although the merchant has not fully laden the ship. And if a certain sum be stipulated for every ton, or other portion of the ship's capacity, for the whole voyage, the payment must be according to the number of tons, &c. which the ship is proved capable of containing, without regard to the quantity actually put on board by the merchant. On the other hand, if the merchant have stipulated to pay a certain sum per cask or bale of goods, the payment must be, in the first place, according to the number of casks and bales shipped and delivered; and if he have further covenanted to furnish a complete lading, or a specific number of casks or bales, and failed to do so, he must make good the loss which the owners have sustained by his failure.

If an entire ship be hired, and the burden thereof be expressed in the charterparty, and the merchant bind himself to pay a certain sum for every ton, &c. of goods which he shall lade on board, but does not bind himself to furnish a complete lading, the owners can only demand payment for the quantity of goods actually shipped. But if the merchant agree to load a full and complete cargo, though the ship be described as of less burden than she really is, the merchant must load a full cargo, according to the real burden of the ship, and he will be liable for freight according to what ought to be loaded.

The delivery of goods at the place of destination is in general necessary to entitle the owner to freight; but with respect to living animals, whether men or cattle, which may frequently die during the voyage, without any fault or neglect of the persons belonging to the ship, it is ruled, that if there be no express agreement whether the freight is to be paid for the lading, or for the transporting them, freight shall be paid as well for the dead as for the living: if the agreement be to pay freight for the lading, then death certainly cannot deprive the owners of the freight; but if the agreement be to pay freight for transporting them, then no freight is due for those that die on the voyage, because as to them the contract is not performed. These distinctions have been made in the civil law, and have been adopted into the modern systems of maritime law.

Freight is most frequently contracted to be paid either by the whole voyage, or by the month, or other time. In the former case the owners take upon themselves the chance of the voyage being long or short: but in the latter the risk of the duration falls upon the merchant; and if no time be fixed for the commencement of the computation, it will begin from the day on which the ship breaks ground and commences her voyage, and will continue during the whole course of the voyage, and during all unavoidable delays not occasioned by the act or neglect of the owners or master, or by such circumstances as occasion a suspension of the contract for a particular period. Thus, the freight will be payable for the time consumed in necessary repairs during a voyage, provided it do not appear that the ship was insufficient at the outset, or that there was any improper delay in repairing her.

In the absence of an express contract to the contrary, the entire freight is not earned until the whole cargo be ready for delivery, or has been delivered to the consignee according to the contract for its conveyance.

If a consignee receive goods in pursuance of the usual bill of lading, by which it is expressed that he is to pay the freight, he, by such receipt, makes himself debtor for the freight, and may be sued for it. But a person who is only an agent for the consignor, and who is known to the master to be acting in that character, does not make himself personally answerable for the freight by receiving the goods, although he also enters them in his own name at the Custom-house.

In some cases freight is to be paid, or rather an equivalent recompence made to the owners, although the goods have not been delivered at the place of destination, and though the contract for conveyance be not strictly performed. Thus, if part of the cargo be thrown overboard for the necessary preservation of the ship and the remainder of the goods, and the ship afterwards reach the place of destination, the value of this part is to be answered to the merchant by way of general average, and the value of the freight thereof allowed to the owner. So, if the master be compelled by necessity to sell a part of the cargo for victuals or repairs, the owners must pay to the merchant the price which the goods would have fetched at the place of destination; and, therefore, are allowed to charge the merchant with the money that would have been due if they had been conveyed thither.

When goods are deteriorated during a voyage, the merchant is entitled to a compensation, provided the deterioration has proceeded from the fault or neglect of the master or mariners; and of course he is not answerable for the freight, unless he accept the goods, except by way of deduction from the amount of the compensation. On the other hand, if the deterioration has proceeded from a principle of decay naturally inherent in the commodity itself, whether active in every situation, or in the confinement and closeness of a ship, or from the perils of the sea, or the act of God, the merchant must bear the loss and pay the freight; for the master and owners are in no fault, nor does their contract contain any insurance or warranty against such an event. In our West India

trade, the freight of sugar and molasses is usually regulated by the weight of the casks at the port of delivery here, which, in fact, is in every instance less than the weight at the time of the shipment; and, therefore, the loss of freight occasioned by the leakage necessarily falls upon the owners of the ship by the nature of the contract.

