support demanded by France. 66 66 "In common with the three Continental Powers, the Plenipotentiary of His Majesty considered the question of peace or war "with Spain, as a question peculiarly French. In his answer (given "in simultaneously with those of the three Continental Powers) to "the queries of the French Plenipotentiary, and in all the discussions "which followed thereupon, the Duke of Wellington uniformly alleged, as one of his reasons for not assenting to the propositions "of M. de Montmorency, the ignorance of the British Government as to the antecedent transactions and communications (during the "last two years) between the Governments of France and Spain. 66 66 "No objection was stated by the Duke of Wellington, on the part "of the King his master, to the precautionary measures of France, "within her own frontier; measures which the right of self-defence "plainly authorised, not only against the danger of contagious "disease (in which they professedly originated, and to which, till "the month of September, they were exclusively ascribed), but "against those inconveniences which might possibly arise to France "from civil contest in a country separated from France only by a "conventional line of demarcation; against the moral infection of "political intrigue, and against the violation of French territory by "occasional military incursions. But it appeared to His Majesty's "Plenipotentiary at Verona to be necessary and just, that, before he 66 was called upon to promise eventually the support of his Govern"ment to measures on the part of France which were likely to lead "to war with Spain, opportunity should have been allowed to his "Government to examine the grounds of those measures; that the 66 cause of offence given by Spain to France should have been speci"fically defined. "It was therefore impossible for His Majesty's Plenipotentiary to "concur' in the decisions of Verona. "It remains for the undersigned to advert to that part of |