ACTIO EX CONDUCTO ACTIO EX CONDUCTO. In Civil Law. An action which the bailor of a thing for hire may bring against the bailee, in order to compel him to re-deliver the thing hired; Pothier, du Contr. de Louage, n. 59; Merlin, Rép. ACTIO EX CONTRACTU. See Ac TION. ACTIO EX DELICTO. See ACTION. ACTIO DEPOSITI CONTRARIA. In Civil Law. An action which the depositary has against the depositor, to compel him to fiulfil his engagement towards him; Pothier, Du Dépôt, n. 69. ACTIO DEPOSITI DIRECTA. In An action which is brought by Civil Law. the depositor against the depositary, in order to get back the thing deposited; Potheir, Du Dépôt, n. 60. ACTIO AD EXHIBENDUM. In Civil Law. An action instituted for the purpose of compelling the person against whom it was brought to exhibit some thing or title in his power. It was always preparatory to another action, which lay for the recovery of a thing movable or immovable; 1 Merlin, Quest. de Droit, 84. ACTIO IN FACTUM. In Civil Law. An action adapted to the particular case which had an analogy to some actio in jus which was founded on some subsisting acknowledged law; Spence, Eq. Jur. 212. The origin of these actions is strikingly similar to that of actions on the case at common law. See CASE. ACTIO FAMILIÆ ERCISCUNDÆ, In Civil Law. An action for the division of an inheritance; Inst. 4. 6. 20; Bracton, 100 b. plaintiff ought not to have or maintain his aforesaid action thereof against" the defendant (in Latin, actio non habere debet). It follows immediately after the statement of appearance and defence; 1 Chitty, Plead. 531; 2 id. 421; Stephens, Plead. 394. ACTIO NON ACCREVIT INFRA SEX ANNOS (Lat.). The action did not accrue within six years. In Pleading. A plea of the statute of limitations, by which the defendant insists that the plaintiff's action has not accrued It differs from non aswithin six years. sumpsit in this: non assumpsit is the proper plea to an action on a simple contract, when it does not accrue on the promise, but subsethe action accrues on the promise; but when quently to it, the proper plea is actio non accrevit, etc.; Lawes, Plead. 733; 5 Binn. 200, 203; 2 Salk. 422; 2 Saund. 63 b. ACTIO PERSONALIS. A personal action. The proper term in the civil law is actio in personam. ACTIO PERSONALIS MORITUR CUM PERSONA (Lat.). A personal action dies with the person. In Practice. A maxim which formerly expressed the law in regard to the surviving of personal actions. To render the maxim perfectly true, the expression "personal actions" must be restricted very much within its usual limits. In the most extensive sense, all actions are personal which are neither real nor mixed, and in this sense of the word personal the maxim is not true. A further distinction, moreover, is to be made between personal actions actually commenced and pending at the death of the plaintiff or defendant, and causes of action upon which suit might have been, but ACTIO JUDICATI. In Civil Law. in his lifetime. In the case of actions actuwas not, brought by or against the deceased An action instituted, after four months had ally commenced, the old rule was that the elapsed after the rendition of judgment, in suit abated by the death of either party. which the judge issued his warrant to seize, But the inconvenience of this rigor of the first, the movables, which were sold within common law has been modified by statutory eight days afterwards; and then the immov-provisions in England and the states of this ables, which were delivered in pledge to the creditors, or put under the care of a curator, and if, at the end of two months, the debt was not paid, the land was sold; Dig. 42. 1; was Code, 8. 34. According to some authorities, if the defendant then utterly denied the rendition of the former judgment, the plaintiff was driven to a new action, conducted like any other action, which was called actio judicati, and which had for its object the determination of the question whether such a judgment had been rendered. The exact meaning of the term is by no means clear. See Savigny, Syst. 305, 411; 3 Ortolan, Just. § 2033. ACTIO MANDATI. In Civil Law. An action founded upon a mandate; Dig. 17. 1. ACTIO NON. In Pleading. The declaration in a special plea "that the said when the cause of action survives to or country, which prescribe in substance that deceased, the suit shall not abate by the death against the personal representatives of the tution of the personal representatives on the of the party, but may proceed on the substirecord by scire facias, or, in some states, by See 6 Wheat. 260. And this brings us to the simple suggestion of the facts on the record. consideration of what causes of action sur vive. CONTRACTS.