emergency. Their example was followed by Mr. Charles Trevelyan (Yorks, W.R., Elland), the Secretary of the Board of Education. These three were replaced respectively by Earl Beauchamp, Mr. Runciman, and Dr. Addison.

The breach between Germany and Great Britain became definitive on Tuesday, August 4. Following his statement of the previous day in the Commons, Sir E. Grey telegraphed in the morning to the British Ambassador in Berlin, protesting against the violation of Belgian neutrality by Germany, and asking for an immediate reply. Before it came he received official Belgian intimations that the violation had already been announced to Belgium and had taken place. The German Government also telegraphed to the German Ambassador in London, instructing him to repeat most positively the formal assurance that, even in the case of an armed conflict, Germany would under no pretence whatever annex Belgian territory, and that she had disregarded Belgian neutrality to prevent what was to her a question of life or death, the French advance through Belgium. Thereupon the British Government sent an ultimatum to Berlin, asking for an unequivocal assurance that Germany would respect the neutrality of Belgium identical with that given the week before by France both to Belgium and to Great Britain, and for a satisfactory reply by midnight to it, and to Sir E. Grey's telegram of the morning; otherwise, the British Ambassador was instructed to make what was, substantially, a declaration of war. Late that night this request was refused: and on Wednesday morning, August 5, Great Britain found herself called to be once more the saviour of Europe.

CHAPTER V.

GREAT BRITAIN AT WAR.

THE war had come suddenly upon Great Britain, but it found a Government well prepared to withstand the enemy and a Parliament and a people whose divisions-on which the Germans had staked their hopes-were rapidly closing, and whose determination to carry on the contest to a victorious issue was being quickly perfected by a growing knowledge of the real position. Promises of help began to pour in from all parts of the Empire; at home steps were at once taken to detain Austrian and German reservists, and to seize or capture enemy ships within reach of British or French cruisers or lying in British ports. Twenty such vessels were taken on the first day of the war; the following days added many others and German oceanic trade was stopped at once. The British Fleets, brought together at Spithead (p. 158) had taken up their stations in the North Sea, and cruisers had been sent to protect the great trade routes from German warships,

or from "auxiliary cruisers" in the shape of fast German liners, armed, and partly coaled, at sea. Horses and motor-lorries were hastily requisitioned for war purposes, and even harvesting was impeded by the (illegal) seizure of farm horses by too zealous agents; and preparations, perfectly well known in the ports, were actively made for the despatch to France of the British Expeditionary Force; but it was only by inadvertence that hints of their nature were published in the Press, and most of the papers patriotically suppressed the news. Then began that system of secrecy as to movements and details, loyally observed by all concerned and rigorously enforced by authority, which was kept up throughout the year by all the belligerents. Baffling to the contending commanders, it was still more so to the contemporary historian; and, for the first few days, it obscured the gravity of the contest.

The first day of war was marked in the Commons by the announcements of the resignations of Ministers (p. 173), of the violation of Belgian neutrality, and of an impending Vote of Credit which was loudly cheered-for 100,000,000l.; and then two war measures were passed almost without debate. The first amended the procedure in Prize Courts in accordance with the findings of a recent Departmental Committee, the second empowered the Crown, in time of war or national emergency, to impose restrictions on aliens, especially with a view to the removal or detention of spies. Next, on the adjournment, the Chancellor of the Exchequer made his statement on the financial position. The emergency, he said, was due to temporary causes, largely to the stoppage of remittances from abroad to enable the discount market to meet its liabilities; there was no failure of credit. After conferences at the Treasury it had been decided not to suspend special payments, but to take steps to suspend the Bank Charter Act, in order to economise the supply of gold. After strongly condemning the hoarding of gold as helpful to the enemy, he stated that on August 7 Government notes for 17. and 10s. would be issued, convertible into gold at the Bank of England, postal orders would also be legal tender, and similarly convertible, and would be issued free of charge. The Bank rate would be reduced to 6 per cent., and the moratorium extended for a month. Bills and cheques would be dealt with as usual, subject to the discretion of the bankers in preventing an abnormal withdrawal of gold. This satisfactory account of the position was fully endorsed by Mr. A. Chamberlain.

Late that evening a White Paper was officially published (Cd. 1467) containing correspondence respecting the European Crisis. It embodied nearly 160 documents, and could not be rapidly grasped; but it eventually enabled the British people to form their own opinion as to the responsibility for the war. Later it was republished, with additions, in pamphlet form at the price

of a penny, and German and French translations were circulated abroad.1

66

The course of events, so far as Great Britain was concerned in them, in the fortnight preceding the war, was as follows: The Austrian Note to Serbia, which was in fact an Ultimatum, was delivered at Belgrade on July 23, and a reply was demanded within forty-eight hours. Sir Edward Grey, while earnestly deprecating any time-limit to this Note, had laid stress, before knowing its contents, on the appalling consequences that would follow should it lead to a European war between four Powers-a complete collapse of European credit and industry which, in great industrial States, would mean a state of things worse than that of 1848." But he declined to express an opinion on the merits of the AustroSerbian dispute. Between the presentation of the Note and the expiry of the time-limit, however, Great Britain made three attempts at peace. In conjunction with Russia, whose Foreign Minister described the Note as "provocative and immoral," she urged the extension of the time-limit on Austria, and pleaded with Germany to do the same. Next, she proposed that Germany, France, and Italy should work together at Vienna and St. Petersburg in favour of conciliation. Italy, France, and Russia assented; Germany had no objection, if Austro-Russian relations became threatening. Thirdly, the Russian, French, and British representatives at Belgrade were instructed to advise Serbia to go as far as possible to meet Austria. Serbia, in fact, conceded very nearly all the Austrian demands; but Austria had determined on war, and Germany, when Sir Edward Grey urged her to persuade Austria to accept the reply, merely "passed on" his message to Vienna. The time-limit having expired, Sir Edward Grey proposed (July 26), by telegram to the British representatives at Paris, Berlin, and Rome, a Conference in London between himself and the French, German and Italian Ambassadors, to discuss the best means towards a settlement. France and Italy accepted; Russia agreed, if direct explanations with Vienna should prove impossible; Germany, however, said that the Conference would practically amount to a court of arbitration, but subsequently "accepted in principle" mediation by the four Powers between Austria and Russia. But Austria now declared war against Serbia. On July 28, however, Sir Edward Grey was informed through the German Ambassador that Germany was endeavouring to mediate between Russia and Austria. He then sent word to the German Government asking them, if they did not like the Conference he had proposed, to suggest any other form of mediation.