Different opinions have been entertained by Valin, Pothier, and other great authorities as to maritime law, with respect to the expediency of allowing the merchant to abandon his goods for freight in the event of their being damaged. This question has not been judicially decided in this country. "The only point," says Lord Tenterden, "intended to be proposed by me as doubtful, is the right to abandon for freight alone at the port of destination: and in point of practice, I have been informed that this right is never claimed in this country."-(Law of Shipping, part iii. c. 7.)

Freight being the return made for the conveyance of goods or passengers to a particular destination, no claim arises for its payment in the event of a total loss; and it is laid down by Lord Mansfield, that "in case of a total loss with salvage, the merchant may either take the part saved, or abandon.”—(Abbott, part iii. c. 7.) But after the merchant has made his election, he must abide by it.

It often happens that a ship is hired by a charterparty to sail from one port to another, and thence back to the first-as, for example, from London to Leghorn, and from Leghorn back to London-at a certain sum to be paid for every month or other period of the duration of the employment. Upon such a contract, if the whole be one entire voyage, and the ship sail in safety to Leghorn, and there deliver the goods of the merchant and take others on board to be brought to London, but happen to be lost in her return thither, nothing is due for freight, although the merchant has had the benefit of the voyage to Leghorn; but, if the outward and homeward voyages be distinct, freight will be due for the proportion of the time employed in the outward voyage. "If," said Lord Mansfield, in a case of this sort, there be one entire voyage out and in, and the ship be cast away on the homeward voyage, no freight is due; no wages are due, because the whole profit is lost; and by express agreement the parties may make the outward and homeward voyage one. Nothing is more common than two voyages: wherever there are two voyages, and one is performed, and the ship is lost on the homeward voyage, freight is due for the first."-(K. B. Trin. Term, 16 Geo. 3.)

It frequently happens that the master or owner fails to complete his contract, either by not delivering the whole goods to the consignee or owner, or by delivering them at a place short of their original destination; in these cases, if the owner or consignee of the goods derive any benefit from their conveyance, he is liable to the payment of freight according to the proportion of the voyage performed, or pro ratâ itineris peracti: and though contracts of this nature be frequently entire and indivisible, and the master or owner of the ship cannot, from their nature, sue thereon, and recover a rateable freight, or pro ratâ itineris; yet he may do so upon a fresh implied contract, for as much as he deserves to have, unless there be an express clause in the original charterparty or contract to the contrary. A fresh implied contract is inferred from the owner's or consignee's acceptance of the goods. Many difficulties have, indeed, arisen in deciding as to what shall amount to an acceptance: it is not, however, necessary actually to receive the goods; acceptance may be made by the express or implied directions, and with the consent, of the owner or consignee of the goods, but not otherwise.

It sometimes happens that the owner of the ship, who is originally entitled to the freight, sells or otherwise disposes of his interest in the ship, where a chartered ship is sold before the voyage, the vendee, and not the vendor or party to whom he afterwards assigns the charterparty, is entitled to the freight. But where a ship has been sold during the voyage, the owner, with whom a covenant to pay freight has been made, is entitled to the freight, and not the vendee. A mortgagee who does not take possession, is not entitled to the freight.

The time and manner of paying freight are frequently regulated by express stipulations in a charterparty, or other written contract; and when that is the case, they must be respected: but if there be no express stipulation contrary to or inconsistent with the right of lien, the goods remain as a security till the freight is paid; for the master is not bound to deliver them, or any part of them, without payment of the freight and other charges in respect thereof. But the master cannot detain the cargo on board the vessel till these payments be made, as the merchant would, in that case, have no opportunity of examining the condition of the goods. In England, the practice is, when the master is doubtful of payment, to send such goods as are not required to be landed at any particular wharf, to a public wharf, ordering the wharfinger not to part with them till the freight and other charges are paid. No right of lien for freight can exist, unless the freight be earned; if the freighter or a stranger prevent the freight from becoming due, the ship owner or master's remedy is by action of damages.

