offered to answer if it were a "firm offer.") On a Referendum it would be impossible to isolate the issue. proposals were fair, and the Government were quite satisfied with the Home Rule Bill as it stood. Even partial and temporary exclusion was an evil, but it was only because it offered the only avenue to a pacific settlement that the Government had felt compelled to take it. Sir Edward Carson (U.) said that, in view of the First Lord's and Mr. Devlin's speeches, he felt that if this were the Prime Minister's last word he ought to be in Belfast. This Government of cowards, who had postponed dealing with the Ulster movement and would not remove the time-limit because of Mr. Redmond, were now going to entrench themselves behind the King's troops. They had been discussing at the War Office for the last two days how many they would require and whether they would mobilise. They wanted an outbreak as a pretext for putting the Ulstermen down. Gamble in anything else, but not in human life. After a bitter attack on Mr. Churchill, he suggested to the Prime Minister that the parts of Ulster in question should be excluded till Parliament further ordered, or till the question was reconsidered with a view to federation. Ulster, alone in Ireland, had always been on the best of terms with the Army; but under the direction of the Government the Army would become assassins. After a scene, provoked by Mr. Devlin (N., Belfast, W.), by denouncing Sir Edward Carson's desertion of the Liberal party, after Home Rule had been defeated in 1886, as that of “ a man on the make," Sir E. Carson, who was very unwell, left-for Belfast, however, and amid a great Opposition demonstration— and Mr. Devlin, continuing, declared that the civil war in Ulster was a "masquerade" and a sham, organised by the Unionist party, which had no policy. He ridiculed some of the "critical incidents" which, according to The Times, had nearly brought about an earthquake, and pointed out that the eleven byeelections since August, 1913, had shown 69,661 votes for Home Rule and 50,885 against it. He thought the exclusion proposals were needless, and at most only four counties would adopt them, possibly not one. He emphasised the Nationalist sacrifice, and believed that six years hence the Protestants would be contributing to the future power and glory of Ireland. Among subsequent speakers Mr. Cave (U., Kingston, Surrey) suggested devolution to Irish provincial assemblies. Mr. Pirie (L., Aberdeen, N.) moved an amendment, declaring that a settlement might be found in the exclusion of the Ulster counties until legislative provision for a general system of devolution for the whole of the United Kingdom was ready to come into operation, such provision to take place within six years. Mr. A. Ward (U., Herts, Watford) urged the Unionists to consider their posi tion and press for the continuance of negotiations between the leaders. Mr. A. Chamberlain, summing up for the Opposition, complained of the provocative speech of Mr. Devlin, and dwelt on the dangers of the Government's proposal; he regretted that Mr. Cave's suggestions, anticipated by some Unionists in the autumn, had been ignored, and that the Prime Minister would not accept the Referendum. The Chief Secretary for Ireland, winding up for Ministers, said that it was a considerable advance to have got to discussing the compatibility of the exclusion of Ulster and Home Rule. He had thought Ulstermen would be inclined to accept this proposal on consideration. He laid stress on the patience of the Ulster Nationalists under provocation, and thought Mr. Cave's and Mr. Ward's speeches held out hopes of settlement. The Vote of Censure was rejected by 345 to 252. The amendment was consequently not put. Sir Edward Carson had left the House to go to Ulster; so had eight Ulster Unionist members. The belief that this portended a new stage in the crisis was heightened by military movements in Ulster, by reports that warrants were out for the arrest of "from 30 to 130" leaders of the Ulster Volunteer Force, and from rumours as to trouble with the officers at the Curragh. The Chief Secretary for Ireland (March 20) and the Attorney-General (March 21) endeavoured to reassure public opinion. But the Chancellor of the Exchequer's utterances at Huddersfield (March 21) had an opposite effect. In one speech he dealt with the land programme and made an eloquent plea for social reform; but earlier in the day he violently attacked the House of Lords and the Orangemen of Ulster, declaring that the former were threatening the doctrine of popular government, and had produced the doctrine of "optional obedience," and that the latter were threatening rebellion that they might not cease to be the dominant caste. He attacked the exclusion of Ulster, and objected that a Referendum would only produce a poll of 40 or 50 per cent. of the