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to invoking the arbitration of Friendly States previously to a Declaration of War.
(6.) The abolition of Domestic Slavery in the United States (1862.)
(7.) The change effected in the relations of Turkey to Europe.
(8.) Negotiations relative to the Isthmus of Suez. I repeat here, however, some portions of the former Preface, which relates to general principles of International Jurisprudence.
These events have not induced me to change the opinions which I have expressed as to the cardinal principles of International Law. On the contrary, I venture to think that they furnish a strong corroboration of them.
The “violence, oppression, and sword-law,” which have prevailed in part of Europe, ought not to shake conviction in the truth of these principles, while on the other hand they are confirmed by the consideration of events which, unconnected with the late war, have happened during the interval mentioned.
There always have been, and always will be, a class of persons who deride the notion of International Law, who delight in scoffing at the jurisprudence which supports it, and who hold in supreme contempt the position that a moral principle lies at its root.
The proposition that, in their mutual intercourse, States are bound to recognize the eternal obligations of justice apart from considerations of immediate expediency, they deem stupid and ridiculous pedantry. They point triumphantly to the instances in which the law has been broken (a), in which might has been
(a) “Sed nimirum historiæ non tantum quæ juste, sed et quæ inique, iracunde, impotenter facta sunt memorant.”—Grotius, De J. B. 1. 2, c.
xviii. s. 7.
substituted for right, and ask if Providence is not always on the side of the strongest battalions. “ Let “our strength,” they say, “ be the law of justice, for " that which is feeble is found to be nothing worth”(6).
But in truth these objections are as old as they are shallow; they leave untouched the fact that there is, after all, a law to which States, in peace and war, appeal for the justification of their acts; that there are writers whose exposition of that law has been stamped as impartial and just by the great family of States, that they are only slighted by those upon whose crimes they have by anticipation passed sentence; that Municipal as well as International Law is often evaded and trampled down, but exists nevertheless, and that States cannot, without danger as well as disgrace, depart in practice from doctrines which they have professed in theory to be the guide of their relations with the Commonwealth of Christendom.
The axiom,“ populus jura naturæ gentiumque “ violans suæ quoque tranquillitatis in posterum re“scindit munimenta,” remains as true to-day as when it was written by its great author two cen
The precedents of crime no more disprove the existence of International than of Civil Law (c). The necessity of justice to the existence of society is not denied; but it is not more obvious than the necessity of justice to the intercourse of States, the society of societies.
Rulhière, speaking of the Russian and Austrian
(b) Wisdom of Solomon, c. ii. v. 11.
intervention in the affairs of Poland, observes: “Il
n'y avait cependant pour cette invasion aucun pré"texte légitime. Les puissances de l'Europe ayant
toujours exercé entre elles le droit du plus fort dans “toute l'étendue de sa barbarie, cherchent à couvrir “ leurs injustices et leurs violences de quelque appa
rence spécieuse; et à tous les commencemens de guerre, on voit éclore des volumes de sophismes. “ Ceux qui furent alors imaginés doivent d'autant “moins être passés sous silence qu'ils ont eu dans “la suite les conséquences les plus fatales” (d).
The whole question is placed upon its true basis by one of the greatest masters of jurisprudence, whose luminous treatise on the subject, though edited in London, is too little read in this country. “Ratio autem hujus partis, et juris est, quia hu
manum genus quantumvis in varios populos, et regna divisum, semper habet aliquam unitatem
non solùm specificam, sed etiam quasi politicam, “et moralem, quam indicat naturale præceptum “mutui amoris et misericordiæ quod ad omnes ex“tenditur, etiam extraneos, et cujuscumque rationis.
Quapropter licèt unaquæque civitas perfecta, respublica, aut regnum, sit in se communitas perfecta, et suis membris constans, nihilominus quælibet “illarum est etiam membrum aliquo modo hujus “universi, prout ad genus humanum spectat: nun
quam enim illæ communitates adeo sunt sibi suffi"cientes sigillatim, quin indigeant aliquo mutuo "juvamine, et societate, ac communicatione, inter“dum ad melius esse majoremque utilitatem : in"terdum verò etiam ob moralem necessitatem, et
(d) Rulhière, Hist. de Pologne, vol. i. pp.
“indigentiam, ut ex ipso usu constat. “ ratione indigent aliquo jure, quo dirigantur et “rectè ordinentur in hoc genere communicationis et " societatis. Et quamvis magna ex parte hoc fiat
per rationem naturalem : non tamen sufficienter, et immediatè quoad omnia : ideoque aliqua specialia jura potuerunt usu earumdem gentium introduci. “ Nam sicut in una civitate, vel provincia consuetudo “introducit jus, ita in universo humano genere po
tuerunt jura gentium moribus introduci. Eo vel “maxime, quod ea, quæ ad hoc jus pertinent, et
pauca sunt, et juri naturali valde propinqua et quæ “ facillimam habent ab illo deductionem adeoque “utilem et consentaneam ipsi naturæ ut licèt non sit “evidens deductio tanquam de se omnino necessaria “ ad honestatem morum, sit tamen valde conveniens “naturæ, et de se acceptibilis ab omnibus" (e).
The suggestion contained in the last Protocol to the Treaty of Paris, 1856, that Christian States should not go to war without previously attempting to adjust their dispute by arbitration, has remained a dead letter, except perhaps in the case of Luxemburg. The Belligerents in the French and Prussian war, and in the Russian and Turkish war, would not listen to the suggestions of such an arbitration; though Turkey, after the defeat of Plevna, made some proposition of the kind.
The writer of these pages is anxious to acknowledge the service which he has derived from the works of his own countrymen, and from those of the United States of North America and the Continent of Europe, in the compilation of these volumes. To the works
(e) Suarez de Leg., lib. ii. cap. xix. $ 9.
of Ward, of Manning, of Wheaton, and Story, he is under great obligations. To various writers on the European Continent, and especially to the learned Pfeiffer, his acknowledgments are also due. He also desires to draw attention to the Spanish works of Abreu and Pando, particularly of the latter; and to the following works, “ Die Geschichte und Literatur “ der Staatswissenschaften,” by R. von Mohl, Erlangen, 1855; an excellent essay by Mr. Hurd, an American jurist, on “ Topics of Jurisprudence con“nected with Conditions of Freedom and Bondage ;' a sketch by M. van Hogendorp, a Dutch jurist, of the Dutch School of Jurisprudence founded by Grotius some Pamphlets on Maritime International Law by Professor Würm of Hamburg ; “Fünf Briefe über “ die Fluss-Schifffahrt” u. s. w., Leipzig, 1858; new editions of Wheaton's " Elements of International “ Law," by Mr. Lawrence and by Mr. Dana, with ample notes; a new edition by Mr. Demangeat of the “ Droit international privé" by M. Fælix; Mancini, “ Della Nazionalità,” Torino, 1851 ; “The Law of
Nations,” by Sir. T. Twiss, 1863; an“Historical Ac. “count of the Neutrality of Great Britain during the “ American Civil War,” by M. Bernard, Chichele Professor of International Law at Oxford, 1870, a work worthy of its very learned author ; “ Inaugural “Lecture on Albericus Gentilis,” by Professor Holland, 1874; “ Discours prononcé, par M. Franck, au
collége de France dans la séance d'ouverture de son “cours, De Droit de Nature et des Gens," “ Journal “ des Débats,” Mardi, December 24, 1872 ; “ Alberico Gentili,” Speranza, Roma, 1876; “ The Papacy and “ International Law," by Ernest Nys, Docteur en Droit, translation by Rev. P. A. Lyons, London,