AGAIN, when we come to confider the Relation we bear to our fellow Creatures of the fame Nature and Degree in this World, thence arife the Duties of Humanity and Juftice. And when we diftinguish these by the feveral particular Relations of Confanguinity or Affinity, fuch as Wife or Husband, Parent or Children; or in any other Refpects more circumftantial or adventitious, such as that of Master or Servant, Prince or Subjects; from thence flow all the several respective Duties and Obligations which unbiaffed Reafon and Experience teach us to be neceffary to the Benefit and Advantage of the whole Kind, and of every individual Man in particular; and are therefore to be difcharged to each other mutualy, according to the nearness or distance of that Relation they bear to us.

LASTLY, When we come to confider the nearest of all Relations, that which we bear to our felves, the regard that every man ought to have for his own Welfare and Happiness; and the Relation which all Other vifible Creatures bear to him as a Rational Agent, thence arife all thofe Virtues and Duties which naturaly tend to promote the Good of Body and Mind, fuch as Sobriety, Temperance, Chaftity. And all comprehended under this second Head, is properly Natural Religion or Morality; for the Sanction of all the Rules and Precepts P 2 whereof,

whereof, and to fhew their tendency towards our Happiness in another World, the Underftanding proceeds thus: From the apparent unequal Diftribution of Rewards to those who obferve them; and of Punishments to fuch as transgress them in this Life, fo plainly inconfiftent with Goodness and Juftice in a perfect Being; we infer the Neceffity of a future State for a final Reward and Punishment; and confequently the Immortality of human Souls.

BEFORE I proceed to the next spacious Scene which opens itself to human Understanding, it is worth observing here; that tho' all our Knowledge of Nature confifts either barely in the mere Contemplation and Simple Apprehenfion of our Ideas of Senfation; or in Experiment and Observation of outward Appearances, and of the various ways of external Objects operating on one another; infomuch that all the pretended Theory and Speculation of natural Caufes and Effects is precarious Conjecture: Yet when we proceed to Morality, our Knowledge, tho' more truly Speculative, is Certain and Undoubted, for the Regulation of our Practice. We have a more evident, clear, and diftinct Knowledge of the Truths of natural Religion, than of the Nature or Effence of any fenfible Objects, on which their Properties and Effects depend. Material Bodies strike upon the Organs of Senfation only by their Qualities and Effects; and just as these

receive

receive the Impreffions, fo they are directly convey'd to the Imagination, but without any clear and Adequate Representation of the intimate Effence of the Objects; and confequently we can know nothing more of them than from their fenfible Properties and Appearances, and from observing how many different ways they influence and affect one another. But the Cafe is otherwise when the Intellect confiders the feveral Relations they bear to one another and to us, and their mutual Respects and Dependences; here its Knowledge is Clear and Adequate; here it expatiates and exerts all its Powers; the Judgments it paffes upon these, without Partiality and Paffion, are Certain; its Deductions are Undoubted; its Conclufions without Confufion; and all the Rules and Precepts it forms concerning those Relations are of eternal Verity. And 'tis agreable to the Wisdom and Goodness of God that the Cafe fhould be thus; fince even the Experimental Knowledge we have of natural Objects is perfectly fufficient for all the Ends of natural Religion and Morality; and as to any Other Use of it, ferves the Conveniences and Exigences of This Life only; whereas the Truths of Morality have a farther Refpect to Eternity and the Purposes of another World.

CHA P. VI.

Of the different Kinds of Knowledge and Evidence.

It

T being a Matter of no fmall Confequence to the Procedure of the Intellect in general, to ftate the feveral very different Kinds of Knowledge, as well as the Degrees of it in each Kind which admits of them; I fhall oblerve that there are thefe fix very diftinct Sorts of Knowledge following, and as many very different Kinds of Evidence upon which they are founded.

I. THE firft is that which we have from our Senfes; and confists in an Intellectual View of all thofe Ideas which are thro' them conveyed inwardly to the Imagination. This is a Knowledge Direct, and Immediate, and Inturtive; utterly exclufive of all Reasoning and Argumentation: The View is Simple, and the Ideas hitherto uncompounded; and the Intellect is as yet no farther employ'd than in a bare Contemplation of the Ideas. It is this view of the Intellect which renders it properly Knowledge, and diftinguishes it from Natural Inftinct in Brutes, which are not capable of any such View of their Ideas. This carries in it the Highest Kind of Evidence, because it is fo di

rect,

rect, and immediate, and fimple, that it admits of no Medius Terminus, or common Meafure, and confequently of no Proof or Evidence at all from Reafon; and all manner of Proof or Evidence would, if Attempted here, have lefs of Perfpicuity and Certainty in it, than that which it already contains in its own Nature. This is a Knowledge which admits of no Degrees of Evidence, for All external Senfation is equaly certain and undoubted In itself; and the Evidence of One Senfe is equaly clear with that of Another, in refpect of their proper and different Objects; and this Evidence can be no otherwise varied than by the prefent Difpofition of the Organ of Senfation; or of the Medium; or by the different Degrees or Manner of Impression from the outward Object. When the Senfation is regular and perfect, the Affent of the Intellect naturaly and Neceffarily follows all at once; but however is not Extorted after the Manner it is in Demonstration, which compels by intermediate Proofand Deduction. Wherefore it would be an odd Affectation to call this fenfitive Evidence by the Name of Demonftration, merely because it is obvious and natural, and not to be deny'd; or because the contrary can be reduced to fuch a Contradiction as this: As if a Man fhould fee a Tree, for inftance, before his Eyes, and fhould fay, the Denial of it implies That the Tree fhould be there, and not there at the fame time; or that he both fees and doth not fee a Tree at the P 4

fam