"in that career, as were in themselves sufficiently indicative "of the spirit in which we interposed. The conduct of the "Allies is inexplicable upon any other ground than that "which is here stated to have been its foundation. If the "intention of three of the greatest Powers in Europe, to put "an end to a manifest grievance, had not been controlled " and modified by many weighty considerations of justice. "and policy, they would have pursued a far different course. "They would not have waited six years before they carried "their interposition beyond the limit of amicable remon"strance; nor, having at length satisfied themselves that "they must advance somewhat further for the execution of "their design, would they have stipulated beforehand to pause upon every successive step, in order to give time for "reflection and concession on the part of a Power whom "they did not design to crush, or even to humble, but, if "possible, to lead into the path of safety and repose.

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"If they had not been restrained by such considerations, "they would at once have put forth a strength irresistible by far greater empires; they would have substituted "dictation, backed by force, for advice and remonstrance; "and they would not have asked the consent of those to "whom it was in their power to give law. But they felt, " as we still feel, that this was a case surrounded with diffi"culties, of which the mere physical resistance of the contu"macious party was the least. They knew that hasty and "violent measures might draw along with them evils worse "than those which they meant to remedy. They knew too "that the long continuance of extraordinary evils might " justify an extraordinary interposition. Still they felt that "they were bound to take care that the interposition should "not be more than commensurate with the evil; that it was "neither politic nor just to risk the overthrow of an empire "for the chance of improving the condition of a part of its subjects; and that the cessation of Piracy in the Levant "would be dearly purchased by a general war in Europe." The pacification of Greece and the Levant was the object

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of the Treaty of 1827, contracted between Russia, England, and France; the object of it was not "to construct a State capable of balancing the Turkish power in Europe, and of "carrying on the relations of peace and war upon a footing "of equality with the Porte; " this object, nevertheless, might, after the rejection by Turkey of the compromise proposed in that Treaty, have been partly intended and effected by the subsequent Treaty of May 7, 1832 (m). The distinction between Intervention and Mediation is pointed out in the happiest manner by Mr. Canning, in a passage of his state paper upon the Pacification of Greece at the close of the year 1824. "If" (he wrote) "the sovereignty of the "Turks were not to be absolutely restored, nor the inde"pendence of the Greek to be absolutely acknowledged (to propose either of which extremes would have been not to "mediate, but to take a decided part in the contest), there was necessarily no other choice than to qualify in some mode "and degree the sovereignty of the one and the indepen"dence of the other, and the mode and degree of that qua"lification seemed to constitute the question for inquiry "and deliberation" (n).

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CCCCII. This observation brings us to the consideration of the Fourth Limitation of the general principle which founds the Right of Intervention,-which is, the right of third Powers to watch over the preservation of the Balance of Power among existing States, whether by preventing the aggressions and conquests of any one Power, or by taking care that, out of the new order of things produced by internal revolutions, no existing Power acquires an aggrandisement that may menace the liberties of the rest of the world (0).

(m) Papers, p, 155.

(n) Reply of Mr. Secretary Canning to a letter of M. Radios, relative to the "Russian Memoir on the Pacification of Greece.”—Vol, xii. of State

Papers (1824-25), p. 900.

(0) Günther, i. 345.

Martens, s. 121, a, b.

This right, indeed, is the right of the State to do that which Cicero (p), with so much eloquent reason, truly maintained was the innate right of every individual: it is the Right of Self-Defence, which is as lawfully exercised in preventing as in repelling attack (9).

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How anxiously this right, "founded so much on common

sense and obvious reasoning," was asserted and cherished by the Greeks, is well known to all readers of Thucydides. and Xenophon, and above all of Demosthenes, whose eloquence was never more "resistless" (r) than when exerted

Ancillon über den Geist der Staatsverf. 320 u. s. w.

Klinkhammer's Disp. Hist. Pol. de Bello propter Success. Regni Hispan., &c. (1829, Amstelodami), pp. 52–66.

De Gardens, Traité complet de Dipl. t. i. p. 257.

Foreign Quarterly Review, vol. viii. (1831), vol. xiii. (1834). Mackintosh's second Review of Burke's Letter on a Regicide Peace. Ortolan, vol. ii., Du Domaine international (tit. iii., De l'Equilibre politique), contains, among other passages worthy of attentive perusal, an elaborate review of the projects of Henry IV. and Sully to found a République très-chrestienne, and thereby maintain a perpetual European equilibrium—an idea which M. Ortolan thinks pervaded the minds of the framers of the Treaty of Westphalia.-Gentz, Ausgewählte Schriften, iv. i. Fragmente aus der neuesten Geschichte des politischen Gleichgewichts.

Fénelon, Euvres de, t. iii. p. 361, ed. 1835: Examen de la Conscience sur les Devoirs de la Royauté, in which work, written for the instruction of the Duke of Burgundy, Mr. Wheaton remarks (Hist. p. 82) that the principles of Intervention to maintain the balance of power are laid down with accuracy and moderation.

Mably, vol. ii. pp. 88, 107, 212.

(p) Pro Milone.