-It is clear that, in general, for his breach of contract on the one hand, a man's personal representatives are liable and, on the other, are entitled to enforce contracts made with him. This is the rule; but it admits of a few exceptions; 6 Me. 470; 2 D. Chipm. Vt. 41. No action lies against executors upon a covenant to be performed by the testator in person, and which consequently the executor cannot perform, and the performance of which is prevented by the death of testator; 3 Wils. Ch. 99; Cro. Eliz. 553; 1 Rolle, 359; as if an author undertakes to compose a work, or a master covenants to instruct an apprentice, but is prevented by death. See Wms. Exec. 1467. But for a breach committed by deceased in his lifetime, his executor would be answerable; Cro. Eliz. 553; 1 Mees. & W. 423, per Parke, B.; 19 Penn. 234. As to what are such contracts, see 2 Perr. & D. 251; 10 Ad. & E. 45; 1 Mees. & W. 423; Tyrwh. 349; 2 Strange, 1266; 2 W. Bla. 856; 3 Wils. 380. But whether the contract is of such a nature is a mere question of construction, depending upon the intention of the parties; Hob. 9; Yelv. 9; Cro. Jac. 282; Bingh. 225; unless the intention be such as the law will not enforce; 19 Penn. 233, per Lowrie, J. Again, an executor, etc. cannot maintain an action on a promise made to deceased where the damage consisted entirely in the personal suffering of the deceased without any injury to his personal estate, as a breach of promise of marriage; 2 Maule & S. 408; 4 Cush. 408. And as to the right of an executor or administrator to sue on a contract broken in the testator's lifetime, where no damage to the personal estate can be stated, see 2 Cromp. M. & R. 588; 5 Tyrwh. 985, and the cases there cited. The fact whether or not the estate of the deceased has suffered loss or damage would seem to be the criterion of the right of the personal representative to sue in another class of cases, that is, where there is a breach of an implied promise founded on a tort. For where the action, though in form ex contractu, is founded upon a tort to the person, it does not in general survive to the executor. Thus, with respect to injuries affecting the life and health of the deceased; all such as arise out of the unskilfulness of medical practitioners; or the imprisonment of the party occasioned by the negligence of his attorney, no action, generally speaking, can be sustained by the executor or administrator on a breach of the implied promise by the person employed to exhibit a proper portion of skill and attention; such cases being in substance actions for injuries to the person; 2 Maule & S. 415, 416; 8 Mees. & W. 854. And it has been held that for the breach of an implied promise of an attorney to investigate the title to a freehold estate, the executor of the purchaser cannot sue without stating that the testator sustained some actual damage to his estate; 4 J. B. Moore, 532. But the law on this point has been considerably modified by statute. On the other hand, where the breach of the implied promise has occasioned damage to the personal estate of the deceased, though it has been said that an action in form ex contractu founded upon a tort whereby damage has been occasioned to the estate of the deceased, as debt against the sheriff for an escape, does not survive at common law, 1 Ga. 514 (though in this case the rule is altered in that state by statute), yet the better opinion is that, if the executor can show that damage has accrued to the personal estate of the deceased by the breach of an express or implied promise, he may well sustain an action at common law, to recover such damage, though the action is in some sort founded on a tort; Wms. Exec. 676; citing, in extenso, 2 Brod. & B. 102; 4 J. B. Moore, 532. And see 3 Wooddeson, Lect. 78, 79; Marsh. 14. So, by waiving the tort in a trespass, and going for the value of the property, the action of assumpsit lies as well for as against executors; 1 Bay, 58. In the case of an action on a contract commenced against joint defendants one of whom dies pending the suit, the rule varies. In some of the states the personal representatives of the deceased defendant may be added as parties and the judgment taken against them jointly with the survivors; 27 Miss. 455; 9 Tex. 519. In others the English rule obtains which requires judgment to be taken against the survivors only; and this is conceived to be the better rule, because the judgment against the original defendants is de bonis propriis, while that against the executors is de bonis testatoris; 119 Mass. 361.' TORTS.-The ancient maxim which we are discussing applies more peculiarly to cases of tort. It was a principle of the common law that, if an injury was done either to the person or property of another for which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction,where the declaration imputes a tort done either to the person or property of another, and the plea must be not guilty,-the action died with the person to whom or by whom the wrong was done. See Wms. Exec. 668, 669; 3 Bla. Com. 302; 1 Saund. 