The German Chancellor's answer was to invite the British

1 The Introduction to this pamphlet has been used in the following sketch of the negotiations. The Belgian Grey Book (Oct. 6), the Russian Orange Book (Sept. 21) and the French Yellow Book (Dec. 1) further set forth the Allies' case. Many of the official documents were published as a pamphlet by the New York Times.

Ambassador, Sir E. Goschen, to call on him, late at night, on July 29. He intimated that, should Austria be attacked by Russia, a European conflict would become inevitable; he thought it clear that Great Britain would not allow France to be crushed, but this was not Germany's aim; if Great Britain's neutrality were certain, Germany would promise, if victorious, to make no territorial acquisitions at the expense of France. But he was unable, on being asked, to give a similar undertaking in regard to the French colonies. Germany would promise to respect the integrity and neutrality of the Netherlands so long as her adversaries did likewise. German operations in Belgium, he said, depended on the action of France, but, after the war, Belgian integrity would be respected if Belgium had not sided against Germany. He hoped that these assurances might lead to an Anglo-German understanding, and ultimately to a neutrality agreement. Sir Edward Grey replied (July 30) with an absolute refusal; France, without further territory being taken from her in Europe, could be so crushed as to become merely subordinate to Germany, and it would be an indelible disgrace to Great Britain to make this bargain at the expense of France; nor could she bargain away any obligation or interest she had regarding Belgian neutrality. The one way of maintaining the good relations between Great Britain and Germany was by the co-operation of the two Powers to preserve the peace of Europe. But, if the peace of Europe could be preserved, he would endeavour to promote some arrangement to which Germany would be a party, by which she and her allies could be assured against any aggressive or hostile policy on the part of France, Russia, or Great Britain. He had desired and worked for this as far as possible during the Balkan crisis, and, Germany having a like object, Anglo-German relations sensibly improved. The idea had hitherto been too Utopian for definite proposals, but he hoped for some more definite rapprochement between the Powers when the existing crisis was over.

On the same day, July 30, M. Cambon reminded Sir Edward Grey of a letter written by the latter on November 22, 1912, agreeing that while consultations between military and naval experts of their two nations did not pledge their Governments to co-operate, yet, should either Government have grave reason to expect an unprovoked attack by a third Power, or something that threatened the general peace, it should immediately discuss with the other whether, and by what measures, they should co-operate in opposition. M. Cambon also showed a letter from the French Foreign Minister, indicating that Germany was preparing to invade France. Sir E. Grey answered next day, after a Cabinet Council, that as yet Great Britain could not definitely pledge herself to intervene. The preservation of the neutrality of Belgium might be an important factor in determining the British attitude. Sir E. Grey also asked the French and German Governments,

M

through their Ambassadors, whether they were prepared to respect Belgian neutrality provided it was not violated; and he asked the Belgian Government whether it would remain neutral. France and Belgium replied affirmatively at once. The German Government temporised, and eventually gave no answer, though Sir Edward Grey had warned the German Ambassador on August 1 of the probable effect of a violation on public feeling in Great Britain.

Meanwhile Russia and Austria were still negotiating (July 30, 31). On the 29th Germany had suggested to Austria that she should content herself with occupying Belgrade. That night Russia offered to stop all military preparations if Austria would recognise that the Austro-Serbian conflict had become a matter of general European interest, and would eliminate from the ultimatum the points involving a violation of the sovereignty of Serbia. Austria now agreed at last to discuss the whole question of her ultimatum, and Russia asked the British Government to assume the direction of these discussions.

But the hope of peace thus held out was wrecked by the German ultimatum requiring Russia to countermand her mobilisation. Germany, meanwhile, had gone further towards mobilisation than Russia; the German Secretary of State refused to discuss a last proposal from Sir Edward Grey for joint action of Great Britain, Germany, France, and Italy, pending a reply from Russia; and on the afternoon of August 1 Germany declared war against France. Next morning the Germans violated the neutrality of Luxemburg. British merchant ships had already been detained at Hamburg-though the detention was temporarily countermanded on representations from the British Ambassador-and the only question now left for the British Government was whether Great Britain should remain neutral. The determining factors proved to be the violation of Belgian neutrality and the danger to France; and the position was fully explained by the Foreign Secretary on August 3 (p. 170) and by the Prime Minister two days later.

The Prime Minister moved the Vote of Credit (Aug. 5) in a speech continuing the noblest traditions of Parliamentary eloquence. After an emphatic tribute to the unremitting efforts of the Foreign Secretary to preserve peace both in the Balkan crisis and to the very last stage of the recent negotiations, he quoted from the German Chancellor's communication to the British Ambassador at Berlin the appeal for British neutrality, the refusal to undertake to respect the integrity of the French colonies, and the treatment of what, to himself personally, had always been a crucial and almost the governing consideration-the position of the small States. The proposal, Mr. Asquith said, amounted to this-as regarded France, free licence to Germany to annex, if successful, the whole of the French possessions out