(9) "Ainsi quand un Etat voisin est injustement attaqué par un ennemi puissant, qui menace de l'opprimer, il n'est pas douteux que vous ne deviez le faire. N'objectez point qu'il n'est pas permis à un souverain d'exposer la vie de ses soldats pour le salut d'un étranger, avec qui il n'aura contracté aucune alliance défensive, il peut lui-même se trouver dans le cas d'avoir besoin de secours; et, par conséquent, mettre en vigueur cet esprit d'assistance mutuelle, c'est travailler au salut de sa propre nation.”—Vattel, 1. ii. c. 1-4.

(r)

"Whose resistless eloquence Shook the arsenal, and fulmin'd over Greece

To Macedon and Artaxerxes' throne."

Milton, Par. Reg. iv. 268-271.

for the purpose of rousing his countrymen to adopt and act upon this principle (s).

In the history of Rome the opportunities for the development of this principle were fewer; but the pages of Livy and Polybius have recorded some remarkable instances of its operation. The reflection of the latter historian upon the conduct of Hiero, King of Syracuse, who, though an ally of Rome, sent aid to Carthage during the war of the Auxiliaries, may claim a place even in a modern work upon International Law. Hiero esteemed it necessary, Polybius tells us, "both "in order to retain his dominions in Sicily, and to preserve "the Roman friendship, that Carthage should be safe; lest by its fall the remaining Power should be able, without let "or hindrance, to execute every purpose and undertaking. "And here he acted with great wisdom and prudence, for "that is never on any account to be overlooked; nor ought "such a force ever to be thrown into one hand, as to incapa"citate the neighbouring States from defending their rights "against it."

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Most justly does Mr. Hume remark upon this passage, "Here is the aim of modern politics pointed out in express "terms" (t).

It was the natural tendency of the Feudal System, introduced into Europe after the fall of Rome, to restrain each State within its boundaries (u); and it may be said, that from the reign of Charlemagne to the invasion of Italy by

(8) Among the passages, see κατὰ Φιλ. Γ. ίε: Τοὺς ἄλλους ἤδη παρακαλῶμεν, καὶ τοὺς ταῦτα διδάξοντας ἐκπέμπωμεν πρέσβεις πανταχοί, εἰς Πελοπόννησον, εἰς Ῥόδον, εἰς Χίον, ὡς βασιλέα λέγω-οὐ δὲ γὰρ τῶν ἐκείνῳ συμφερόντων ἀφέστηκε τὸ μὴ τοῦτον ἐᾶσαι πάντα καταστρέ ψασθαιῖν ἐὰν μὲν πείσητε, κοινωνοὺς ἔχητε καὶ τῶν κινδύνων καὶ τῶν ἀναλωμάτων, κ.τ.λ.

(t) Polybius, 1. i. c. 83 : Τότε δὲ καὶ μᾶλλον ἐφιλοτιμεῖτο πεπεισμένος συμφέρειν ἑαυτῷ καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐν Σικελίᾳ δυναστείαν καὶ πρὸς τὴν Ῥωμαίων φιλίαν τὸ σώζεσθαι Καρχηδονίους, ἵνα μὴ παντάπασιν ἐξῇ τὸ προτεθὲν ἀκονιτὶ συντελεῖσθαι τοῖς ἰσχύουσιν, πάνυ φρονίμως καὶ νουνεχῶς λογιζόμενος, κ.τ.λ. Hume's Essays, vol. ii. p. 323, Essay vii. On the Balance of Power. 314-15, &c.

(u) See Koch, Tableau des Révolutions, t. i. pp.

Charles VIII. of France, towards the close of the fifteenth century, the state of the civilized world was not such as to call into any general operation this principle of International Law (r). To repel this invasion, the ingenious and refined Italians strove to induce the European Powers to adopt that policy of preventing the undue aggrandisement of any one. Power, by which they had for some time maintained the equilibrium of the petty States of their own Peninsula. During the century which followed (y), and from the time that the liberties of the German Protestants were secured, under the guarantee of France and Sweden, by the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, this principle of International Law has been rooted in the usage and practice of the whole civilized world. The preservation of the Balance of Power has been the professed object of all, and the real end of most of what may be called the Cardinal Treaties. The recital and analysis of the events which led to them belong to the history of the progress, rather than to a treatise on the principles, of International Jurisprudence. It will be sufficient for our present purpose to notice briefly those Treaties in which this feature is most conspicuous.

CCCCIII. In the year 1519 (z), enormous territorial possessions rendered the Emperor Charles V. more powerful than any sovereign who had existed in Christendom since the reign of Charlemagne ; a natural apprehension was felt by the other States of Europe, which the personal character of Charles was well calculated to foment (a). No better occasion could arise for the practical application of that refined and sagacious policy, which had so lately crossed the Alps. France took upon herself the task of adjusting the equilibrium of power in Europe; Francis I. actually concluded for this object a Treaty of Alliance with the Turks, the first Treaty contracted by an European Sovereign, and by which the Porte

(x) Koch, as to English conquests in France, t. i. p. 314.

(y) Wheaton's Hist. p. 81.

(z) Koch, i. 317.

(a) Ib. i. 318.

VOL. I.

PP