216, 217, n. (1); Cowp. 371-377; 3 Wooddeson, Lect. 73; Viner, Abr. Executors, 123; Comyn, Dig. Administrator, B, 13. But if the goods, etc., of the testator taken away continue in specie in the hands of the wrong-doer, it has long been decided that replevin and detinue will lie for the executor to recover back the specific goods, etc.; W. Jones, 173, 174; 1 Saund. 217, note (1); 1 Hempst. C. C. 711; 10 Ark. 504; or, in case they are sold, an action for money had and received will lie for the executor to recover the value; 1 Saund. 217, n. (1). And actions ex delicto, where one has obtained the property of another and converted it, survive to the representatives of the injured party, as replevin, trespass de bonis asport. But where the wrong-doer acquired no gain, though the other party has suffered loss, the death of either party destroys the right of action; 3 Mass. 351; 6 How. 11; 1 Bay, 58; 4 Mass. 480; 13 id. 272, 454; 1 Root, 216. Successive innovations upon this rule of the common law have been made by various statutes with regard to actions which survive to executors and administrators. The stat. 4 Ed. III. c. 7, gave a remedy to executors for a trespass done to the personal estate of their testators, which was extended to executors of executors by the stat. 25 Ed. III. c. 5. But these statutes did not include wrongs done to the person or freehold of the testator or intestate; Wms. Exec. 670. By an equitable construction of these statutes, an executor or administrator shall now have the same actions for any injury done to the personal estate of the testator in his lifetime, whereby it has become less beneficial to the executor or administrator, as the deceased himself might have had, whatever the form of action may be; 1 Saund. 217, n. (1); 1 Carr. & K. 271; Ow. 99; 7 East, 134, 136; 11 Viner, Abr. 125; Latch, 167; Poph. 190; W. Jones, 173, 174; 2 Maule & S. 416; Coke, 27 a; 4 Mod. 403; 12 id. 71; Ld. Raym. 973; 1 Ventr. 31; 1 Rolle, Abr. 912; Cro. Car. 297; 2 Brod. & B. 103; 1 Stra. 212; 2 Brev. 27. And the laws of the different states, either by express enactment or by having adopted the English statutes, give a remedy to executors in cases of injuries done to the personal property of their testator in his lifetime. Trover for a conversion in the lifetime of the testator may be brought by his executor; T. U. P. Charlt. 261; 4 Ark. 173; 11 Ala. N. s. 859. But an executor cannot sue for expenses incurred by his testator in defending against a groundless suit; 1 Day, 285; nor in Alabama (under the Act of 1826) for any injury done in the lifetime of deceased; 15 Ala. 109; nor in Vermont can he bring trespass on the case, except to recover damages for an injury to some specific property; 20 Vt. 244. And he cannot bring case against a sheriff for a false return in testator's action; Ibid. But he may have case against the sheriff for not keeping property attached, and delivering it to the officer holding the execution in his testator's suit; 20 Vt. 244, n.; and case against the sheriff for the default of his deputy in not paying over to testator money collected in execution; 22 Vt. 108. In Maine, an executor may revive an action against the sheriff for misfeasance of his deputy, but not an action against the deputy for his misfeasance; 30 Me. 194. So, where the action is merely penal, it does not survive; Cam. & N. 72; as to recover penalties for taking illegal fees by an officer from the intestate in his lifetime; 7 S. & R. 183. But in such case the administrator may recover back the excess paid above the legal charge; Ibid. The stat. 3 & 4 W. IV. c. 42, § 2, gave a remedy to executors, etc., for injuries done in the lifetime of the testator or intestate to his real property, which case was not embraced in the stat. Ed. III. This statute has introduced a material alteration in the maxim actio personalis moritur cum persona as well in favor of executors and administrators of the party injured as against the personal representatives of the wrong-doer, but respects only injuries to personal and real property; ACTIO PERSONALIS Chitty, Pl. Parties to Actions in form ex delicto. Similar statutory provisions have been made in most of the states. Thus, trespass quare clausum fregit survives in North Carolina, 4 Dev. & B. 68; 3 Dev. No. C. 153; in Maryland, 1 Md. 102; in Tennessee, 3 Sneed, 128; and in Massachusetts, 21 Pick. 250; even if action was begun after the death of the injured party; 22 Pick. 495; in New Jersey, 38 N. J. L. 296. Proceedings to recover damages for injuries to land by overflowing survive in North Carolina, 7 Ired. 20; and Virginia, 11 Gratt. 