electorate, and a majority on that small poll would destroy reform. Let the Home Rule controversy be settled, in order to open the way to deliverance from social wretchedness. This speech and Sir Edward Carson's departure damped whatever hopes of settlement had been based on certain passages in the Vote of Censure debate. Meanwhile rumours had reached London that officers in Ireland had resigned to avoid serving against Ulster; and many Unionists believed that British troops were to be ordered to shoot down the Ulster Volunteers at once. The chief sources for the history are the Prime Minister's statements to the Press and in the Commons (March 22, 23); the White Paper (March 25); the Morning Post account (March 26), based on information from the officers concerned; the First Lord of the [MARCH Admiralty's speech (March 30), and Colonel Seely's speech (April 9); the Ulster version issued in April, and the consequent debates in the Unionist motion for an inquiry (post, Chap. III.). In December, 1913, the War Minister had warned the Generals commanding in chief, that while soldiers were justified in contemplating disobedience to outrageous orders, e.g. massacring a demonstration of Orangemen who were not dangerous, they might have to assist in supporting the Civil Power, and that they could not pick and choose between lawful and reasonable orders. Any officer resigning was to be asked for reasons, and, if he indicated that he desired to choose between orders, the War Minister would at once submit to the King that his name should be removed. On March 14 it was determined to protect certain military stores in Ireland from possible raids by Ulster Volunteers. General Sir Arthur Paget, commanding in Ireland, was ordered to take the necessary steps. Cavalry and horse artillery were to support the infantry, and, as the Great Northern Railway of Ireland was expected to refuse to convey the troops, preparations were made to send them by sea, and one company was actually sent by sea to Carrickfergus; but the railway authorities accepted the troops. As was afterwards revealed, naval support was provided for the operations (p. 60). On March 20 Sir A. Paget arrived in Dublin and conferred, first, with General Gough, commanding the Third Cavalry Brigade, who apparently refused to serve against Ulster, preferring to be dismissed the service; next, with the other generals, and, according to the Morning Post (April 7), his instructions were as follows: The Third Cavalry Brigade was to move forward to seize the bridges across the Boyne and to wait there till relieved by the infantry; a fleet was to anchor in Belfast Lough and co-operate with the Army, 25,000 troops were to be employed, and a division of infantry got from England. The force was made large apparently in order to deter the Volunteers from attacking it, but the Unionists insisted that it was provocative. It appears to have been intimated also to the officers that the Ulster Unionist leaders were to be arrested, and possibly -though as to this there is a conflict of evidence that the orders were in accordance with the wishes of the King. It seemed that Sir A. Paget might unintentionally have misinterpreted the intentions of the Government. However, he telegraphed to the War Office that evening that the Brigadier and fifty-seven officers, Third Cavalry Brigade (out of a total of seventy), preferred to accept dismissal if ordered North; and General Gough sent him a Minute, saying that, while these officers were prepared to maintain order and preserve property, they had rather be dismissed than initiate active military operations against Ulster. (These officers comprised all those of the Sixteenth Lancers, nearly all those of the Fourth Hussars and Fifth Lancers, and six out of thirteen of the Third Brigade Royal Horse Artillery.) Next day, He March 21, Sir A. Paget attempted to remove their fears. assured them that the measure contemplated was merely a measure of precaution, but he spoke of " massacres," of "battles,' of a possible disarmament of regiments which refused to move, which would be the "Indian Mutiny over again," and finally said that "there were worse things than a Court Martial," which was interpreted to refer to the possibility of a capital sentence for disobeying orders. For these explanations the authority is the Morning Post account, based apparently on statements from the officers concerned. The situation was not bettered by them, or by the wild rumours which were published in London (March 21 and 22) of mutinies of infantry regiments in Ireland. On Sunday, March 22, therefore, the Prime Minister authorised The Times to state: (1) That the recent movements of troops in Ireland were purely precautionary and intended only to safeguard the depots of arms, while the naval movements merely consisted in sending troops to Carrickfergus by two small