FR

CHA P. IV.

Compound Ideas of Senfation.

ROM this fimple Apprehenfion or Intuitive Contemplation of Ideas in the Imagination, the Intellect proceeds not only to make its own manifold Remarks and Obfervations upon them, in the fame Situation and Condition they appear there: But intirely to Invert their whole Order and Difpofition at Will; and to fit and prepare them by numberless Changes or Alterations in whole or in part, for any Ufe or Purposes of its own. For tho' the pure Intellect cannot Add one Simple original Idea to the Number already in the Imagination, yet it hath an arbitrary and defpotick Power over all that it finds there; and exerts itfelf to the utmost in a great Variety of Operations upon them. It Enlarges or Diminisheth them at Pleasure in any Proportion; as for inftance, the Idea of a Mite may be increased to the bigness of an Elephant, and that of the Sun may dwindle into the Size of a Spark of Fire. It Compounds or Divides them; as the Idea of a Man and Horse may be put together into one; and when the Compofitions are thus Against Nature, they are filed Chimeras: So again the Idea of a Man's Body may be divided into its integral Parts, or bodily Members. It Unites or Separates them; as it can bring a multitude of particular Ideas of Men together to make up the compound Dd 2

Idea

Idea of an Army; fo it can Separately confider things not actualy feparated in Nature, as the Pure Intellect from the Will and Affections, for the more Diftinct View and Reafoning of the Mind, and this is truly Abstraction. It Improves or Debafes any of its Ideas; as the Idea of Light may be carried on beyond that of the brightest Sun Beams, which Men do when they attempt to form any Simple Idea of God's Glory; fo again a Shadow may be aggravated till it ends in thick and palpable Darkness. It Compares them infinitely to find out their Relations, and Similitudes, and Oppofitions; and then by forting, and tranfpofing, and bringing them together, it forms to itself an endless Variety of Compound Ideas. It places one Idea to Stand for many or all others of the fame kind, and thus renders it Universal in its Signification. It conjoins them with the Operations of our Mind known by Consciousness, in order to make up Complex Notions. It fubftitutes the Idea or Conception of one thing for another whereof it has even an Imaginary Refemblance, as in Metaphor: or of which it has a Real and Known Similitude, which is Human Analogy. And laftly it fubftitutes our Conceptions of Things human and Directly known, for the Reprefentation of Immaterial Objects whereof we have no Direct Idea or Conception; and this, not on account of any Known, but an Unknown tho' Real Similitude, or Proportion, or Correspondency which is Divine Analogy.

HERE

HERE again is a New Enlargement of the Mind of Man, and an Advance towards Knowledge which Brutes are not capable of: For as they have not even that fimple Apprehenfion of the Intellect, which is diftinct from the Perception of Senfe; fo are they much less capable of any of these Operations that are all SubSequent to this fimple Apprehenfion. They have not the leaft Power over their Ideas, either to Enlarge or Diminish them; to Compound or Divide them; to Unite or Separate them; to Improve or Debafe them; but above all to Compare them with one another, to Substitute Ideas or Notions for the Reprefentation of others, on account of any Real or Imaginary, Known or Unknown Proportion or Similitude. In short Brutes can neither Tranfpofe nor Alter any one Idea in their Imagination; but are on the contrary altogether under the Power of their Ideas or fenfible Impreffions, as to their whole Direction and Conduct.

How great a Privilege of a rational and human Mind this is, and what a vaft Scope it gives to the Understanding, will immediately appear when it is confidered; that the very fame Power the Intellect hath over its Simple Ideas, it hath alfo over all its own various Alterations of them, and endless Compofitions out of them. The very Same Operations of the Intellect are renewed and exerted to the utmost Over

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Over again upon these likewife; fo as to tranfpofe, and alter, and combine them with the fame defpotic Power: And as thofe Operations are all thus repeated upon this New Sett of compounded Ideas; fo it may proceed to operate after the fame Manner upon thofe that are Doubly compounded, as we may fay; and fo on according to the working or dexterity of the Mind. If our ftore of Simple Ideas only are Innumerable, as we have seen they are; furely the Alterations and Combinations of them by the Intellect, together with its own Obfervations upon their feveral Qualities and Relations must be more fo: And if the Intellect can exercise the fame Operations over again upon its own Further voluntary Compofitions out of them; then our Compounded Ideas can hardly come within the Power of Arithmetic to number. As I have met it expreffed with Hyperbole enough, The Truths and Refolutions of the Intellect from thence, must be prodigiously more than have yet been difcover'd by the Sons of Men: And perhaps they contain more than would ever be discovered, were the prefent Frame of things to continue as it is for Millions of fucceeding Ages. And again, If a few Letters are capable of infinite Combinations and Alterations, what endless Variety must the Combinations and Alterations of the Ideas we are furnished with from all the Objects of the visible Creation, afford?

Ir is of no fmall Confequence to our Progrefs

grefs in Knowledge to obferve here, that the Term Idea is attributed to thofe Alterations and Combinations of the Intellect in a Less proper Sence; and not in the fame Strict Propriety in which it is attributed to the Simple and Original Perceptions of the Senfes, when conveyed to the Imagination. However as these are the Primary, fo the other are a Secondary Set of Ideas: But then we must intirely drop the Term here, and carry it with us no farther; for all Beyond thefe are either Notion, or Conception, or Apprehenfion; or what you may more properly call by any other Denomination, than that of Idea.

THE want of diftinguishing rightly between the Simple Perceptions of Senfe, and the Simple Apprehenfion of the Intellect; between the Primary and Simple Ideas of Senfation, which are Independent of the pure Intellect, and those Secondary compound Ideas which are its Creatures; between all thofe, and the Complex Notions and Conceptions of the Mind: But above all, the want of diftinguishing between the Conceptions of things human, when they are Direct and Immediate; and when they are transferr'd to things spiritual and immaterial by Semblance only and Analogy. For want, I say, of observing these fundamental Diftinctions thro' our modern Syftems of Logic and Metaphyfics; their Authors, inftead of Helping the Understanding and enabling it to clear up things obfcure and difficult; Dd 4

have