1. Aliter in South Carolina, 10 Rich. 92; and Maryland, 1 Harr. & M'H. 224. Ejectment in the U. S. circuit court does not abate by death of plaintiff'; 22 Vt. 659. But in Illinois the statute law allows an action to executors only for an injury to the personalty, or personal wrongs, leaving injuries to realty as at common law; 18 Ill. 403. Injuries to the person. In cases of injuries to the person, whether by assault, battery, false imprisonment, slander, negligence, or otherwise, if either the party who received or he who committed the injury die, the maxim applies rigidly, and no action at common law can be supported either by or against the executors or other personal representatives; 3 Bla. Com. 302; 2 Maule & S. 408. Case for the seduction of a man's daughter; 9 Ga. 69; case for libel; 5 Cush. 544; and for malicious prosecution; 5 Cush. 543; are instances of this. But in one respect this rule has been materially modified in England by the stat. 9 & 10 Vict. c. 93, known as Lord Campbell's Act, and in this country by enactments of similar purport in many of the states. These provide for the case where a wrongful act, neglect, or default has caused the death of the injured person, and the act is of such a nature that the injured person, had he lived, would have had an action against the wrong-doer. In such cases the wrong-doer is rendered liable, in general, not to the executors or administrators of the deceased, but to his near relations, husband, wife, parent, or child. In the construction given to these acts, the courts have held that the measure of damages is in general the pecuniary value of the life of the person killed to the person bringing suit, and that vindictive or exemplary damages by reason of gross negligence on the part of the wrong-doer are not allowable; Sedg. Damages. Pennsylvania, New Jersey, New York, Massachusetts, Connecticut, and some other states, have statutes founded on Lord Campbell's Act. In Massachusetts, under the statute, an action may be brought against a city or town for damages to the person of deceased occasioned by a defect in a highway; 7 Gray, 544. But where the death, caused by a railway collision, was instantaneous, no action can be maintained under the statute of that state; for the statute supposes the party deceased to have been once entitled to an action for the injury, and either to have com menced the action and subsequently died, or, being entitled to bring it, to have died before exercising the right; 9 Cush. 108. But the accruing of the right of action does not depend upon intelligence, consciousness, or mental capacity of any kind on the part of the person injured; 9 Cush. 478. For the law in New York, see 16 Barb. 54; 15 N. Y. 432; in Missouri, 18 Mo. 162; in Connecticut, 24 Conn. 575; in Maine, 45 Me. 209; in Pennsylvania, 44 Penn. 175. But this rule, that the wrong-doer must have acquired a gain by his act in order that the cause of action may survive against his representatives, is not universal. Thus, though formerly in New York an action would not lie for a fraud of deceased which did not benefit the assets, yet it was otherwise for his fraudulent performance of a contract; 20 Johns. 43; and now the statute of that state gives an action against the executor for every injury done by the testator, whether by force or negligence, to the property of another; Hill & D. 116; as for fraudulent representations by the deceased in the sale of land; 19 N. Y. 464; or wasting, destroying, taking, or carrying away personal property; 2 Johns. 227. In Massachusetts, by statute, a sheriff's executors are liable for his official misconduct; 7 Mass. 317; 13 id. 454, but not the execu tucky; 9 B. Monr. 135. And in Missouri, for false return of execution; 10 Mo. 234. Under the statute of Ohio, case for injury to property survives; 4 McLean, C. C. 599; under statute in Missouri, trespass; 15 Mo. 619; and a suit against an owner for the criminal act of his slave; 23 Mo. 401; in North Carolina, deceit in sale of chattels; 1 Car. Law Rep. 529; and the remedy by petition for damages caused by overflowing lands; 1 Ired. 24; in Pennsylvania, by statute, an action against an attorney for neglect; 24 Penn. St. 114; and such action has been maintained in England; 3 Stark. 154; 1 Dowl. & R. 30. Actions against the executors or administrators of the wrong-doer. The common law principle was that if an injury was done either to the person or property of another, for which damages only could be recovered in satisfaction, the action died with the person by whom the wrong was committed; 1 Saund. 