I generally take my Inftances and Similitudes from thence; not but that I comprehend all other Senfations under it.

2. NOR Secondly, doth it make any altera. tion in the Foundation upon which I build, whether the Ideas of fenfible Objects exhibit to us a true Image of their Real Nature, as they are in themselves; or whether the Objects be only the Occafions of producing them; or whether we perceive them only by their Effects, or Adjuncts, or Circumftances or Qualities: As Heat may be no true Image of Fire; nor Light of the Sun; nor Colour of the Superficies; nor Sweetness of Sugar. For whatever Impreffion external fenfible Objects make upon us, this we call their Idea; becaufe it is the only Perception of them we are capable of, and the only way we have of knowing them.

Which

Idea, tho' it should be supposed to exhibit to us no more of the true and intrinfic Nature of the Object, than the Impreffion on the Wax doth of the real true Nature of the Stone or the Steel which made it: Yet the Object leaves behind it fuch a Similitude and Refemblance of itself upon the Senfes, as answers all the Ends of Knowledge in this Life; and lays a Groundwork fufficient to build all that Knowledge upon, which is neceffary in order to another, whether in respect of natural or revealed Religion.

THAT

THAT Our Ideas or Perceptions of sensible Objects do not exhibit to us their whole intrinfic Nature, fo as to afford us a complete and Adequate Knowledge of their intire Effence; together with the inward Configuration and Difpofition of all their Parts, is easily granted: But that they are agreeable to the true Nature of the Things perceived, as far as they go; that there is fuch an exact Correspondence between these and their Ideas, that what Knowledge we have of the Objects is True and Real, and not feign'd or Imaginary, is more than probable: Our Knowledge falls fhort indeed, but it fails in Degree only; and tho' it is Imperfect, yet it is not Falfe or delufive.

Now that the Nature, and Attributes, and intrinfic Qualities of fenfible Objects are thus far intirely agreeable to that external Appearance they make to us by the Mediation of our Ideas, is fufficiently evident from this plain Reason: Because it was eafy to the Power and Wisdom of God, to have contrived all our Organs of Senfation for a juft and exact Perception of their real true Nature; as for what is Feign'd only and Delusive, which is in truth no real Perception of them at all. He could as well have adapted all our Faculties to the real Nature of Things as they Are in themfelves, as to what they are Not; and we may reasonably conclude, that this is more agree

able

able to the Truth and Veracity of the Divine Nature, than to have made us altogether for Delufion and put fuch an invincible Deceit upon all the Powers and Faculties of Perception which he gave us, that we should have no Real true Knowledge of any of their proper Objects, but be deceived in every thing about

us.

NOTHING can be more abfurd than this Opinion, according to which external Objects are only the Occafional Caufes of fuch Affections in us as the Objects themselves have no Similitude of, nor any natural Relation to. For no Thought is more obvious than that every thing fhould act according to its respective Nature; and if fo, then they muft operate upon our Senfes according to their own intrinfic Qualities; and our Senfations of them, as far as they reach, must be juft, and agreeable to what the Objects are in themselves. But this Opinion must fuppofe that God Sufpends the real Nature and intrinfic Powers of every Agent, and miraculously interposes in every act of theirs, to alter thofe Effects which they are naturaly difpofed to produce, into fome others quite different from them, or above their Power of acting. Thus all Objects without us muft operate upon us by Qualities and Attributes quite different from what they are realy endued with; they muft affect us in a manner beyond or befide any Power of Act

ing that is in them; and we may as well fup-. pose that nothing may act upon something.

HOWEVER Perfons may for Argument fake, or out of any Affectation of Singularity, abet this Error; yet they can't forbear fufpecting it to be fuch when they confider, that all external fenfible Objects have univerfaly the fame uniform Effects upon all Men's Senfes, and at all times, when they are equaly dis-` posed: This must incline them to believe, that as far as external Objects do affect us, they do it truly according to their own intrinfic Nature and our's; and that if our Organs were more nicely difpofed, and our Faculties more curious and perfect, all farther Impreffions of external Objects upon us, would be just and real; and ftill more exact and complete Reprefentations of their true Nature and Effence.

3. A THIRD thing neceffary to be premised, and of no fmall Confequence towards removing infinite Confufion out of our way of Thinking; and towards a clear and diftinct Procedure of our Understanding in the attainment of true Knowledge is; that the Word Idea, according to its genuine and proper Signification, fhould be limited and confined to our fimple Senfations only, and to the various Alterations and Combinations of them by the pure Intellect. Whenever the Word is apply'd to the Operations of our Mind; or to thefe confidered

in

in Conjunction with any of those Ideas of Senfation on which they operate, it is used in a very Loofe and Improper Manner; and the calling them all Ideas indifferently, and in the fame propriety and ftrictness of Speech without distinction, hath evidently tended to the amufing and perplexing the Understanding; and no way contributed to the improvement and enlargement of our Knowledge.

THUS the laying down the Ideas of Senfation and Reflection to be Alike the Original Sources and Foundation of all our Knowledge, is one great and fundamental Error which runs thro' most of the Difcourfes and Effays of our modern Writers of Logic and Metaphyfics. Nothing is more true in Fact, than that we have no Ideas but of fenfible Objects; upon thefe it is that the Mind begins to exert all its Operations; of which we have a Consciousness indeed; but cannot frame to our felves the leaft Idea or Resemblance of them, abftractedly from those Objects upon which they operate. We are Confcious to our felves of the two chief Operations of the mind, Thinking and Willing; as also of the feveral Modes of them, Remembrance, Difcerning,Reasoning, Judging, Knowledge, Faith, &c. But let any Man look into himself, and try whether he can find there any Idea of Thinking or Willing intirely feparate and abftracted from any thing to be thought of or willed; or fuch as he doth of a Tree or an Horfe;

and