small items, is recommended by convenience, 1826. and has been generally adopted. It seems to have been properly adopted in this case. Harding V. Handy. 12. The twelfth and last exception, is a repetition of the often repeated, and as often reject- Handy ed claim, to be admitted to swear to his whole account. The original plaintiffs except (1.) to the allowance made to the said Asa Handy for buildings which were erected on the lot after the death of C. W., which are said to be no advantage to it. But there is no proof, and no reason to believe, that these buildings were not a real advantage to the property, and did not increase the rent and the value. This exception, therefore, was properly overruled. 2. The second exception is to the admission of the said Handy's oath, in cases in which he refused to produce his books, and the books of C. W. No example of this admission is given, nor is there any proof in support of the exception. The rule by which the Master was governed has been already stated and approved: 3. The third exception is a repetition of the objection to the admission of items in the account of Handy, on his own oath; and is answered by a reference to that part of the report which relates to this subject, and which has been already stated. The fourth, fifth, sixth, and seventh exceptions, are totally unsupported by evidence, and, consequently, cannot be sustained. V. Harding. 1826. Harding V. Handy. Handy V. Harding. All the heirs to be made par the tion Court. of the We think the Circuit Court did right in confirming the report of the Commissioner. Upon the return of this report, the Circuit Court directed the estates to be sold, and the money due to the said Asa Handy to be paid, in the first instance, and that one fifth of the residue should be paid to each of the plaintiffs, that being the distributive share of each under the law of Rhode Island. The decree proceeds to authorize the heirs who were not made parties to come in and receive their distributive shares, on paying their proportion of the costs and charges of suit. The objection to this decree is, that the children of Mary Handy, and the children of Daniel Wheaton, are not parties to the suit. It has been supposed, that it is not necessary, ties, if within in Rhode Island, to make all the heirs parties, jurisdic because, by the laws of that State, parceners can sue separately for their respective portions of the estate of their ancestor. This law would, undoubtedly, be regarded, in a suit brought on the common law side of the Circuit Court. Its influence on a suit in equity is not so certain. But, however this may be, we are satisfied that a sale ought not to have been ordered, unless all the heirs had been before the Court as plaintiffs or defendants. Although the legal estate may be in Caleb Wheaton under the deed made by the administrator, yet he acknowledges himself to be a trustee for the heirs, having purchased for their benefit. They have, therefore, a vested equitable interest in the property, of which they Harding V. Handy. V. Handy Harding. ought not to be deprived without being heard. 1826. They may choose to come to a partition, and to redeem their shares by paying their proportion of the money with which the estate is charged. The bill does not state, that the heirs who are not made parties are unwilling to become so, or cannot be made defendants by the service of process. We think, then, that there is error in proceeding to decree a sale, without bringing all those heirs before the Court who can be brought before it; and for this error, the decree must be reversed, and the cause sent back, with liberty to the plaintiffs to amend their bill by making proper parties. If all the heirs cannot be brought before the Court, the undivided interest of those who do appear, is to be sold, and the lien of Asa Handy is to remain on the part or parts unsold, to secure the payment of so much of the money due to him as those parts may be justly chargeable with. DECREE. These causes came on to be heard, &c. on consideration whereof, this Court is of opinion, that there is no error in the interlocutory decree, nor in so much of the final decree as approves and confirms the report made by the Master; but there is error in so much thereof as directs a sale of the premises therein mentioned, all the heirs who are shown to be interested in the said premises not being made parties, and it not being shown or alleged that they could not be made parties. So much of the decree, therefore, as directed a sale of the premises in the Cassell V. Carroll. 1826. bill mentioned, is REVERSED and ANNULLED, and the residue thereof is AFFIRMED; and the cause is remanded to the said Circuit Court, with liberty to the plaintiffs to make all proper parties, that the whole may be sold if all the heirs can be made parties, otherwise the shares of such as are made parties. Each party to pay his own costs in this Court. [FEUDAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. ASSIGNMENT BY THE HUSBAND, OF A CHOSE IN ACTION, BELONGING to the WIFE.] HENRY CASSELL, Administrator of LOUISA V. CHARLES CARROLL of Carrollton. The title and claim of Charles Lord Baltimore, his heirs and representatives, to the quit rents reserved by the Proprietary of the late Province (now State) of Maryland, was extinguished by the agreement between the heirs, devisees, and personal representatives of the said Lord Baltimore, and of his son and heir, Frederick Lord Baltimore, made in 1780, and confirmed by an act of the British Parliament in 1781. It seems, that a bona fide assignment, for a valuable consideration, made by a husband, of a debt actually and presently due to his wife, devests, in equity, the title of the wife. But, however this may be in general, the agreement made in 1780, including the quit-rents then actually due (if at all) to Louisa Browning, the daughter of Charles Lord Baltimore, and assigning them to Henry Harford, the devisee of Frederick Lord Baltimore, having been entered into in England, by the husband of Louisa Browning and her committee, (she being a lunatic,) and the consideration having actually gone beneficially for her use; and the whole transaction having been between British subjects, under the direction of the High Court of Chancery, and confirmed by an act of Parliament, transferred a complete legal and equitable title to the assignee. ERROR to the Circuit Court of Maryland. This was an action of debt, brought by the plaintiff in error in the Court below, for the recovery of certain quit-rents alleged to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff's intestate. The special verdict found by the jury stated the following facts. The jury find, by their verdict, that Charles the First, in the eighth year of his reign, granted to Cæcelius Calvert, Baron of Baltimore, his heirs and assigns, for ever, in fee simple, the Province (now State) of Maryland, by a charter dated the eighth of June, 1633. Cæcelius Calvert died in 1675, and left Charles, afterwards Baron of Baltimore, his son and heir, who entered into the said Province, and was seised thereof. The said Charles, in 1711, granted, according to the laws of the Province, to Charles Carroll, Esq. father of the defendant, a patent for a tract of land containing ten thousand acres, "to have and to hold the same unto him, the said Charles Carroll, his heirs and assigns, for ever; to be holden of us and our heirs, as of our manor of Baltimore, in free and common soccage by fealty only for all manner of services, yielding and paying therefor, yearly, unto us and our heirs, at our receipt at the city of St. Mary's, at the two most usual feasts in the year, viz. at the feast of the annunciation of the blessed Virgin 1826 Cassell Carroll |