State v. Robbins. reported, that upon her privy examination before him, "she acknowledged," &c. But suppose this is to be inferred from the certificate of the Clerk. Then it is repugnant; for, the certificate of Barnard is, that she made the ac. knowledgment "in open Court." Nor, is it aided by the entry upon the docket; (admitting that the entry can be called in aid,) for the entry is, that the deed was proven, and "her private examination taken in open Court." It is not stated, by whom the ex. amination was taken, and for aught that appears, the husband was present. We are of opinion, that the deed was not valid to pass the title of Lydia Cook. The judgment must, therefore, be reversed, and a judgment be entered for the plaintiff, according to the verdict. PER CURIAM. Judgment accordingly. THE STATE vs. EDWIN ROBBINS. In an indictment for selling to a slave in the night time, it is not necessary to negative an order of the owner or manager, the offence having been committed in the night time. In such an indictment, the slave is sufficiently identified by his name; a further description, by giving the name of the owner, is not necessary. The case of The State v. Miller, 7 Ire. 725, cited and approved. Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Edgecombe County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge SETTLE presiding. The defendant was tried and convicted upon the fol. lowing indictment, to wit: State v. Robbins. "STATE OF NORTH CAROLINA, Edgecombe County. } Superior Court of Law, "The jurors for the State, upon their oath, present, that Edwin Robbins, a licensed retailer of spirituous liquor, by a measure less than a quart, late of the County aforesaid, at and in said County, on the first day of September in the year eighteen hundred and forty-eight, and in the night time of said day, between the hours of sunset thereof and sunrise of the day next ensuing, to a slave, named Sampson, one pint of spirituous liquor unlawfully did sell and deliver, to the common nuisance of the good citizens of the State, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the State. (Signed,) MOORE, Atto. Gen❜l. On motion of the defendant, the judgment was arrested and the Attorney General appealed. Attorney General, for the State. PEARSON, J. There is no ground, upon which the judgment ought to be arrested. On the contrary, the Attorney General has framed an indictment, unencumbered by useless words; which, from its brevity and clearness, may well be adopted as a precedent. The averment, that the defendant "unlawfully did sell and deliver" to the slave, would not be supported by proof of a sale and delivery to the slave as the agent and for and on account of his owner; nor is it necessary to negative an order of the owner or manager, the offence having been committed in the night time. State v. Miller, 7 Ired. 725, decides both points. The slave is sufficiently described by his name. A further description, by giving the name of the owner, is State v. Satterfield. not necessary. The law only requires "certainty to a certain intent in general" in indictments for this offence. The Court below erred in arresting the judgment. There must be a judgment for the State. PER CURIAM. Ordered to be certified accordingly. THE STATE TO THE USE OF WILLIS F. REDDICK vs. GEORGE W. B. SATTERFIELD. An infant, being entitled to a sum of money arising from the sale of a tract of land, sold under a decree of a Court of Equity, and the same having been received by her guardian, conveyed it by a deed of trust to her separate use, and if she died without leaving a child, to her intended husband. She married and died under age and without a child. Held, that in a Court of Law, at least, her personal representative was entitled to recover the money so received by the guardian. Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Gates County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge MANLY presiding. This was an action of debt on a guardian bond. Sarah Ann Hunter, the intestate of the plaintiff, and the ward of the defendant, in 1847, before her marriage, executed a deed, conveying all her estate, among other things the proceeds of the sale of a tract of land, sold under the decree of the Court of Equity for partition, which was in the hands of the defendant, her guardian, to a trustee for her separate use, and if she died without a child living at her death, then to the use of her contemplated husband, one Willis F. Riddick. State v. Satterfield. The intestate intermarried with the said Riddick, and had a child born alive, but it died before the intestate. At the date of the deed and at the time of her marriage, the intestate was about sixteen years of age. She died at the age of eighteen. The breach assigned was a refusal to pay the amount of about $1000, the sum received by the defendant, as guardian, together with interest thereon from the 19th of May, 1840; at which time, the defendant, as guardian, had received the said amount, being his ward's share of the land, sold under the decree of the Court of Equity, for partition. His Honor was of opinion, that the plaintiff could only recover the interest upon the sum received by the defendant, as guardian; and a verdict and judgment were en tered for the plaintiff for the penalty of the bond, to be discharged by the payment of the sum of $549, which was the interest upon the sum received by the defendant. Heath, for the plaintiff. No counsel for the defendant. PEARSON, J. We think his Honor was mistaken in the view, which he took of the case. Admit that the deed of the intestate was void by reason of her infancy, his Honor seems to have been under the impression, that the fund was to be treated as land, and that the plaintiff, as personal representative, could only recover the profits or interest up to the time of the death of the intestate, which, we presume, he considered was for the benefit of the hus. band, but that the principal belonged to the heirs at law. Without deciding how the rights of the parties may be considered in a Court of Equity, we are of opinion, that in a Court of Law, the defendant, having received money belonging to his ward, was, after her death, bound to pay it over to her personal representative; and that his re State v. Bogue. fusal to do so was a clear breach of the bond to the amount of principal and interest. The judgment must be set aside and a venire de novo issued. PER CURIAM. Judgment accordingly. THE STATE vs. JOSEPH BOGUE & AL. Where several persons are indicted for a trespass, it is not a matter of right for any of the defendants to insist, on the trial, that the jury should be required to pass upon the guilt or innocence of any of the others, before they pass upon the whole. This is a matter of discretion in the presiding Judge -a discretion rarely, if ever, used, except in cases, where there is no evidence against a part of the defendants, or where the Court is satisfied, that persons are made defendants, to prevent their being examined in the case. From the exercise of a discretionary power in the Court, no appeal lies. Appeal from the Superior Court of Law of Perquimans County, at the Spring Term 1849, his Honor Judge MANLY presiding. The defendants were indicted for a forcible trespass in entering the yard of the prosecutor, and there shooting his dog. The prosecutor and his family, and a man by the name of Crothers, were present, and the latter was a witness for the State and examined before the jury. It was proved, that the three first named defendants came up first, and together entered the yard, and the three last came up together, soon after the entry was made, and stood while the dog was killed-one of them being the son of the first named defendant. Upon the closing of its |