216 a, note (1); 1 Harr. & M'H. 224. And where the cause of action is founded upon any mal-tors of a deputy sheriff'; Ibid. So in Kenfeasance or misfeasance, is a tort, or arises ex delicto, such as trespass for taking goods, etc., trover, false imprisonment, assault and battery, slander, deceit, diverting a watercourse, obstructing lights, and many other cases of the like kind, where the declaration imputes a tort done either to the person or the property of another, and the plea must be not guilty, the rule of the common law is actio personalis moritur cum persona; and if the person by whom the injury was committed dies, no action of that kind can be brought against his executor or administrator. But now in England the stat. 3 & 4 W. IV. c. 42, § 2, authorizes an action of trespass, or trespass on the case, for an injury committed by But in Texas the rule that the right of acdeceased in respect to property real or per- tion for torts unconnected with contract does sonal of another. And similar provisions are not survive the death of the wrong-doer, has in force in most of the states of this country. not been changed by statute; 12 Tex. 11. Thus, in Alabama, by statute, trover may be And in California trespass does not lie against maintained against an executor for a conver- the representatives of the wrong-doer; 3 Cal. sion by his testator; 11 Ala. N. s. 859. So in 370; nor in Alabama does it survive against New Jersey, 1 Harr. (N. J.) 54; Georgia, 17 the representatives of defendant; 19 Ala. Ga. 495; and North Carolina, 10 Ired. 169. 181; and an action for malicious prosecution In Virginia, by statute, detinue already does not survive defendant's death; 121 Mass. commenced against the wrong-doer survives 550. Detinue does not survive in Tennessee, against his executor, if the chattel actually whether brought in the lifetime of the wrongcame into the executor's possession; other- doer or not; 3 Yerg. 133; nor in Missouri, wise not; 6 Leigh, 42, 344. So in Kentucky, under the stat. of 1835; 17 Mo. 362. Tres5 Dana, 34. Replevin in Missouri does not pass for mesne profits does not lie against abate on the death of defendant; 21 Mo. 115; personal representatives in Pennsylvania; nor does an action on a replevin bond in Dela- 5 Watts, 474; 3 Penn. 93; nor in New ware, 5 Harr. (Del.) 381. It has, indeed, Hampshire; 20 Vt. 326; nor in New York; been said that where the wrong-doer has se- 2 Bradf. N. Y. 80; but the representatives cured no benefit to himself at the expense of may be sued on contract; Ibid. But this the sufferer, the cause of action does not sur、 action lies in North Carolina, 3 Hawks, 390, vive, but that where, by means of the offence, and Vermont, by statute; 20 Vt. 326. Tresproperty is acquired which benefits the testa-pass for crim. con., where defendant dies tor, then an action for the value of the property survives against the executor; 6 How. 11; 3 Mass. 321; 4 id. 480; 5 Pick. 285; 20 Johns. 43; 1 Root, Conn. 216; 4 Halst. 173; 1 Bay, 58; and that where the wrongdoer has acquired gain by his wrong, the injured party may waive the tort and bring an action ex contractu against the representatives to recover compensation; 5 Pick. 285; 4 Halst. 173. pending the suit, does not survive against his personal representatives; 9 Penn. 128. Where the intestate had falsely pretended that he was divorced from his wife, whereby another was induced to marry him, the latter cannot maintain an action against his personal representatives; 31 Penn. 533. Case for nuisance does not lie against executors of wrongdoer; 1 Bibb, 246; 73 Ill. 214; nor for fraud in the exchange of horses; 5 Ala. N. s. 369; ACTIO IN PERSONAM 111 ACTION ACTIO UTILIS. An action for the benefit of those who had the beneficial use of property, but not the legal title; an equitable action; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 214. other instances where a party was equitably entiIt was subsequently extended to include many tled to relief, although he did not come within the strict letter of the law and the formulæ ap nor, under the statute of Virignia, for fraudu-him closely, administered such relief only as lently recommending a person as worthy of that warranted, and admitted such claims as credit; 17 How. 212; nor for negligence of were distinctly set forth by the pleadings of a constable, whereby he failed to make the the parties; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 218. money on an execution; 3 Ala. N. s. 366; nor for misfeasance of constable; 29 Me. 462; nor against the personal representatives of a sheriff for an escape, or for taking insufficient bail bond; Harr. 42; nor against the administrators of the marshal for a false return of execution, or imperfect and insufficient entries thereon; 6 How. 11; nor does debt for an escape survive against the sheriff's execu-propriate thereto. tors; 1 Caines, 124; aliter in Georgia, by statute; 1 Ga. 514. An action against the sheriff to recover penalties for his failure to return process does not survive against his executors; 13 Ired. 483; nor does an action lie against the representatives of a deceased postmaster for money feloniously taken out of letters by his clerk; 1 Johns. 