cruisers without the necessity of marching them through Belfast; (2) that no warrants were issued for the arrest of the Ulster leaders, and no such step was contemplated; (3) it was untrue that the Government contemplated instituting a general inquiry into the intentions of officers if asked to take up arms against Ulster; it was hoped that this contingency might never arise. It was under these circumstances that both Houses met on Monday, March 23. In the Commons the War Minister stated that on the evening of March 20 General Sir A. Paget had notified the War Office that some officers might be unable to carry out his instructions; the Army Council telegraphed asking him to state the circumstances, and ordering the senior officers concerned to report themselves at the War Office. An inquiry held by the Army Council showed that the incident was due to a misunderstanding of questions put them by Sir A. Paget, and, with his approval, they had been ordered to rejoin their units. The movements of troops ordered on the night of March 19 from information received were: One company of infantry was instructed to move to Enniskillen, Omagh, Armagh, and Carrickfergus respectively; one battalion of infantry was ordered, half to Dundalk and half to Newry, and one from Victoria Barracks, inside Belfast, to Holywood Barracks, just outside. The reason was the necessity for protecting Government arms, ammunition, stores, and other property. All these movements had been completed in accordance with instructions from the General commanding in Ireland, and all orders had been punctually and implicitly obeyed. To make a discussion possible, the Prime Minister moved the adjournment, at Mr. Bonar Law's request. The latter said that a new danger had arisen-that the Army should be destroyed before their eyes. The resignations were not confined to the Cavalry Brigade; an officer in an infantry regiment at the Curragh had written stating that on Thursday, March 20, the following proposal had been put before the officers: "Any officer whose home is in Ulster can be given leave; officers who object to fighting against Ulster can say so and will be at once dismissed from service;" and they were given half an hour to decide. Nine or ten objected to go on any conditions. He read a letter from an officer who had heard Sir A. Paget's address at the Curragh, stating that he had said that "active operations" were to be taken against Ulster, and that he expected the country "to be in a blaze by March 21. Officers domiciled in Ulster were to be "allowed to disappear," and would subsequently be reinstated, but must give their word not to fight for Ulster; others who would not fight against Ulster would be dismissed. This meant more than merely protective operations, and in his belief certain Ministers, probably without the Prime Minister's knowledge, had made the movement either to provoke or to intimidate the people of Ulster. Neither officers nor men should be compelled to take part in civil war against their will. (Labour members interjected inquiries whether the Army was also entitled to refuse to act in suppressing the railway strike.) The Prime Minister replied. It was the duty of the Army to protect military property and stores, and to aid the civil power in the maintenance of order. Any officer or private who refused to assist in doing these duties was guilty of a breach of duty and was liable to be dismissed. In December, 1913, instructions were issued to General Sir A. Paget, and the rule as to excusing officers domiciled in an area of disturbance would apply anywhere as far as practicable. Long before the First Lord's speech the danger of a seizure of the guns and stores had been pointed out, and the operation was purely protective, and was over. The Cavalry Brigade had not been ordered to move. Sir A. Paget had had no instructions beyond those of December, except to make these particular movements. Brigadier-General Gough and his officers had misinterpreted his speech, and he denied using anything like the language given. General Gough and the officers concerned had returned to their posts and expressed their willingness to carry out the duties required. (These explanations were greatly interrupted by the Opposition.) Finally, if officers and soldiers were to discriminate between the validity of different laws, the fabric of society would crumble. Suppose acute labour troubles and a stoppage of food, transport, and fuel, were the troops to follow their sympathies? Mr. Balfour (U.) ridiculed the Prime Minister's explanation, and contended that the Government had intended to coerce Ulster, and had shrunk from doing so. Ulster might be wrong, but her conviction was rooted, and Ministers had aroused forces which could only be pacified by a broad and statesmanlike treatment which they had given no indications of being able to adopt. |