THERE is an effential difference between a fimple Apprehenfion of the Mind, and a fimple Perception of the Senfe; the Confequence of this is an Idea in the Imagination; the former frames or occafions no New fimple Idea, and only apprehends one that is Already made and presented to its view: As when by looking upon a human Body, a Representation or Similitude of it is tranfmitted thro' the Eyes to the Imagination; this is the Caufe of a New Idea, in which the pure Intellect hath no part; it contributes nothing to the Production of that Idea, and it is formed without the leaft Actor Concurrence of the Mind. In all Senfations the Imagination is purely Paffive, difpofed by Nature to Receive only, and Retain fuch Impreffions as are made upon the Senses; fo that there may be an immenfe Number of fimple Ideas lodged there, before we need neceffarily fuppofe one fimple Act or Apprehenfion of the Intellect with relation to them, which must be an Act Subfequent to all Senfation whatsoever; and never to be confidered in Conjunction with it, as if it were one and the fame thing. The fimple Apprehension I am now speaking of, is an Act or Operation of the Mind, and not of the Senfes, which laft is common to us with Brutes; but the firft a Perfection and Excellency of an human Soul: Infomuch that it is the moft noble and elevated Manner of Operation in the Intellect; and

that

that by which it comes nearest to the Manner of Knowledge in Angels; Præcipua, says a great Philofopher, Intellectûs humani ficut Angelorum functio videtur effe, ut fit ex fuâ naturâ intelligens; boc eft fimplici Intuitu, non ratiocinatione cognofcens.

Now therefore antecedently to this fimple Apprehenfion, or any other Act of the pure Intellect, we are to fuppofe the Imagination plentifully ftored and furnished with Ideas of Senfation altogether without its Concurrence. They began to be tranfmitted inwardly thro' the Senfes from our Infancy; they daily multiply by Experience and our Conversation with external fenfible Objects; and are increased to a prodigious Number before we are conscious to our felves of any Operations of the pure Intellect upon them. In this common Storehoufe, and Receptacle, thofe Ideas lie in Confufion together, all disjoin'd and unranged; and in no other Order than that wherein they Happen to be firft tranfmitted. And were there no Immaterial Principle at all within us, they would always remain in the fame diforderly Condition, undisturbed and unobserved; and without any other Alteration than what would be made by the Acceffion of New Ideas from Objects as yet unperceived; and by the reviving of those that were defaced or obliterated, from the Repetition of fuch Impreffions as had been made before.

3

CHAP.

T

Of Inftinct in Brutes.

HIS is the very State and Condition of

Brutes. Tho' they are capable of all the Senfations that are in us; and tho' the Senses of many of them are more Acute than those in Man, and confequently more fufceptible of quick and vigorous Impreffions from fenfible Objects; yet all this is no more in them, than the ftriking of one material Substance upon another; the Effect of which remains juft as long as there is a Difpofition in the animal Spirits to retain it: But for want of an higher and Immaterial Principle, when the Idea is once formed, they can take no After View or Notice of it diftinct from the Seniation itself. This is the utmoft Extent of all that Knowledge in Brutes, which we call by the Name of Inftinct; and is realy no other than a Calculation or Difpofition of their Senfes by the Author of Nature, to excel in those particular Inftances of Sensation, wherein the Being or Prefervation of every Species is most concerned. They are never actuated or influenced by more than One fimple Idea at a time; nor by that neither, but when there is fome Actual Impreffion of the external Object to ftir it up within them, or fome Remains of the Impreffion continuing

tinuing in the Imagination and Brain; and all they perform is at the Impulse and Inftigation of particular Ideas of Senfation, which is the only Direction they have in all their Operations.

FOR this Reafon Brutes can have no fuch thing as Memory properly fo called; for after the Impreffions are made, or the Ideas form'd, they lie in their Imagination (without any Notice or Observation) to sway and direct their Motions, as long as they laft: But their Ideas decay gradualy, so as never to be revived again by any proper Recollection; and must be renewed by a Repetition of the fame, or of a like Impreffion, from the Presence of the Object; which is as different from Memory as natural Inftinct is from Reafon. The bare receiving and retaining the Impreffions or Ideas of external Objects in the Imagination, is not Memory even in Man; but an Ability or Faculty of Viewing them at Pleasure, in the Abfence of the Objects which they stand for in the Mind; of Reviving them again within us and Clearing them up after they have grown Confufed and Obfcure, without any New Impreffion from Abroad: And above all a Power in the Intellect of Impregnating the Imagination with all its own Alterations and Combinations of fimple original Ideas; together with a Faculty in the Mind of Retaining and Recollecting all its various Complex Notions and

Conceptions, at its own Will and Pleasure; no→ thing of all which is in the Nature and Power of Brutes. It may seem indeed that a Dog can at once attend to the Shape, and Smell, and Voice of his Master; and put those Ideas together to make up one compounded Idea. But the Dog frames no Idea of his Master from them all at once; but ever distinguisheth him by fome One of them at a time, and by them all fucceffively. If he hears his Master's Voice he attends only to that; if he Sees him, all Attention to his Smell and Voice is loft; and when all these Ideas of the Master are in Any Degree defaced and impaired by Absence, there can be no renewal of them but by the Approach or Prefence of the Master.

THE Common Objection against what I have faid of Brutes here is, that a Dog Dreams, and Barks, and Moves in his Sleep; that he is Uneafy in the Abfence of his Mafter; diftinguisheth the Smell of him among a thousand, and Knows him again when he fees him; that he will find the way Home again after being conveyed to great Distances from thence; which Operations could not poffibly be performed without a Memory. But this Objection fuppofes me to have afferted, that Impreffions made by external Objects upon the Senfes and Imagination of Brutes, laft no longer than the Prefence of the Objects; that these being reved leave no Footsteps of themselves be