396. See ABATEMENT. ACTIO IN PERSONAM. (Lat. an ac- insisted on in a court of justice. In a quite tion against the person). A personal action. This is the term in use in the civil law to denote the actions which in the common law are called personal. In modern usage it is applied in English and American law to those suits in admiralty which are directed against the person of the defendant, as distinguished from those in rem which are directed against the specific thing from which (or rather the proceeds of the sale of which) the complainant expects and claims a right to derive satisfaction for the injury done to him; 2 Parsons, Mar. Law, 663. ACTIO VULGARIS. In Civil Law. A legal action; a common action. Sometimes used for actio directa; 1 Mackeldey, Civ. L. 189. ACTION (Lat. agere, to do; to lead; to conduct). A doing of something; something done. In Practice. The formal demand of one's right from another person or party, made and common sense, action includes all the formal proceedings in a court of justice attendant upon the demand of a right made by one person or party of another in such court, including an adjudication upon the right and its enforcement or denial by the court. In the Institutes of Justinian an action is de fined as jus persequendi in judicio quod sibi debetur (the right of pursuing in a judicial tribunal what is due one's self); Inst. 4. 6. In the Digest, however, where the signification of the word is expressly treated of, it is said, Actio generaliter sumitur; vel pro ipso jure quod quis habet persequendi in judicio quod suum est sibi ve debetur; vel pro hac ipsa persecutione seu juris exercitio (Ac ACTIO PRÆSCRIPTIS VERBIS. In Civil Law. A form of action which derived its force from continued usage or the responsation in general is taken either as that right which prudentium, and was founded on the unwritten law; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 212. The distinction between this action and an actio in factum is said to be, that the latter was founded not on usage or the unwritten law, but by analogy to or on the equity of some subsisting law; 1 Spence, Eq. Jur. 212. ACTIO REALIS (Lat.). A real action. The proper term in the civil law was Rei Vindicatio; Inst. 4. 6. 3. ACTIO IN REM. An action against the thing. See ACTIO IN PERSONAM. ACTIO REDHIBITORIA. In Civil Law. An action to compel a vendor to take back the thing sold and return the price paid. ACTIO RESCISSORIA. In Civil Law. An action for rescinding a title acquired by prescription in a case where the party bring ing the action was entitled to exemption from the operation of the prescription. ACTIO PRO SOCIO. In Civil Law. An action by which either partner could compel his co-partners to perform the partnership contract; Story, Partn., Bennett ed. § 352; Pothier, Contr. de Société, n. 34. ACTIO STRICTI JURIS (Lat. an action of strict right). An action in which the judge followed the formula that was sent to each one has of pursuing in a judicial tribunal his own or what is due him; or as the pursuit itself or exercise of the right); Dig. 50. 16. 16. Action was also said continere formam agendi (to include the form of proceeding); Dig. 1. 2. 10. This definition of action has been adopted by Mr. Taylor (Civ. Law, p. 50). These forms were prescribed by the prætors originally, and were to be very strictly followed. The actions to and the slightest variation from the form prewhich they applied were said to be stricti juris, scribed was fatal. They were first reduced to a system by Appius Claudius, and were surreptitiously published by his clerk, Cneius Flavius. The publication was so pleasing to the people that Flavius was made a tribune of the people, a senator, and a curule edile (a somewhat more magnificent return than is apt to await the labors of the editor of a modern book of forms); Dig. 1. 2.5. These forms were very minute, and included the form for pronouncing the decision. In modern law the signification of the right of pursuing, etc., has been generally dropped, though it is recognized by Bracton, 98 b; Coke, 2d Inst. 40; 3 Bla. Com. 116; while the two latter senses of the exercise of the right and the means or method of its exercise are still found. the part of one person as actor against another, Subordinate to this is now connected in a quite common use, the idea of the answer of the de |