(For further information and details with respect to this subject, see the art. CHARTER

PARTY, in this Dictionary; Abbot (Lord Tenterden) on the Law of Shipping, part. iii. c. 7.; Chitty's Commercial Law, vol. iii. c. 9.; Molloy de Jure Maritimo, book ii. c. 4., &c.) FRUIT (Ger. Obst, Früchte; Du. Ooft; Fr. Fruit; It. Frutta, Frutte; Sp. Fruta; Rus. Owoschtsch; Lat. Fructum). This appellation is bestowed by commercial men upon those species of fruit, such as oranges, lemons, almonds, raisins, currants, apples, &c., which constitute articles of importation from foreign countries.

FULLERS' EARTH (Ger. Walkererde; Du. Volaarde; Fr. Terre à foulon; It. Terra da purgatori; Sp. Tierra de batan; Rus. Schiffernaia; Lat. Terra fullonum), a species of clay, of a greenish white, greenish grey, olive and oil green, and sometimes spotted colour. It is usually opaque, very soft, and feels greasy. It is used by fullers to take grease out of cloth before they apply the soap. The best is found in Buckinghamshire and Surrey. When good, it has a greenish white, or greenish grey colour, falls into powder in water, appears to melt on the tongue like butter, communicates a milky hue to water, and deposits very little sand when mixed with boiling water. The remarkable detersive property on woollen cloth depends on the alumina, which should be at least one fifth of the whole, but not much more than one fourth, lest it become too tenacious. (Thomson's Chemistry; Jameson's Mineralogy.) Malcolm, in his Survey of Surrey, published in 1809, says that he took considerable pains in endeavouring to ascertain the consumption of fullers' earth, and that he found it to be about 6,300 tons a year for the entire kingdom, of which about 4,000 tons were furnished by Surrey.

FUNDS (PUBLIC), the name given to the public funded debt due by government. The practice of borrowing money in order to defray a part of the war expenditure began, in this country, in the reign of William III. In the infancy of the practice, it was customary to borrow upon the security of some tax, or portion of a tax, set apart as a fund for discharging the principal and interest of the sum borrowed. This discharge was, however, very rarely effected. The public exigencies still continuing, the loans were, in most cases, either continued, or the taxes were again mortgaged for fresh ones. At length the practice of borrowing for a fixed period, or, as it is commonly termed, upon terminable annuities, was almost entirely abandoned, and most loans were made upon interminable annuities, or until such time as it might be convenient for government to pay off the principal.

In the beginning of the funding system, the term fund meant the taxes or funds appropriated to the discharge of the principal and interest of loans; those who held government securities, and sold them to others, selling, of course, a corresponding claim upon some fund. But after the debt began to grow large, and the practice of borrowing upon interminable annuities had been introduced, the meaning attached to the term fund was gradually changed; and instead of signifying the security upon which loans were advanced, it has, for a long time, signified the principal of the loans themselves.

Owing partly, perhaps, to the scarcity of disposable capital at the time, but far more to the supposed insecurity of the Revolutionary establishment, the rate of interest paid by government in the early part of the funding system was, comparatively, high. But as the country became richer, and the confidence of the public in the stability of govern ment was increased, ministers were enabled to take measures for reducing the interest, first in 1716, and again in 1749.

During the reigns of William III. and Anne, the interest stipulated for loans was very various. But in the reign of George II. a different practice was adopted. Instead of varying the interest upon the loan according to the state of the money market at the time, the rate of interest was generally fixed at three or three and a half per cent. ; the necessary variation being made in the principal funded. Thus, suppose government were anxious to borrow, that they preferred borrowing in a 3 per cent. stock, and that they could not negotiate a loan for less than 4 per cent.; they effected their object by giving the lender, in return for every 1004. advanced, 150l. 3 per cent. stock; that is, they bound the country to pay him or his assignees 41. 10s. a year in all time to come, or, otherwise, to extinguish the debt by a payment of 1501. In consequence of the prevalence of this practice, the principal of the debt now existing amounts to nearly two fifths more than the sum actually advanced by the lenders.

Some advantages are, however, derivable, or supposed to be derivable, from this system. It renders the management of the debt, and its transfer, more simple and commodious than it would have been, had it consisted of a great number of funds bearing different rates of interest: and it is contended, that the greater field for speculation afforded to the dealers in stocks bearing a low rate of interest, has enabled government to borrow, by funding additional capitals, for a considerably less payment on account of interest than would have been necessary had no such increase of capital been made.

In point of fact, however, these advantages are but inconsiderable, while the disadvantages inseparable from the practice of funding a large amount of stock at a low rate of interest are great and lasting. During war, especially if any considerable portion of its expenditure be defrayed by means of loans, the rate of interest uniformly rises, and

is usually much higher than during peace. If, therefore, loans were funded in stocks bearing a rate of interest equivalent to the market rate when they happen to be contracted for, the charge on their account might be reduced soon after the return of peace, according to the fall in the rate of interest; whereas, when loans are funded in stocks bearing a low rate of interest, with a corresponding increase of capital, it becomes impossible to take advantage of the fall of interest at the return of peace, and the country is burthened with the war interest in all time to come! It is not easy to exaggerate the injury we have sustained by overlooking this plain principle. In 1815, to specify only one of many similar instances, government bargained for a loan of 36,000,0004, it being stipulated that every subscriber of 100l. should be entitled to 1747. 3 per cent. stock, and 10%. 4 per cent. stock, making the interest on the loan 5l. 12s. 4d. per cent. The great improvidence of this transaction is obvious. Had from 51. 158. to 61. per cent. of interest been paid for the loan, it might have been obtained without funding any additional capital; and had that been done, we should have been able, within 4 or 5 years, in consequence of the fall of interest after the peace, to reduce the charge on account of the loan to 3 or 34 per cent. ; but, owing to the way in which the contract was made, we have not had, and will not have, any means of reducing the exorbitant charge on account of this loan, so long as the market rate of interest is above 3 per cent., except by paying 174l. for every 100l. originally received, exclusive of the 101. of 4 per cent. stock! But this, as already stated, is only one instance out of many of the same sort. We believe, indeed, that we are within the mark when we affirm that, owing to this erroneous method of funding, the country is at present paying from 6,000,000l. to 7,000,000l. a year on account of the public debt more than it would have had to pay, had the same sums been borrowed and funded without any increase of capital.*

That this improvident system should have been so extensively acted on by our finance ministers during the American and French wars is the more surprising, seeing that experience had already demonstrated the advantages of funding limited capitals at a comparatively high rate of interest. Owing partly to the scarcity of capital, but much more to the supposed instability of the revolutionary establishment, the loans during the reigns of William III. and Anne were mostly contracted at a very high rate of interest. Luckily, however, this was not attempted to be disguised by assigning to the parties large amounts of stock bearing a low rate of interest. The stock created was the exact amount of the loans, the interest on it being increased according to the supposed insecurity of the government, the scarcity of floating capital, &c. Now, mark the consequences of this. So early as 1716, Sir Robert Walpole, availing himself of the greater facility with which money was procured after the treaty of Utrecht, and of the greater stability of the government, was able, by offering to pay off the creditors, to reduce the charge on account of the debt from 1,598,6021 to 1,274,146l., being a saving of 324,4561., or about part of the entire charge. In 1727, a farther saving of about 340,000l. a-year was effected by reducing the interest on the greater portion of the debt from 5 to 4 per cent. And in 1749, during the administration of Mr. Pelham, the interest was again reduced from 4 to 3 per cent., a measure which produced a fresh saving of 565,000l. a-year!

Happily the practice of funding in a 5 per cent. stock, was not entirely abandoned during the late war. In 1822 the total British and Irish 5 per cent. stock amounted to about 150,000,000!.; and, by offering to pay it off, a reduction of interest was then effected to the extent of about 1,200,000l. a-year! And, since that period, further savings have been effected by the reduction of the interest on the 4 and 4 per cent. stock. But, unfortunately, by far the greatest proportion of the debt created during the late war, and that with the American colonies, was funded in the 3 per cents.; and, as already stated, the charge on that portion has, in consequence, been hitherto, and will, most probably, continue to be, for an indefinite period, unsusceptible of diminution.

For a further and full discussion of this subject, see the 2nd edition of the Treatise on Taxation and the Funding System, by the author of this work, pp. 441–468.